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ABSTRACT 

The thesis focuses on the impact of the EU Directive (2002/14/EC), which was 
incorporated into UK employment law, with its phased implementation starting on 6th 
April 2005. The empirical evidence is based on a survey and predominantly on case-
study research that involved interviews with: managers, employees and trade union 
representatives, together with the collection of relevant documentary evidence. The 
empirical findings, especially for the non-unionised sector, indicate that the reflexive 
nature of the Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) Regulations has 
mainly stimulated the development of organisation-specific or tailor-made 
information and consultation arrangements, which minimally comply with the 
legislative provisions. Moreover, the development of such arrangements is primarily 
based on the ad hoc momentum that is generated by business pressures (i.e. collective 
redundancies, transfer of undertakings etc) and can be viewed as reflecting the 
conceptual framework of legislatively prompted voluntarism. 
The ICE Directive is aimed at bringing a consistency to the establishment of basic and 
standard information and consultation arrangements across the workplaces in Great 
Britain. Subsequently, it should promote the harmonisation of employee participation 
practices amongst the UK and other EU countries, as it has the goal of ensuring that 
there is a minimum floor of rights in relation to information sharing and consultation 
with employees. Nevertheless, the Europeanisation of British industrial relations 
cannot instantly take place through the adoption of such EU directives. With regard to 
this research endeavour, it emerges that the extant national idiosyncrasies cannot be 
substantially altered, whilst business pressures and employers’ goodwill continue to 
be key drivers in the development of employee participation and consultation 
arrangements in Great Britain, albeit within the newly adopted legislative and 
statutory framework. 
Keywords: consultation, employee involvement and participation, EU Directive, 
industrial relations, information-sharing, trade unions. 
Total Number of Words of the ‘Main Report’ (Approximately): 89,225. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Research Topic
CHAPTER ONE 

INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH TOPIC 

1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Overview 
Employee participation is one of the key areas of EU employment policy that is 
regulated through directives and legal initiatives (Gold, 2009). One recent example is 
the implementation of the Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) 
Directive3 (European Commission, 2002; cited in Cressey, 2009: p. 151). This EU 
Directive (2002/14/EC) is described as an attempt to bring “harmony” to employee 
participation amongst EU member states, through the establishment of a general 
framework and floor of statutory rights for informing and consulting with employees 
(Broughton, 2002: p. 217). Various definitions of employee participation can be found 
in the academic literature. For instance, Dundon et al. (2003: p. 20) define it as: 
“… the extent to which employees are represented in organisational decision-making, 
and the mechanisms for this can be either direct (management deals directly with 
employees) or indirect (management deals with employee representatives). Techniques 
can include self-managed teams, joint consultative committees or negotiating 
bodies…”. 
Dundon and Wilkinson (2009: p. 407) suggest that employee involvement is 
connected with “managerial initiatives designed to elicit employee commitment”. 
Furthermore, Higgins and Croucher (2008: p. 327) point out that participation gives to 
the employees the chance to “influence and take part” in management decision-
making. Moreover, employee voice mechanisms are seen as being strongly tied to 
employee participation practices and can be broadly denoted as an “opportunity for 
employees to ‘have a say’ about matters that affect them at work” (Dundon et al., 
2003: p. 12). 
3 Hereinafter cited as ICE Directive. 
     1 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Research Topic
Across EU member states there are notable differences in “…histories, traditions, 
customs and practices…” (Broughton, 2005: p. 200) and these actually impede the 
implementation of “simple legislative devices” at the EU level (Cressey, 1993: p. 86), 
in relation to the issues of employee participation. Nevertheless, the ICE Directive is 
viewed as a EU employment policy that can potentially bring a convergence in 
employee participation practices amongst member states as soon as they put in place 
“a permanent and statutory framework for employee information and consultation” 
(Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009: p. 413). 
1.1.2 Consultation and Collective Voice of Employees in the UK 
In terms of joint consultation, the industrial relations system “…has a long and 
somewhat checkered history in Britain…” (Marchington and Armstrong, 1986: p. 
158). For instance: 
“…the most normal method of conducting consultation was through works councils. 
Large scale development dated from the first world war and the impetus given by the 
Whitley Committee reports in 1917 and 1918. The councils are not required by law and 
have been founded normally as a result of a management initiative but sometimes as a 
result of a trade union or employees’ initiative, or even of a collective agreement…” 
(Bulletin of the European Communities, 1975: p. 95). 
During the 1940s, joint consultation constituted a substantial part of employee voice 
with regard to UK workplaces (Clegg, 1979). However, during the 1950s and 1960s it 
significantly declined (Brannen, 1983) and this was attributed to the resurgence of 
joint negotiating committees (Clegg, 1970; cited in Brown and Nash, 2008: p. 101). 
From the beginning of 1970s onwards this tendency was reversed, with there being a 
notable revitalisation in terms of the numbers of joint consultation committees (JCCs) 
(Marchington and Armstrong, 1986; Brown, 1981). 
According to the available empirical evidence, this revitalisation or resurgence can be 
mainly attributed to the fact that employers supported the idea of establishing 
“voluntary consultation bodies” (Brannen, 1983: p. 63) and in this regard 
management promoted the “concept of industrial democracy and [employee] 
participation…as a response to the threat of legislation” (Cressey et al., 1981: p. 54). 
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It is argued that on some occasions these councils were a result of trade union or 
employee initiatives based in some instances on collective agreements4 and this 
particularly became evident from the beginning of 1970s onwards (Gordon-Brown, 
1972). More specifically: 
“Shop stewards, normally elected by union members in particular establishments under 
systems of varying formality, have played an important part in this development [i.e. 
single channel for consultation and negotiation]. The merger of the machinery of 
consultation and negotiation is often a significant aspect of ‘joint regulation’ which 
was discussed in connection with the collective bargaining. The ability of management 
to take decisions unilaterally has in some sectors been substantially reduced by this 
kind of development…” (Bulletin of the European Communities, 1975: p. 96). 
Furthermore, between the mid 1980s and the end of 1990s there was a substantial 
decline in indirect forms of participation and collective voice, especially in the form 
of JCCs, coupled with an increase in the direct forms of communication between 
management and employees (Millward et al., 2000: p. 109; cited in Blyton and 
Turnbull, 2004: p. 265). This decline in collective voice in the UK continued 
thereafter, but to a lesser extent, with the most recent Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS 2004) providing further evidence of this trend (Kersley et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, there was also an increase in information-sharing up until the 
end of 1990s, with “a levelling off thereafter” (Peccei et al., 2007: p. 4). In general, 
consultation has not declined as much as collective bargaining and in fact there are 
some indications that it has started to increase slowly in the private sector (Gospel and 
Willman, 2003). In this regard, other recent surveys have shown that the previously 
negative trend is now in reverse (CBI, 2006; IRS, 2005; LRD, 2006; cited in Hall et 
al., 2007: p. 7), especially in relation to UK multinational companies (Edwards et al., 
2007). 
According to other recent empirical evidence, since the end of 1990s there has also 
been a consistent strengthening in the forms of collective representation through trade 
union forums and JCCs or works councils (cited in Brewster et al., 2007b: pp. 1254-
4 Bulletin of the European Communities (1975) Employee Participation and Company Structure in the 
European Community, (Supplement 8/75), European Communities Commission – p. 96.   
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1259). Overall, it appears that in unionised workplaces “permanent consultation 
mechanisms” are quite evident and cover a range of issues, but they are kept separate 
from “negotiating forums” (Torrington et al., 2005: p. 482). More specifically:  
“…in Britain, voluntary collective bargaining and voluntary joint consultation have 
traditionally been seen as separate and complementary processes, with collective 
bargaining focusing on the divergent interests of employers and employees and 
consultation focusing on their common interests… in many cases, collective bargaining 
has been concerned with pay determination and conditions of employment and joint 
consultation with welfare, health and safety, training and efficiency…” (Farnham, 
2000: pp. 81-82; cited in Torrington et al., 2005: p. 482). 
In general, single channels of representation through the unions appear to be the most 
common form of employee voice in the UK, but sometimes these are supplemented 
by joint representation bodies or JCCs. In addition, statutory or collective agreements 
are often simultaneously evident as forms of employee representation. 
Moreover, influence, recognition and membership of the trade unions steadily 
declined during the 1980s and 1990s (Millward et al., 2000) which can be 
predominantly attributed to the “…legal abstention…under the Conservative 
governments (1979-1997)…” (Perrett, 2007: p. 620), but this tendency became less 
evident after the end of 1990s (Grainger and Holt, 2005), especially after the election 
of the Labour government in 1997.  According to WERS, from 1984 to 1998, over 80 
per cent of workplaces were reported to have “two-way forms of communication 
between employers and employees”, whilst hybrid forms of union and non-union 
voice mechanisms were widely expanding during this period as well (Willman et al., 
2007: p. 1321). In addition, analysis of the WERS shows that the decline of trade 
unions was much smaller between 1998 and 2004.  
Nonetheless, as yet, the proportion of workplaces with forms of employee 
representation continues to fall and the volume of collective bargaining is still 
shrinking (cited in Kersley et al., 2006: p. 143). Similarly, analysis of the WERS 
suggests that there has been an ongoing “decline in collective voice and thus an 
increase in workplaces with no-voice arrangements” (Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 
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2005: p. 28). Furthermore, Brown and Nash (2008) use the findings of WERS 
1998/2004 and point out that “… workplace-level consultative committees, which had 
been present at 20% of workplaces in 1998, were reported in only 14% in 2004…” (p. 
102). However, the “decline” of JCCs is much less evident in unionised workplaces 
(Gospel and Willman, 2005: p. 131), with these being “twice as common” in 
unionised than in non-unionised workplaces (cited in Millward et al., 2000: pp. 108-
109) and these tend to be evident “in parallel with collective bargaining machinery” 
(Torrington et al., 2005: p. 483). In particular, according to Kersley et al. (2006): 
“…there had been a decline in the incidence of consultative committees at workplace 
level since 1998, when one-fifth of establishments had such arrangements for 
consulting their staff. The decline was primarily evident among workplaces with less 
than 100 employees, where the percentage of workplaces with on-site committees fell 
from 17% in 1998 to 10% in 2004. Among workplaces with 100 or more employees, the 
incidence remained stable (56% in 1998, compared with 54% in 2004). The decline 
was also concentrated within workplaces that did not recognise trade unions, where the 
incidence of a workplace-level consultative committee fell from 14% in 1998 to 8% in 
2004. Among workplaces that did recognize unions, the proportion with a workplace-
level committee remained unchanged (32% in 1998; 29% in 2004)…” (pp. 126-127).  
Furthermore, the use of direct forms of communication in UK workplaces remains 
prevalent, whilst there is also a “…growth of direct voice arrangements…” (Gospel 
and Willman, 2005: p. 132). Overall, empirical findings from the analysis of the 
WERS for 2004 indicate that the “…proportion of workplaces with consultative 
committees…” has not changed significantly, but that “…the previous downward 
trend had continued…” (Carley and Hall, 2008: p. 29). On the other hand, some 
academics anticipate that this downward trend will be potentially reversed and 
collective voice mechanisms, especially JCCs, will hopefully increase and be 
enhanced in future years (Dietz and Fortin, 2007), along with multi-channel 
representation (Gospel and Willman, 2005). In particular, according to an IDS survey 
(2005) forms of consultation increased from 49 to 68 per cent (two years before the 
enactment of the legislation) and this has been attributed to the imminent 
implementation of the ICE Directive on employee consultation (cited in Cressey, 
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2009: pp. 154-155). However, Hall (2006) has expressed reservations about this 
optimism. 
1.1.3 Future Potential Prospects of Information and Consultation Arrangements 
in the UK 
In general, empirical evidence from British workplaces indicates that consultation and 
also negotiation arrangements tend to prosper best in the unionised sector, where well-
structured and effective forms of employee representation are more likely to have 
evolved (Charlwood and Terry, 2007). In addition, there is a strong belief that “in the 
shadow of the law” the mechanisms of information-sharing and consultation will 
become more widespread (in both union and non-unionised workplaces) through the 
transposition of the EU directives into the UK domestic legislation on employee 
participation (Peccei et al., 2008: p. 346). For instance, the recent ICE Directive 
(2002/14/EC), which is also known as the Information and Consultation of Employees 
(ICE) Regulations 20045, was initially implemented in April 2005 for the first 
threshold of organisations with at least 150 employees, becoming fully operational in 
the UK in April 2008, thus now providing a legislative framework for informing and 
consulting employees about general enterprise issues and business decisions for 
organisations with at least 50 employees (an overview of the legislation is provided in 
section 2.3.1). Nonetheless, Hall (2006) has expressed strong scepticism about the 
likely impact of this legislation and other academics have argued that “apathy” from 
employers and employees may subsequently lead to nothing more than “a little 
change” (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007a: p. 1137). 
For Bulgaria, the Republic of Cyprus, Malta, Poland, the Republic of Ireland, 
Romania and the UK, the adoption of the ICE Directive establishes, for the first time, 
“a general statutory system of information and consultation” (Carley and Hall, 2008: 
p. 8). In this regard, hitherto consultation arrangements in the UK have been flexibly 
designed and primarily implemented for various reasons that range from what could 
be termed unforeseen business pressures (such as: collective redundancies, transfer of 
undertakings etc) to “routine activity” (Gollan and Perkins, 2007: p. 94) and thus 
5 Hereinafter cited as ICE Regulations. 
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have continued to be seen as “soft law” mechanisms (Doherty, 2008: p. 610). That is, 
in general, such EU directives have been: 
“…binding but require appropriate legislation from each member state within a set 
period of time to comply with the objectives of the directive. These are formulated in 
broad terms, allowing member states flexibility to interpret specific provisions…” 
(Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005: p. 51).  
As a consequence, prior to the implementation of the ICE Regulations JCCs operated 
within a weak or absent legislative framework, with their development predominantly 
originating from the unilateral initiatives of employers and managers on a voluntary 
basis. Similar forms of employee representation in other EU countries, such as works 
councils in: Germany, Austria, Benelux and the Nordic countries, have operated for 
many years within a much more legally comprehensive and binding industrial 
relations context, where consultation and codetermination rights are strongly tied to 
employee voice mechanisms.  
To date, the features of voluntarism have strongly characterised British industrial 
relations, with there being a widespread belief that the: state, government and 
employment law should not intervene in employment related issues, such as: 
collective bargaining, employee participation and trade union organisation. However, 
the recent implementation of the ICE Regulations challenges the non-regulatory 
nature of British industrial relations with regard to employee participation. In 
particular in this regard, the ICE Directive provides, for a first time, a general 
statutory framework in which employers must share information and consult with 
their employees over a wide scope of organisational and employment issues, once 
either the employers/managers voluntarily choose to introduce the establishment of 
consultation mechanisms or employees vote to request the implementation of such 
mechanisms.  
In relation to employee rights, a number of academics have expressed the belief 
(Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007) that such EU directives, which constitute an important 
parameter of the “European social agenda” (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: p. 253), 
could potentially radically change the context of employment participation in Great 
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Britain. For instance, Benson (2009: p. 117) suggests that “…for the foreseeable 
future… European law is likely to continue to exert a significant impact on UK 
employment law and practice in a variety of ways…”. In sum, the flexible provisions 
contained in the ICE Regulations allow for a range of options with regard to: 
management, individual employees and trade union representatives. Thus, it remains 
to be seen the extent to which these provisions can assist in the development of 
employee representation structures in UK workplaces and the subsequent impact this 
could have on British industrial relations.    
1.2 Focus of the Research 
1.2.1 Other Surveys and Research Projects 
The introduction of the ICE Directive (2002/14/EC) into British employment law has 
led to a vigorous debate amongst academics and practitioners about its likely impact 
and outcomes. Hitherto, relatively limited empirical evidence has been available and 
at the time of empirical research carried out for this study the most recent surveys, 
such as: IRS (2005), CBI (2006) and LRD (2006), could provide only tentative and 
interim findings. Even the relatively recent WERS (2004) can only give hints about 
the likely prospects of the ICE Regulations, as the data were collected before the 
official transposition of the ICE Directive. The first most notable and comprehensive 
research on the matter was published by Hall et al. (2007) and it provisionally 
evaluates the responses of certain organisations. In particular, this project involved 
interviews and employee surveys for thirteen case-study organisations with at least 
150 employees. A subsequent report was published for the second part of the project 
one year later (Hall et al., 2008), covering eight case-study organisations with at least 
100 employees. Furthermore, a published report in December 2009 (Hall et al., 
2009b) provides additional evidence with regard to four case-study organisations with 
the lowest threshold covered by the legislation, that of at least 50 employees. 
1.2.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
The purpose of the thesis is to widen the current limited scope of empirical findings in 
relation to the potential impact upon employee participation and industrial relations in 
Great Britain, brought about by the implementation of the ICE Directive 
(2002/14/EC). It must be noted that the research endeavour involves case-study 
     8 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Research Topic
organisations, where the minimal threshold of employees is set at 150, as assigned for 
the first stage of the phased implementation of the legislation.  
The empirical fieldwork was initiated with the conducting of a survey in January 
2006. 500 organisations were included in the selected sample, which was acquired 
from the ACAS database. 74 organisations responded and provided details about: 
their direct and indirect employee voice mechanisms, the content of their current 
information and consultation arrangements, and their potential responses after the 
transposition of the ICE Directive. Moreover, ten organisations provided contact 
details with the purpose of possibly participating in the research as case-studies and 
finally, four of these were selected for in-depth research. One-to-one interviews (with 
managers, individual employees and trade union representatives), visits, non-
participant observation of council meetings and collection of documentation (or other 
relevant data) for each of the case-study organisations took place, in order to make an 
in-depth evaluation of their information and consultation arrangements and to assess 
the changes or modifications in their employee representation structures as a result of 
the implementation of the ICE Directive. The first visit to one of the case-study 
organisations took place in March 2006, whereas the last one-to-one interview was 
conducted in December 2006 and contact with all of the organisations concerned was 
maintained until January 2008. 
Overall, the main objectives of the research include: 
•	 To review the debate and address the arguments, as set out in the available 
literature, regarding the transposition and implementation of the ICE Directive 
into the UK’s employment law. Various dimensions are taken into 
consideration, such as: the impact of EU legislation on employee involvement 
and participation, the European social model and dimension, outline of the 
ICE Directive, strategies and opportunities for managers and employees in 
relation to the provisions of the legislation, debates amongst the social partners 
and an overview of the concept of legislatively prompted voluntarism6 as a 
potential framework for understanding future implementation of the ICE 
Regulations. 
6 Coherent description regarding the concept of legislatively prompted voluntarism is provided in 
section 2.3.7. 
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•	 To assess and evaluate the initial responses of organisations as a result of the 
implementation of the ICE Regulations. 
•	 To focus on the benefits and problems of implementing information and 
consultation arrangements through analysis of the four case-study 
organisations. 
•	 To address critically the changes or modifications in information and 
consultation arrangements within the four selected case-study organisations. 
•	 To pinpoint the: perceptions, approaches, strategies and opportunities for 
management, individual employees and trade union representatives, in relation 
to the statutory provisions of the ICE Regulations. 
•	 To predict the likely: limitations, prospects, challenges, opportunities and 
potential outcomes from the implementation of the ICE Regulations. 
•	 To assess the extent to which the ICE Regulations are able to challenge British 
voluntarism in relation to information and consultation arrangements.  
Consequently, the main research questions that emerge are: 
•	 In relation to changes and modifications as a result of the adoption of the ICE 
Regulations: what are the strategies and opportunities that have been adopted 
by the managers, individual employees and trade union representatives in the 
case-studies? 
•	 To what extent can the information and consultation arrangements help the 
trade union and employee representatives to influence management 
prerogative and decision-making? 
•	 Do the case-studies illustrate examples of true-consultation or pseudo-
consultation? 
•	 Does the concept of legislative prompted voluntarism offer the most 
appropriate framework for understanding the implementation and potential 
implications of the ICE Regulations? 
•	 Can the ICE Regulations strengthen industrial democracy and employee voice 
mechanisms? 
•	 Are the ICE Regulations contributing towards harmonisation in the context of 
British industrial relations and EU employment policy? 
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CHAPTER TWO 

LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Outline of EU Legislation on Employee Involvement and 
Participation 
2.1.1 European Social Model and Dimension 
The development of EU employment regulation has strong roots in the past and as 
Gold (2009: p. 10) points out, its “first stage” can be identified as starting in 1958. 
Furthermore, the relatively recent dialogue about the “genesis” of the European 
Company Statute (ECS) model and all the initiatives taken for the establishment of 
basic rights of employee participation and representation, at board level, originated in 
1959 (Gold and Schwimbersky, 2008: p. 48). 
Since the enactment of the first Social Action Programme (1974), there has been 
widespread interest, within the European Community in establishing and developing 
“legislative support for the participation of workers in decision-making” (Ewing and 
Truter, 2005: p. 626). Other examples of analogous initiatives include the provisions 
of Collective Redundancies (1975) and Transfer of Undertakings (Acquired Rights) 
(1977) (cited in Shackleton, 1996: pp. 13-16). The aforementioned initiatives are 
included within the sphere of “the social dimension”, which is classified as one of the 
European dimensions together with the economic and political (Sisson, 2005: p. 49). 
“The social dimension” (Gold, 2009: p. 6) includes a number of parameters, such as: 
the rulings from the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the provisions of the Social 
Charter, and most importantly for this research, the implementation of directives or 
legal initiatives that cover a range of employee rights, including employee 
participation in the workplace. Issues that are relevant to employee representation and 
the wider context of industrial relations are included in the European social model, 
and therefore, the concepts of model and dimension are interrelated when it comes to 
issues regarding employee participation. 
     11 
Chapter 2: Literature Review
During the 1980s, the European Commission emphasised that “strong and capable 
social partners” in conjunction with “social dialogue” are the necessary prerequisites 
for the effective “harmonisation of employment and working conditions” (EC, 1988: 
pp. 88-89), which could be attained through the transposition and implementation of 
EU directives across the community (cited in Gold et al., 2007: pp. 8-10). As a result, 
in particular, the commission introduced significant initiatives related to employee 
involvement practices, and more specifically, about information and consultation 
rights. 
For instance, the Vredeling proposals were viewed as an impetus for further growth 
and development of social dialogue at the European level (Weston and Martinez-
Lucio, 1997: p. 764). These proposals took the form of a draft directive (1983), which 
is known also as the Vredeling Directive, named after the Dutch commissioner 
(Hendrikus – or Henk – Vredeling), who was responsible for social affairs at the EU 
level. It included, in particular, the employee rights of information-sharing and 
consultation, but mainly covered multinational organisations “with complex 
structures” (Gold, 2009: p.14). Other examples of similar initiatives taken by the 
European Commission include the: Fifth (Draft) Directive (1983) and the Health and 
Safety Framework Directive (1989) (cited in Shackleton, 1996: pp. 13-16).  
Moreover, the European Council adopted the Social Charter (1989), but initially this 
was without the support of the UK government. The Maastricht Treaty (formally 
signed in February 1992) enhanced further “the role of both social dialogue and 
qualified majority voting (QMV) through an agreement on social policy and social 
protocol” with an initial opt-out for the UK (Gold, 2009: p. 5). Afterwards, the 
“scope of EU social policy” was significantly broadened through the Treaty of the 
EU (1993) and “its incorporation into” the Treaty of Amsterdam, through Article 136 
in 1997 (Gennard and Judge, 2002; cited in Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005a: p. 
51). In particular, Article 20 of the Social Charter included the statutory right of 
workers for information-sharing and consultation, and in general terms the notion of 
employee participation. Moreover, Sisson (2005: p. 49) citing Rhodes (1997: pp. 69-
70) points out the importance of the social dimension, by highlighting the fact that 
some of the key areas of EU social policy include “… regulatory policies for the 
labour market embracing workers’ rights, the promotion of social dialogue and 
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collective bargaining…” (quoted in Sisson, 2005: p. 49). Furthermore, Marginson and 
Sisson (2006: p. 37) describe this dimension as “social policy competence” that in 
practical terms involves the context of the “industrial relations system” and issues 
relevant to the “development of human resources” at the EU level. 
All the aforementioned developments do not exist in a vacuum, but rather they have 
emerged within the wider context of the European social model or social Europe that 
is defined by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)7 as: 
“…a vision of society that combines sustainable economic growth with ever-improving 
living and working conditions. This implies full employment, good quality jobs, equal 
opportunities, social protection for all, social inclusion, and involving citizens in the 
decisions that affect them. In the ETUC’s view, social dialogue, collective bargaining 
and workers’ protection are crucial factors in promoting innovation, productivity and 
competitiveness…”. 
Similarly, the main parameters and principles of the European social model involve: 
“… the importance of collective bargaining and institutionalised dialogue in the 
workplace; a role for the state as the guarantor of social cohesion…” (cited in Milner, 
2005: p. 108).  
Furthermore, Milner (2005: p. 107) refers to the definition by Grahl and Teague 
(1997: p. 405), in which the European social model is considered to be “…a specific 
combination of strongly institutionalised and politicised forms of industrial 
relations…”. In addition, according to Article 136 of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), 
some of the aims of European social policy include: “…the promotion of 
employment…improved living and working conditions…dialogue between 
management and labour…” (cited in Sisson, 2005: p. 49). Moreover, also along these 
lines the European social model is identified as promoting the following contextual 
characteristics: 
7 Further details are provided on the website of the European Trade Union Confederation 
(http://www.etuc.org/a/111). 
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“… trade unions were accepted as legitimate social partners; the collective regulation 
of employment relations strongly influenced individual employment contracts; and a 
general framework for employee representatives was supported by legislation or 
agreements between federations of trade unions and employers…” (Tailby and 
Winchester, 2005: p. 431). 
In general, the distinctive route of the UK in comparison with the European social 
model, especially during the 1990s, has been emphasised by Milner (2005) as follows: 
“In the 1990s, discussion of the European social model took place in the context of 
fierce debates about employment policy, particularly the merits of US- and UK-style 
labour market deregulation, given these countries’ better job creation record…” (p. 
108). 
Furthermore, Dundon and Wilkinson (2009: p. 407) suggest that the European 
Commission strongly favours the development of an “indirect route to employee 
participation”. In general, it is claimed there has been notable “progress in relation 
to EU-level social dialogue” during the last ten years (Casey and Gold, 2000: p. 118). 
However, the enforceability and relative influence of EU level agreements have 
proved to be problematic over that period as the “legal regimes and compliance 
systems vary widely across the member states” (Casey and Gold, 2000: p. 119). The 
UK, in particular, along with the Republic of Ireland, provide good examples of non-
compliance, with the context of employment relations being characterised as a 
“voluntary, decentralised, [and] conflict-based system” (Williams, 1988: p. v) and 
the labour markets in both countries being less regulated than in other EU countries 
such as: Germany, Sweden and Austria. For instance, the UK and Ireland were against 
the introduction of the ECS model, because it was considered to be “inappropriate to 
their own domestic conditions” (Goulding, 2004; cited in Gold and Schwimbersky, 
2008: p. 51) and similar strong scepticism was expressed in relation to the ICE 
Directive (Cressey, 2009; Carley and Hall, 2008). Moreover, the transposition of such 
EU directives on employee participation initiated debates amongst the social partners 
in these countries. In particular, Milner (2001) points out that the “UK labour market 
is lightly regulated” (p. 331) and Sisson (2005: p. 46) contends that “social 
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partnership arrangements” are much weaker in the UK compared with other EU 
countries. 
2.1.2 The Influence of EU Directives and Regulations on British Industrial 
Relations 
Overall, the context of industrial relations in Britain is now characterised as strongly 
decentralised, with low levels of collective bargaining coverage (Lorber 2006) and 
highly evident “adversarial” features (Beaumont, 1991: p. 232; Edwards, 1992: p. 
361; cited in Provis, 1996: p. 475). Furthermore, the different context of employment 
relations in Great Britain compared to other European countries is attributed to the 
“deeply contrasting attitudes towards both European integration and social policy” 
(Gold, 1992: p. 102). In this regard, there was strong opposition by the UK 
government against the initiatives taken by the EC, especially against the directives of 
Vredeling and the Fifth Draft on Public Companies. Consequently, the context of the 
British industrial relations system was not significantly changed as a result of these 
legislative actions. This led many academics to highlight the opposition of the UK 
government to the aforementioned EU legislative proposals, especially in relation to 
European social policy issues (as assigned through the Maastricht Treaty in February 
1992). In addition, they point out the variant features of British industrial relations in 
comparison with other countries or social partners in the European Union. For 
instance, it is argued that: 
“…the UK opposes what it sees as the imposition of further regulation of labour 
markets governing areas like working time, maternity rights and participation. Its 
partners, however, reflecting more regulatory traditions, could not envisage the 
creation of a single European market without a ‘social dimension’ to protect employees 
exposed to increased competitive pressures… the UK position, which involves a series 
of legal and political uncertainties, does not seem to set a convincing precedent…” 
(Gold, 1992: p. 102). 
In addition, a published report in 1996 refers to the official position of the UK 
government and its opposition to the EU directives on employee participation, which 
was described as showing signs of “the pre ‘opt-out’ fight against the European 
Works Council Directive” (Wild, 1996: pp. 15-16) that would subsequently ensue. 
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That is, this report illustrates the strong and rigid opposition of the UK government 
against the establishment of statutory provisions and legislative frameworks. In 
particular, it states: 
“Successful employee involvement in Britain is best developed on the basis of voluntary 
agreement. It depends on a spirit of cooperation, not on legal requirements. You cannot 
force people by law to cooperate with one another. It has got to be suited to the specific 
circumstances of the particular firm and its employees. There is no master plan which 
meets every firm’s needs. That is why the [UK] government has consistently opposed 
pressure for legislation which would impose rigid requirements in place of flexibility 
and diversity” (Wild, 1996: p. 15; originally published in HMSO, 19898). 
From the beginning of 1970s until the end of 1990s, within the context of the 
European Community, substantial legal requirements about informing and consulting 
employees were transposed into EU countries’ jurisdiction. However, they were 
developed “in a somewhat piecemeal fashion” (DTI 2002, p. 24) and strictly 
constrained to specific areas, such as: collective redundancies, transfer of 
undertakings, health and safety, and occupational pensions (DTI 2002; Hall, 2005b). 
More specifically, Marginson and Sisson (2006) suggest that: 
“…in Ireland and the UK, workplace representatives only began to gain legal rights to 
information and consultation with accession to the EU and the passage of the directives 
on collective redundancies (1975), transfers of undertakings (1977), working time 
(1993)…” (p. 48). 
In September 1994, all member states of the EU, with the exception of the UK 
government that demonstrated its strong opposition, agreed to follow the proposition 
from the European Commission concerning:  
“…the objectives of a single market to provide for the disclosure of information and for 
consultation of workers on key decisions and issues of a European-wide nature which 
significantly affect workers’ interests… the means of achieving this is best done 
8 HMSO (1989) People and Companies: Employee Involvement in Britain, UK Government 
Publication. 
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through flexible structures adapted to the needs of the individual companies…” 
(O’Kelly, 1995: p. 85). 
The statutory enforcement of these employee rights through the aforementioned EU 
directives resulted in the establishment of the Social Protocol between eleven states 
under Maastricht agreement, with the UK exercising its opt-out from the process. In 
this regard, Sako (1998) argues that the continued absence of a consistent legislative 
framework for employee representation in the UK acted against the pluralist 
establishment of employee participation practices, because a strong reliance upon 
“employers’ goodwill” is still evident (p. 12). Moreover, many of the measures 
included in the “Social Action Programme” (such as: the EU directives on 
employment issues) were not adopted and implemented by the UK until 1997 (cited in 
Gold, 2009: p. 19). This led to the situation that “the UK was increasingly ‘out of 
step’ with the rest of Europe with respect to employee rights…” (Blyton and Turnbull, 
2004: p. 194). Furthermore, during the 1990s, Gold (1993) described the context of 
British industrial relations as a system where “…the role of the state is limited and 
there is little legislation conferring basic rights. Abstention from regulation of labour 
markets is the tradition…” (p. 17). 
In sum, at the time the UK was the only EU member state that was not covered by the 
aforementioned directives and legislative proposals, as assigned in the “Social 
Chapter [of] Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference” (Wild, 1996: p. 47), because 
it initially “opted-out” from the provisions of the Maastricht agreement (Gold and 
Hall, 1994: p. 177; cited in Gold et al., 2000: p. 275). In other words, the different 
approach of the UK government signalled a notable political divergence in 
comparison with other countries, in particular Germany and the Nordic countries, who 
supported “greater regulation of employment and social affairs at EU level” (Casey 
and Gold, 2000: p. 111). This divergence led to the Maastricht Social Policy Protocol 
being signed by all EU member states, with the exception of the UK and thus resulted 
in a “two-speed social Europe” (Gold, 2009: p. 19). Nonetheless, this protocol did 
stimulate some activity by “UK-based multinationals” (Hall, 1992: p. 547). 
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2.1.3 The Signing of the Social Chapter by the UK Government (1997) 
In the beginning of 1990s, the Conservative government opposed the imposition of 
employee statutory rights on workers’ participation and instead supported the 
development of “best suited” arrangements for companies (Ackers et al., 1992: p. 
272). However, an important ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (in 1994) 
against the UK necessitated “…the obligation of employers to consult with employee 
representatives… in organisations with or without recognised trade unions…” 
(Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 443). More specifically, this referred to cases where 
the consultation process involved specific business-issues, such as: collective 
redundancies and transfer of undertakings, and the outcome of this ruling was viewed 
as one of the first steps to “harmonise the UK legislative framework with EU 
requirements on employment policy and basic employee rights” (Casey and Gold, 
2000: p. 104). 
In addition, in 1997 the Labour government signed the Social Chapter for the UK that 
involves a wide floor of rights and that includes amongst other issues“… the 
protection of employees’ rights in the event of a transfer of an undertaking…the 
introduction of information and consultation machinery for a variety of situations… 
participation for workers, and health and safety at the workplace…” (Marchington 
and Wilkinson, 2005a: pp. 51-53). This formally came into force in May 1999 when 
the Amsterdam treaty was signed and this officially signalled the end of the UK’s opt-
out from the Social Chapter. After the UK’s signing up to the Social Chapter, 
employees were given the statutory right to elect representatives and be consulted for 
redundancies and transfer of undertakings, in both union and non-union workplaces. 
That is, this development “… ended the UK opt-out from the ‘Social Protocol’ … thus 
limiting its capacity to resist new EU-initiated employment rights…” (Tailby and 
Winchester, 2005: p. 433). 
The decision by the UK government to “opt-into the agreement on social policy” 
(Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005a: p. 51) subsequently led to the adoption of EU 
directives on employee participation and the establishment of a “works council-style 
system in UK domestic organisations” (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: p. 264). It is also 
argued that these developments have been stimulating the Europeanisation of 
employment relations in Great Britain and the establishment of “a universal right to 
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representation” with further “opportunities for unions” (Marchington and Wilkinson, 
2005a: p. 292). 
For instance, in relation to information and consultation on health and safety, acquired 
rights and collective redundancies issues, Wild (1996) argues that: 
“the UK government, in particular, has had to amend its original implanting 
provisions for both collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings to ensure 
compliance with these directives following successful challenges at the European Court 
of Justice… The UK government approach of guaranteeing information and 
consultation on an individual basis in the absence of trade union recognition was found 
to be unsatisfactory. With effect from 1 March 1996, companies have had to ensure 
consultation through elected employee representatives if this is so desired by the 
employees affected by a decision” (p. 46). 
More specifically, Cressey (2009) argues that the Labour government was strongly 
hostile towards “any proposal that would cut across existing practices and harm the 
traditional format of employee relations in the UK” (p. 153). However, when the 
UK’s opposition was finally undermined the government was forced to launch the 
introduction of “a minimum level” of “specific rights” for employee participation, 
including the establishment of a general framework for information and consultation 
(Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: p. 194). Nonetheless, these authors argue that these 
developments can be hardly described as a “fundamental shift”, because the adopted 
approach regarding employment relations, by the UK governments, did not entail a 
significant “legislative reform” (ibid). 
Nevertheless, as a result of the rulings of the ECJ and the signing of Social Chapter, 
the UK Labour government was forced to be more adjacent in relation to EU social 
policy. That is, this brought significant changes to the area of employment relations, 
which were stimulated by the legislative requirements of the EU directives contained 
within the chapter. Moreover, this had the purpose of providing a comprehensive 
statutory framework for employee participation through more sustainable works 
councils. In sum, it is important to note that even though the Labour government 
strenuously resisted the ICE Directive (EWCB, 2002), the two key ECJ cases 
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(C382/92 and C383/92) provided the basis for this legislation to have to be eventually 
adopted by the UK. In particular, according to Hall (2005b: p. 105): 
“…the ECJ ruled in 1994 that the UK was in breach of the collective redundancies and 
transfer of undertakings directives by failing to provide for the designation of employee 
representatives for the purposes of the consultation required by the directives where an 
employer did not recognise unions9. Thus, for the purposes of implementing EU 
consultation requirements, the ECJ overturned UK law’s traditional reliance on 
recognised trade unions as the ‘single channel’ of employee representation. The UK 
therefore had to introduce supplementary statutory employee representation 
mechanisms to apply the directives in the absence of union recognition…”.  
The aforementioned changes have necessarily resulted in UK workplaces being more 
sympathetic and flexible towards employee representation (Ackers et al., 2005; 
Davies and Kilpatrick, 2004). Moreover, the election of the Labour government and 
the signing of the Social Chapter provided a strong impetus for legislative changes 
and alterations in accordance with the Social Action Programme - as agreed in the 
Maastricht Treaty (cited in Cressey, 1998: p. 78). Furthermore, the Fairness at Work 
programme (DTI, 1998b) provided the impetus for the long-term promotion of 
partnership amongst all social actors (Lourie, 1998; Undy, 1999; Wood and Godard, 
1999; cited in Bacon and Storey, 2000: p. 407). More specifically, these alterations 
included the: Statutory Consultation Requirements for Redundancies and Transfer of 
Undertakings10, Government’s Statutory Trade Union Recognition (under the 
Employment Relations Act 1999)11, Directive on European Works Councils (EWCs) 
(1999)12, and more recently, the implementation of the Information and Consultation 
of Employees (ICE) Regulations (2005)13. 
9 Davies, P. (1994) “A Challenge to Single Channel?”, Cases: C-382/92 and C-383/93, Commission v

United Kingdom, Industrial Law Journal, 23 (3), pp. 272-285.  

10 Department of Trade and Industry (1996), Redundancy Consultation and Notification, PL 833 (rev

3);

Department of Trade and Industry (1998a), Employees’ Information and Consultation Rights on 

Transfers of Undertakings and Collective Redundancies, Public Consultation Document URN 97/988. 

11 The statutory trade union recognition provisions of the Employment Relations Act 1999 
(UK9903189F) were brought into effect by the Government on 6 June 2000.  
12 The Council Directive (94/45/EC – 22 September 1994) was adopted under the Social Chapter of the 
Maastricht Treaty, and was required to be implemented by the UK by 15 December 1999 
(‘Implementation in the UK of the European Works Council Directive – A Consultative Document, 
July 1999, URN 99/926). 
13 EU Directive: 2002/14/EC. 
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2.1.4 Debate and Implications about EU Directives and Regulations 
The ICE Regulations involved the transposition of the European Directive (i.e. the 
ICE Directive) on the Information and Consultation of Employees into UK law in 
2005 (Houses of Parliament, 2004; cited in Storey, 2005: p. 2) and they are 
considered to be one of “the few hard law initiatives in EU employment policy” to be 
implemented since 1997 (Gold, 2009: p. 23). In particular, these developments are 
perceived by Sisson (2005) as significant parameters and drivers that could potentially 
bring about the Europeanisation of UK employment relations. More specifically, he 
envisages radical changes within the context of industrial relations in the UK: 
“…the much-lauded ‘voluntarism’ of UK employment relations is all but dead: 
personnel management and individual employment rights have become inextricably 
tied together, bringing about an increasing tendency to a legal dependency culture. 
European integration has also been a major factor in accelerating the reshaping of the 
UK’s economy and, consequently, its structure of employment…” (Sisson, 2005: p. 46). 
On the whole, there is vigorous scepticism about the effectiveness of the 
aforementioned EU directives in bringing a potential convergence between the 
“divergent industrial relations systems” (Baldry, 1994: p. 99; Crouch 1993; cited in 
Weston and Martinez-Lucio, 1997: p. 765), which are described as three different or 
divergent traditions, denoted as: “Romano-Germanic, Anglo-Irish and Nordic 
systems” (Jones and Cressey, 1995: p. 12). In a similar way, Marginson and Sisson 
(2006: pp. 42-48) take into consideration the analyses of “social protection dimension 
and welfare regime” within the sphere of the European social model (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Scharpf, 2000) and also the divergent industrial relations systems 
between EU countries14 (Ebbinghaus, 1999; Supiot 2000), in order to develop a model 
of four main clusters across the dimensions of “workplace representation and 
regulatory basis” (Rogers and Streeck, 1995; Regalia, 1995; Traxler et al., 2001; 
cited in Marginson and Sisson, 2006: p. 46). In this regard, in line with the 
aforementioned differentiation made by Jones and Cressey (1995), these clusters are 
subsequently distinguished as: “Rhineland, Latin, Nordic and Anglo-Irish countries” 
(Marginson and Sisson, 2006: p. 42). Within the aforementioned frameworks, Jones 
14 In their analysis, Marginson and Sisson (2006: pp. 42-48) use the EU-15 and Norway in order to 
develop the model of four main clusters of countries. 
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and Cressey (1995) provide a very comprehensive description of the UK’s industrial 
relations context: 
“…in the Anglo-Irish system a written constitution is absent and legislation plays a 
more limited role in the conduct of labour law. The tradition is one of non-intervention 
by the state and legal system in the functioning of the labour market and industrial 
relations. Significantly, collective agreements in the Anglo-Irish system are not legally 
binding on the parties involved…” (p. 12). 
In similar vein, Bach (2005: p. 31) gives a short description of British employment 
regulation that shows the contrast with many other EU countries: 
“… for most of the twentieth century the UK system of employment regulation has been 
characterised as ‘voluntarist’ which ensured that employment regulation was 
conducted primarily through collective bargaining between employers and unions and 
the state did not intervene to provide a legal framework of individual and collective 
rights to the same degree as in most other European Union (EU) countries…”. 
Moreover, Keller (2002) points out the lack of statutory rights in the Anglo-Irish 
systems and criticises the strong opposition of the two governments to any 
intervention by EU legislation into their domestic employment laws. Nevertheless, he 
goes on to contend that the EU directives can provide a good opportunity for bringing 
significant changes in the area of industrial relations: 
“… countries with fairly weak or no statutory rights at all, especially the UK and 
Ireland, opposed any kind of outside, ‘foreign’ intervention that would in any case 
‘import’ some kind of binding regulation into their rather voluntaristic systems, install 
unknown and therefore dangerous precedents and, thus, lead to gradual, but in the 
long run considerable changes within their national industrial relations…” (Keller, 
2002: p. 426).  
The development of the EU directives and legislative initiatives, which have been 
implemented in the UK, have led Gold (1998) to suggest that within the context of the 
European industrial relations system: 
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“…we might expect over time that the various obstacles to more intensive use of social 
dialogue may be gradually overcome, especially given a more sympathetic attitude 
adopted by the UK government…” (p. 130). 
For instance, there is a great emphasis on the fact that social dialogue should be 
prioritised in line with the common practices in other EU countries:  
“… the general approach to social dialogue at a European level contains many useful 
lessons for Britain. It demonstrates that an IR system can be rooted in a search for 
compromise. It means institutions that are designed to generate agreement rather than 
resolve conflict. This requires a cultural change on the part of British employers…” 
(Introduction by Taylor, 1994: p. xvi; cited in Ackers and Payne, 1998: p. 536). 
On the other hand, serious scepticism has been expressed about the effectiveness of 
specific pieces of legislation, such as the Statutory Union Recognition15, mainly 
because of their “individualistic focus” (Perrett, 2007: p. 619). Moreover, the CBI 
expressed its serious reservations to the Labour leadership and argued that 
“…compulsory recognition is wholly inconsistent with the UK’s voluntary system of 
employee relations and cannot be a basis for effective workplace relationships…”16. 
From a different perspective, previous legislation has been criticised by some authors 
for being ambiguous about the real and pragmatic provision of collective rights 
(Smith and Morton, 2001), whereas others have highlighted how employer resistance 
has limited the effectiveness of such legislative enactments (Gall, 2004).    
Furthermore, as noted in the previous section, the UK government initially expressed 
serious reservations about the two latter EU directives (94/45/EC and 2002/14/EC) on 
the consultation of employees, and as a consequence their transposition into UK 
employment law was delayed. In this regard, according to Ramsey (1997), the two 
latter developments can be considered as “a direct descendant of the Vredeling 
Directive” (p. 316). More specifically, Cressey (1998) envisaged that the EWC 
Directive would provide the opportunity and momentum for establishing coherent 
15 Perrett (2007) provides one of the most recent comprehensive assessments regarding the Statutory 
Trade Union Recognition as it was embodied through the 1999 Employment Relations Act (ERA). 
16 Further details are provided by: Financial Times, 18th March 1997, “Labour Union Plan Raises 
Concern” (also cited in Lourie, 1998: p. 35). 
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“consultative provision” (p. 78) for the majority of organisations covered by the 
legislation at the EU level. Moreover, it was believed that this EU Directive would 
actually create strong “activity in both management and union circles” (Weston and 
Martinez-Lucio, 1997: pp. 764-765). 
In this regard, Cressey (1998: p. 67) cites a criticism made by the TUC in relation to 
the initial opposition of British government towards the implementation of EWC 
Directive: 
“…British business sees the value of works councils, and the enthusiasm with which 
many companies have gone ahead and set them up shows just how irrelevant is the 
UK’s opposition – based purely on political dogma” (TUC press release, January 
1997). 
On the other hand, more recently serious reservations have been expressed about the 
actual benefits of the EWC Directive, such as: 
“…the architects of the EWC Directive were perhaps ‘naive’ in their vision that 
workers’ and employers’ representatives would happily come together in a ‘spirit of 
co-operation’…” (Trimming, 2007: p. 259). 
The latest transposition of an EU Directive on employee consultation, that is the ICE 
Directive, is described as “a major development in UK employment law”, because it 
is the first that actually establishes a general and consistent statutory-framework for 
consultation rights (Hall, 2006: p. 456) and can potentially “pave the way for new 
arrangements” (Marchington et al., 2004: p. 63). Before the implementation of this 
EU Directive the UK had no such statutory framework containing general rights to 
representation, as a consequence its institutionalisation was mainly considered as 
being voluntarist. Single voice-channels of trade union representation are evident in 
workplaces across the UK, but works councils are still considered to be relatively 
“rare” (Marginson and Sisson, 2006: p. 47). In general, Carley and Hall (2008) 
identify a cluster of countries that include: Bulgaria, the Republic of Cyprus, Malta, 
Poland, the Republic of Ireland, Romania and the UK, which did not have a general 
statutory framework for information-sharing and consultation of employees prior to 
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the implementation of the ICE Directive. For this cluster of countries, they have 
suggested that: 
“…in legislative terms, the impact of the [ICE] Directive has been greatest in countries 
with no works council tradition, owing to a combination of elements such as: a history 
of largely voluntarist industrial relations; the primacy of trade unions as a 
representation channel; and the relatively recent adaptation of industrial relations 
systems to EU ‘norms’…” (Carley and Hall, 2008: p. 30). 
In relation to the transposition of the ICE Directive into British employment law, 
early on Bercusson (2002) provided a very thorough and comprehensive interim 
analysis about its potential outcomes. He suggested that such EU directives should not 
be seen as “isolated cases” but rather as a consistent “…part of a general evolution of 
policy in the EU towards labour in the enterprise…” (Bercusson, 1996: p. 221; cited 
in Bercusson, 2002: pp. 211-212). However, this author has also argued that the 
content of the ICE Directive was seriously “weakened” by the Labour government 
(Bercusson, 2002: p. 209). 
Furthermore, Lorber (2006), taking into consideration the wider contextual framework 
and institutionalisation of the British industrial relations system, highlights that: 
“…the new information and consultation arrangements will be grafted onto a system of 
collective relations historically and traditionally based on collective bargaining, 
industrial action and a flavour of conflict between the two main protagonists (i.e. 
employer and trade unions)...” (pp. 252-253). 
The necessity of establishing this legislative framework is clearly illustrated in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities: 
“…the existence of legal frameworks at national and Community level intended to 
ensure that employees are involved in the affairs of the undertaking employing them…” 
(Directive 2002/14/EC – L80/29). 
Overall, from an optimistic point of view, it is argued that: 
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“… the [ICE] Directive represents a substantial step towards the establishment of a 
pan-European standard for employee information and consultation as a key element of 
the European social model…” (Carley and Hall, 2008: p. 30). 
Even though, there has been a parallel decline in collective voice, and consequently an 
increase in workplaces with no voice arrangements, academics have noted that this 
trend has been “counteracted” by the EU directives (Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 
2005). In this regard, these “legislative developments” are considered to contribute to 
that EU policy which aims to enhance further the role of “social partners” (Brewster 
et al., 2007b: p. 1252). In addition, it is argued that the transposition of such EU 
directives can enable “British employee participation practices” to come closer to 
those found in other “European continental systems” (Pendleton and Deakin, 2007: p. 
340), and simultaneously the sustainability of these practices can be ensured through 
the implementation of the employee statutory rights on employee participation (cited 
in Sako, 1998: p. 12). 
It is also suggested that the aforementioned legislative proposals have challenged the 
“traditional non-regulatory policy”, in relation to the broader context of British 
industrial relations and the forms of collective representation in UK workplaces (Hall 
and Terry, 2004: pp. 208-209). However, there is still much scepticism about the 
actual impact of these proposals, as British companies tend to have “weaker” or even 
“symbolic forms” of representation, in which employees have limited influence in 
relation to collective rights, compared to the “…active model favoured by the 
European trade union movement…” (Marginson et al., 1998: p. 74; cited in Wills, 
1999: p. 22). 
2.2 Meanings and Definitions of Information-Sharing and 
Consultation of Employees 
Within the context of the Vredeling proposal, Blanpain (1983) provided the following 
definitions: 
“…disclosure of information to employees means that the employer provides 
information about which explanation may be sought and questions can be raised; 
information which will eventually be discussed…” (p. 21), 
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“…consultation refers to subjects within the power of managerial prerogative…[it] 
means that advice is given to the employer, leaving the decision-making power of the 
employer intact…the employer retains the power to make decisions, after having 
listened to the views of the employee representatives. This advice does not require 
either unanimity or a majority vote and can take place either at the request of the 
employer or the request of labour…” (p. 22).  
Similarly, according to article 2 of the EU Directive (2002/14/EC): 
“…information means transmission by the employer to the employees’ representatives 
of data in order to enable them to acquaint themselves with the subject matter and to 
examine it. Consultation means the exchange of views and establishment of dialogue 
between the employees’ representatives and the employer, with a view to reaching 
agreement…” (cited in Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009: p. 413). 
Torrington et al. (2005) have highlighted the importance of consultation arguing that: 
“…irrespective of legal obligations, consultation is generally regarded as a hallmark 
of good management. An employer who fails to consult properly, particularly at times 
of significant change, is likely to be perceived as being unduly autocratic…” (p. 482). 
There is a variety of meanings that are assigned to information and consultation and in 
addition to the terms: employee voice, involvement and participation practices. For 
instance, Croucher (2008: pp. 368-370) views the concept of employee voice through 
various forms that include: “open door policies, suggestion schemes, employee 
attitude surveys, employee forums, work/project team and general meetings”. In 
addition, Marchington et al. (2001) denote a diversity of meanings for employee 
voice/involvement practices at the organisational level. Similarly, according to 
Dundon et al. (2004: pp. 1150-1153), employee voice can be briefly designated as: 
“…(a) a form of contribution to decision-making, (b) an articulation of individual 
dissatisfaction/satisfaction, (c) a demonstration of collective organisation…” (cited in 
Bratton, 2007b: p. 442). 
Based on the type of issues included in the practices of involvement and also the fact 
that its nature can “vary from formal bargaining through to management control”, 
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Cressey et al. (1985: pp. 7-9) constructed the “Continuum of Employee Involvement” 
(a brief overview is provided in figure 2.1). According to this continuum, at the right-
hand side there is strong “management control” with a minimal level of employee 
involvement and high emphasis placed on “business related issues”. Further along 
the continuum employees may exert greater influence over decision-making through 
information-sharing and consultation, with the issues included in the agenda tending 
to be more “job-” rather than “business-related” (ibid). Finally, at the left-hand side 
employees may attain strong control over management decision-making, through 
collective representation mechanisms of “formal bargaining” (ibid). 
Formal Management 
Bargaining Consultation Information Control 
More Less 
Involvement Involvement 
Business 
Job-Related Related 
Issues Issues 
Industrial 
Relations Health and Technical Product Capital 
Pay Manning Policy Safety Pensions Contraction/Closure Change Innovation Investment 
Figure 2.1: The Continuum of Employee Involvement. Adapted from Cressey et al. (1985: p. 8).  
Similarly, Blyton and Turnbull (2004: p. 255) argue that employee participation 
structures and activities17 can be denoted as: “industrial democracy, participation, 
involvement, empowerment and…partnership”. Furthermore, with the use of the 
model in figure 2.2 they illustrate the way that different information and consultation 
arrangements can be unpicked at the organisational level. More specifically, at the 
left-hand side of the schema employees receive information from management 
without active involvement in any decision-making, further along the continuum 
employee representatives may exert advisory power, based on joint consultation and 
at the right-hand end they may have “full control over decisions” (ibid: p. 256). 
17 Various definitions about this notion can be found in the available literature. For instance, employee 
participation is defined as “…state initiatives which promote the collective rights of employees to be re-
presented in organisational decision-making…”, while employee involvement is being seen as an 
“…opportunity to influence and where appropriate take part in the decision making…” (Hyman and 
Mason, 1995: p. 21). 
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Using the terminology adapted by Ramsey (1980), “pseudo-participation” represents 
the left-hand side of the continuum in figure 2.2, whereas “true-participation” is 
more likely to be found at the other end (cited in Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: p. 255). 
Within this perspective, “pseudo-consultation” is described as the situation in which 
employees perceive that “management is not genuinely interested in hearing their 
views or in taking them on board”, and under these circumstances consultation 
arrangements are used as a process of “legitimising” management decision-making 
(Torrington et al., 2005: p. 483), thus giving the dubious impression to the employees 
that they are actually being consulted. Similarly, pseudo-consultation has been 
described as follows: 
“…downward communication within the JCC, where management informs employee 
representatives of decisions already taken. Employees and employee representatives 
are not empowered to influence management decisions. Pseudo consultation or 
‘information giving’ is practised more commonly in organisations which are union-free 
or where unions are particularly weak and as a method of industrial relations, it 
merely seeks to maintain management’s right to manage, neither to challenge it nor to 
legitimise managerial authority…” (Farnham and Pimlott, 1995: p. 52; cited in Rose, 
2008: p. 346). 
No  Receiving   Consultation  Joint       Employee  
Involvement    Information  Decision-Making    Control   
Figure 2.2: The Continuum of Employee Involvement. Adapted from Blyton and Turnbull (2004: 
p. 255). 
  Control 
Co-determination 
Consultation
 Communication 
Information

Figure 2.3: The Escalator of Participation. Adapted from Marchington and Wilkinson (2005b: p.

401). 
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The different meanings of terms that are connected with the employee involvement 
practices become more complicated, when both union and non-union settings are 
considered (Dundon et al., 2006: p. 493). In this regard, Boxall and Purcell (2003) 
consider employee voice as a very important mechanism that can enable employees or 
their representatives to have a stronger influence over management decision-making. 
In addition, the “breadth” and “depth” of employee voice mechanisms can be 
defined in accordance with the extent to which they can potentially be implemented 
within the organisations (Marchington, 2005: pp. 30-33; cited in Dundon and Gollan 
2007: pp. 1184-85). 
Furthermore, Marchington and Wilkinson (2005b: pp. 400-402) assign the dynamics 
of employee participation and involvement arrangements according to their “degree, 
level, form and range” (a brief overview is provided in table 2.1). They also display 
through their “escalator of participation” (ibid: p. 401) the extent to which the 
influence of employees can be exerted over management decision-making, starting 
with information-sharing and ending with employee control (figure 2.3 illustrates the 
scaling of these forms of participation). Taking into consideration the aforementioned 
escalator18, Marchington (2005) further re-conceptualises the notion of employee 
participation and argues that: 
“…managers retain ultimate control over decisions until the final two categories [i.e. 
information, two-way communication and consultation]… despite being accorded the 
right to be consulted about an issue, workers’ views can be ignored if management sees 
fit…” (p. 27). 
That is, the “escalator of participation” (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005b: p. 401; 
cited in Wilkinson et al., 2010: p. 11) exposes the limitations of the ICE Directive, in 
that the legislative provisions fail to provide employees any of the statutory rights of 
negotiation, co-determination and employee control. In addition, Wild (1996: p. 24) 
argues that co-determination relies on the principle that “…a decision needs the 
agreement of both…” social partners and this is not provided by the ICE Directive. 
From a slightly different perspective, Torrington et al. (2005) describe the 
 It is also described as “the depth [or] framework of employee participation” (Marchington and 
Wilkinson, 2005b; cited in Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009: pp. 408-409). 
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consultative process as the first stage in which the opinion of employees is considered 
before management decision-making is taken, but they also accept that even though 
the collective consultation involves “…formally talking to employee representatives 
with a view to reaching agreement. There is no obligation on employers to negotiate 
or to conclude any formal deal, but an attempt must be made in good faith…” (ibid: p. 
479). 
According to Coupar and Stevens (2005: p. 52), the notion of consultation is still 
“something of a mystery, located somewhere between two-way communication and 
joint decision-making” and they also add that sometimes the boundaries between 
consultation and negotiation can be hardly distinguished. Likewise, it is also 
suggested that “…the distinction between negotiations and consultation was always 
somewhat unreal…” (Bulletin of the European Communities, 1975: p. 96). 
The Degree means the extent to which employees can influence management decision-making (e.g. 
whether they are simply informed of changes, consulted or actually make decisions). 
The Level is about where in the organisational hierarchy employee participation and involvement takes 
place; such as: task, departmental, establishment or corporate level. 
The Range involves the subject matter included in the employee participation and involvement 
arrangements, which can refer to just relatively trivial topics or to more strategic issues. 
The Form is about the type of employee participation and involvement arrangements, i.e. they can be 
either direct (individualised) and/or indirect (collective), where employees are involved through their 
elected representatives. 
Table 2.1: The Dynamics of Employee Participation Practices in Relation to their: Degree, Level, 
Range and Form. Adapted from Marchington and Wilkinson (2005b: p. 400). Also cited in 
Dundon et al. (2003: pp. 20-21). 
Nonetheless, through an analysis of the Vredeling proposal, Blanpain (1983) makes a 
clear distinction between the two terms and pinpoints the difference on the extent to 
which management prerogative can be challenged. In particular, it is asserted that the 
negotiation process depends primarily on “the power of joint regulation by 
management and trade unions” (IELL ‘Great-Britain’, 1980: par. 42; cited in 
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Blanpain, 1983: p. 22). Furthermore, Blanpain (1983: p. 23) refers to the definition of 
negotiation process as provided by Marsh (1979: p. 208), which is: 
“…a method of joint decision-making involving bargaining between representatives of 
workers and representatives of employers, with the object of establishing mutually 
acceptable terms and conditions of employment…”. 
Another perspective about the dimensions of employee involvement practices is 
provided by Bratton (2007b), who suggests that they fall along the following 
continuum: “…communication of information, financial involvement, upward 
problem-solving, quality circles, extended consultation, cross-functional teams, self-
directed teams, collective bargaining, worker directors, and works councils...” (pp. 
452-453). Furthermore, the most recent empirical evidence indicates and emphasises 
the strong differences between consultation and negotiation (Hall et al., 2009; 
Wilkinson et al., 2007; Beaumont and Hunter, 2007). More specifically, collective 
negotiation arrangements with regard to important employment issues, such as pay 
and conditions, are strictly relied upon in trade union recognition agreements, whilst 
although consultation may be broader as a process in comparison with negotiation, as 
it can often cover all the employees in the workplace, it usually provides less 
influence over decision-making and consequently managerial prerogative is hardly 
ever seriously challenged. In addition, consultation has historically been proved to be 
“a weaker form of collective interaction” compared to negotiation (Terry, 2003a: p. 
493). 
Within the context of the EU directives on employee participation, Gollan and 
Wilkinson (2007b: p. 1146) identify information as the “provision of data on 
workplace issues or more strategic matters”. However, they also emphasise the fact 
that consultation usually does not involve issues related to collective bargaining and 
consequently, “responsibility for decision-making ultimately remains with 
management” (ibid). Similarly, Dundon et al. (2006: p. 493) consider information-
sharing as a “central component” in employee involvement practices and emphasise 
its constraints and limitations. In this respect, they regard consultation as a more 
“extensive” practice compared to information-sharing, but they go on to stress 
strongly the difference between the consultation process and collective bargaining 
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(ibid). Furthermore, Beaumont and Hunter (2007) assign “catalytic consultation” as 
being the process that aims at: 
“…developing cooperative spirit, genuine understanding of business needs and options 
and a joint problem-solving approach to workplace problems” (p. 1230). 
Taking into consideration the guidance by ACAS (2005) and CIPD (2004), 
consultation is seen as the process by which managers seek and regard “employees’ 
view before making a decision”19. Moreover, according to relatively recent empirical 
findings, the definitions given in constitution agreements emerge as being similar, but 
in some cases there is also an emphasis on the purpose to “reach an agreement” and 
the possibility to have a mutual consensus in decision-making (Hall et al. 2007: pp. 
47-48). In addition, collective consultation may encourage “critical and constructive 
views” to come up and potentially lead to “consensus” (Cox et al., 2007: p. 32). 
Nonetheless, there is scepticism about the extent to which employers really like to 
allow employees a wide scope of influence in the decision-making process. For 
instance, it is suggested that employers tend to be reluctant in engaging in negotiation 
or consultation procedures that involve important and “core decisions” (Ewing and 
Truter, 2005: p. 640). Moreover, some empirical evidence indicates that collective 
bargaining tends to be associated with real consultation (Millward et al., 2000), whilst 
collective consultation is usually just considered and perceived by management or 
employers as an upward or downward form of communication (Gollan and 
Wilkinson, 2007a; Brannen, 1983). 
2.3 Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) Regulations 
2004 
2.3.1 Overview 
In the UK, the legal framework of employee consultation is considered to be 
minimalist, but the transposition of the ICE Directive may bring a significant change 
to this issue (Schomann, 2006). The main purpose of this EU Directive (as defined by 
article 1 of the ICE Directive: 2002/14/EC) is to: 
19 Cited in Hall et al. (2007: p. 47). 
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“…establish a general framework setting out minimum requirements for the right to 
information and consultation of employees in undertakings or establishments within the 
European Community…” (L 80/3120). 
Furthermore, Cressey (2009: p. 140) points out that the ICE Regulations involve 
business issues that are related to “…tactical and operational management dealt with 
by lower representation…” and compares the legislation with the European Company 
Statute (ECS), which is connected with relatively higher level representation and 
more strategic issues. In addition, a paper by Hall (2005b: pp. 103-126) provides a 
very comprehensive overview and assessment of the legislation arguing that:  
“…the regulations will promote the spread of information and consultation 
arrangements within UK enterprises, but it remains to be seen to what extent, in what 
forms and with what results...” (p. 126). 
Similarly, Beaumont and Hunter (2007) suggest that: 
“…it remains to be seen how far the new [ICE] Regulations will bring about a 
significant and lasting change in the role of consultation in UK employment 
relations…” (p. 1230). 
Also from this point of view, Gollan and Wilkinson (2007b) argue that: 
“… the history and context of the Information and Consultation Directive passage into 
UK law and the implementation of the ICE Regulations potentially provide a guide to 
the future prospects of employee representation in the UK…” (p. 1157). 
Initially, the UK government invited both social partners, i.e. representatives from 
CBI and TUC, in order to discuss possible ways of implementing the ICE Directive 
and this resulted in the development of an “outline scheme” for its legislative 
framework and implementation (Carley and Hall, 2008: p. 22). As already addressed 
 Directive (2002/14/EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council (11 March 2002): 
“Establishing a General Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees in the European 
Community”, Official Journal of the European Communities, Published on 23rd March 2002, L80/29-
L80/33. 
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above, the ICE Regulations21 have extended the statutory framework by establishing a 
minimum set of requirements in a very important area of industrial relations that has 
remained, until recently, a matter for voluntary determination (an overview of the 
statutory provisions is provided by many academics, such as: Hall, 2005b: p. 112; 
Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 445; Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: pp. 1150-1151; 
Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009: p. 414). In particular, the implementation of the ICE 
Directive22 in the UK was made in three sequential phases. Initially, from April 2005 
it was applied to undertakings with at least 150 employees and since April 2007, the 
threshold was lowered to 100 employees, whereas from April 2008 onwards the 
minimum threshold was set at 50 employees. 
Originally, the main objective of this legislation was to create a broader contextual 
framework for information and consultation in workplaces within the EU social 
dimension, so that employees would be able to be involved and hence exert a stronger 
influence over management decision-making (European Commission, 1998). It was 
also considered as a potential opportunity to fill a gap in statutory employment 
requirements and promote “a higher degree of harmonisation of social laws in 
Europe” (Schomann et al., 2006: p. 33). Member states were allowed discretion with 
regard to the transposition of the ICE Directive (2002/14/EC) and its practical 
implementation (article 4; L 80/32). Nonetheless, the British government was 
criticised for weakening the content of the legislation (Bercusson, 2002). Moreover, 
the Deputy Director of Employment Policy for the EEF highlighted the employers’ 
lobbying to ensure that they got the “least worst deal” for them (Yeandle, 2005: p. 
30). In other words, the British government was viewed by many as trying to 
accommodate the interests of both social partners (employers and trade unions) and 
this subsequently led to the weakening of the ICE Directive, whilst the strong 
opposition of the EEF was also noteworthy. In particular, the EEF considered the 
imposition of a standard model and the “one size fits all approach to information and 
consultation arrangements” as “completely inappropriate” (ibid). 
21 A brief overview and description regarding the content and provisions of the ICE Regulations are 

provided in the Appendices and Notes. 

22 A comprehensive and detailed analysis of the legislation is provided by the DTI Guidance (January

2006) on the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004. 

     35 
Chapter 2: Literature Review
In conjunction with articles 1 and 4, it is argued that: 
“…in accordance with the principles set out in Article 1, and without prejudice to any 
provisions, and/or practices in force more favourable to employees, the Member States 
shall determine the practical arrangements for exercising the right to information and 
consultation at the appropriate level…” (L 80/32). 
Nevertheless, according to the statutory requirements employers and management 
must provide employee representatives with at least the standard information-sharing 
and consultation rights, whilst the minimal set of issues that should be included in the 
agenda can be laid out in the following way: 
“(a) information on the recent and probable development of the undertaking’s 
activities and economic situation; (b) information and consultation on the situation, 
structure and probable development of employment, and on any anticipatory measures 
envisaged (especially about any threats to employment, such as redundancies, transfer 
of undertakings etc), (c) information and consultation, with a view to reaching an 
agreement, on decisions that are likely to lead to substantial changes in work 
organisation or in contractual relations” (adapted from the DTI Guidance, 2006).  
Consequently, companies now have to consider the necessity that they have to comply 
with the legal requirements and also the possibility that employees may initiate the 
statutory procedures in order to enforce their information-sharing and consultation 
rights23. However, it has to be noted that employers are allowed a great degree of 
flexibility in their responses and do not have to act unless 10 per cent or more of the 
workforce triggers the establishment of negotiations regarding the information and 
consultation arrangements, as defined by the statutory requirements of the legislation. 
In the case that 10 per cent of employees do make such a request, the standard 
provisions of the legislation must be implemented in instances where negotiations to 
reach an agreement fail. In this regard, Amicus’ complaints towards Macmillan 
23 Hereinafter, the verb enforce involves the notion of strengthening. More specifically, it is assumed that 
enforcement of information and consultation arrangements/rights practically involves the consolidation of more 
structured or even stronger/empowered forms of employee voice (in line with the statutory framework of the ICE 
Regulations), which may potentially lead to more effective employee voice (depending on the circumstances of 
each case-study) with relatively greater influence upon management prerogative (i.e. management decision-
making) and subsequently such arrangements may be more likely to sustain forms of true-consultation rather than 
pseudo-consultation. 
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Publishers Ltd is one example where the employer was forced to adopt the standard 
statutory provisions, as enforced by the CAC, and employees requested new 
arrangements, which were subsequently implemented (detailed overview is provided 
in Dukes 2007: pp. 329-340; cited also in Gollan and Perkins, 2009: p. 211). 
However, there is still scepticism about the available options for employees to trigger 
the procedures for negotiations, because even the 10 per cent threshold is considered 
“a tough standard to meet” (Hall, 2006: p. 461), especially in non-unionised 
workplaces. Nevertheless, the legislation provides a great degree of flexibility for the 
negotiated agreements and encourages a spirit of co-operation. In other words, it 
allows a great scope for employers and employee representatives regarding the actual 
content of these agreements, so as to reach a consensus that takes into account the 
“interests of both the undertaking and employees” (detailed overview is provided in 
DTI Guidance, 2006: pp. 34-39). 
The main provision of the legislation, which is considered of paramount importance, 
is the necessity to attain the approval of employees for any sort of arrangements that 
may be suggested or put in place by employers (Dietz and Fortin, 2007). Assuming 
that there is already a valid pre-existing agreement (PEA), employees may request 
negotiations for new arrangements. Under such circumstances, the employer must 
comply or ballot the workforce on whether they support the request for new 
negotiations and these have to proceed, if only 40 per cent of employees endorse such 
a request (a detailed overview of these procedures are provided in the appendices and 
notes). Otherwise, the employer is not obliged to make any changes and the pre-
existing arrangement shall remain as it is. It has to be noted that pre-existing 
agreements should be: written (including any possible collective agreement with the 
trade union), cover all employees, endorsed and approved by employees and should 
have clearly defined information and consultation arrangements. With respect to this 
issue, Dukes (2007: p. 329) points out that Moray council is a “significant case” of a 
pre-existing agreement being practically enforced by the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal (EAT) under the terms of the new legislation.    
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2.3.2 Debate about the ICE Regulations: Views from the Government and Social 
Partners 
Before the implementation of the ICE Regulations, there was a discernible history of 
antipathy by management towards works councils, whilst trade unions often 
considered them as a threat to the “traditional approaches to collective bargaining” 
(Redfern, 2007: p. 293). The unions’ scepticism about the establishment of 
consultation forums was also recognisable in the past. For instance, according to the 
Bulletin of the European Communities (1975): 
“In the past, an effort was made to draw a sharp distinction between consultation 
through the works council or some other medium, and negotiation through trade union 
machinery leading to collective agreements. This was largely the result of trade union 
suspicions that the works council could be used to undermine their position” (S. 8/75: 
p. 94). 
The scepticism in relation to the unilateral establishment of consultation arrangements 
by management was also central to Ramsey’s (1977) publication about the “Cycles of 
Control” in which he emphasised the fact that such arrangements are potentially 
imposed as an effort to set aside and deter any initiative taken by “organised labour”, 
such as the establishment of union-based agreements (cited in Dundon and Gollan, 
2007: p. 1190). It is also argued that even though trade union leaders tend to be less 
supportive towards voluntarism, they are still “suspicious of statutory intervention in 
the sphere of employee representation” (Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 447). 
Furthermore, recent empirical evidence indicates that union representatives may be 
afraid of losing the power of their collective bargaining rights, especially in 
workplaces where they have “minority membership” (Hall et al., 2007: p. 70). This 
fear may subsequently lead to more direct and individualised mechanisms of 
information and consultation, with less power and influence over management 
decision-making (Marchington, 2000). This is also viewed as a “substitution effect”, 
through which there will be an ongoing attempt to “exclude” union forums and 
“promote” non-union forms of representation (Dundon et al., 2006: p. 498). On the 
other hand, the available evidence also indicates that management does not 
necessarily and universally “use the ICE Regulations as a means to de-recognise 
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unions in favour of the [consultative] forum” (Hall et al., 2007: p. 73). Taking into 
consideration the experience of analogous UK legislation24 on employee participation 
in relation to the implementation of the EWC Directive, it is argued that trade union 
and employee representatives generally consider works councils as “beneficial” for 
collective bargaining purposes (Cressey, 1998: p. 78). 
The “reflexive” character of the ICE Regulations is actually described as an effort to 
“underpin and encourage autonomous process of adjustment” (Barnard and Deakin, 
2000: p. 341; cited in Hall, 2006: p. 456), whilst this also highlights the fact that the 
UK government “sought to inject a strong degree of flexibility in the way in which it 
would be implemented” (Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 444). Furthermore, the view 
from the TUC is that the UK government adopts a “voluntarist approach” so as to 
uphold “the UK’s traditions for the voluntary regulation of employment relations” 
(Veale, 2005: p. 27). As has been noted in the previous section, the CBI was strongly 
opposed to the transposition of the ICE Directive and opted to follow a “minimalist 
approach” regarding its implementation (Carley and Hall, 2008: p. 27). In particular, 
they provided positive comments on the government’s attempt to weaken the practical 
contents of the legislation, urging them to accept “the least damaging deal available” 
during the negotiation process with TUC, in relation to the directive’s final text (ibid). 
In addition, “EU intervention” in national legislation on employee rights was strongly 
criticised by the employers (cited in Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 444). 
However, the UK government is currently positive towards the implementation of the 
ICE Regulations, in spite of its initial reservations and scepticism. For instance, the 
minister responsible for the enactment and transposition of the legislation provided 
vigorous support (Hall, 2005b) and in addition, according to the official DTI 
Guidance (2006): 
“…the government strongly supports the principle of employers informing and 
consulting their employees on an on-going basis about matters that may affect them. It 
is good for the employees themselves, and good for the organisations they work for… 
the government would encourage all employers, irrespective of their size and the 
24 Hall (2006: p. 457) characterises as “analogous UK legislation” the experience of EWCs and he 
links its relevance to the ICE Directive. 
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nature of their activity, to inform and consult their employees in a way suited to their 
particular circumstances…” (p. 4). 
The development of the ICE Regulations has drawn strong attention as an issue for 
research in the area of British employment relations. For instance, as previously noted 
in chapter 1, Hall et al. (2007) published a very thorough and consistent 
analysis/report on the initial impact of the legislation, employing a longitudinal case-
study method in thirteen organisations with at least 150 employees. Afterwards, 
through a similar method they identified a sample of eight organisations with at least 
100 employees (Hall et al., 2008). Furthermore, in December 2009, they published a 
provisional report using a sample of four organisations with at least 50 employees 
(Hall et al., 2009b). 
Trade union officials commented extensively on the ICE Regulations. In particular, 
the TUC views the transposition of the EU Directive as a “real strategic 
breakthrough” (Hall 2005b: p. 103). Furthermore, Veale (2005) points out the 
positive official stance of TUC concerning the implementation of the ICE 
Regulations: 
“…this legislation represents a radical development in the UK context, introducing for 
the first time a comprehensive statutory framework regulating employee information 
and consultation issues…” (p. 21); 
“… [it] is potentially the most significant piece of employment relations legislation 
ever to be introduced in the UK…” (p. 22). 
Moreover, British trade unions, including USDAW, have been promoting the idea of 
establishing strong mechanisms of information and consultation and describe the 
legislation as an “opportunity” for union representatives to “get a foot in the door” 
(2006: p. 3) through consultation forums and potentially attain a formal trade union 
recognition agreement in workplaces if there is not any form of collective bargaining 
(a brief overview is provided in the USDAW guide on the ICE Regulations25): 
25 USDAW (2006) The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, Published on: 10th 
May 2006. 
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“building the union’s influence through information and consultation could form an 
integral part of an organising strategy…The information and consultation procedures 
offer an opportunity to gain access to companies where this was previously difficult 
[especially the non-unionised ones]. Where it might be difficult to get statutory 
recognition initially, the legislation gives the union the opportunity to sit down with 
employers and gives access to employees. Starting an organising strategy with a view 
to getting an agreement could be a good starting point for a more sustained organising 
campaign later” (2006: p. 3).  
Similarly, the Unite union (2007) provides a very comprehensive and detailed guide 
about the ICE Regulations, and puts a great emphasis on the strategy that it believes 
its members should follow26. Even the EEF now provides support for the ICE 
Regulations, stressing their positive outcomes:  
“There is now a growing volume of evidence from many different sources that 
informing and consulting employees can improve business performance. It is also 
EEF’s practical experience from talking to members, both large and small, that an 
increasing number of manufacturers are using a range of methods to inform and 
consult with their employees” (Yeandle, 2005: p. 29). 
Many researchers claim that unionised forms of representation are stronger than the 
“inferior” and internally-based voice mechanisms, such as the information and 
consultation arrangements (Harcourt at al., 2004; c. f. Millward et al., 2000; cited in 
Brewster et al., 2007: p. 1249). Moreover, nowadays one of the main aims of the TUC 
is to ensure that trade unions have sufficient “organising opportunities” without 
being susceptible to losing the legitimacy of their voice over the current information 
and consultation arrangements, as defined in the existing collective agreements 
(Carley and Hall, 2008: p. 27). In particular, Carley and Hall (2008) emphasise the 
debate amongst the social partners, with special regard to the trade unions that are 
traditionally regarded as the sole or main representation channel, in relation to the 
“perceived threat to their position from new channels and structures” (p. 31) through 
the establishment or modification of information and consultation arrangements.  
26 UNITE the Union (2007) The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 (the ICE 
Regulations), Guidance for Unite Amicus Section Officers and Workplace Representatives, (1st 
Printing: June 2007), Published by Unite Amicus section. 
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According to Gollan et al. (2006: p. 506), there is also scepticism about the extent to 
which unions can “meet the needs of either employees and management”, and 
whether they can be perceived by the employees “as both representative and able to 
act independently”. That is, unless they can adequately satisfy the aforementioned 
requirements, they may lose their influence or even be “supplanted” under the 
provisions of the ICE Regulations (ibid). However, it has to be noted that trade unions 
(such as: Unite or Amicus) are formally encouraging officials to be more active and 
thus take advantage of the opportunities provided by the legislation. For instance, 
Amicus guidance urges union representatives to negotiate with the purpose to reach, 
at least, the standard statutory requirements of the legislation (Hall, 2006). 
Furthermore, the representatives of this union are strongly advised to seek the 
opinions of “national or regional officers” before getting involved in any negotiation 
procedures (Amicus, 2004: p. 16; cited in Hall, 2006: p. 467). 
In one of its most recently published guides (June 2007), Unite puts a great emphasis 
on the way in which its members should become involved under the new 
arrangements, in order to prevent any potential management strategy that seeks to 
undermine their role in relation to collective bargaining rights: 
“Unite Amicus Section prefers for all new recognition agreements to cover the 
requirements of the [ICE] Regulations wherever possible to pre-empt alternative 
arrangements being introduced which might undermine the union’s role” (Unite the 
Union, 2007: p. 8). 
Furthermore, according to the aforementioned guide of the Unite union it is 
considered that this legislation may stimulate union involvement and recruitment, 
with the added corollary that members should make sure that “collective rights are 
not undermined” (ibid). In addition, it is strongly recommended that union 
officials/representatives should not agree to sign any sort of agreement unless the 
minimum statutory rights are sufficiently considered. The guide also urges its 
members to be very careful regarding employers’ proposals and avoid any sort of 
information and consultation arrangements that may potentially: 
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“… (a) undermine existing recognition provisions because the (I)nformation & 
(C)onsultation group would overlap with what had previously been collective 
bargaining areas…, (b) undermine union representation arrangements, e.g. by 
guaranteeing non-union I & C representative places in bargaining units where the 
union is recognised…, (c) undermine union information and influence by providing for 
company representatives to meet with I & C Reps more frequently than they meet with 
union negotiating bodies…, (d) harm the trust and communication between union 
workplace representatives or officers, and the members they represent, but giving the 
company too much discretion to decide what information given under I & C provisions 
is ‘confidential’…” (ibid). 
There is also a separate section that provides a comprehensive guide that distinguishes 
how the union sees the difference between consultation and negotiation. 
“Where there are union and non-union representatives, a frequent option has been to 
introduce an over-arching information and consultation committee, incorporating 
representatives of both union and non-union groups, with trade union representatives 
continuing to negotiate in a separate body. Information and consultation can therefore 
be kept separate from negotiation” (Unite the Union, 2007: p. 10). 
In this vein, it is suggested that the transposition of the ICE Directive, alongside union 
representation, may lead to “the ‘next best’ option” which is the “dual channel 
voice” (Willman et al., 2007: p. 1332). In particular, the findings by Hall et al. (2007) 
suggest that trade union officials are, in general, tending to accommodate the 
information and consultation forums as a separate body of representation. On the 
other hand, there is a great emphasis still placed on the “negotiating role” of union 
representatives, and the distinctive “demarcation line” between the consultation 
forums and negotiation bodies, which underlines the generally cautious attitude of 
unions towards non-union representative bodies (ibid: pp. 58-60). Similarly, the 
USDAW (2006) guidance refers to this situation: 
“…ideally the union should seek to negotiate with the employer to secure the Union’s 
role in the process – for example having reserved seats…” (p. 4). 
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More specifically, there is evidence that non-union representatives do not participate 
in meetings when union-based issues are included on the agendas. By contrast, 
“negotiation and bargaining rights” are rarely included as issues for discussion on 
consultation forums/committees (cited in Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007a: p. 1137). In 
reality, the evidence suggests that management usually tries to ensure that any sort of 
collective negotiation procedure is not included in the agreed constitution of 
information and consultation arrangements (Wilkinson et al., 2007; Beaumont and 
Hunter, 2007; Hall et al., 2007). The scepticism about the extent to which the “dual 
system of employee representation” can be accommodated successfully, with the 
involvement of both union and non-union delegates, was also raised in relation to the 
implementation of the EWC Directive (cited in Weston and Martinez-Lucio, 1997: p. 
777). Therefore, one of the key themes that emerges from the above discussion is the 
extent to which the ICE Regulations can strengthen the role of trade unions and their 
influence over management decision-making. In this regard, USDAW (2006) 
guidance regarding the perspectives on the ICE Regulations supports the involvement 
of union representatives, as this union sees this legislation as an opportunity to 
enhance the role of trade union officials: 
“…being part of the process and having union members involved in information and 
consultation procedures allows the union to have influence inside some companies for 
the first time. Union representatives can show that they have experience, training and 
expert back up of USDAW to be effective… The information and consultation process 
acts as a ‘shop window’ in which the Union can demonstrate its value to all employees. 
Importantly this occurs within the workplace and enables the union to show the 
tangible benefits of union membership to that particular workforce…” (p. 3). 
By contrast, from the pessimistic point of view on the part of the unions, questions 
have been raised about the extent to which the legislation could undermine collective 
bargaining rights, by providing further impetus to employers for the establishment of 
non-union representation forms, which encourage the growth of broader forms of 
employee voice and dissuade the development of negotiation forums. Furthermore, 
Marchington (2005) strongly criticises the fact that trade unions in the UK are still 
having to try to “get rights to information and consultation in line with their EU 
counterparts” (p. 27). In addition, unions are generally wary of the establishment of 
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broad forms of consultation, perceiving them as threats to the power of their collective 
bargaining (Hall, 2006). For instance, the guidance by USDAW (2006) puts a great 
emphasis on the potential pitfalls of establishing consultation arrangements, such as 
the management strategy of unilaterally establishing pre-emptive agreements, which 
may restrict the scope of action that is available to employee and union 
representatives. This guidance also emphasises the necessity for union representatives 
to challenge the development of such agreements, if they are seen to be inferior to 
current union-based arrangements. 
“…just as the union can seek to use the legislation to its advantage, employers too may 
look to gain an advantage. The union has to be aware of these as it is far more difficult 
altering an information and consultation agreement than setting one up. There are two 
main dangers: the creation of non-union consultative bodies and inferior 
agreements…” (USDAW, 2006: p. 4). 
Furthermore, serious concerns have been expressed that pre-existing agreements may 
end up being used as a unilateral attempt by management to comply satisfactorily 
with the statutory requirements and yet establish only minimal provisions. In this 
regard, there have also been warnings that such agreements may not be easily 
challenged, owing to the higher threshold which is required in order for employees to 
be legally entitled to request negotiations for reviewing the current arrangements.     
“The legislation does not guarantee a place to the union. Therefore, there is a danger 
that a consultative body, such as a staff council, could be entirely of non-union 
representatives … [especially] in workplaces with low levels of membership… Some 
companies may feel that they have to comply with the legislation immediately. In this 
case the employer could instigate the process themselves and rush through an inferior 
agreement … Employers could also seek to place items that were previously on the 
bargaining agenda onto the information and consultation agenda which could limit the 
effectiveness of the union…” (ibid). 
Finally, it is noteworthy that both the CBI and TUC have expressed their concerns 
regarding the provisions of legislation on triggering the negotiations when 
information and consultation arrangements are already in place. More specifically, the 
CBI would like to maintain “existing company practice” (Carley and Hall, 2008: p. 
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28), whereas, on the other hand the TUC does not want any “existing arrangements”, 
especially these included in formal trade union recognition agreements, to be 
superseded by relatively inferior and alternative arrangements (ibid). 
2.3.3 Contextual and Organisational Factors Affecting Information and 
Consultation Arrangements  
Communication practices within an organisation can be significantly affected by 
“institutional and legislative” factors (Brewster, 2007: p. 782). A thorough and 
consistent analysis, regarding the impact of EWCs on management decision-making, 
indicates that the effectiveness of consultative bodies relies on a range of contextual 
conditions (Marginson et al. 2004: pp. 210-215). In particular, these conditions 
include: the fit between the consultative infrastructure and key level(s) of 
management, the context/platform of industrial relations, the unionised or non-
unionised setting, management policy towards the consultation forums and the 
cohesiveness of employee representation (ibid). From the early 1990s until relatively 
recently, case-study evidence (for instance: Marchington, 1994; Beaumont and 
Hunter, 2003) clearly shows that variation in: objectives, scope, and operation, and 
also the impact of: information, communication and consultation mechanisms are 
affected by organisational factors (such as: decision-making structures, and 
institutional arrangements for collective bargaining and negotiation procedures). At a 
wider level, the “size of the firms” and the type of “industrial sector” are also 
considered as important variables that may shape the form of employee voice 
mechanisms (Brewster et al., 2007b: p. 1253).  
Furthermore, academic researchers emphasise the importance of the development of 
trust, because consultation should be considered to be a continuing relationship. More 
specifically, it is stated that a “loss [or] violation of trust” can lead to less open forms 
of communication and thus negatively affect the consultation process (Beaumont and 
Hunter, 2007: p. 1232). In particular, “trust” is considered to be substantial for the 
effective operation of JCCs and it is included in the list of “antecedents, 
determinants, outcomes mediators or moderators”, with regard to the “life-cycle” of 
the consultation process (Dietz and Fortin, 2007: p. 1163). In general, within more co-
operative and less adversarial workplaces, collective representation tends to be more 
common alongside other forms of employee voice (Brewster et al., 2007b; Thelen, 
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2001). The importance of maintaining high levels of trust, concerning the functioning 
of JCCs, is also highlighted by Marchington and Armstrong (1986: p. 169) together 
with external and internal organisational conditions, such as: “product market 
determinism, oppositional management approaches, ability of employers to impose 
their preferred strategies on employees and effective union organisation”. 
Dundon et al. (2003: p. 65) provide a framework of “good practice” in the area of 
information and consultation, involving the use of key policy areas that include: 
“perceptions, structures, processes, integration and representation”. According to 
the aforementioned framework, the “degree and range” of involvement practices (as 
similarly cited in Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005b: p. 400), the legitimate role of 
employee representatives to ascertain a significant influence over management 
decision-making, and overall, the co-existence of both direct and indirect methods of 
participation, are all important considerations in the development of effective 
information and consultation mechanisms.  Furthermore, Storey (2005: p. 4) points 
out key themes that need to be taken into account when implementing these 
mechanisms, such as the: training of representatives, scepticism by employers, trade 
unions and individual employees, and issues that involve “suspicion and resistance”. 
Gollan and Wilkinson27 (2007b: p. 1153) emphasise the “micro-level” factors that can 
affect the extent to which information and consultation mechanisms are effective in 
the workplace. More specifically, these factors include: “…leadership skills, vision, 
time and [the] resources…” that are required so that a change in “culture” can be 
achieved (ibid). They also point out that “macro-level” factors28, i.e. “problems of 
disconnected capitalism”, also cited in Thompson (2003), can strongly affect 
27 Furthermore, Gollan and Wilkinson (2007b: pp. 1153-1154) have adapted the model developed by Kostova and 
Roth (2002) in order to illustrate the possible available ways for organisations to respond to the implementation of 
the ICE Regulations. Organisations that have reviewed and adjusted their already established information and 
consultation mechanisms are denoted as “true believers”; they are following the “active adoption” together with 
the “converters” (cited in Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: pp. 1153-1154). Employers that are forced to comply 
with the statutory requirements of the legislation, but they are not strongly embracing employee involvement 
practices, are following the “ceremonial adoption” (ibid). On the other hand, employers, who support the 
employee involvement practices but they are not complying with the ICE Regulations, are following the “assent 
adoption” (ibid). In addition, those, who do not embrace employee involvement practices and are not complying 
with the legislation, are considered as having the “minimal adoption” approach (ibid). 
28 More specifically, Gollan and Wilkinson (2007b) take into consideration the rationale by Thompson (2003) and 
suggest that “…it is difficult for managers – whatever their personal inclinations – to provide the time and 
flexibility to allow workers to be more involved in a meaningful way. To the extent that they can allow ‘bargains’, 
either by negotiation or consultation, these are fragile creatures all too easily wrecked by external forces…” (p. 
1153). 
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collective bargaining procedures, such as: consultation and negotiation. Similarly, 
according to the empirical findings of Wilkinson et al. (2007: pp. 1289-93) “internal 
factors” (i.e. management style and social processes) and “external factors” (i.e. 
market characteristics and organisational restructuring) can perform a crucial role in 
the consultation process. In sum, consultation is susceptible to various factors and 
thus can be described as “fragile” (Beaumont and Hunter, 2007: p. 1242). 
In addition, Hall et al. (2007: pp. 16-26) provide a solid analysis of the factors that 
can potentially affect “company strategy” in relation to information and consultation 
arrangements. These factors indicatively include: the status of ownership, crisis or 
major organisational change, change of management team, approaches towards 
employee involvement practices, presence or not of a recognised trade union, 
management attitude towards the trade unions, and finally, the actual influence of 
legislation on management thinking. Moreover, Dundon et al. (2006) argue that a set 
of analogous variables can influence the effectiveness of regulatory voice 
mechanisms, which include “managerial attitudes, employee expectations, union 
demands, and business pressures” (p. 507). For instance, according to Blyton and 
Turnbull (2004), when management does not provide strong support towards the 
development of employee involvement practices, consultation can become ineffective 
and take place after the decision-making and as a result, the former is actually “selling 
decisions rather than consulting over them” (p. 275). That is, under these 
circumstances employee participation relies upon pseudo-consultation rather than 
true-consultation. 
Evidence from the implementation of an analogous EU Directive, namely that of 
EWCs, illustrates that the effectiveness of employee voice mechanisms generally 
depends on the “practices and assumptions embedded” in the institutional 
environment of British industrial relations (Stirling and Tully, 2004: p. 79). 
Furthermore, negotiations on setting up or reviewing information and consultation 
arrangements can depend on “company-specific factors”, such as: the nature of the 
business and industrial relations arrangements/traditions (Gilman and Marginson, 
2002: p. 38). In other words, forms of representation cannot exist in a vacuum and 
their outcomes are reliant upon a specific contextual set of conditions. For instance, an 
IPA survey indicates that these outcomes are “mediated through changes in attitude 
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and behaviour, better relations with unions or representatives, less resistance 
[etc]…” (Coupar and Stevens, 2005: p. 50) and not simply through compliance with 
the requirements of the ICE Regulations, whose features are flexible and the 
imposition of whose provisions is voluntary.  
According to Blyton and Turnbull (2004), the content of the ICE Regulations can 
provide a consistent set of opportunities, especially under specific conditions (which 
are weak and not sufficient within the context of UK employment relations). These 
conditions include: (a) the level of effectiveness of works councils within the context 
of the statutory framework of employee involvement and collective representation, (b) 
the extent to which employers, employees and trade unions are actively engaged in 
workplace-based participation, and (c) the robust provision of statutory rights that can 
enable work councils to be independent from management (Truter, 2003 and Wever, 
1995; cited in Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: pp. 267-268). Furthermore, they point out 
the fundamental role that the state can play in the “development of consultation” and 
suggest that the UK government has not taken any substantial and influential initiative 
for adequately establishing favourable conditions (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: p. 267). 
2.3.4 Changes and Adjustments to Information and Consultation Arrangements: 
Strategies and Approaches Adopted by Employers, Managers and Trade Unions 
As Gollan and Wilkinson (2007) argue, the ICE Regulations could potentially 
improve the context of British industrial relations, but this will rely heavily on “…the 
strategies of employers, and the response by employees and trade unions to these 
initiatives…” (2007a: p. 1134). Similarly, Doherty (2008: p. 619) suggests that the 
“structure and content” of the ICE Directive are important, but also that “processes” 
are equally critical as well (i.e. strategies by actors, existing structures, enforcement 
etc). The legislation also provides the social partners with a flexible range of choices 
and options “both procedurally and substantively” (Hall, 2006: p. 456). 
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Figure 2.4: Voice Systems and Management Style. Adapted from Boxall and Purcell (2003: p. 
180). 
The above model in figure 2.4 (as adapted from Boxall and Purcell, 2003: pp. 180-
181) suggests that the attitude of organisations towards “legislative voice 
mechanisms” can potentially be problematic in command/control environments, 
especially if there is strong avoidance of trade union recognition. On the other hand, 
such legislative mechanisms can be effectively developed and further enforced in 
workplaces where high commitment/involvement practices are supported and co-
operative or less adversarial relationships have been developed by management with 
employee and/or trade union representatives. Likewise, Sisson (2002) observes that 
information and consultation mechanisms can be more effectively applied within a 
climate of: mutual respect, trust, co-operation, openness and honesty, whilst such 
mechanisms will be potentially ineffective in a command and control culture, where 
there is no consensus in decision-making.  
In general, it is argued that non-union voice mechanisms can be influenced by a set or 
“map of factors”, as illustrated by Dundon and Gollan (2007: pp. 1185-1189). More 
specifically, these are classified as “micro/organisational dimensions [or] dynamics” 
(such as: the management approach towards trade unions and the development of trust 
in employee relations) and “macro/environmental factors” (such as: market 
influences and the regulatory environment). “These general sets of potential 
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influences” should be considered in order to develop a holistic and integrated 
approach and understand better the context of employee voice mechanisms in non-
unionised workplaces (ibid: p. 1189) and there needs to be a keen awareness of the 
potential negative outcomes of “union avoidance, ideological hostility [and] 
irrational/rational employer behaviour” (ibid: p. 1189-1194). In sum, not only is the 
ICE Directive one of the necessary prerequisites in order to develop consistent forms 
of employee voice, but also other factors, such as “organisational dynamics”, need to 
be taken into account (ibid: p. 1183) and there ought to be an equal involvement of all 
parties or social partners. 
The aforementioned strategies that can be in engaged in by employers who are against 
the establishment of union-based arrangements are also described as “union 
substitution” or “union suppression” (ibid: p. 1189; also cited in Marchington and 
Wilkinson, 2005a: pp. 276-279) and they focus on the principle to “reduce the 
likelihood of outside involvement by trade unions, ensuring that voice processes are 
contained within the organisations” (Dundon and Gollan, 2007: p. 1189). In 
particular, figure 2.5 provides a brief overview that embodies the “strategies and 
objectives of non-union voice arrangements” (ibid: p. 1190), where in the mutual case 
(win-win) the interest of all parties is promoted by: co-determination, joint-
consultation and co-operation schemes, through dual channels of representation. On 
the other hand, conflictual (win-lose) workplace relations are more likely to emerge in 
single channels of representation where limited workplace decision-making exists and 
unionised forms of representation are not prioritised. Also, this theoretical framework 
underlines that non-union arrangements may operate either as a complementary voice 
mechanism to management decision-making or act as a substitute for union 
representation. In the latter case, it is widely believed that they have often emerged as 
a result of a management initiative with the purpose to dissuade the involvement of 
trade unions and to discourage any sort of formal recognition agreement.  
     51 
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Characteristics Complement  Substitute 
Representative 
Interest 
Mutual (win-
win) 
Conflictual (win-
lose) 
Mutual (win-
win) 
Process 
Co-
determination/ 
Joint 
Consultation 
Representation of 
employee interests Co-operation 
Power Base 
Legally imposed 
or management 
initiative 
Legally imposed or 
management 
initiative 
Management 
Initiative 
Channel of 
Representation Dual Single Dual 
Rights 
Information, 
Consultation, 
Co-decision 
making, limited 
veto powers 
Information, 
Consultation, 
Limited 
Workplace 
Decision-making 
Production, 
Line 
Information, 
Suggestion 
Schemes, 
Problem 
Identification 
Figure 2.5: Strategies and Objectives of Non-Union Employee Voice Arrangements. Adapted 
from Gollan (2000: p. 415), and Also Cited in Dundon and Gollan (2007: p. 1190).  
According to the available research evidence, there is scepticism about the extent to 
which non-unionised arrangements and structures can actually provide effective 
means of information-sharing, communication and consultation and whether these 
means can fill the gap in the area of employee representation (for example: 
Charlwood and Terry, 2007; Tailby et al., 2007; Freeman and Rogers, 1999; Towers, 
1997). However, for those workplaces where there is no structured employee 
representation, the ICE Regulations do provide non-unionised employees the 
opportunity to request the establishment of standard and basic information and 
consultation arrangements. In such cases, the single channel of representation can be 
established either by management initiative or by employee request. In other words, 
the ICE Directive can slowly bring a convergence across non-unionised workplaces, 
with regard to employee representation, as the statutory provisions become more 
embedded in practice. Under these circumstances, the arrangements provide basic 
consultation rights, but it is still questionable to what extent the non-union employee 
representatives can have an impact on workplace decision-making, as their ability to 
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influence management prerogative is considered by many academics to be limited 
(Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007; Dundon and Gollan, 2007). 
2.3.5 ICE Regulations: Challenges and Opportunities for Management, 
Individual Employees and Trade Unions 
a) Industrial Democracy and Social Partnership in the Workplaces 
By the late 1970s, “participation reached its high point in the UK” (Dundon and 
Wilkinson, 2009: p. 406) and at the same time the notion of industrial democracy and 
the issue of “how workers might be represented at board level” was discussed in the 
Bullock Report29 (Bullock, 1977; cited in Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009: pp. 406-407). 
In addition, industrial democracy was promoted by the trade unions that had relatively 
strong collective bargaining power. Furthermore, in this context the provision of the 
Labour government’s Social Contract was viewed as being an attempt to promote 
employee rights (Ackers et al, 1992). However, the idiosyncrasies of the British 
industrial relations system and employee participation practices, in combination with 
the sociological context, led Brannen (1983) to surmise that “…the barriers to both 
economic and industrial democracy are very great and deep-rooted in [British] 
society…” (p. 155) and thus very difficult to change. Similarly, according to Lorber 
(2006: pp. 252-253): 
“…the defence of workers’ interests has been through the medium of collective 
bargaining and industrial action, trade unions being the representatives of the 
workforce. There was a focus on the market function of collective representation, as 
opposed to the industrial democracy function. This traditional system has evolved with 
a strong decentralisation of collective bargaining towards company level…”. 
At the European level, “social dialogue centres on partnership” between trade unions 
and employers and the role of works councils as “representative bodies” is also 
highlighted (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005a: pp. 286-287). The notion of 
partnership was firmly supported by the Labour government in 1997, with the debate 
in the UK about this concept primarily relying on issues involving “company and 
workplace employment relations” (Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 432), which 
29 The concept of industrial democracy was discussed in Lord’s Bullock Report in 1977, which 
subsequently resulted in a white paper in 1978 (Bullock, 1977; cited in Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009: 
pp. 406-407). 
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contrasted with the more robust institutionalisation and stronger legislative context 
that characterised other Western European countries (Haynes and Allen, 2001; Heery, 
2002; Terry, 2003; cited in Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005a: p. 287). In other 
words, the notion of partnership between management and trade unions, in the UK 
context, that was pioneered at the beginning of 1990s was primarily at the enterprise 
level, and mainly focussed on “business or corporate restructuring initiatives” 
(Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 439).  In addition, Gill et al. (1999) argued that the 
government and trade unions in Great Britain were more “keen to pursue the notion of 
social partnership” (p. 319). Further, according to Casey and Gold (2000: p. 119) the 
concept of social partnership or dialogue, within the context of British industrial 
relations can be considered as: 
“… forums where employers, workers and their representative bodies (referred to in 
short as ‘insiders’) discuss ‘insider issues’ (such as pay, terms and conditions and 
rights at work) through consultation procedures and collective bargaining…”. 
Oxenbridge and Brown (2005) provide examples of partnership orientated 
organisations in the UK between management and trade unions (cited in Tailby and 
Winchester, 2005: p. 439). In general, it is also suggested that social partnership 
could: effectively accommodate different interests amongst workers and managers, 
promote the establishment and operation of workplace representative bodies and 
regulate the operation of labour markets (Ferner and Hyman, 1998). 
One fundamental aspect regarding the implications of the ICE Regulations is 
concerned “with the principles of democracy” (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: p. 
1147). In this regard, as previously noted, the implementation of the ICE Directive 
establishes for the first time a general statutory framework that provides employees 
the right to be informed and consulted by their employers on a range of key: business, 
employment and restructuring issues. Consequently, under this set of arrangements 
the concept of “workplace democracy” can be further promoted as the “discretion of 
management” in decision-making being constrained or challenged and thus 
employees become more involved in the development of consultation procedures 
(Sisson, 2002; Coriat, 2002; cited in Dundon et al., 2003: p. 18). 
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The requirement to strengthen the concept of social dialogue and promote the 
principles of mutual trust and employee involvement, at the European level, is also 
pinpointed in the formal document of the ICE Directive (2002/14/EC), as published in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities in March 200230. 
“There is a need to strengthen dialogue and promote mutual trust within undertakings 
in order to improve risk anticipation, make work organisation more flexible and 
facilitate employee access to training within the undertaking while maintaining 
security, make employees aware of adaptation needs, increase employees’ availability 
to undertake measures and activities to increase their employability, promote employee 
involvement in the operation and future of the undertaking and increase its 
competitiveness… Timely information and consultation is a prerequisite for the success 
of the restructuring and adaptation of undertakings to the new conditions created by 
globalisation of the economy, particularly through the development of new forms of 
organisation of work…” (L 80/29). 
Taking into consideration the implementation of the EWC Directive, McGlynn (1995) 
emphasises that management prerogative is difficult to challenge. In particular: 
“…employees under the terms of [the EWC Directive] only have the right to be 
informed and consulted: the prerogatives of management are unaffected. At the end of 
the day, management may still take the decision initially proposed…” (ibid: p. 82). 
“... the [EWC] Directive…decentralises the decisions as to the structure of information 
and consultation procedures, allowing the decisions to be taken at the most appropriate 
and lowest level. Further, in seeking to encourage partnership between labour and 
capital, the [EWC] Directive recognises that partnership will best be supported and 
sustained where the parties can reach agreement among themselves as to the terms 
most suitable to them…” (ibid: p. 83). 
Nonetheless, in light of the “experience of analogous UK legislation” (Hall, 2006: p. 
457), the ICE Directive (on employee participation) could potentially be seen as a 
good opportunity to promote the concept of social partnership in the workplace and 
 Directive (2002/14/EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council (11 March 2002): 
“Establishing a General Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees in the European 
Community”, Official Journal of the European Communities, Published on 23rd March 2002, L80/29-
L80/33. 
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thus bring the context of UK employment relations closer to the notion of industrial 
democracy, as expressed in the European social model. 
b) Challenging Management Prerogative and Influencing Decision-Making 
Casey and Gold (2000: p. 105) envisaged that the new Labour government in 1997 
put “a brake on almost 20 years of government emphasis on managerial prerogative” 
through the backing of “new forms of social partnership at work”. In this regard, at 
this time the prevalence of managerial prerogative was evident in the information and 
consultation arrangements in British workplaces, which were primarily based on the 
“discretion of management” and this remained especially so until the transposition of 
the ICE Directive (Marchington et al., 1992; Gunnigle et al., 2002; cited in Dundon et 
al., 2003: p. 18). Moreover, management decision-making in the UK has had to deal 
with “fewer legal constraints”, in comparison with the majority of “other EU 
member states” (Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 448). As it has been mentioned 
above, these arrangements have been developed within a contextual framework that 
features the parameters of “disorganised decentralisation” (Traxler, 1995: pp. 6-7) or 
“decentralised collective bargaining and consultative trajectory” along with “a long 
history of voluntarist industrial relations” (Wilkinson et al., 2004: p. 298).  
In general, consultation arrangements can potentially allow employees to: have 
stronger influence in their workplaces, challenge the “managerial prerogative” 
(Gollan, 2002; Sisson, 2002; cited in Dundon et al., 2006: p. 493), enhance their 
influence over decision making (Gollan, 2005) and affect the “power relations” 
between employee and employer (Dundon et al., 2006; quoted in Wilkinson et al., 
2007: p. 1280). Much of the relevant literature also contends that it is important for 
employees to have “a say in matters” and decisions that “affect them”, so that they 
can perceive the potential outcomes in a “positive” way, and thus be able to adapt 
them (McCabe and Lewin, 1992; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002; cited in Dundon et 
al., 2003: p. 16). Similarly, the need to establish and develop more consistent 
information and consultation mechanisms are emphasised in ACAS research papers, 
which point out various positive and beneficial outcomes, such as: 
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“…better quality and more enduring decisions; better employment relations… less 
resistance and conflict; fewer disputes; better morale; ... [and] more effective change 
management…” (Dix and Oxenbridge, 2003: p. 24). 
Furthermore, Dundon et al. (2006) suggest that the recent legislation is an opportunity 
for change in the area of industrial relations, as it allows for the establishment of 
collective voice mechanisms in the current non-unionised workplaces and enables the 
employees to be become involved in “decision-making processes” (p. 318). Sisson 
(2002) also emphasises the benefits of setting up effective mechanisms of information 
and consultation: 
“…effective information and consultation is a critical tool in obtaining the input of 
employees – the scrutinizing of proposals by employees can lead to alternative and 
better decisions… if implemented together with other so-called ‘high commitment 
management practices’, [information and consultation arrangements] are positively 
associated with improvements in  performance outcomes…” (p. 6). 
On the other hand, there has been a lot of criticism about the limitations of the ICE 
Regulations in relation to the great scope for unilateral action that is being provided to 
management, which may lead to “preferred consultation arrangements” (Tailby et 
al., 2007: p. 211). Employees could also perceive that the legislation can achieve very 
little in relation to “true consultation” (Wilkinson et al., 2007: 1295). Thus, to date, 
consultation has often been regarded, within the JCCs, as a process by which 
employees’ views are heard, but the final decision-making still relies upon 
management prerogative (Brewster et al., 2007a; Wood, 2008). A number of 
academics (Bercusson, 2002; Scott, 2002; Hardy and Adnett, 2006) have criticised the 
initial reservations of the UK government towards the drafting of the ICE 
Regulations, pointing to its strenuous effort to weaken the content of the legislation 
(cited also in Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: pp. 1149-1151). As a result of this effort, 
it has been suggested that the “diluted” contextual framework of this legislation does 
not “provide grounds for optimism” and therefore strong forms of employee 
involvement still need to be developed (Truter, 2003: p. 30; quoted in Blyton and 
Turnbull, 2004: p. 267). 
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The available literature does illustrate clear differences in the attitudes of management 
towards the notions of information and consultation. More specifically, management 
tends to be quite open towards information and communication procedures, but less 
enthusiastic to consult with employees, owing to the fear of losing its existing 
prerogative (Hall, 2005a). Furthermore, according to Gollan and Wilkinson (2007a), 
empirical research in the UK indicates that JCCs mainly tend to be unilaterally 
established by management and, in such cases, “the main aim of collective 
consultation is to increase information and communication, rather than bargaining” 
(p. 1136). 
Whatever the prospective outcomes of the ICE Regulations, there are still strong 
grounds to support the argument that management is still the main “strategic policy 
actor in adapting and interpreting the legislation” (Dundon et al., 2004: p. 1168). 
Furthermore, it can be claimed with strong evidence that it is the combination of 
“regulatory pressures” and “managerial choices” that determines the strength and 
effectiveness of voice mechanisms (ibid: p. 1167). However, employee rights that are 
provided by law are considered to be “the single most important resource for unions 
engaged in effective consultation” (Terry, 2003a: p. 498), if managers’ control over 
decision making is to be effectively challenged. Nevertheless, it was previously noted 
that “formal agreements” are not sufficient enough to bring significant changes and 
develop effective forms of employee voice and other factors within the organisational 
context need to be effectively combined with these, so as to ensure the efficacy of 
these mechanisms (Stirling and Tully, 2004: p. 79). 
Recent case-study evidence indicates that there is a tendency for management to 
espouse some sort of “commitment to act” in order to secure compliance with the 
minimal requirements of the legislation (Hall et al., 2007: p. 25) and moreover, 
information and consultation arrangements tend to be unilaterally set up by them with 
the emphasis being placed on information-sharing (ibid: p. 47). Therefore, the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms is questionable, especially when the “goals” and 
“priorities” are primarily set by management (Marsden, 2007: p. 1263). If on the 
other hand, the “needs” of all parties were to be fully considered, these arrangements 
could become much stronger (ibid). 
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Apart from the fact that management prerogative is still strong in the UK, there is also 
the belief that employees have not yet been sufficiently stimulated to reap all the 
benefits from the ICE Regulations, especially in workplaces with “low rates of 
representation” (Charlwood and Terry, 2007: p. 325). Moreover, efforts by 
employers to establish consultation forums for the first time have been criticised for 
being incidences of “pre-emptive action” (ibid: p. 335) that may subsequently 
marginalise or undermine the influence of trade unions. In similar vein, Peccei et al. 
(2008) suggest that management is: 
“…in a better position to decide whether to share information, irrespective of the 
presence or absence of either trade unions or joint consultation arrangements at the 
workplace. It may also be using direct participation allied to information-sharing as a 
way of pre-empting both joint consultation and trade unions…” (pp. 360-361). 
Even in cases where true and authentic consultation exists, it appears that the issues of 
great importance for employees (especially distributive issues, such as: pay, terms and 
conditions) tend to be precluded from the agendas of JCCs (cited in Tailby et al, 2007: 
p. 221). It is also suggested that the perceived “sincerity” of management as taking 
into account employee views and suggestions and allowing them to have influence 
over management decision-making, is paramount in ensuring the effectiveness of 
information and consultation mechanisms (Cox et al, 2007: p. 32). 
The vague reference in the ICE Directive that information and consultation forums 
can be generally made up of employee representatives, thus failing to mention, 
precisely, how trade union representatives can be elected and participate in these 
forums, has led to unions expressing the fear that the legislation could be used by 
management to try to undermine their influence. In this regard, this has led one 
academic to argue that trade unions are being “written out of the script” (Hall, 2006: 
p. 460) given the very nature of the minimal statutory provisions. On the other hand, 
the same author points out that they can still play a significant role, especially by 
actively participating in negotiating PEAs (ibid: pp. 460-461). Moreover, from the 
optimistic point of view, it is suggested that the ICE Regulations may enable union 
representatives (especially where minority membership exists) to exert stronger 
influence upon management decision-making and thus entrench their recognition in 
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the workplace. Furthermore, this may help them “to gain a foothold in workplaces 
[where] they have previously found [it] difficult to organise” (Kersley et al., 2006: p. 
108). In addition, it is contended that the general statutory framework of the ICE 
Directive can potentially provide a better role to union representatives, as it will 
enable them to attain a greater involvement in “longer-term decision-making” (Ewing 
and Truter, 2005: p. 641). 
From a negative perspective, it is argued that management may view any outside 
involvement suspiciously and therefore attempt to establish more broad forms of 
representation in order to weaken the union-based arrangements (Gollan, 2005; Hall 
2006; Gollan and Wilkinson 2007). It is also suggested that the “statutory regulation 
of employee consultation” may weaken the “single-channel of trade union 
representation” (Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 447). Consequently, this may 
further differentiate the consultation process, distancing it from negotiation and 
collective bargaining (Geary and Roche, 2005; Sisson, 2002), as the foremost tends to 
be a broader process of employee voice, whilst the two lattermost strongly depend on 
unionised forms of representation. Furthermore from the pessimistic point of view, 
the ICE Regulations may give the opportunity to employers to develop arrangements 
that are aimed at forestalling the possibility of trade union recognition agreements 
(Ewing and Truter, 2005). In this regard, the fact that the legislation enables the 
establishment of non-union bodies of representation, whereas union recognition 
usually provides comprehensive collective consultation and negotiation rights, may 
motivate employers to establish broader forms of representation, rather than concede 
rights of “unionisation” and “collectivism” (Schomann, 2006: p. 20) and in such 
cases a consultation forum may be made to operate as a substitute of collective 
bargaining (Marchington 1989). Under these circumstances, managers may well take 
the view that trade unions are less likely to “gain support and request recognition” 
and management decision-making can take place “without the presence of organised 
opposition” (Torrington et al., 2005: p. 483). 
Moreover, it is contended that the consultative forums, such as JCCs, are “the most 
common form of representative voice” in non-unionised workplaces (Kersley et al., 
2006: p. 126) and it is also suggested that managers may be using the ICE Regulations 
to insulate further information and consultation mechanisms from negotiation and 
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collective bargaining procedures (Geary and Roche, 2005; Sisson, 2002). However, 
this does not mean that the aforementioned mechanisms cannot co-exist together and 
empirical evidence from the 1980s indicates that in heavily unionised workplaces 
JCCs tend to rely also on collective bargaining mechanisms. By contrast, it emerged 
that in workplaces with relatively weaker union influence, JCCs mainly operate as a 
communication mechanism (Daniel and Millward, 1983). Quite recently, there is also 
strong and consistent evidence that JCCs can operate and co-exist alongside union 
forums and consequently, rights of negotiation and collective bargaining can remain 
intact. In addition, it is argued that the statutory establishment of employee 
consultation can be “beneficial to union activity” (Heery et al., 2004; Kersley et al., 
2006: p. 126). With respect to this, in unionised workplaces where a recognition 
agreement already exists it can enrich and “deepen the agenda” (Gollan and 
Wilkinson, 2007b: p. 1153). However, it is also suggested that employers may 
consider the ICE Regulations as a “Trojan Horse” and potentially a challenge to 
management prerogative (ibid: p. 1154). Nonetheless, according to Freeman and 
Medoff (1984), the interaction between employees and managers is considered to be 
the primary factor that affects the “efficacy of voice”, rather than simply the existence 
or not of trade union recognition agreement (cited in Sako, 1998: p. 12). In sum, 
Gospel and Willman (2005) provide a description of the potential outcomes for trade 
unions when they engage with the new regulations: 
“At one end of the spectrum, where unions already have a high level of membership 
and bargaining coverage, they may eschew new arrangements but use the law to 
capitalise on what they already have, and expand the scope and level of consultation 
and bargaining. At the other end of the spectrum, where unions have no presence, 
[they] will have little choice but to accept what employers may put into place…” (p. 
142). 
2.3.6 Debate about the Implications of the ICE Regulations 
Hall (2006: p. 456) describes the legislation as “a significant change” in the area of 
employment relations, whilst Blyton and Turnbull (2004: p. 266) anticipate that 
“consultative arrangements” are likely to be expanded further with the introduction 
of the ICE Regulations. Similarly, this development is considered to be a great 
opportunity and can potentially “transform the UK industrial relations environment” 
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(Gollan and Wilkinson 2007a: p. 1134). Moreover, the legislation may bring 
employee participation in Great Britain into a “more regulated” framework (Peccei et 
al., 2008: p. 362) and it is also argued that it can revitalise “joint regulation” in the 
UK, which has been constrained until now due to the “voluntarist system and 
unsympathetic institutional framework” (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: p. 1154). 
Many researchers (Ewing and Truter, 2005; Hall, 2005; Lorber, 2003; McKay and 
Moore, 2004) anticipate that “in the shadow of the law” information-sharing would 
become more widespread and evident in large organisations (cited in Peccei et al., 
2008: p. 346), whilst “joint consultation” is expected to have a stronger correlation 
with “information disclosure” (ibid: p. 348). Similarly, it is suggested that the 
legislation may force many organisations, especially smaller ones, formally to 
recognise consultation and employments rights for the first time (Wilkinson, 1999; 
quoted in Wilkinson et al., 2007: p. 1280). 
One of the key issues raised by Bercusson (2002) is whether the development of this 
legislation can potentially bring UK practices closer to the European social model or 
whether British exceptionalism will continue. In this regard, Scott (2002) has 
expressed strong reservations and scepticism regarding the potential implications and 
beneficial changes brought about by the transposition of the ICE Directive into the 
UK Employment law. In the same vein, Truter (2003) has suggested that this 
legislation is not sufficient in itself to empower employee voice and cannot play “…a 
pivotal role in the construction of a German-style social partnership model…” (p. 28; 
quoted in Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: p. 268). 
In general, the voluntarist context has led many academics to argue that the statutory 
legal framework in the UK, in relation to the provision of collective and individual 
employee rights, is much weaker compared to other EU countries (Sisson and 
Marginson, 2003; Hyman, 2003). It is additionally suggested that employee 
representation, which is based on information-sharing and consultation, is currently 
less widespread in the UK than in the more “co-ordinated market economies” of 
continental Europe (Waddington, 2001; cited in Marginson et al., 2004: p. 231). 
Similarly, before the transposition of the ICE Regulations, Sako (1998) posits that UK 
organisations are “less prone to set up JCCs” (p. 11) owing to the “relative absence 
of legislation” (p. 9). 
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A number of researchers have investigated the impact of the ICE Regulations in 
British workplaces to date, and further research is expected to take place so that a 
thorough and more detailed evaluation of the legislation can be made. In contrast to 
the earlier widespread highly positive expectations, the available evidence indicates 
that the ICE Regulations have not initiated a strong “seismic shift” (Cressey, 2009: p. 
156) and the benefits and outcomes of these regulations are still very much “open to 
debate” (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: p. 1157). It is also necessary to assess 
whether the legislation can attain its “objectives” through engagement in both indirect 
and direct methods of employee participation (Cox et al., 2007: p. 32).  
According to Blyton and Turnbull (2004), “the experience of EWCs is relevant” in 
order to assess effectively whether the ICE Directive can “contribute to fuller and 
more effective participation, rather than engender a minimalist response…” (p. 267), 
whilst the outcomes may vary “from substantial to negligible consultation” (ibid). In 
this regard evidence provided by the experience from the implementation of the EWC 
Directive indicates that the outcomes of such EU regulations depend on various 
factors, such as the: nature of statutory provisions, context of industrial relations, 
management strategies and the attitudes of employees and trade unions (Hall and 
Marginson 2005; Ramsay, 1997).  
According to Marchington (2005), employee involvement and participation practices 
tend to be “diluted and managerially-motivated” (p. 24) in the UK, but through the 
ICE Regulations they can still perform the role of: 
“…a new initiative by employers to seek co-operation from employees through various 
processes of information-sharing, consultation and financial involvement…” (ibid). 
Empirical evidence also shows that many companies use information and consultation 
mechanisms in order to promote their own partnership agreements, especially with the 
involvement of trade unions (Dundon et al., 2003). Thus, in line with the 
implementation of the EWC Directive in the UK, it is suggested that “…trade union 
representatives will have better information about pay and conditions elsewhere, 
which will enable them to introduce meaningful comparisons into bargaining…” 
(Marginson and Sisson, 1994: p. 45; quoted in Wills, 1999: p. 22). Moreover, 
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regarding the analysis of the experience from implementing the aforementioned EU 
Directive (such as: LRD, 1995; Hall et al., 1995), Cressey (1998) suggests that a pre-
existing or pre-emptive agreement may generally provide the following advantages: 
“…more flexibility, allowing for best suited arrangements to be agreed, and fitting with 
existing information and consultation arrangements…[it also] allows [employers] to 
negotiate with, and tailor arrangements regarding, workforce representation without 
statutory provisions applying…” (p. 69). 
Nevertheless, pre-existing arrangements for EWCs are not fully enforceable nor are 
they “protected” by the law (Cressey, 1998: p. 70), and similarly there is no such 
enforcement within the context of the ICE Regulations (Gollan and Wilkinson, 
2007b). If there is no consensus in the negotiations and failure to abide by the 
statutory requirements, disputes and complaints can be resolved through the Central 
Arbitration Committee (i.e. CAC). Nonetheless, Dietz and Fortin (2007: p. 1176) 
argue that the ICE Regulations, as adopted in the UK, do not provide sufficient 
enforcement and sanctions so that employers and employees will necessarily share “a 
common position” about the development of information and consultation 
arrangements. Furthermore, the “reflexive” (Barnard and Deakin, 2000: p. 341; 
quoted in Hall, 2006: p. 456) nature of the ICE Regulations is pointed out as one of its 
primary features. However, Lorber (2006: pp. 257-258) criticises the flexibility of the 
legislation which works “at the expense of minimum rights” and could result in weak 
forms of employee voice. 
The transposition of the ICE Directive should force many UK companies to comply 
with the statutory requirements. Moreover, it is anticipated that organisations will 
comply in many different ways in relation to the statutory requirements. Key matters 
of interest regarding the outcomes of the ICE Regulations include the extent to which 
UK companies have changed or will change their employee voice mechanisms in the 
future. For instance, it may emerge that organisations are opting to follow the minimal 
statutory provisions or are implementing substantial changes in the consultation 
process, thus revealing extensive divergence across workplaces.  
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Likewise, it can be argued that the ICE Regulations now cover a wide range of 
organisations after the completion of the phased implementation in April 2008 and it 
is anticipated that several medium-sized and small organisations are likely to establish 
new employee voice arrangements (Hall et al., 2009). Other indicative issues that 
need to be addressed are: the extent to which the legislation is affecting and 
promoting the spread of information and consultation arrangements in both unionised 
and non-unionised workplaces, the nature, effectiveness and diversity of the 
mechanisms and adjustments being introduced, and the procedures that are being used 
to implement these adjustments and changes.  
Commenting on the available empirical evidence, as provided by Hall (2006), the 
anticipated aftermath of the ICE Regulations can be described “as something of a 
damp squib, with cautious management and uncertain union responses” (cited in 
Cressey, 2009: p. 155). Extant case-study research indicates that the impact is not as 
strong as originally envisaged. More specifically, Cressey (2009) suggests that 
although the legislation has prompted and shaped the introduction of information and 
consultation arrangements in a number of organisations, the real influence of the 
legislation is limited and negligible. In particular, the management approach, in 
relation to the consultation process, has not significantly changed and employee 
involvement is not as active as it was originally expected to be (Hall 2005a; Hall et 
al., 2007; Hall et al., 2008). More specifically, Cressey (2009) refers to the case-study 
research that was made by Hall et al. (2007) and concludes that only in one instance 
was there actually a new agreement.  He also adds that in eight out of the thirteen 
cases pre-existing arrangements were already in place, whilst in the remaining cases 
management took the initiative to introduce new arrangements “on an informal 
basis” (Cressey, 2009: p. 155). Furthermore, no instances of employees triggering 
vote procedures or making substantial use of statutory provisions were found. With 
regard to union representatives, they appear to have “…some role but not a 
predominant one…they were not using the [ICE] Directive and its provisions to 
establish a ‘bridgehead’ for greater recognition and power in collective 
bargaining…” (ibid: p. 156). 
Overall, it is believed that the ICE Regulations have not brought “widespread 
institutional innovation” so far, which is primarily attributed to their “perceived 
     65 
Chapter 2: Literature Review
‘minimalist’ nature” (Carley and Hall, 2008: p. 29). In addition, according to the 
findings of WERS 2004, less than 20 per cent of workplaces currently use indirect 
forms of representation and further analysis indicates that there has been a decline in 
consultation mechanisms compared with the findings of WERS 1998, which 
subsequently led Charlwood and Terry (2007) to suggest that: 
“…few, if any, employers had been stimulated by the imminent enactment of the 
Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations to take pre-emptive action by 
introducing representative consultation where none existed before. However, that does 
not mean that nothing is happening…” (p. 335). 
By contrast, evidence from the IRS survey (2005) shows that consultation 
mechanisms have become more widespread, and this is predominantly attributed to 
the transposition of the ICE Directive. Another more recent survey, with regard to the 
employment practices in multinational companies, points out the impact of the ICE 
Regulations, emphasising the potential likelihood of stimulating dual channels of 
representation, resulting in separate forms with discrete consultation and negotiation 
rights: 
“…37% of cases (42% of those reporting any consultative arrangement) had made 
changes to arrangements over the previous 3 years. In nine out of every cases, such 
change involved the establishment of new arrangements at all (three-quarters of the 
relevant total) or some (one-quarter) sites; in seven out of ten cases it involved 
modifications to existing arrangements…” (Edwards et al., 2007: p. 84). 
“…the UK’s recent ICE legislation appears to be having a discernible impact… these 
developments might also signal that amongst a key group of employers’ consultation-
based forms of representation are emerging as an alternative to traditional union-
based arrangements focused on negotiation…” (ibid: p. 86). 
Similarly, Carley and Hall (2008) suggest that the legislation has prompted the 
introduction of new consultation arrangements and modification of the current ones – 
“particularly in the UK’s operation of multinational companies” (p. 29). 
Nevertheless, when providing a coherent and thorough description about the potential 
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impact of the ICE Regulations within the context of industrial relations in the 
European Union, Broughton (2005) notes that: 
“While countries such as the UK and Ireland have needed to set out additional rights 
in new legislation, bringing their systems more into line with practice elsewhere in the 
EU, the countries that give employees enhanced rights to information, consultation – 
and in some cases, codetermination – will not alter their practice…” (p. 216). 
“In conclusion, it is likely that the new information and consultation Directive will 
ensure a certain degree of harmony around the EU in terms of basic information and 
consultation provision. However, it is also likely that the existing variation in provision 
around the EU will remain in place to a large extent” (p. 217). 
Originally, Hall (2006) provided interim findings about the initial impact of the ICE 
Regulations, in particular highlighting the pre-emptive approach of employers, the 
avoidance strategy by trade unions and the relatively scarce incidence of initiatives 
taken by employees: 
“… the available evidence suggests considerable employer-led activity in terms of 
reviewing, modifying and introducing information and consultation arrangements but a 
relatively paucity of formal ‘pre-existing agreements’… This picture is consistent with 
a ‘risk assessment’ rather than a ‘compliance’ approach by management, facilitated by 
union ambivalence towards the legislation and low use of its provision by 
employees…” (p. 456). 
Finally, as previously noted, consistent and coherent evidence about the impact of the 
ICE Regulations indicates that the implementation of this legislation could lead to 
notable modifications in the context of British employment relations, if their 
provisions are enforced effectively:  
“… [information and consultation arrangements] are, in the main, not trivial; they are 
taken seriously by management and the employee representatives; they are becoming 
more accepted by trade unions on the ground; and are likely to evolve over time…there 
are lessons already for others who wish to develop employment relations in Britain 
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beyond unilateral management or traditional industrial relations…” (Hall et al. 2007, 
pp. 75-76). 
2.3.7 Legislatively Prompted Voluntarism: A Potential Conceptual Framework 
for Understanding the Implications of the ICE Regulations? 
The “UK’s self exclusion” (Gold and Hall, 1994: p. 177) from adopting EU directives 
and agreements, has contributed to the perpetuation of the non-regulatory tradition. 
This attitude principally prevailed in the past, because of strong political opposition to 
change by the Conservative government and has also continued, until recently, with 
the expressed reservation of the New Labour government. As a consequence, the 
features of light regulation have remained within the wider context of the British 
industrial relations system. More specifically, it is argued that the “tradition of 
voluntarism” was and still remains highly prevalent (Sisson and Marginson, 2003: p. 
159). Similarly, Hardy and Adnett (2006) suggest that “the British 
unitarist/voluntarist approach” has not yet changed (p. 1028), whilst Doherty (2008) 
considers that any claims for the “demise of voluntarism” are “overly simplistic’ (p. 
610). Moreover, according to Marchington et al. (2004), voluntarism has been the key 
feature of the institutionalisation of British employment relations and stems back to 
the “…Trade Disputes Act 1906, which provided the main principles of union law 
until the 1980s…” (p. 45). 
Voluntarism is still perceived as the “prevailing philosophy” and the “best way to 
resolve problems” (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005: p. 49) within the context of 
British employment relations, which is further described as “collective laissez-faire” 
(Kahn-Freund, 1959; p. 224; cited in Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: p. 179). In detail, the 
primary characteristics of voluntarism in British industrial relations include: “…1) 
non-legally binding collective agreements; 2) voluntary union recognition by 
employers; 3) a light, voluntary framework of state-provided supplementary dispute 
resolution facilities, with no governmental powers to order suspension of industrial 
action or impose ‘cooling-off’ periods…” (Marchington et al., 2004: p. 45). As a 
consequence, information and consultation arrangements and other representation 
structures do not, on the whole, draw upon “general, permanent and statutory 
provisions” (Doherty, 2008: p. 613). 
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However, Sisson (2005) suggests that the strengths of the aforementioned features 
have started to weaken “…under the weight of the regulations [for] implementing EU 
directives…” (p. 55), but employee involvement is still “…pursued with a voluntarist 
tenor…” (Marchington et al., 2004: p. 54). Taking into consideration the impact and 
experience of “analogous UK legislation” (Hall, 2006: p. 457) that includes the 
statutory trade union recognition31 and the implementation of the EWC Directive in 
the UK, Hall and Terry (2004: p. 226) argue that the ICE Regulations could result in 
“legislatively-prompted voluntarism”32 , which primarily involves the subsequent 
diffusion of “organisation-specific information and consultation arrangements” 
(Hall, 2006: p. 457) rather than the definite imposition of a standard model.   
In other words, the implementation of the ICE Regulations may result in tailor-made 
and structured information and consultation arrangements, which are predominantly 
based on the temporary needs and objectives of organisations, albeit within a 
legislative framework (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007a). Under such circumstances, 
employee involvement and participation mechanisms are developed through a 
“legislatively grounded prompting” (Doherty, 2008: p. 619) where “autonomous” 
information and consultation arrangements (ibid: p. 618) are likely to emerge. 
Moreover, it has been argued that such a framework allows for a flexible scope, with 
regard to the responses of: employers, employees and trade unions, and thus refutes 
the “one size fits all” approach (cited in Higgins and Croucher, 2008: p. 328; also 
quoted in Yeandle, 2005: p. 30; Hall, 2006).   
In other words, in the UK context, it is contended that social partners and stakeholders 
(i.e. employers, employees and trade unions) are most likely to prefer the introduction 
and establishment of “voluntary agreements”, rather than having to be liable to the 
“statutory enforcement” of default legislative provisions and standard structures 
(Hall, 2003; cited in Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 447). This preference is 
similarly envisaged in a report published by ACAS (2004), which emphasises the 
flexibility of the legislation and anticipates the development of tailor-made employee 
31 The statutory trade union recognition provisions of the Employment Relations Act 1999 
(UK9903189F) were brought into effect by the Government on 6 June 2000.  
32 Cited in several publications (e.g. Hall, 2005a: p. 5 and p. 16; Geary and Roche 2005: p. 192; Hall, 
2006: p. 457; Hall et al., 2007: p. 7; Hall et al., 2008: p. 7; Hall et al., 2009a: p. 1; Hall et al., 2009b: p. 
1; Butler 2009a: p. 199; Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009: p. 415). 
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voice arrangements based on “particular circumstances” (Tailby and Winchester, 
2005: p. 444) or “enterprise-specific rules” (Keller, 2002: p. 442). 
A thorough comprehension of voluntary information-sharing and consultation 
arrangements can provide a clear understanding of the implications of the ICE 
Regulations (Peccei et al., 2008). In this context, Hall (2006: p. 456) and Doherty 
(2008: p. 618) refer to the description given by Barnard and Deakin (2000) and 
suggest that the ICE Regulations are an example of legislation with a “reflexive 
design”, which allows for and prompts the establishment of organisation specific 
arrangements through “autonomous processes of adjustment”, rather than specifying 
“particular distributive outcomes” (Barnard and Deakin (2000: p. 341). This is 
similar to the official TUC perspective, which supports the view that “…the impact of 
this new legislation may be largely reflexive…” (Veale, 2005: p. 28). 
However, given their negative perspective on voluntarism, Gollan and Wilkinson 
express scepticism about the implications of the ICE Regulations, suggesting that they 
can hardly “…provide a platform for a fundamental change in employment 
relations…” (2007a: p. 1138), and that the most feasible scenario seems to be the 
continuation of the “… voluntarist tradition albeit within a statutory framework…”, 
adding that the regulations may end up being “another missed opportunity” for 
sustaining and enhancing employee representation schemes (2007b: p. 1156). That is, 
under these lenses the legislation is seen as being a part of “soft law mechanism of 
voluntary, non-binding social pacts” (Doherty, 2008: p. 610). Moreover, Hall (2005b) 
suggests that the ICE Regulations will potentially stimulate: 
“…the spread of organisation-specific information and consultation arrangements, 
introduced voluntarily or as a consequence of the statutory trigger mechanism being 
used, and also that there may be relatively few cases where the statutory ‘default 
model’ provided by the standard information and consultation provisions is imposed on 
companies…” (p. 122). 
Finally, it is posited that the conceptual framework of legislatively-prompted 
voluntarism is characterised as an “event driven disclosure model”, where 
information and consultation arrangements are “palliative” rather than 
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“preventative” and based on specific employer-initiated events, such as collective 
redundancies and TUPE scenarios, with the consideration of employee rights being 
temporary and ad hoc (Gospel et al., 2003: p. 346; quoted in Doherty, 2008: p. 611). 
Consequently, consultation rights have no “continuous impact on the employment 
relationship” and the triggering mechanism does not rely on a “bargaining-
consultation agenda” (Doherty, 2008: p. 611). In other words, under this 
circumstance the conceptual framework of legislatively-prompted voluntarism is in 
complete contrast to the “agenda driven disclosure model” (ibid). Furthermore, 
Dundon and Wilkinson (2009) suggest that within this contextual framework a 
diffusion of “legally-prompted forms of employee participation” (p. 415) is expected, 
whilst it is also anticipated that: 
“…the law may encourage employers to be more creative by devising their own 
schemes for employee information and consultation, rather than rely on a legally 
imposed model of employee participation under the ICE Regulations…” (ibid). 
2.3.8 ICE Regulations: An Opportunity for Unitarism or Pluralism?  
Coupar and Stevens (2005) suggest that the ICE Regulations can further stimulate the 
“debate” with regard to “unitarist versus pluralist” models (p. 43), with these two 
models, in effect, encapsulating the different approaches regarding the management 
prerogative (Bacon, 2003). With respect to this, the principles of the pluralist model 
are founded on real debate amongst all social partners and stakeholders and the input 
of employees is considered substantial, as it accepts that their voice should be “heard 
at their place of work” (Coats, 2003: p. 3; quoted in Coupar and Stevens, 2005 p. 44). 
Pluralism is also viewed as inevitably engendering “legitimate conflicts of interest”, 
with the overall purpose being to protect the interests of all the parties concerned 
(Brown, 1988; cited in Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: p. 31). On the other hand, within 
the concept of unitarism, the “common purpose” (Fox, 1966: p. 2) is the success of 
the organisation, with all parties being perceived as sharing the same goal in the spirit 
of “harmony and co-operation” (quoted in Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: p. 31). In 
addition, Dundon et al. (2006: p. 498) use the description of Goodman et al. (1998) in 
order to suggest that within the perspective of unitarism “…what is good for the 
business is assumed to be good for workers…”. It also argued that through the lens of 
the unitary approach, the employers are using employee involvement mechanisms and 
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non-union representation as a means of “incorporating or bypassing unions”, which 
is referred to as the strategy of “trade union avoidance” (Taras and Kaufman, 2006; 
cited in Butler, 2009a: p. 201). More specifically, Marchington and Wilkinson (2005) 
provide a thorough description of the managerial strategies and approaches that can 
lie behind the aforementioned models or philosophies: 
“…managers with a unitary perspective would trust employees to make the ‘correct’ 
decision, and since everyone supposedly has the same interests there should be no 
conflict between what is the best for the company and what is the best decision for 
employees. In contrast, the pluralist accepts the role of a union in the workplace and 
believes in a policy of gaining the support of unions and employees to achieve an 
‘acceptable’ solution. Pluralists believe that shop stewards should be consulted about 
changes that may have a fundamental effect on employees…” (p. 269). 
These models are also connected to the willingness of managers to share power 
(Blyton and Turnbull, 2004; Freeman and Rogers, 1999). With respect to this, Poole 
and Mansfield (1992) argue that unitarism is the preferred approach of managers to 
“employee participation in decision-making” (p. 207) and they also add that in these 
circumstances “most employee involvement practices” are supported by the managers 
under the assumption that “these do not radically affect their control function within 
the firm” (ibid). 
Furthermore, Ackers and Payne (1998) take into consideration the voluntarist features 
of the British industrial relations system, describing the British HRM and employee 
involvement practices during the 1980s as “crudely unitarist and managerial” (p. 
532) and compare them with the three distinctive “definitions/interpretations of the 
pluralist tradition” (p. 533). They also support the view that pluralism and social 
partnership can give an opportunity to trade unions “to regain a central presence in 
the employment relationship” (ibid: p. 532). However, even though it is evident that 
the EU Directive on information and consultation constitutes “the completion of an 
old discredited pluralist agenda”, its realisation now would appear to be “watered 
down” (Weinz, 2006; cited in Cressey, 2009: p. 158). Moreover, it is claimed that 
unless pluralist information and consultation arrangements evolve, the ICE 
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Regulations will achieve “very little in terms of true consultation” (Brewster et al., 
2007b: p. 1152). 
2.3.9 Information and Consultation Arrangements: A Low or High Road 
Approach? 
Using the terminology of low and high road approach, Dundon et al. (2003: pp. 63-
64) suggest that a high road strategy includes both direct and indirect forms of 
employee voice that may complement each other and result in substantial benefits, 
such as “improved management decision-making”, leading to a better climate of 
employee relations. This strategy encourages both information and consultation, and it 
may also help organisations to: enable broader forms of employee voice, contribute to 
“employee cooperation”, challenge management decision-making and “shape the 
agenda” of council meetings (Dundon et al., 2006: p. 508). In other words, the high-
road approach is described as a mixture of tailored-made employee voice mechanisms 
based on a broad agenda of issues (Doherty, 2008).  
On the other hand, a low road strategy can be adopted by management as one to 
secure a safe compliance with the minimal and standard statutory legal requirements. 
Furthermore, it is argued that this strategy may subsequently create pseudo-
participation or partial-participation arrangements, which only provide employees 
with a limited scope of influence over decision-making. Under these circumstances, 
management prerogative remains relatively strong and arrangements may be simply 
described as processes of: “information-passing”, downward communication and 
“pseudo-consultation” (Dundon et al., 2006; quoted in Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: 
p. 1156). That is, such voice arrangements are used in order to inform employees 
about decisions that have already been taken and thus the simple aim is to 
“legitimise” the whole process (Torrington, 2005: p. 483). Similarly, Doherty (2008) 
suggests that the low road approach can in practice “minimise employee input into 
decision-making and consolidate management control” (p. 616). However, other 
authors contend that “full participation” may threaten managerial authority and 
control (Pateman, 1970, 1975 and 1983; quoted in Brannen, 1983: p. 151).  
Turning to the matter of JCCs, these can be either an alternative body for collective 
bargaining purposes and hence, exert strong influence over management decisions or 
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they can just be part of the wider-company communication practices (Cressey et al., 
1981; also cited in Brannen, 1983: p. 63). In addition, it is pointed out that managers 
have the option to operate these committees, either as an integrated process that 
involves both consultation and negotiation alongside collective bargaining, or they 
can employ separate arrangements regarding these (Bratton, 2007b). In British 
workplaces, JCCs are generally considered to be “secondary to union membership” 
and an alternative form of collective voice (Beaumont and Hunter, 2007: p. 1230). To 
sum up, it remains to be seen to what extent organisations will follow the low or high 
road approach, with regard to the establishment and review of information and 
consultation arrangements, as required by the statutory provisions of the legislation. 
2.4 Synopsis and Summary 
As it has been already argued, because of its flexible framework the ICE Directive 
cannot provide uniform enforcement with regard to the consultation mechanisms in 
the UK. In fact, in one interpretation of the WERS 2004 it is pointed out that: 
“… consultation was occurring at a diminishing number of workplaces. Joint 
consultation remains a feature of collective bargaining, but has been contracting along 
with it, despite substantial recent legislative support…” (Brown and Nash, 2008: p. 
102). 
Similarly, Hall (2006) suggests that the anticipated “…upturn in the proportion of 
workplaces covered by JCCs…” (p. 462) has not emerged as expected. In particular, 
the decline of consultation is strongly evident in small organisations with less than 
100 employees and this is especially the case where there is the absence of a trade 
union recognition agreement (cited in Kersley et al., 2006: pp. 126-127).  On the other 
hand, there is recent evidence (CBI, 2006; IRS, 2005; LRD 2006; Edwards et al., 
2007), which indicates that there is a gradual renaissance “…in the incidence of 
formal [information and consultation] arrangements…” (cited in Hall et al., 2007: p. 
7) and other researchers argue that there is a slow and steady revitalisation of JCCs 
over the last few years (Brewster et al., 2007b). However, many academics have 
reservations about the implications of the ICE Directive (2002/14/EC), with regard to 
the extent to which it can revitalise the forms of employee consultation and Hall 
(2006) even goes so far as to describe its potential outcome as “…something of a 
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damp squib, with cautious management and uncertain union responses…” (Hall, 
2006; quoted in Cressey, 2009: p. 155). 
Nevertheless, the transposition of the ICE Directive into the UK’s domestic 
employment law is certainly an important development, because there was no such 
general framework of statutory provisions beforehand. This has led Bratton (2007b) to 
suggest that this legislation “…is likely to provoke further interest and academic 
research, especially in member states without a strong EWC Tradition (e.g. Britain 
and Ireland)…” (p. 462). Furthermore, through the implementation of the EWC and 
ICE Directives in the UK, “…Labour governments have attempted to balance 
promotion of deregulated flexible labour markets with a more participative dimension 
for union inputs…and voluntary initiatives such as partnership…” (Hyman and 
Summers, 2007: pp. 369-370). 
It remains to be seen from the empirical evidence to what extent all parties (i.e. 
management, trade unions and individual employees) will be actively involved in the 
establishment or enforcement of information and consultation arrangements, because 
the legislation, by itself, does not carry the weight to bring about substantial changes. 
As has already been mentioned, other factors (i.e. regulatory framework, management 
and employee attitudes, trade union strategies, and economic/business pressures) can 
play an important and influential role (cited in Dundon et al., 2006: pp. 492-493). In 
addition, independent bodies, such as: the EAT, CAC and ACAS will also need to 
contribute towards the widespread effectiveness and enforcement of the legislation. 
However, the transposition and implementation of the EU directives with regard to 
employee participation cannot be considered as newly established developments, but 
rather they are the result of long-lasting debates at the European Community level, 
with their roots lying in the “genesis of European Company Statute (1959-1970)”, as 
described by Gold and Schwimbersky (2008: p. 48). The lack of unanimity between 
all member states of the EU (and especially the notable divergence of Anglo-Irish 
countries) has led Keller (2002) to argue that: 
“… all closed concepts of homogeneity and coherence that had constituted the ideal of 
EU regulation in earlier stages of development proved to be impossible to materialise. 
     75 
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Step by step they had to be abandoned in the interest of reaching a final decision after 
more than three decades on non-decisions…” (p. 441). 
Furthermore, in the past, the UK opted-out from the routes of convergence, in relation 
to the provisions of social policy and protocol, such as “agreements through social 
dialogue” between employers and unions (Gold, 1998: p. 107). In fact, until recently 
the UK has been very slow in adopting and implementing the necessary changes 
within its legislative framework to employee consultation rights, so that coherence 
and compliance with the EU directives can be achieved.  
However, on the other hand, it is also questionable to what extent the ICE Regulations 
actually fit in with the current needs and conditions of organisations, because the 
basic provisions of consultation rights contained within the ICE Directive originate 
back to the EC debates of the 1960s and 1970s, and also rely on the Vredeling 
proposal that was devised under conditions of the 1980s (Blanpain et al., 1983; 
Docksey, 1986). In other words, as Keller and Sorries (1999) argue, the new statutory 
provisions may result in being “nothing but old wine in new bottles” (p. 124). In 
addition, taking into consideration the experience of previous and analogous EU 
legislation, such as the EWC Directive, Cressey (1993: p. 101) suggests that such 
participation provisions are very unlikely to challenge “management prerogative”. 
Nowadays, employee involvement practices tend to be unitarist and voluntarist rather 
than pluralist, with the agenda regarding employment issues being strongly led by 
management. Consequently, the ICE Regulations may predominantly provide the 
opportunity for management to establish employer-dominated arrangements, rather 
than promote: industrial democracy, social dialogue and employee participation. In 
other words, within the context of EU industrial relations, the ICE Directive will in 
reality constitute just the completion of an “old discredited pluralist agenda” 
(Cressey, 2009: p. 158). 
Available research, so far, indicates that activity and responses to the transposition of 
the ICE Directive are mainly led by employers and management. Moreover, the extant 
empirical evidence indicates that the active involvement of individual employees and 
trade unions is relatively limited (Hall, 2006; Hall et al., 2007; Hall et al., 2008; Hall 
et al., 2009). It is also evident that “voluntary participation arrangements” are 
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dominant in the British institutionalisation of employment relations, which 
consequently makes “worker access to participation highly unequal” (Streeck, 1997: 
p. 11). Hopefully, these inequalities can be eliminated, or at least lessened, through 
the transposition and implementation of EU directives on employee participation, 
such as the ICE Regulations. In this regard, Broughton (2005) provides a short 
overview about the potential outcomes of the ICE Directive by arguing that it: 
“…will ensure a certain degree of harmony around the EU in terms of basic 
information and consultation provision. However, it is also likely that the existing 
variation in provision around the EU will remain in place to a large extent…” (p. 217). 
Strong reservations are expressed about the effectiveness of imposing such EU 
directives, since “national peculiarities and idiosyncrasies” are still prevalent, and 
subsequently “genuine Europeanisation” can hardly be sustained within the 
“complex ‘multi level’ framework of [the] EU regulations” (Keller, 2002: p. 441). 
Moreover, the spirit of reluctance to engage in such matters is still evident and this is 
highlighted by the UK’s opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights33 in summer 
2007, which subsequently suggests deviation away from the concept of a European 
social dimension34. 
Using the arguments of Gold (1998) in relation to the potential impact of the EWC 
Directive, the general framework for informing and consulting employees cannot 
bring a: 
“…sudden breakthrough into European-collective bargaining like a kind of industrial 
relations ‘big bang’. It is more likely that information disclosure, consultation and 
negotiation will evolve in an opportunistic way…”  (p. 130). 
In addition, the ICE Regulations do not provide rights of co-determination to British 
employees that in other countries are already strongly upheld and adhered to in their 
employment statutory and legislative frameworks (Broughton, 2005). But on the other 
33 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2007/C 303/01), “Notices from European

Union Institutions and Bodies”, Official Journal of the European Union, (European Parliament, 

Council and Commission), 14th December 2007. 

34 Further details are provided on the website of the Federation of European Employers:

(http://www.fedee.com/histsoc.html). 
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hand, the institutional conditions in the UK (Casey and Gold, 2005), particularly in 
relation to the legal and political system, are hopefully now more favourable towards 
the transposition and implementation of EU directives on employee participation. 
Consequently, the implementation of the ICE Directive can only set a “threshold 
level” of information-disclosure and consultation in the workplaces (Peccei et al., 
2008: p. 362) for the lower-levels of employee representation, whilst the ECS model 
is relevant to the “higher level representation” that can substantially challenge the 
“strategic decision-making” (Cressey, 2009: p. 140). 
From a theoretical point of view, the ICE Regulations can be a “catapult for change” 
(Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007a: p. 1138), with the statutory provisions shaping 
employee participation arrangements in British workplaces. However, the overall 
effectiveness of these mechanisms is reliant upon the extent to which the interests of 
all partners are fully considered (Marsden, 2007). Initiatives based primarily on 
managerial control and a unitarist perspective may subsequently result in “weak 
employer-dominated partnerships” (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: p. 1152) rather 
than “robust union-management partnerships” or “robust non-union consultative 
regimes” (Ackers et al., 2005; cited in Dundon et al., 2006: p. 497). The results of 
relatively early empirical studies about the ICE Regulations indicate that they are not 
bringing substantial changes in those workplaces where trade union recognition 
agreements already pre-exist (Hall et al., 2007, 2008 and 2009). This would appear to 
be the case, because usually unionised employees can voice their views through 
structured mechanisms of representation and the extant formal agreements can already 
secure the provision of consultation and negotiation rights that are considered by 
union representatives to be superior, when compared with the statutory provisions of 
legislation. However, the provisions are proving useful in those cases where unions 
have not yet been able to get formal recognition agreements, because they at least 
allow the unionised employees to endorse the request for new or reviewed 
information and consultation arrangements and thus be actively involved in the 
development of union-based or hybrid forms of representation. In other words, the 
new provisions, on occasion, are emerging as being highly beneficial in workplaces 
where minority union-membership exists. Overall, the legislation appears to present 
challenges and opportunities and this is particularly so in the non-unionised sector, 
where there are less structured forms of employee representation or the complete 
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absence of consultative bodies (Charlwood and Terry, 2007; Gollan and Wilkinson, 
2007a). 
It remains to be seen the extent to which both partners at workplaces will become 
involved and if this is substantial then pluralist forms of consultation arrangements 
may well emerge. In particular, given the fact that compliance with the statutory 
requirements is necessary for most organisations, it is still unclear how the partners 
will work to resolve differences in future. If this does not happen, then the statutory 
provisions will be subject to unitarist and managerial manipulation that will provide 
the opportunity to employers to comply safely and minimally with the legislative 
requirements, without the establishment of coherent and effective forms of 
consultation. In sum, depending on the circumstances, the ICE Regulations can be 
either seen as a pointless EU Directive on employee participation or a good 
opportunity to promote industrial democracy in the workplace, through newly 
sustainable forms of employee voice and participation. 
2.5 Outline of Research Focus 
Empirical research will provide evidence of whether, and to what extent, all parties 
and social actors are making the best use of the EU Directive on employee 
consultation (2002/14/EC), and consequently, whether the statutory provisions on 
information-disclosure and consultation have the potential to change the voluntarist 
and non-regulatory context of British industrial relations. In other words, it remains to 
be seen to what extent the ICE Regulations will change the context of industrial 
relations and how far the employee participation provisions contained within the 
legislation will bring UK practices in this regard closer to those of other EU countries. 
In addition, the ICE Regulations prompt the need to address a series of 
questions/themes so as to assess their overall potentiality for leading to the 
establishment of more coherent forms of employee voice and representation in the 
UK. In particular, these include: eliciting the extent to which organisations have 
adjusted their own information and consultation arrangements or tailored their 
constitution agreements, investigating what sort of strategies have been adopted and 
seeking the views expressed by: management, trade unions and individual employees, 
in relation to such arrangements. Furthermore, the potential of the legislation to act as 
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an enforcement measure, thereby strengthening further the: information-sharing, 
communication and consultation arrangements in UK workplaces, needs to be 
evaluated. In other words, a pressing research need is to assess the extent to which the 
legislation can assist towards the establishment of more “comprehensive employee 
representation structures” (Dickens and Hall, 2003: p. 143; cited in Marchington and 
Wilkinson, 2005a: p. 292). Moreover, it would be helpful to ascertain the degree to 
which the ICE Regulations are providing the opportunity to employees to have a 
greater influence over management decision-making and thus enhance their own level 
of control. 
In addition, it is appropriate to explore whether under the new provisions the role of 
employee and union representatives can become stronger and therefore be more 
influential in management decision-making, thereby shifting the environment to one 
that is pluralist rather than unitarist. In similar vein, another emerging issue from the 
above review of the literature is the need to assess to what extent the ICE Regulations 
can actually provide the opportunity for promoting industrial democracy and assisting 
social dialogue in the workplace and thus result in a framework of employment 
relations in Great Britain that is closer to concept of the European social model 
(Bercusson, 2002). A number of academics have registered their strong scepticism 
towards the ICE Directive, with one suggesting that it will simply end up to be an 
unnecessary EU law on employee participation (Sisson, 2002). In particular, the fear 
is that a minimalist response will be espoused by organisations “in which a 
compliance attitude is adopted and managers do little more than tick the required 
boxes” (Dundon et al. 2006; cited in Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009: p. 415). 
Moreover, other proponents of this perspective argue that the statutory framework 
may actually provide further impetus for management to impose unitarist 
arrangements, and consequently, act as a stimulus for “continued British 
exceptionalism” (Bercusson, 2002; cited in Hall, 2005a: p. 18). 
Whatever the outcome of the transposition of the ICE Directive, it will no doubt 
provide much discourse in relation to its impact on UK industrial relations. In this 
regard, the debate around the European social dimension (Threlfall, 2007) or 
alternatively the notion of “social Europe” (Milner, 2005: p. 105), has already been 
stimulated by the implementation of the ICE Regulations amongst the social partners 
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in the UK and across academia. These debates are concerned with the extent to which 
this legislation can be an impetus for substantial changes or another missed 
opportunity for nurturing collectivism, partnership and democratisation in UK 
workplaces. Moreover, as noted in section 2.3.7, many academics (e.g. Gollan and 
Wilkinson 2007; Doherty, 2008; Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009) appear to concur with 
the view of Hall and Terry (2004) and Hall (2006) that notably portrays the most 
feasible outcome of the ICE Regulations as being the diffusion of: organisation-
specific, autonomous and tailor-made information and consultation arrangements, 
which can be described as the development of “legally-prompted forms of employee 
participation” (quoted in Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009: p. 415). Consequently, there 
needs to be in-depth investigation in order to test the validity of these anticipated 
outcomes. All the aforementioned identified themes and research objectives can be 
addressed through the conduct of surveys and case-study research, which is the 
methodology chosen for the purposes of this research endeavour. 
     81 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology
CHAPTER THREE 

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 

3.1 Introduction 
This research project primarily relies on the principles of an inductive approach, since 
the main purpose is to identify the “patterns” (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005: p. 152) 
and themes that emerge from the implementation of the ICE Regulations, as already 
addressed in chapter 1. The most appropriate research approach to achieve this is 
deemed to be qualitative, employing: case-studies, interviews, partial engagement in 
participant observation, and collection of documentation and other relevant data. 
Notwithstanding its limitations, the case-study approach does allow for an in-depth 
exploration of the main research objectives and questions that can subsequently lead 
to the genesis and development of theory. The main justification for the conducting of 
interviews is because the aim is to explore, within the context of social partnership in 
the workplace, the specific aspects and mechanisms of change in relation to the 
information and consultation arrangements. In particular, the perceptions of: 
managers, trade unions and employees regarding existing employee voice 
mechanisms are sought for each of the case-study organisation, as well as their views 
on the potential implications from using these arrangements.  
Overall, the research objective is not just to make comparisons between the case-
studies, but rather to provide an analysis about the meanings and outcomes expected 
from the new arrangements across the selected sample and within the wider context of 
employment relations in Britain. Creswell (1994: p. 61) describes the case-study as 
“…a single, bounded entity, studied in detail, with a variety of methods, over an 
extended period…” (cited in Maylor and Blackmon, 2005: p. 243). Therefore, the 
thesis follows the case-study methodology for both practical and theoretical reasons, 
because they are particularly useful when limited prior evidence regarding the matter 
under investigation is available. 
     82 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology
3.2 Using a Qualitative Framework 
In general, the qualitative paradigm is considered as the most appropriate 
methodological approach when the research objective is to “understand the meaning 
and complexity of issues rather than measuring predetermined variables” (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1994; cited in Terzi, 2002: p. 88). Similarly, Hussey and Hussey (1997: 
p. 12) argue that qualitative research is “more subjective in nature” and focuses on 
“perceptions in order to gain an understanding of social and human activities”, in 
contrast with quantitative research that is “objective in nature and concentrates on 
measuring phenomena”. More specifically, from a sociological point of view, 
qualitative methods are important because research in the field of employment 
relations deals not only with organisations but also with the people in them. In 
particular, “people can ascribe meanings, thoughts and feelings to the situation in 
which they find themselves” (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005: p. 220), and therefore, a 
qualitative research methodology is multidimensional and “has the potential to be far 
more personal” (p. 221). 
In sum, rather than “providing statistically representative data”, qualitative research 
focuses on the “exploration of processes and experiences; knowledge for 
understanding” (Scott and Shore, 1979; cited in Dix and Oxenbridge, 2003: p. 78). 
Organisations are social systems, within which the setting for social behaviour can be 
identified and because it is people that construct and maintain social systems, research 
on them is different to that regarding physical objects and systems based in the natural 
sciences. 
3.3 Epistemological Assumptions 
The term “paradigm” is defined as the “…progress of scientific practice based on 
people’s philosophies and assumptions about the world and the nature of 
knowledge…”, and subsequently, the way that “research should be conducted” 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997: p. 47). In general, paradigms are “…universally 
recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and 
solutions to a community of practitioners…” (Kuhn, 1962:  p. viii), whilst Hussey and 
Hussey (1997: p. 47) suggest that paradigms also signify a specific context of 
“accepted sets of theories, methods and ways of defining data”. More specifically, it 
     83 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology
is argued that “epistemology is concerned with the study of knowledge and what it is 
accepted as a valid knowledge” (Hussey and Hussey, 1997: p. 49). On the one hand, 
“positivists believe that only phenomena which are observable and measurable can 
be validly regarded as knowledge”, and they “try to maintain an independent and 
objective stance” (ibid). On the other hand, “phenomenologists attempt to minimise 
the distance between the researcher and that which is being researched”, and they 
“may be involved in different forms of participative enquiry” (ibid). The divergence 
between the two approaches is highlighted by Smith (1983: p. 10), who argues that 
“…in quantitative research facts act to constrain our beliefs, while in interpretive 
research beliefs determine what should count as facts…” (cited in Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997: p. 49). 
Case-study research relies on a specific epistemological position. In this regard, rather 
than establishing an objective reality, independent of beliefs and values, the research 
purpose is to highlight people’s perceptions and subjective interpretations within the 
sphere of employee relations that actually emerge, and in this particular research 
endeavour in relation to the implementation of a specific piece of employment 
legislation. Therefore, the study and its analysis are essentially based on an 
interpretivist position and people are not seen as passive agents, but are actively 
engaged in interpreting and constructing their beliefs (Terzi, 2002). From the 
“ontological” point of view and for the purposes of the research, it is accepted that 
the world is “socially constructed and understood by examining the perceptions of the 
human actors” rather than just being “objective and external to the researchers” 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997: p. 49). 
Within the context of the research project, the human actors are actually the social 
partners, stakeholders and social actors (such as: managers, employees, trade unions, 
agencies of enforcement including the EAT, ACAS, CAC etc) that are actively 
involved in the development of information and consultation arrangements. In other 
words, the research about the implications of the ICE Regulations within the 
contextual framework of British industrial relations is purely qualitative and, 
therefore, it comes closer to hermeneutics and interpretivism rather than positivism. 
As Von Wright (1993) argues, hermeneutics is based on the interpretative and 
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subjective understanding of issues and themes, whilst positivism favours the scientific 
method, which stresses the need to “seek universal laws that explain observable 
phenomena” (cited in Terzi, 2002: p. 128). Furthermore, according to Taylor and 
Bogdan (1984), qualitative research is connected with interpretive inquiry and 
assumes that the development of knowledge is situated within a certain contextual 
framework. This type of research is usually dependent on the researcher’s skills in 
eliciting peoples’ perceptions on issues and subsequently identifying effectively the 
main emerging themes and issues.  
3.4 Selection of Case-Study Organisations for the Purposes of the 
Research 
The case-study approach is well suited to new research areas or when the existing 
literature is limited and the impact of the ICE Regulations in the context of UK 
employment relations exemplifies such conditions. Moreover, a case-study approach 
embodies “…an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence…” (Robson, 1993: p. 5). 
In other words, a case-study entails research that focuses on understanding the current 
parameters and dynamics of a specific setting (Eisenhardt, 1989). Furthermore, Yin 
(1994) suggests that each selected case-study should contribute towards to the 
development of a whole study that can provide consistent outcomes regarding the 
research questions and themes, within a set of internal and external conditions. In 
addition, Terzi (2002: p. 90) argues that: 
“…through carefully selected cases and the theoretical framework; the researcher 
attempts to understand, to the fullest extent, whether different conditions will produce 
different case results and to articulate these conditions more explicitly…”. 
According to Hartley (1994), case-study methodology is appropriate when exploring 
social processes and their subsequent development as they evolve within the 
organisations. In addition, this methodology is useful when the intention is not just the 
study of a simple typicality or issue, but also the investigation of certain 
organisational idiosyncrasies, such as: employee voice arrangements. Additionally, 
case-studies can provide in-depth understanding (Geertz, 1973), “rich descriptions” 
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and “a foundation for theory development” (Van Maanen, 1979; cited in Terzi, 2002: 
pp. 90-91). 
The case-study approach is often considered when ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions are 
posed and, consequently, it can allow for the addressing of either exploratory and 
descriptive or analytic research questions. That is, the specific treatment can: explain, 
describe, illustrate, highlight, explore or evaluate the social phenomena under 
investigation (Yin, 1994). In particular, the aim of this research project is to explore 
‘why’ and ‘how’ the organisations have responded to the transposition of the ICE 
Directive and its implementation. Moreover, there is the goal of eliciting whether the 
outcomes from introducing a change in the existing information and consultation 
arrangements or the development of newly-established ones are consistent with 
management objectives. To achieve these ends it is necessary to investigate concepts 
that are interrelated, thus the research challenge is of an exploratory nature. In sum, 
the main purpose of case-studies is not just to depict the frequency and occurrence of 
a specific phenomenon, but rather to highlight occasions of theoretical and practical 
importance (Yin, 1994). 
Furthermore, Maylor and Blackmon (2005) suggest that a multiple case-study 
approach is useful, as it allows for the identification of those features that are unique 
to each case and those that are common across all cases. This approach can provide a 
significant advantage over the single case-study design, especially when theory is to 
be built and tested by looking for various patterns across the selected sample. 
Moreover, these particular authors argue that there are two ways in which to choose 
the research cases for comparison: 
“…one is to choose either an extreme situation…or a set of cases that varies widely on 
one or more aspects…the second way to choose…is to take a replication approach – 
choose a set of cases that are similar to each other and look for differences and what 
causes those differences…” (ibid: p. 249). 
Hall (2004) and Dundon et al. (2003), who followed a case-study approach in order to 
assess the impact of the ICE Directive, chose the second way and identified factors 
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across organisations that they wanted to compare in the area of UK industrial 
relations35. 
In this research endeavour although the all four case-studies represent a variety of 
different circumstances and situations, the analysis after selection is similar to that of 
Hall (2004) and Dundon et al. (2003), being based on specific parameters which are: 
(a) existence or not of a trade union recognition agreement; (b) long-established or 
recently introduced information and consultation arrangements; (c) diverse forms of 
representation structure – such as: separate or combined arrangements for collective 
bargaining, negotiation and consultation (especially where there is a trade union 
recognition agreement); (d) size of the company; and (e) various sectors of economic 
activity.  
The case-studies and sites were identified through the conducting of a survey. More 
specifically, 74 respondents (i.e. nearly a 15 per cent response rate of those 
contacted), most of whom were HR managers/directors, provided a comprehensive 
insight and overview with regard to the initial responses of organisations resulting 
from the implementation of the ICE Regulations. The survey was conducted with the 
collaboration of ACAS from December 2005 to January 2006, with questionnaires 
being sent to 500 organisations included in the first threshold, as denoted by the initial 
stage of the phased implementation of the legislation36. The main themes of the 
questions for the postal survey were: the current awareness of respondents concerning 
the ICE Regulations, the current practices concerning direct and indirect forms of 
employee involvement, the content of information-sharing and consultation, and the 
organisations’ actions in relation to the implementation of the legislation. Finally, the 
respondents were asked to indicate whether they would like to participate as a case-
study organisation in the main research project.  
35 For instance, according to Dundon et al. (2003), such factors include: (1) size; (2) structure (single or 
multi-site organisations); (3) systems of corporate governance (British or foreign-owned, public and 
private); (4) union and non-union organisations; (5) types of arrangements for collective bargaining and 
consultation; (6) geographical spread across the UK; (7) single or multi-tier consultation arrangements; 
(8) long-established or recently-introduced information and consultation arrangements; (9)

separate/combined arrangements for collective bargaining and consultation; (10) universal or union-

based election of representatives; (11) occupational classifications; (12) different sectors of economic

activity (e.g. retail outlets, hi-tech, manufacturing, financial services, public sector etc). 

36 Further details about the questionnaire are included in the appendices and notes, whilst analysis of

findings is presented in chapter 4.
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Ten organisations volunteered to participate in the research as case-studies and four 
were finally chosen with the aim being to provide a comprehensive picture with 
regard to the research objectives that could not have been obtained just by conducting 
the survey. The other six volunteer sites were subsequently excluded, two of them 
after a limited number of interviews had been conducted, as is discussed below, and 
regarding the rest of the cases access was not finally forthcoming after the initial 
positive responses. On reflection, after looking at the four chosen cases in some detail, 
the primary criteria selected for comparison between the cases were (a), (b) and (c), as 
illustrated above, because they provided rich data both within and across 
organisations. For example, in case-study one, taking into consideration the criterion 
(b), pre-existing arrangements already existed and only a review of the constitution 
took place at the Felixstowe site (in March 2005), without any changes being 
implemented. Whereas when this issue is taken in conjunction with criterion (c), 
consultation arrangements co-existed along with a union-based negotiation forum and 
a collective bargaining agreement. In addition, this organisation operates in the 
manufacturing sector, comprising two undertakings/sites and is a part of a French 
multinational company. More specifically, the consultation arrangements and levels of 
union membership amongst employees differ considerably between the two sites. In 
particular, at the Manchester site, there is only a union-based consultation and 
negotiation body and no representation structure for the non-unionised employees. 
This complex situation, with regard to this case-study organisation, gives an example 
of the appropriateness of the selected criteria.   
Similarly, the second case-study provides another example exhibiting diverse 
arrangements within the same organisation, which also centres on criterion (a). It is a 
British retail organisation that used to be in the public sector until the end of 2004. At 
the head office at that time there was no trade union recognition agreement and 
consultation arrangements were set up (in January 2005) due to the implementation of 
the ICE Regulations. At the depot sites, the pre-existing trade union recognition 
agreements with three separate sections of the workforce along with the existence of 
two JCCs have remained the same. 
Case-study three exemplifies a non-unionised organisation in the retail sector, where 
formal information and consultation arrangements were already pre-existent and no 
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changes or adjustments were deemed necessary. In further detail, it is a British owned 
organisation, with a central head office responsible for several stores. Only managers 
and employees from the Yeovil store were interviewed, but nevertheless employee 
voice arrangements are similar for all parts of the organisation. Case-study four 
provides a notable example of a relatively recently established consultation forum 
(September 2006) in a non-unionised organisation belonging to the retail/wholesale 
sector. An additional parameter, in this case, is the separate development of a 
Constitution Agreement (August 2007) in a recently acquired warehouse, where no 
formal trade union agreement existed previously and the proportion of union 
membership was rather small. In sum, all of the case-studies provided examples of 
multi-tier consultation arrangements within different sets of variables and parameters; 
table 3.1 contains a brief outline of the key features of each of the selected cases. As a 
consequence of the diverse arrangements found across the selected sample, this 
researcher would contend that the data collected from the case-studies covers a 
significant range of the evidence to be found in different UK workplaces. In other 
words, for this particular research endeavour, the aforementioned four case-studies 
were deemed by this researcher to give comprehensive insights that subsequently 
would enable a consistent addressing of the main themes and objectives of the 
research project. 
Stebbins (1992) suggests that the interconnecting chain of multiple qualitative case-
studies improves the “validity” of empirical findings, because cross-case comparisons 
in order to elicit any common features can be made and this allows for the researcher 
to gain in-depth knowledge and understanding of the research themes as the empirical 
fieldwork further develops (cited in Hussey and Hussey, 1997: p. 63). Moreover, the 
use of this multiple sampling technique allows for a deeper probing of respondent 
experiences, thus allowing for contextual understanding as to ‘why’ things are as they 
are in each organisation. Furthermore, although a general survey, such as the one 
carried out for a sample of organisations across the UK, can provide useful insights 
into the field of research objectives, its outcomes cannot probe to a sufficient depth or 
elicit a comprehensive understanding of the implications of the ICE Directive. Thus, 
the multiple case-study approach is engaged so as to achieve this goal. In particular, 
the purpose is to acquire rich data in relation to: different sectors of economics 
activity, levels of unionisation and non-unionisation, the size, the current 
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arrangements of information and consultation, the existing collective bargaining 
structures, and the operation of the newly-established arrangements in UK 
workplaces. In-depth analysis is considered also important, because these contextual 
factors and parameters have proved to be the key features in previous research (Cully 
et al., 1999). 
Workplace 
Number of 
Employees 
(approximately) 
Sector 
Union 
Recognition 
Agreement 
Trade Union 
Membership 
Information & 
Consultation 
Arrangements 
Case-
Study 1 Felixstowe site 250 
Manufacturing 
of electricity 
meters 
Yes (agreement 
with Unite, i.e. 
former 
recognition 
agreement with 
AMICUS and 
the TGWU) 
51%-70% (only 
for production and 
direct workers) 
1) Pre-existing 
Information and 
Consultation Council 
and Review of the 
Constitution 
Agreement in March 
2005 (coverage for 
all employees). 2) 
Separate union-based 
negotiation body (for 
production and direct 
workers) 
Manchester site 180 Manufacturing of gas meters 
Yes (agreement 
with the GMB) 
91%-100% (only 
for production and 
direct workers) 
1) Non-compliance 
with the ICE 
Regulations. 2) No 
arrangements for the 
non-unionised 
employees (indirect 
workers). 3) Union-
based consultation 
and negotiation body 
for production and 
direct workers 
Case-
Study 2 
Head office in 
Somerset 1000 
Central 
administration  No N/A 
Setting up of 
Information and 
Consultation Council 
in January 2005 
Depot sites in 
Bridgwater 550 
Warehousing, 
retailing and 
distribution 
Yes (three 
separate 
agreements 
with USDAW 
and the TGWU 
for different 
sections of 
workforce) 
51%-70% 
(coverage for all 
the employees)  
1) Two JCCs (pre-
existing 
arrangements already 
in place). 2) Three 
separate union-based 
consultation and 
negotiation bodies  
Case-
Study 3 Yeovil store  300 
Retailing, 
fashion and 
home-ware 
No N/A 
Pre-existing 
Information and 
Consultation Council 
Case-
Study 4 
Head office in 
Warrington  600 
Warehousing, 
wholesale and 
distribution 
No 
Only at the Bolton 
warehouse: 
(approximately 
10% membership 
of UNISON and 
Unite) 
1) Setting up of 
Information and 
Consultation 
Forum/Council in 
September 2006. 2) 
Setting up of a 
separate Information 
and Consultation 
Forum at the Bolton 
warehouse in August 
2007 
Table 3.1: Key Features in the Selection of Case-Studies. 
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In accordance with a longitudinal approach, the conducting of the main empirical 
fieldwork (i.e. visits, interviews, non-participant observation of council meetings, 
collection of the relevant documentary evidence, and also collection of constitution 
agreements and minutes from meetings etc) started in March 2006 and was completed 
in December 2006. After this period, contact was maintained with the HR managers 
until January 2008 (through a phone or e-mail contact) for the collection of further 
data or documentary evidence. As Hussey and Hussey (1997: p. 63) argue, “…a 
distinctive feature of this approach is that there is a chain of studies. Each link in the 
chain is an examination or re-examination of a related group or social process…”. 
3.5 Limitations of the Case-Study Research 
The main limitation of using this research method is the fact that it only provides 
minimal data on certain important aspects of the effects of the ICE Regulations. In 
this regard, on matters connected with employee attitudes, such as: organisational 
commitment organisational behaviour, labour turnover and absenteeism, a much 
larger data set is required, if meaningful outcomes are to be identified. Moreover, it is 
difficult to explore the implications of the newly established information and 
consultation arrangements in terms of organisational effectiveness (such as: 
performance, productivity etc), as this requires a longer time frame in conjunction 
with quantitative analysis (Peccei et al., 2007; Cox et al., 2007). In sum, a longer 
research period in conjunction with a greater number of in depth case-studies would 
help to close the knowledge ‘gap’ in relation to the nature of the link between 
information and consultation, and other dimensions of organisational efficacy. As 
already suggested, the expected ‘lag effect’ between policy initiatives and outcome 
effects can be as much as three years (Hope-Hailey et al., 2005).  
Overall, the thesis addresses the first stage of the phased implementation of the ICE 
Directive, but the subsequent reduction of thresholds to 100 employees (on 6th April 
2007) and then to 50 employees (on 6th April 2008) are outside the scope of this 
research in terms of its timeframe. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the evidence 
from the four case-studies, in conjunction with the survey and other collected data, 
will allow for the identification of the main themes that are emerging through the 
implementation of the ICE Regulations. In other words, the research outcomes are 
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expected to make a contribution towards recognising the general trends, outcomes and 
future developments in relation to this legislation.  
3.6 Interviewing and Non-Participant Observation for the Purposes 
of the Research 
Interviewing is a method of collecting data in which selected participants are asked 
questions in order to find out what they do, think or feel, which can help the 
researcher to classify and organise an individual’s perception of reality. Of particular 
relevance to this research which involves conducting case-study, interviews are one of 
the most important sources of information (Yin, 1994; Berg, 1989) and interview 
types are typically classified as: structured, semi-structured or unstructured. A semi-
structured interview refers to one that includes predetermined questions and topic 
areas, where questions are asked of each participant in a systematic and consistent 
order, but with some freedom for the interviewer to digress and probe, depending on 
the situation and the flow of the conversation (Berg, 1989). This type of interview is 
most valuable when the fieldworker is attempting to understand the principal variables 
and parameters of a specific organisation, from the insider’s perspective. More 
specifically, “…at this point, questions are more likely to conform to the ‘native’s 
perception of reality’ than to the researcher’s…” (Fetterman, 1998: p. 38). Within a 
qualitative methodology, interviews are usually semi-standardised and open 
(Sarantakos, 1998: p. 247). Furthermore, the embodied flexibility in the semi-
structured interview allows for further insights that otherwise may be constrained if 
there is a set format of structured questions that must be adhered to.  
Notwithstanding its positive aspects, the interviewing technique can be limited for a 
number of reasons. For instance, it is time consuming compared to other methods, 
such as questionnaires, and it is strongly prone to the possible bias of the interviewer. 
Apart from these limitations, the interviewing method can also be affected by factors 
common to other data collection techniques, such as: possible misrepresentation or 
misinterpretation of facts, genuine mistakes, unwillingness or inability to offer 
information and limited access. However, it is easier to “detect problems when 
interviewing than when using other methods” (Sarantakos, 1998: p. 267), because the 
interviewee as an active participant provides instant feedback and knowledge that can 
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be adapted during the interview itself and also exported to subsequent interviews 
(Silverman, 2001), a feature that is not available through carrying out surveys. In 
order to activate this mechanism during the interview stage, it is important that an 
atmosphere of trust and friendship is developed between the interviewer and the 
respondent (Lamnek, 1988).  
For the purposes of this research project, structured interviews were considered to be 
unsuitable, because little was known about the participants’ experiences prior to the 
meeting and thus semi-structured interviews were chosen as the most appropriate data 
gathering technique. This is further justified by the fact that the research goal was to 
collect information regarding the interviewees’ personal beliefs and perceptions, 
considered opinions and insights in relation to the information and consultation 
arrangements in the workplaces, all of which would be difficult to obtain through 
structured interviews, because rigid questioning would restrict the available 
opportunities or options to elicit richer in-depth understanding of these matters. That 
is, semi-structured interviews can fulfil the exploratory purpose of understanding how 
people perceive and feel about the research topics (Oppenheim, 1992); in this 
particular instance the views of managers and employees are of interest. Moreover, as 
Oppenheim (1992: p. 67) argues, “…the purpose of exploratory interview is 
essentially heuristic: … to develop ideas and research hypotheses rather than to 
gather facts and statistics…” and interviews are required when researchers aim to 
understand respondents’ perceptions or how they have come to attach such meanings 
to phenomena (Berg, 1989). In particular, with reference to the research questions and 
objectives, the interviews were aimed at attaining understanding of how the 
information and consultation arrangements are being perceived in relation to the 
implementation of the ICE Regulations.  
As previously noted, through the conducting of the survey ten respondents agreed to 
participate as case-study organisations in the research and provided their contact 
details. After formal consent by the HR managers, visits were conducted in the four 
selected case-study organisations and different numbers of interviews took place for 
each, depending on the availability and the extent to which access was granted. All 
interviews were one-to-one and face to face, apart from two that were conducted 
through questionnaires sent by post and e-mail (in case-studies one and two), while in 
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one instance there was an additional phone interview with the HR manager (in case-
study four). Furthermore, contact was maintained with the HR managers through e-
mails and phone calls until January 2008, with the purpose of collecting further data 
and documentary evidence as deemed necessary (such as: constitution agreements and 
minutes from the council meetings). The format and context of the semi-structured 
interviews are included in the appendices and notes. 
In total, twenty-eight interviews were carried out, including those with: one senior HR 
manager (i.e. the senior manager who was responsible for employment relations 
issues), other senior managers, employee representatives, individual employees, 
senior trade union officials and union representatives. All interviews were recorded 
and transcribed and then they were typed and stored in: MS Word, N-Vivo and PDF 
files. Access for the interviews in all the case-studies was provided by the HR 
managers, who personally arranged the meetings or provided the details of potential 
interviewees who were subsequently contacted by the researcher. In addition, in case-
study two, the director of Group Logistics and IT was the link person who made the 
contact with the depot director and HR manager at the depot sites.  
Even though only a limited number of the interviews were with union representatives, 
their viewpoints still provided useful insights. More specifically, one face-to-face 
interview was conducted with a trade union representative and one filled out an 
interview question schedule. However, as discussed above there are limitations when 
questionnaires are used, because in such instances the question schedule is structured 
and it is not easy or is sometimes impossible to ask follow up questions, as correctly 
conducted semi-structured interviews can usually allow for. In addition, only a limited 
number of interviews took place in case-study four: the HR and field support 
managers (whilst one additional phone interview took place with the HR manager 
after a period of one year). Moreover, no interviews were conducted with employees 
or union representatives at the Manchester site in case-study one and in fact only the 
HR manager made a contribution.  
In sum, the research approach allows for the different perceptions and beliefs amongst 
the participants, namely: individual employee representatives, union representatives 
and managers, to be elicited as highlighted by other researchers and academics 
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(Kochan et al., 1986; Purcell and Ahlstrand, 1994; Storey, 1992; Hyman, 1987; cited 
in Brewster, 2007: p. 779). Further details in relation to the conduct of the interviews 
and the job titles/responsibilities of interviewees, are provided in table 3.2. Moreover, 
in conjunction with the purposes of the empirical fieldwork, permission was granted 
for a non-participant observation in the consultative council meetings in case-studies 
one and three, which provided a substantial clear view of how the arrangements are 
operating in practice. 
3.7 Limitations in Conducting the Interviews 
First of all, as it has been argued in the previous section, the relative lack of 
interviews with trade union representatives was a considerable limitation for the 
purposes of the research. However, the two interviews with union representatives, 
which were carried out in two case-study organisations, did provide a substantial 
amount of useful data. However, access was difficult to obtain because permission 
from HR managers was a prerequisite and this was not always forthcoming. 
Moreover, in other cases union representatives were reluctant to express their 
opinions, given that they were not particularly familiar with the interviewer. 
In addition, apart from the four case-studies, two visits were made to two other 
manufacturing companies included in the survey and in both cases interviews were 
only conducted with the HR managers. One organisation is a multinational company 
that manufactures vehicle components, in which a JCC operates alongside a union-
based negotiation forum (there is also representation on a European works council). 
This organisation provided a good example of voice arrangements in a highly-
unionised workplace, given that the vast majority of employees (more than 91 per 
cent) are members of Amicus or Unite union. However, it emerged that no changes 
and adjustments had been made as a result of the implementation of the ICE 
Regulations to UK workplaces. This case-study research was not included in the 
selected sample as limited access was offered in relation to conducting research 
within this organisation. One interview with the HR manager took place, which was 
recorded and transcribed (1st December 2006), but when no permission was given for 
the collection of documentary evidence for reasons of confidentiality, it was decided 
not to conduct any further empirical research.  
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Date of Interview Job Occupation and Responsibilities Gender 
Type of 
Interview 
Case-
Study 1 Manchester 8th March 2006 HR Manager Male One-to-One 
11th March 2006 
Staff Employee Representative 
(Chairman of the Consultative 
Council) 
Male One-to-One 
Felixstowe 11th March 2006 
Trade Union Representative 
(Manufacture Associate 
Representative) 
Male One-to-One 
16th March 2007 HSE Manager Female Filled-out Questionnaire 
Case-
Study 2 17th May 2006 HR Manager Female One-to-One 
6th July 2006 Finance Board Director Male One-to-One 
6th July 2006 
Employee Representative (F 
Grade) - Buying, Marketing and 
Merchandising 
Male One-to-One 
25th July 2006 Group Logistics and IT Director Male One-to-One 
Head 
Office 25th July 2006 
Employee Representative – D 
Grade – Constituency of Finance Male One-to-One 
25th July 2006 
Employee Representative – D 
Grade – Constituency of 
Property and HR Management 
Female One-to-One 
25th July 2006 Employee Representative (F Grade) - Sales/Ledger/Finance Female One-to-One 
12th December 2006 HR Manager Female One-to-One 
Bridgwater 
Site/Depot 12th December 2006 Management Representative Male One-to-One 
12th December 2006 Depot Director Male One-to-One 
March 2007 Trade Union Representative Male Filled-out Questionnaire 
Case-
Study 3 7th June 2006 
Individual Employee from 
Catering Department Female One-to-One 
7th June 2006 Individual Employee from the Finance Team Female One-to-One 
7th June 2006 Representative from Section Managers in Fashions (DSM1) Female One-to-One 
7th June 2006 Secretary of the Store Council Female One-to-One 
7th June 2006 Individual Employee from the Warehouse Department Male One-to-One 
Yeovil 
Store 7th June 2006 HR Officer Female One-to-One 
7th June 2006 
Representative from Section 
Managers in Furniture Store 
(DSM2) 
Female One-to-One 
7th June 2006 Representative from Section Managers in Cook-shop (DSM3) Female One-to-One 
7th June 2006 Employee Representative from the Finance Group Female One-to-One 
7th June 2006 HR Manager Female One-to-One 
25th October 2006 Store Director Male One-to-One 
Case-
Study 4 
Head 
Office 
17th November 
2006 
November 2007 HR Manager 
Female 
Female 
One-to-One 
Phone 
17th November 
2006 Field Support Manager Female One-to-One 
Table 3.2: List of Interviews with Trade Union Representatives, Individual Employees and 
Management Representatives. 
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Similar events occurred in relation to the second potential case-study organisation that 
was eventually not included in the selected sample. It is part of a multinational 
company that manufactures cosmetics and has a JCC along with a union-based forum 
for negotiation purposes (once again there is a representation on a European works 
council). Moreover, approximately 51 to 71 per cent of the employees are members of 
the Amicus union. In relation to the selection criterion (c), which is concerned with 
the diverse forms of representation, in this potential case-study the union 
representatives had taken the initiative to include in their proposals the issue of the 
ICE Regulations with regard to the possibility for any adjustments or modifications, 
and in fact, these had actually been taken as an item for discussion on the agenda of 
the union meetings. Negotiations about the review of employee voice arrangements 
lasted for nearly six months (during 2006), but eventually there was mutual consent 
by both parties and partners that no changes were necessary and it was agreed to 
maintain the current information-sharing, consultation and negotiation arrangements, 
as defined in the constitution and trade union recognition agreements. However, the 
HR manager of this company did not grant permission for the recording of the 
interview (23rd January 2007) or the collection of any relevant documentation, for 
reasons of strict confidentiality and consequently no further interviews were 
conducted. 
These two case-studies, which were not included in the main sample for in-depth 
analysis, represent typical examples of the potential obstacles that are generally 
encountered and have to be addressed during the conducting of empirical fieldwork. 
3.8 Summary 
This research endeavour has a qualitative framework and is based on an inductive 
methodological approach, within the context of a case-study design. The 
epistemological stance relies on the principles of interpretivism, whilst from the 
ontological point of view it predominantly relies on the perceptions of human and 
social actors. Notwithstanding the underlined limitations, there was sufficient access 
for the conduct of interviews and collection of relevant documentary evidence within 
the four case-studies. It is notable that a substantial number of interviews with 
employee representatives and individual employees took place for case-studies two 
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and three, which helped to compensate for the lack of interviews with employees in 
case-study four. Moreover, the adopted methodology and subsequent conduct of the 
empirical fieldwork are entirely appropriate for eliciting rich data with regard to the 
emerging themes that, in turn, can allow for effective addressing of the research 
questions. 
This chapter has provided a detail account and justification for the research 
methodology. The next five chapters contain the empirical evidence gathered, 
beginning with chapter 4, which reports on the results from the survey of 
organisations in relation to the ICE Regulations that were subsequently drawn upon in 
order to identify the case-study organisations for the main investigation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 

ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY 

4.1 Introduction 
A survey was conducted with the collaboration of ACAS, between December 2005 
and January 2006, and the sample included 500 organisations in Great Britain (from 
various sectors - with at least 150 employees) drawn from the ACAS database. 74 
organisations (nearly 15 per cent) responded to the questionnaire, 41 of which had a 
trade union recognition agreement and 33 did not (table 4.1 illustrates the sample that 
provided responses) and the majority (i.e. 60 out of 74; 81.08 per cent) of these were 
from the private sector. The highest proportion of those with agreements came from 
the manufacturing sector (20 out of 41; i.e. 48.78 per cent), whilst non-unionised 
organisations from this sector were somewhat less common in terms of the overall 
sample (12 out of 33; i.e. 36.36 per cent). It has to be noted that some of the non-
unionised organisations had very low trade union membership, with 15 having 10 per 
cent or less trade union membership and only one between 31 and 50 per cent 
membership; the rest of respondents did not provide an answer to this question. 
The survey provides an interim cluster of findings for the transposition of the EU 
legislation on information and consultation of employees in Great Britain, and took 
place approximately nine months after the official implementation of the ICE 
Regulations. Its purpose was to assess the extent to which direct and indirect forms of 
employee voice were being used by British organisations, the use and content of 
information-disclosure and consultation, and to identify any changes or future plans in 
relation to the implementation of the ICE Directive (2002/14/EC). More importantly, 
the survey was also used as a tool to trace potential case-studies for the research 
project. Ten organisations volunteered to participate in the research, and finally, four 
of them were included in the selected sample for the main case-study research.  
The main finding of the survey is the fact that the ICE Regulations are having a 
stronger influence in non-unionised workplaces rather than in the unionised sector. 
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That is, the majority of the organisations that decided to take no action appeared to 
have a trade union recognition agreement, whilst those that intended to set up a 
negotiation body appeared to be predominantly non-unionised organisations. In 
addition, the findings from the survey confirm that JCCs (and indirect forms of 
participation) are certainly more widespread and evident in the unionised sector rather 
than in workplaces where trade union recognition agreements are non-existent. These 
outcomes are consistent with those of Cully et al. (1999), who argue that “…union 
representation and indirect employee participation go hand in hand…” (p. 100) and 
that, in general, there is a tendency for non-unionised workplaces to rely mainly on 
direct forms of employee involvement/participation. However, Hall (2006) strongly 
emphasises that “…reliance solely on the use of direct methods of information and 
consultation is unlikely to be considered a realistic or desirable means of meeting the 
Regulations’ requirements…” (p. 466). Moreover, drawing on the survey results, it is 
argued that the ICE Regulations are more likely to bring substantial changes to non-
unionised workplaces where representation-based bodies for collective consultation 
are not widespread than to those that are unionised. Further, it has emerged that the 
vast majority of respondents (who were predominantly HR managers) have a 
relatively good knowledge of the ICE Regulations (further details are provided in 
table 4.3) However, as will become apparent in the empirical case-study interviews, 
when considering individual employees there is strong evidence that there is a distinct 
lack of understanding of the legislative provisions.  
Table  4.1: Background of the Organisations that

Responded to the Survey.

Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
Total No Yes 
Type of 
Organisations 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Voluntary Sector 
5 
28 
0 
33 
8 
32 
1 
41 
13 
60 
1 
74 
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Table 4.2: Sectoral Categorisation of Organisations. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Type of 
Organisations 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
12 
1 
20 
0 
32 
1 
Wholesale and Retail 2 5 7 
Hotels and Restaurants 4 0 4 
Transport and 
Communication 0 2 2 
Financial Services 1 0 1 
Other Business Services 10 5 15 
Public Administration 0 2 2 
Health and Social Work 2 2 4 
Other Community 
Services 1 5 6 
Total 33 41 74 
Table 4.3: Level of Knowledge of the ICE Regulations. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Level of Not at all 0 1 1 
Knowledge of ICE Little 3 1 4 
Regulations To some extent 11 15 26 
Quite a lot 17 19 36 
Extensive 2 5 7 
Total 33 41 74 
4.2 Direct Forms of Employee Involvement and Participation 
Taking into consideration the issue of trade union recognition agreements, the results 
of the survey reveal slightly different patterns in the direct forms of involvement in 
relation to the unionised and non-unionised sectors. More specifically, there would 
appear to be a slight tendency for more widespread use of direct employee 
involvement practices in the latter rather than in the former. According to the 
empirical findings of other researchers, “…direct communication practices do not 
seem to have been used to supplant indirect representation via trade unions, but there 
is some small evidence that they may be used to exclude unions…” (Forth and 
Millward, 2002: pp. 22-23; cited in Gospel and Willman, 2005: p. 133). The evidence 
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from the survey would appear to concur with this view that unionised organisations 
continue to use indirect forms of involvement, whereas those who are non-unionised 
are increasingly engaging in direct representation to get their employee voice heard. 
In general, Gospel and Willman (2005) suggest that direct forms of involvement are 
steadily becoming more widespread and argue that “… regular meetings between 
senior managers and the workforce, problem-solving groups and briefing groups all 
increased significantly in the private sector…” (p. 132). In this regard, the findings of 
the survey indicate that there is increasing incidence of direct of forms of involvement 
amongst both the unionised and non-unionised sectors, but this is most marked in the 
latter type of workplaces. Detailed figures and presentation of the survey data in 
relation to the direct forms of involvement used by the organisations are provided in 
the appendices and notes and the analysis is primarily based on the distinction 
between the existence, or not, of a trade union recognition agreement. 
4.3 Indirect Forms of Employee Involvement and Participation 
As illustrated in table 4.4, half of the respondents indicated the absence of European 
works councils in their organisation (37 out of 74; i.e. 50 per cent) and what is more, 
twenty one did not provide an answer to this question. This can be primarily attributed 
to the fact that most of the organisations in the survey are not multinational. In fact, 
the response rate of ‘a great deal’ is relatively very low both for the unionised (three 
out of 41; i.e. 7.31 per cent) and non-unionised sectors (three out of 33; i.e. 9.09 per 
cent). Moreover, the respondents from only one unionised and one non-unionised 
organisation denoted that they use EWCs ‘often’, whilst there were identical response 
rates amongst the unionised and non-unionised organisations for the categories 
‘infrequently’ and ‘sometimes’ (three out of 41; i.e. 7.31 per cent, and one out of 33; 
i.e. 3.03 per cent, respectively). 
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Table 4.4: The Use of European Works Councils in the 
Unionised and Non-Unionised Sectors. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
European Not at all 17 20 37 
Works 
Councils 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
1 
1 
3 
3 
4 
4 
Often 1 1 2 
A great deal 3 3 6 
Not answered 10 11 21 
Total 33 41 74 
The responses reveal that there was substantial variation in the use of other indirect 
forms of employee involvement (such as: non-routinised written communications or 
meetings between employee representatives and senior managers). However, it is 
evident that unionised workplaces have predominantly adopted this type of employee 
involvement (further details are provided in table 4.5). More specifically, the majority 
of the unionised organisations (12 out of 41; i.e. 29.27 per cent) replied equally 
‘sometimes’ and ‘often’. A similar response rate is revealed in terms of using this 
mechanism extensively for both the unionised (six out of 41; i.e. 14.63 per cent) and 
non-unionised sectors (five out of 41; i.e. 15.15 per cent). On the other hand, 14 
organisations reported that they did not use this indirect form of participation at all 
and there was a higher response rate in this category from the non-unionised sector 
(nine out of 33; i.e. 27.27 per cent) as compared with that of unionised workplaces 
(five out of 41; i.e. 12.20 per cent).  
Table 4.5: Non-Routinised Written Communications or Other

Forms of Indirect Participation.

Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Non-routinised Not at all 9 5 14 
Written 
Communications 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
6 
5 
5 
12 
11 
17 
Often 4 12 16 
A great deal 5 6 11 
Not answered 4 1 5 
Total 33 41 74 
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One of the most notable findings of the survey is the responses regarding the use of 
JCCs or any other forms of employee representative bodies. As is also confirmed 
from the results of other surveys (such as: WERS 2004, IRS 2005, WMERF 2005), 
these indirect forms of employee involvement are more evident and widespread in 
unionised workplaces. Referring to the WMERF 2005 survey, Hall (2006) points out 
that: 
“…non-union organisations in the survey were less likely than unionised organisations 
to inform and consult directly, and were less likely to have information and 
consultation bodies. They were more likely to have no information and consultation 
arrangements at all…” (p. 464).   
According to the findings of this survey, 28 respondents (i.e. 37.84 per cent) indicated 
that they use JCCs ‘often’ (details are illustrated in table 4.6 and figure 4.1). In 
particular, there is a much higher response rate for the unionised sector (18 out of 41; 
i.e. 43.90 per cent) in comparison with the non-unionised sector (10 out of 33; i.e. 
32.26 per cent). Similarly, JCCs are more extensively used (i.e. ‘a great deal’) by 22 
organisations, with a higher response rate for the unionised sector (14 out of 41; i.e. 
34.15 per cent) and a relatively lower one for the non-unionised sector (eight out of 
33; i.e. 24.24 per cent). By contrast, there were 10 responses for no use ‘at all’, with 
seven of these coming from non-unionised organisations. Finally, only seven 
organisations are using JCCs ‘infrequently’ or ‘sometimes’ and in these categories, 
taken together, four of them are non-unionised. 
Table 4.6: The Use of Joint Consultative Committees in the 

Unionised and Non-Unionised Sectors.

Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Joint Consultative 
Committees 
Not at all 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
7 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
10 
7 
7 
Often 10 18 28 
Total 
A great deal 8 
33 
14 
41 
22 
74 
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A strong positive correlation between having a union recognition agreement and the 
use of JCCs is also apparent, while the trade union membership is an additional and 
influential factor. Similarly, through their own research Gospel and Willman (2005) 
suggest that “…union recognition and consultative committees appear to be 
associated in each size band…” (p. 130). More specifically, according to the findings 
of the conducted survey, more than a half of the organisations (16 out of 28; i.e. 57.14 
per cent) that use JCCs ‘often’ have 51 per cent or more trade union membership 
(further details are illustrated in table 4.7). Similarly, of the 22 organisations 
responding that they normally use JCCs ‘a great deal’, half of them have 31 per cent 
or more trade union membership. 
Figure 4.1: The Use of Joint Consultative Committees or Employee Representative Bodies. 
A great deal OftenSometimes Infrequently Not at all 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
Yes 
No 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
Members of Trade Unions 
Total 
Less than 
10% 11%-30% 31%-50 51%-70% 71%-90% 
More than 
90% Do not know Not answered 
Joint Consultative 
Committees 
Not at all 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
4 
2 
2 
0 
0 
1 
10 
7 
7 
Often 4 1 2 9 5 2 4 1 28 
Total 
A great deal 4 
16 
2 
6 
7 
10 
3 
13 
0 
7 
1 
3 
3 
15 
2 
4 
22 
74 
Table 4.7: Joint Consultative Committees and Trade Union Membership. 
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At the time of research, it emerged that those organisations that had pre-existing 
agreements and JCCs were less prone to make substantial changes as a result of the 
implementation of the ICE Regulations (further details are provided in tables 4.8 and 
4.9, and figure 4.2). For instance, twenty-three organisations had designed (or were 
intending to design) a pre-existing agreement, of which eighteen (i.e. 78.26 per cent) 
used JCCs ‘often’ or ‘a great deal’. In addition, eighteen organisations had decided to 
take no action and ten of these (i.e. 55.56 per cent) used JCCs ‘often’ or a ‘great deal’. 
To sum up, because JCCs are stronger and more widespread in unionised workplaces, 
it was anticipated that unionised companies would tend to ‘take no action’ and this is 
confirmed by the findings of the survey (details are illustrated in table 4.10). More 
specifically, thirteen out of the eighteen organisations that decided to ‘take no action’ 
appear to have a trade union recognition agreement.  
Therefore, the evidence from the survey appears to support the perspective that 
unionised organisations usually have structured mechanisms for consultation and 
negotiation, in which case the provisions of the ICE Regulations are viewed as 
relatively inferior, and consequently, no changes or modifications are considered 
necessary. For instance, of those organisations that decided to ‘take no action’, 11 had 
51 per cent or higher trade union membership, and only two had less than 10 per cent 
(table 4.10). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that eight organisations denoted that they 
intended to ‘set up a negotiating body’ and seven of these did not have a trade union 
recognition agreement in place (table 4.8). As a consequence, in can be surmised that 
non-unionised organisations may be more inclined to set up such bodies, because they 
generally appear to have less well co-ordinated and more poorly structured 
mechanisms of representation. 
It is also worth mentioning that sixteen unionised organisations indicated their 
intention to discuss their current arrangements (table 4.8), which reinforces the view 
that trade union representatives are relatively more aware of the ICE Regulations. In 
other words, this outcome is consistent with some of the arguments discussed in the 
literature review in chapter 2. More specifically, it is suggested that union 
representatives are more likely to put items relating to the ICE Directive on the 
agenda of consultative meetings and union forums, and thus, they can have the 
opportunity to review their pre-existing arrangements in accordance with their own 
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interests. By contrast, individual and non-unionised employees tend to lack the 
required: co-ordination, knowledge and expertise for taking such initiatives. Finally, 
only a small number of organisations denoted that they intended to ballot their 
workforce. 
Table 4.8: Organisational Responses and Intended Actions as a Result of

the ICE Regulations.

Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Organisational 
Response to 
Design a pre-existing 
agreement 15 8 23 
ICE 
Regulations 
Discuss with a 
recognised trade union - 16 16 
Ballot the workforce 2 1 3 
Set up a negotiating body 7 1 8 
Decide to take no action 5 13 18 
Other 4 2 6 
Total 33 41 74 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
Yes 
No 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
Design a Discuss Ballot the Set up a Decide to Other 
pre-existing with a workforce negotiating take no 
agreement recognised body action 
trade union 
Figure 4.2: Organisational Responses to the ICE Regulations. 
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Joint Consultative Committees 
Not at all Infrequently Sometimes Often A great deal Total 
Organisation's 
Response to 
Design a pre-existing 
agreement 3 2 0 6 12 23 
ICE 
Regulations 
Discuss with a 
recognised trade union 0 1 2 8 5 16 
Ballot the workforce 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Set up a negotiating body 1 1 2 3 1 8 
Decide to take no action 5 2 1 7 3 18 
Other 1 1 1 3 0 6 
Total 10 7 7 28 22 74 
Table 4.9: Organisational Responses to the ICE Regulations and Use of Joint Consultative 
Committees. 
Members of Trade Unions 
Total 
Less than 
10% 11%-30% 31%-50 51%-70% 71%-90% 
More than 
90% Do not know Not answered 
Organisation's 
Response to 
ICE 
Regulations 
Design a pre-existing 
agreement 
Discuss with a 
recognised trade union 
7 
1 
4 
1 
2 
4 
1 
5 
1 
3 
0 
1 
6 
0 
2 
1 
23 
16 
Ballot the workforce 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 3 
Set up a negotiating body 3 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 8 
Decide to take no action 2 0 2 6 3 2 3 0 18 
Other 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 6 
Total 16 6 10 13 7 3 15 4 74 
Table 4.10: Organisational Responses to the ICE Regulations and Trade Union Membership. 
Another perspective on the impact of the ICE Regulations is the level of anticipation 
that the employees were intending to vote to on whether to endorse the triggering of 
the statutory procedures for negotiations. According to the responses, in twenty four 
organisations it was considered ‘not at all likely’ that employees would attempt to 
endorse such request, whilst in a further thirty nine organisations it was deemed “not 
very likely”. In fact, only in five organisations (i.e. 6.76 per cent), was it believed that 
employees would “quite likely” do so37 (further details are provided in table 4.11). In 
line with the aforementioned evidence, Hall (2006) suggests that: “…a striking 
finding from both the IRS and WMERF surveys… is the very low expectation on the 
 During one visit, an interview was conducted with the HR manager in one of these companies. 
According to him, the issue was brought into the discussion by the union representatives, in order to 
have a review of the constitution of the JCC and also for the separate consultation/negotiation forum 
that is normally held with the union representatives of Amicus. The issue had been discussed for 
approximately 6 months, but after mutual consent, no changes were made since it was considered that 
the company already complied with the legislation, in terms of the necessary communication, 
consultation and negotiation mechanisms, as were appropriate to each body. This organisation was not 
finally included in the selected sample of the case-study empirical research, because as already 
explained in the research methodology chapter, there was heavily restricted access for conducting any 
research in this organisation, with no permission being given for documentary collection and thus no 
further interviews were finally conducted. 
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part of employers (3% in both the IRS and WMERF surveys) that their employees will 
request negotiations under the Regulations on the establishment of new information 
and consultation arrangements…” (p. 464). On the other hand, other surveys (CBI, 
2006; IRS, 2005; LRD, 2006) indicate that information-sharing and consultation 
arrangements have slowly started to emerge (Hall et al., 2007: p. 7).  Finally, the 
majority of respondents considered that the ICE Regulations could bring little change 
to the overall context of British employment relations, and this belief was especially 
strong in unionised workplaces (further details are provided in tables 4.12 and 4.13).  
Table 4.11: Possibility of There Being Endorsement of a Request for

New Information and Consultation Arrangements

Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Potential Requirement Not at all likely 10 14 24 
for new I&C 
Arrangements 
Not very likely 
Unsure 
20 
0 
19 
4 
39 
4 
Quite likely 1 4 5 
Not answered 2 0 2 
Total 33 41 74 
Table 4.12: Perceived Impact on the Employment Relations. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Potential Change 
in the Employment 
Relations 
Not at all 
Little 
To some extent 
5 
13 
13 
8 
21 
10 
13 
34 
23 
Quite a lot 2 2 4 
Total 33 41 74 
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Table 4.13: Impact on the Climate of Employment Relations. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Potential Change in 
the Climate of 
Employment Relations 
No change 
A bit better 
Much better 
25 
6 
2 
33 
7 
0 
58 
13 
2 
Not answered 0 1 1 
Total 33 41 74 
4.4 Nature of the Issues Covered in Information-Sharing and 
Consultation with Employees 
Information-sharing emerged as being consistently widespread for most issues, both 
at unionised and non-unionised sites, except for those concerned with ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility’ (further details are provided in the appendices and notes). 
Moreover, provision of information regarding ‘Training Strategy’ and 
‘Equality/Diversity’ issues, tended to be more infrequent than for other matters. In 
nearly all cases of the survey ‘information-sharing’ around issues that directly 
affected employees (such as employment and pay issues) was reported as being fairly 
extensive and this was particularly so for the unionised sector. 
Similar to the case of information-sharing, according to the findings of the survey, 
consultation was found to be quite extensive for the majority of the issues 
(predominantly in the unionised sector), once again with the exception of issues about 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility’. It emerged that employees were consulted to a 
moderate level on issues relating to: ‘Training Strategy’, ‘Technological Changes’, 
and ‘Equality and Diversity’. Moreover, it was revealed that items normally included 
on collective bargaining agendas (such as: employment and pay issues) were regularly 
put forward for consultation in unionised workplaces. Similarly, consultation on 
‘Health and Safety’ issues was quite detailed in the unionised sector, which is not 
particularly surprising given that this is generally considered to be a compulsory item 
in the context of consultation with employees. A detailed overview of the data from 
the survey on the aforementioned issues can be found in the appendices and notes. 
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4.5 Summary 
In general, surveys can provide in-depth information (Hakim, 1992) about the content 
of specific issues and constructs that are embodied in research objectives. More 
specifically, the postal survey provided interim evidence about: the use of direct and 
indirect voice mechanisms, the content of information-sharing and consultation 
arrangements, and a brief overview of both initial and future responses of the 
employers and employees in relation to the first stage of the phased implementation of 
the ICE Regulations. In general, the findings of the survey suggest that in unionised 
workplaces pre-existence of consultation arrangements is more evident, and in these 
scenarios organisations are less prone to take any action and make any changes as a 
result of the implementation of the statutory provisions. In other words, consistent 
with the available literature and other empirical research evidence, the results of the 
survey underline the assertion that union-based employee representation structures are 
more influential in terms of employee voice, and this is particular the case where trade 
union membership is relatively higher.  
On the other hand, non-unionised organisations would appear to rely more on direct 
forms of employee involvement and therefore they may engage in further action in 
relation to establishing new forms of employee representation as provided by the 
transposition and implementation of the ICE Directive. Finally, the survey provided 
the opportunity for identifying potential case-studies for the main empirical fieldwork. 
In this regard, the case-studies can provide a more thorough and insightful 
understanding of the information and consultation arrangements, because they can 
elicit a rich variety of data through the interviews with: managers, employee and 
union representatives, something that a simple survey cannot normally achieve by 
itself. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 

CASE-STUDY ONE 

5.1 Organisation’s Structure and Employee Representation 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The first case-study of the research is a French owned multi-national company. It is 
considered to be one of the biggest leaders in the design and manufacturing of meters 
and systems for the: electricity, gas, water and heat markets. It has many sites 
worldwide and two main manufacturing undertakings/sites in the UK, which produce 
electricity (in Felixstowe) and gas (in Manchester) meters and are both unionised, 
becoming part of the same group in 1989. As appears on company’s website, its stated 
vision is: “…to be the worldwide reference for delivering innovative and competitive 
metering products and systems to our customers…”. There is also a stated aim for 
‘employees’ empowerment’, in relation to which “…through continuous development, 
we give our employees the opportunity to reach their full potential and express their 
leadership, entrepreneurship and individual sense of responsibilities…”. 
Employees are designated with particular titles: 
• Direct workers (who are directly concerned with manufacturing production) 
• Indirect workers (who are the support staff) 
• Administrative and management staff. 
There is a different style of employee representation for the two UK sites in relation to 
information-sharing, communication and consultation procedures, owing to the 
variations in: culture, history and problems faced in the past. There are also distinct 
forms of representation regarding the direct workers and the rest of the employees, 
with the former being the only ones having trade union recognition agreements for 
collective bargaining purposes 
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5.1.2 The Felixstowe Site 
There is a formal trade union recognition agreement with Amicus and the TGWU38, 
which was reviewed and further enforced after a ballot (2004). Previous to that there 
was a recognition agreement with the TGWU (1989), with six trade union 
representatives and there was also 100 per cent union membership. However, after 
1989 largely because the working conditions were relatively stable, most of the 
employees did not want to be trade union representatives and after 1992 when the 
only remaining trade union representative finally retired no one came forward to 
replace him and the recognition agreement was ended by default. After that, there 
were no communication channels or any form of information and consultation 
arrangements. The management took the initiative to request volunteers as 
representatives from different constituencies (table 5.1 provides a complete list) in 
order to create a forum, but the procedures were less formal than before and between 
1992 and 1998, there was communication and consultation with direct workers, but 
not with the indirect workers. In other words, management’s main efforts were just 
put into having communication with the direct workers, constituting about 100 
employees, leaving the support staff, who numbered about 50, largely unrepresented. 
In 1998, owing to a significant downturn in business, a decision to make redundancies 
was taken. However, because of the legal requirements, as prompted by the British 
government39, they had to set up a consultation body for all the areas affected by the 
proposed dismissals, so as to comply with the required procedures. Hence, through 
the instigation of management a formal consultative committee was created, which 
was a pre-cursor to the later established Consultative Communication Committee or 
Company Consultative Committee (CCC). Moreover, employee representatives and 
trade union officials were actively involved in this process. In addition, a trade union 
recognition agreement and union-based representation were re-established and with 
the external involvement of ACAS, a new constitution was written and agreed upon, 
which amongst other measures required there to be: a chair person, a deputy chair 
person and elected representatives. 
38 On 1st May 2007, Amicus and TGWU merged and formed the biggest union in the UK, which is

known as: Unite the union (http://www.unitetheunion.org/). Therefore, it is implicitly assumed that the

organisation has a trade union recognition agreement with Unite. 

39 Department of Trade and Industry (1996), Redundancy Consultation and Notification, PL 833 (rev3); 

Department of Trade and Industry (1998a), Employees’ Information and Consultation Rights on 

Transfers of Undertakings and Collective Redundancies, Public Consultation Document URN 97/988.  

     113 
Chapter 5: Case-Study One
During the development of the Constitution Agreement, the members of the 
committee decided what kind of information should be communicated and how the 
consultation process would take place. Since this time the CCC has included 
representatives from all areas across the site and consists of: one place for the senior 
trade union representative, two for those from the manufacturing associates, one from 
each constituency, nominated managers, and a representative from the HR 
department. As described by the HR manager, it involved an “evolution” process. 
Since 1998, the business has been continuously growing, with the number of 
employees steadily increasing and it is being claimed by the HR manager that there is 
a very good climate for employment relations, with jobs being generally secure. 
Currently, the CCC is the main representative body at the Felixstowe site. It has a 
hybrid form as it involves the: direct workers (about 50 per cent of them are trade 
union members), indirect workers and the other administrative/support staff. That is, 
this is a representation body for union and non-union employees. Alongside these 
meetings there is a union-based forum for negotiation and discussion of collective 
issues, as defined in the trade union recognition agreement with Amicus and the 
TGWU. In addition, a variety of other methods are used as a part of the company’s 
daily working practices; these mainly include direct involvement practices (based on 
downward and two-way communication schemes), such as: team/department 
meetings, site communication briefings, focus groups or workshops, staff newsletters, 
noticeboards and e-mail notices/reporting40. Another factor that affected the company 
was a change of the ownership during the 1990s, which internationalised it further and 
thus this helped the management to be more aware of the legislative requirements 
prompted by the European directives. Moreover, this increased internationalisation 
resulted in the election of one representative from the Felixstowe site onto the 
European works council. At the time of the research, the total number of employees 
had risen to approximately 250.  
40 Further detailed information and other insightful aspects, about the level of direct and indirect voice 
mechanisms at the Felixstowe site, are provided in the appendices and notes. 
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5.1.3 The Manchester Site 
At this site, the structure of the company is similar to that in Felixstowe, but the 
situation is different in relation to the form of employee representation and voice 
mechanisms. In this regard, all the direct workers (about 60 to 70 employees) are 
trade union members and there is a trade union recognition agreement with the GMB 
union, but there is no formal body of representation for communication and 
consultation with the indirect workers or the rest of the staff. That is, there is a 
communication, consultation and negotiation body involving seven trade union 
representatives for the direct workers, whereas the rest of the workforce only engages 
in direct communication and consultation arrangements that are based on downward 
and in some cases two-way communication mechanisms41. 
In 1989, the total number of employees was about 1,200, whereas by 1994, the 
number had decreased to about 750 as the deregulation of the utility market had 
deeply affected the company. Moreover, in 1994 sales reduced significantly because 
of the main customer’s decision not to purchase mechanical gas meters any longer but 
to acquire static meters instead. This change was the main dominant challenge that the 
company had to address during the 1990s and this later deeply affected the form of 
employee representation, not least because the number of employees was drastically 
reduced to 180 early in 1994. However, after a few months, the orders came back to 
the standard level, because it turned out that the static meters that the customer had 
opted for did not work after rigorous testing and consequently, the number of 
employees increased so that by the end of 1994 there were approximately 250. 
Nevertheless, since this time the company has primarily used short-term contracts 
(STCs) and now employs a substantial number of agency workers. As the HR 
manager noted, the dramatic changes in the number of employees that involved large 
scale collective redundancy “traumatised the employee relations”. Furthermore, the 
HR manager added that the harsh period of redundancies left the direct workers 
perceiving that the trade union recognition agreement with the GMB was the only 
“shield” capable of “defending” their collective rights (i.e. regarding consultation 
and negotiation) and therefore they sanctioned the union to operate through a highly 
41 Further detailed information and other insightful aspects, about the level of direct and indirect voice 
mechanisms at the Manchester site, are provided in the appendices and notes. 
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structured formal forum. Currently, the total number of employees is approximately 
180 (including full and part-time).  
Since 1994, because of there being a confrontational relationship between 
management and trade union representatives, any initiative to set up a consultative 
council or any other broader form of representation alongside that of the trade union 
forum, was seen by the union officials as an attempt to limit their power over 
consultation and negotiation rights, thereby enhancing management: involvement, 
power and prerogative in the decision-making process. Another notable feature is the 
fact that the UK representative on the European works council comes from the 
Felixstowe site and there is not one from Manchester. In this regard, the trade union 
representatives at the Manchester site appear to be indifferent to having a ballot in 
order to elect a representative to this council, which shows how strongly attached they 
are to the trade union recognition agreement and their ambivalence, if not hostility, to 
any other form of employee representation.  
5.1.4 Overview 
The CCC is formally the main information-sharing, communication and consultation 
body at the Felixstowe site. However, on both sites collective negotiation, 
consultation and communication procedures over: pay, terms and conditions (or other 
employment issues etc), involve: the trade union officials (who represent the direct 
workers), the HR manager and manufacturing management. Indirect workers and 
administrative staff are not trade union members and do not have a collective 
agreement. At the Manchester site, these employees consult individually without any 
formal system of collective representation, whereas at the Felixstowe site they are 
represented through the CCC meetings. Moreover, on both sites the negotiation 
procedures for indirect workers and administrative staff are carried out at the 
individual level. There is direct provision in relation to information-sharing and 
communication to all employees through the company’s intranet, e-mail reporting, 
notice boards etc42. Both sites have experienced periods of intense and conflictual 
industrial relations, with job losses and employment insecurity, mainly caused by 
market pressures and these problems and constraints have affected the form that 
42 The level, content and issues included in the arrangements of informing and consulting with the 
employees at both sites, are provided in detail in the appendices and notes. 
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employment relations have taken and hence, the style of workplace representation at 
each site. With respect to this, the outcomes have been different at the two sites, in 
that there are distinct undertakings/establishments and the reasons for this are 
explored in detail in the following sections.  
5.2 Interviews and Collection of the Qualitative Data 
For the purposes of the research, semi-structured interviews were conducted with: the 
HR manager, an employee representative and a senior trade union official. 
Furthermore, access was granted for the collection of relevant documentation (such as 
Constitution Agreement documents and minutes from six different CCC meetings) 
and non-participant observation of a consultative meeting at the Felixstowe site.  
Two visits were made to the company’s sites, one in Manchester (in March 2006) and 
the other in Felixstowe (in May 2006). The first interview with the HR manager, who 
is now the HR director for both UK sites, took place in Manchester. Two months 
later, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the staff employee 
representative (who is also the chairman of the consultative council) and a trade union 
representative at the Felixstowe site, aimed at collecting information about: the 
history and current status of employee voice mechanisms, the use of information and 
consultation arrangements, perceptions about the impact and effectiveness of these 
mechanisms and arrangements, and also the attitude towards and level of awareness 
regarding the ICE Regulations. In addition, it should be noted that the chairman of the 
consultative council is also the Felixstowe representative for the company’s European 
works council. At the time of research, all the interviewees had worked for 
approximately 15 to 20 years in the company, and therefore, they had an in-depth 
knowledge regarding the developments in terms of such matters as employee 
representation and changes to employee voice mechanisms over the period in 
question. 
The current HR manager of the company, in the UK, originally started his job at the 
Manchester site. During the 1990s, he became HR director for both the Manchester 
and Felixstowe sites. Additionally, he is the company’s current global HR director for 
the electricity business line. There was a long and detailed interview, which lasted 
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approximately three hours and he provided extensive information about the employee 
involvement practices and representation at both sites. He began the interview by 
presenting the history and structure of the company in substantial detail, which helped 
the researcher, in particular, to acquire a comprehensive understanding regarding the 
background to employee voice history at both sites. Both the employee representative 
(who is also the chairman of the CCC meetings) and the senior trade union official at 
the Felixstowe site have worked in the company since about 1990, the latter’s job title 
being that of process controller. The chairman of the CCC meetings is currently the IT 
coordinator and representative of the shop floor manufacturing employees at the 
Felixstowe site and he is also the sole UK representative for the European works 
council. Finally, the manager of Health, Safety and Environment Issues provided, 
through a filled out questionnaire, her opinion and views about the information and 
consultation arrangements across the company. It should be noted that she was the HR 
manager of the company when the CCC forum was initially set up (1998 to 1999) and 
was also greatly involved in the development of the company’s council.  
5.3 The CCC Meetings at the Felixstowe site 
5.3.1 Adjustments and Reviews – The Impact of the ICE Regulations 
According to the Constitution Agreement document that was signed by management, 
trade union and employee representatives: 
“consultation is the process by which management and employees or their 
representatives jointly examine and discuss issues of mutual interest. It involves 
seeking acceptable solutions to issues through genuine exchange of views and 
information. It does not remove the right of managers to manage but imposes an 
obligation that the views of employees will be sought and considered before decisions 
are made” (April, 2005: p. 3), 
“provision of information is the process by which management communicates 
information to employees or their representatives and will depend on the subject matter 
and impact nature of the issue; all persons will respect the confidentiality of issues 
when identified – this requirement will be clearly communicated at the time” (ibid). 
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It should be noted that the previous CCC Constitution Agreement (2003) was brought 
to the table for review by the HR management team during a CCC meeting in March 
2005. In particular, it was put on the agenda in order to ensure compliance with the 
ICE Regulations, thereby demonstrating that the HR management team had 
endeavoured to secure employee approval for any proposed changes. More 
specifically, in February 2005, the ICE Regulations were initially discussed in a 
subgroup (named the Joint Working Group). Subsequently, the HSE manager43 
briefed a CCC meeting about the contents of the regulations, putting forward potential 
methods for communication and stressing the importance of confidentiality. She also 
circulated a summary sheet containing the main discussion points of the subgroup, 
which afterwards were accompanied by the minutes of the CCC meeting, with the 
agreement that a draft of the latter would be distributed within five to seven working 
days of the meeting.  
The representatives were advised during the CCC meeting that they were bound to 
acknowledge their acceptance of the changes contained within the minutes, unless 
they had any amendments to suggest, in which case, these would been reconsidered at 
the following committee meeting for further review. In addition, all the necessary 
preparations were taken for the forthcoming nominations and elections of 
representatives for the newly formed CCC (in May 2005). Other issues related to the 
composition of CCC meetings, were also discussed, such as the definition of: 
appropriate representation and the roles and responsibilities of representatives. 
Subsequently, the HSE manager updated the Constitution Agreement and emailed it 
to all the representatives, which was then followed by an acknowledgement sheet that 
was circulated for signing by all concerned to indicate their acceptance of the 
reviewed document. The view was expressed that all the aforementioned procedures 
were considered to be “in compliance with the ICE Regulations” (CCC minutes, 9 
March 2005: p. 4). 
In reality, no significant changes or further amendments were made, and all the 
representatives officially signed the reviewed Constitution Agreement (March 2005) 
in order to endorse their approval, which was subsequently deemed to be effective 
43 The current HSE manager was the HR director in 1998 to 1999. She was greatly involved in the 
development of the CCC meeting. 
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from 6th April 2005. The HR manager and all members of the CCC believe that this 
review actually reflects a Pre-Existing Agreement (PEA)44 for the Felixstowe site. In 
general, in such cases, it is suggested that “the parties are given a free hand in 
agreeing the nature of the information and consultation arrangements that will 
apply” (Hall, 2006: p. 460). PEAs also provide flexibility that allows for 
“arrangements which best suit the structure and culture of the organisation” (CBI, 
2004: p. 18). However, there is no such full coverage of representation or similar 
Constitution Agreement for the other establishment (or undertaking) located in 
Manchester. In addition, in the document of the Constitution Agreement, it is 
explicitly underlined that the CCC is not a negotiation forum. 
“All collective bargaining issues relevant to the union recognition agreement may be 
brought up in the separate [union-based] forum as defined in that agreement” 
(Constitution Agreement Document, April 2005: p. 4).  
The company takes the view that its agreements at the Felixstowe site fully comply 
with the legislation and only minor tidying up amendments needed to take place with 
regard to the Constitution Agreement. In other words, the first CCC constitution 
document, which was agreed and signed by elected representatives and trade union 
officials between 1998 and 1999, was the main driver that actually established the 
current agreement. Therefore, by securing employees’ approval for the recent review 
of the CCC constitution, it appears that the management team unilaterally and legally 
underpinned its existing arrangements with a formal voluntary agreement and thus 
limited the possibilities for the employees to trigger further negotiations under the 
regulatory statutory procedures. If there was a request for negotiations, the subsequent 
ballot would require at least 40 per cent of the employees to endorse the request for 
new negotiations. However, this would seem to be highly unlikely because all the 
partners: management, employee representatives, and trade union stewards have 
expressed their current contentment with the agreed constitution. It is worth 
mentioning that there is a specific section in both Constitution Agreements (in April 
2005 and September 2003) about the potential ways of changing and altering the 
arrangements. More specifically: 
44 The constitution of the CCC formally meets the criteria of the PEA, because it is written, covers all 
the employees in one undertaking, was approved by employee representatives and sets out clearly the: 
information, communication and consultation mechanisms. 
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“…the Constitution will be periodically reviewed by the HR manager and 
Chairperson. Normally this will be on a bi-annual basis. The exceptions to this 
timescale will be where the Constitution requires amendments according to UK 
legislation and/or best practice under ACAS recommendations” (Constitution 
Agreement Document, April 2005: p. 11).  
5.3.2 The Composition of the CCC Meetings 
The CCC is composed of representatives to cover all the employees, including 
management and as shown in tables 5.1 and 5.2, the representatives encompass all the 
various constituencies. Moreover, all the employees of the company can be a 
representative as soon as they have achieved six months service. 
The council can have a rotating chairperson on a yearly basis who can be either an 
employee or a management representative. Usually, the elections for the CCC are held 
on a bi-annual basis in the middle of the calendar year. Moreover, all the elected 
representatives are given training in how meetings should be conducted and how they 
can benefit from them. For all intended purposes, the election procedures are in 
accordance with ACAS recommendations, in that they are fair and transparent (Dix 
and Oxenbridge, 2003). The forum meets formally on a bimonthly basis, with special 
meetings being called when deemed appropriate by the chairperson and the meeting 
dates are published annually. One acceptable justification for special meetings is 
when there is a significant site wide issue, which requires communication and 
consultation prior to the next scheduled meeting, such as a major business issue like 
collective redundancy that requires consultation in accordance with the legislative 
requirements. According to the Constitution Agreement document: 
“Chairpersons will conduct the business of the meetings and encourage freedom of 
expression and active participation. They will also convene the meetings. The meetings 
will normally be 2hrs in duration unless significant additional discussion is 
appropriate and agreed” (April 2005: p. 7). 
     121 
Chapter 5: Case-Study One
Group 
No. of 
Reps 
Constituency / Representation 
Manufacturing 
Associates 
2 • Shop floor: direct workers 
Manufacturing 
Associates 
1 
• Shop floor ‘direct workers’ who are eligible members of 
Amicus and TGWU 
Staff 4 
      All staff in all other Departments: 
• MIS / Finance / HR / Site Facilities / Sales & Marketing (1) 
• Manufacturing Engineering (2) 
• Product Development / Global Product Marketing / Systems 
Residential (1) 
Management 4 
• Member of Senior Management Team (2) 
• HR Manager (1) 
• Other Management (1) 
Table 5.1: Composition of the Participant Representatives on the Consultative Council at the 
Felixstowe Site (Source: Constitution Agreement Document, April 2005: p. 4). 
According to the Terms of Reference, the group is responsible for discussing 
collective issues. However, when issues are not in consort with the remit of the CCC 
or should be dealt with in another forum, the group may refer the individuals 
concerned to the appropriate person in the company. Moreover, for those issues that 
affect only specific areas, subgroups may be formed and empowered to make 
decisions on issues concerning that specific subgroup. Nevertheless, their 
updates/feedback will be communicated to the rest of the CCC membership via e-mail 
or any other method deemed appropriate. 
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Management Representatives Employee Representatives 
Management Representatives will be 
from across the Management Team 
All significant employee groups are represented on a 
constituency basis and should be elected by the 
employees that they will represent 
A member of the Senior management 
team must be present at all CCC 
meetings 
Six out of the seven Employee Representative 
positions will be elected in accordance with the CCC 
constitution 
The four Management 
Representatives will also have 
designated substitutes 
The company will retain one position on the 
Company Consultative Council for the Union’s 
Senior Representative for the purpose of 
representation of the Manufacturing Associate 
Members of the Unions, as defined in the Union 
Recognition Agreement signed on 17 July 2003 
Where appropriate the ‘Other 
Management’ representative may be 
periodically replaced at the discretion 
of the other 3 Management 
Representatives 
In the Manufacturing Associate constituency, the two 
Employee Representatives for Shop Floor ‘directs’ 
must represent all ‘direct’ Manufacturing Associates 
for consultation purposes, whether the Employee 
Representatives or constituents are members of the 
Company recognised unions or otherwise 
All collective bargaining issues relevant to the 
Union Recognition Agreement may be brought up 
in the Separate forum as defined in this 
Agreement; the CCC is not a negotiation forum 
Table 5.2: Composition and Roles of the Participant Representatives on the Consultative Council 
at the Felixstowe Site (Source: Constitution Agreement Document, April 2005: pp. 4-5 and 8-10). 
5.3.3 The Purpose and Role of the CCC Meetings 
According to the HR manager: 
“… the purpose of the meetings is to consult, communicate and discuss what we would 
call…site-wide issues – in other words, issues that are affecting all the employees, 
rather than little and tiny issues…which can be resolved by the managers in the 
locality…(and)…it is really the opportunity to open up any other business discussion… 
I guess the main objective is to have a forum where employees right from the lower 
levels can sit in front of the general manager and can bring issues…[in order to] work 
and put together our policies, and communicate our policies…”. 
As stated in the Constitution Agreement, the council’s purpose is “to provide a 
framework in order to continually improve business performance through the 
involvement of all employees in the decision making” (p. 3). The evidence from this 
123

Chapter 5: Case-Study One
site would appear to support Ramsey’s (1997) claim that the setting up of a CCC, or 
its equivalent, is an attempt to make employees more receptive to significant changes 
(e.g. collective redundancies) during periods of economic pressure. Moreover, 
consistent with the views of Marchington et al., (2001) and Dundon et al., (2006) it 
emerges that the main reason for having this forum is due to the company’s belief that 
employee participation practices are generally welcome, especially if they contribute 
to improved: performance, efficiency, profitability and competitiveness. Furthermore: 
“the management representative gauges site wide issues/concerns from the Council 
and Constituency, feeding them into the management team. They also represent 
management opinion and Company policies, and raise site wide issues for discussion, 
where possible, before they are implemented into the organisation” (Constitution 
Agreement Document, April 2005: p. 8). 
Overall, the main duties of the elected and nominated representatives45 are to maintain 
regular contact with their constituency members in order to receive relevant requests 
from them, which they can present to the CCC meetings for consultation, when 
deemed appropriate. In addition, they have the duties of informing their members of 
any actions taken and of reflecting accurately the views of their constituencies.  
5.3.4 Agenda and Issues for Discussion During the CCC Meetings 
The CCC agenda includes information on issues, such as: reviews of the business and 
financial results, overviews of QHSE issues and HR updates. In addition, 
management is expected to provide appropriate information, wherever possible, so as 
to “provide meaningful consultation to take place” (Constitution Document for CCC, 
April 2005: p. 3) in relation to substantial matters, such as proposals for significant 
organisational or contractual changes. Moreover, the management representatives are 
in a strong position to raise and explain site wide issues for discussion, such as: 
company policy. In brief, the standard agenda items for the CCC meeting are as 
follows: 
• Actions/minutes from the last meeting 
• Issues raised by employee representatives 
45 The roles and responsibilities of management and employee representatives are illustrated in detail in 
the appendices and notes. 
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• European Company Council (ECC or EWC) update 
• Any other business issues. 
The agenda items are to be received by the council secretary ten working days before 
the meeting date and each representative is to be sent the final agenda three days 
before the meeting. The council secretary is also responsible for taking and issuing 
minutes, which should be: 
“…in summary form with relevant detail included where appropriate, be an accurate 
record of the main points raised and any decisions reached, indicate who is responsible 
for taking action on particular topics, and be used by the Chairperson to monitor 
progress on any action points decided by the CCC…” (Constitution Agreement 
Document, April 2005: p. 7). 
The draft of the minutes is distributed to the representatives, who finally give their 
approval and/or make suggestions for amendments to the secretary. 
In addition, issues that should be discussed under the requirements of employment 
law, such as: maternity/paternity changes, age legislation and age discrimination, are 
typical matters brought to the company council as part of the consultation process. 
That is, ordinary employees are encouraged to express their opinions on such matters 
and also to put forward to their representatives suggestions for agenda items for 
discussion at the CCC meetings. As the chairman noted, “…I do not remember any 
major issues that have gone by without their letting us know…”. Furthermore, 
financial issues, training and development or any issue that directly affects employees 
are regularly included on the agenda46. According to the senior trade union official:  
“…usually they [i.e. the management] inform us on most of the business or other 
important issues, decisions or changes…we have a meeting for everyone from the shop 
floor about finances, changes and everything here…”. 
46 The level, content and issues included in the arrangements of informing and consulting with the 
employees at the Felixstowe site are included in the appendices and notes’. 
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However, the company’s strategic issues are mainly discussed at the European works 
council meetings, rather than at CCC meetings. Finally, as previously noted, in the 
Constitution Agreement there is a strong emphasis on confidentiality around any 
issues that are discussed, in that all those involved must not divulge company matters 
to the outside world or the external market. 
5.3.5 Non-Participant Observation of a CCC Meeting (on 11th May 2006) 
A non-participant observation of one of the CCC meetings was conducted in May 
2006, with informal discussions taking place with the chairman and the HR secretary 
prior to the meeting. Both confirmed to the researcher that after 1998 the council 
constitution was continually reviewed and modifications to the proceedings around 
CCC meetings took place whenever it was considered necessary. In this regard, before 
the implementation of the ICE Directive the interviewees confirmed that in March 
2005 the issue was discussed and a reviewed Constitution Agreement was endorsed 
and signed by all representatives, but no changes were finally made because there was 
a consensus that they already complied with the legislation47. Moreover, according to 
the representatives the majority of individual employees do not know much about the 
legislation, whereas at first it appeared that the management representatives and union 
stewards have keen awareness with regard to the ICE Directive. However, it 
transpired that the chairman of CCC meetings was unsure about the exact date that the 
ICE Regulations came into force and also it turned out that it was the HR and HSE 
management teams that initially brought the matter forward for discussion.  
There is a well structured network of communication (through the internal website, e-
mail reporting, staff newsletters etc) and the chairman always sends an e-mail to all 
the representatives before the meeting, providing detailed information about it. The 
main issues included on the agenda (apart from the standard items) on this particular 
occasion were: review and overview of business/QHSE issues, subgroup updates and 
HR updates. There was an open climate in the meeting and the employee 
representatives, in particular, were very forthcoming. This observation was backed up 
by one employee representative and the trade union official who both noted at 
interview that the managers are always ready and open to hear any sort of problems. 
47 Further details are provided in section 5.3.1. 
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During the meeting, a lot of issues were discussed, some of which were trivial (i.e. the 
development of a new car parking area, trolleys, payslips etc), whereas others were 
more critical (i.e. review of business and financial issues, QHSE issues, the 
forthcoming European works council meeting, the development of the relationship 
with the other UK site in Manchester, HR issues, appraisal system, maternity and 
paternity policies/procedures and adoption leave policies/procedures). In addition, 
matters related to corporate social responsibility, such as blood donation sessions 
were discussed. Finally, towards the end of the meeting one of the management 
representatives announced that some changes in the production line were going to be 
made (including the insertion of a new manual line), adding that the number of 
temporary manufacturing associates would have to be increased and new working 
shifts would be assigned for weekends and bank holidays, owing to the increased 
production levels. 
5.4 ICE Regulations: Current Attitudes of Trade Unions, Individual 
Employees and Management 
5.4.1 Employee Involvement Arrangements and Representation Structures 
As noted previously, the different culture, history of representation, level of trust and 
other contextual factors, have affected significantly the climate of employment 
relations and hence, the way that communication and consultation procedures take 
place at the two sites. In particular, using the terminology of the relevant literature, the 
different history or “historical baggage” of employee relations (Beaumont et al., 
2005: p. 94) has strongly shaped the style of representation structures at the two sites 
and in fact, both have followed different evolutionary paths.  
At the Manchester site, the big upheaval (1994), created a demarcation line between 
management and direct workers, in relation to consultation and negotiation 
procedures. With respect to this, unionised employees have been indifferent and in 
some cases hostile to any new legislative arrangements, because they perceive such 
initiatives and arrangements as a challenge to their union-based representation 
structures. This is in line with the arguments and empirical findings of Gollan (2007: 
p. 95), who stressed that “the extent of the trade union role appears to be the issue” 
in relation to the forms and arrangements for informing and consulting with the 
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employees. Moreover, everything is formally applied, with consultation and 
negotiation being carried out through the trade union officials and any other form of 
representation is considered to be a threat to unionised employees, because they are 
afraid that such initiatives may undermine the their extant negotiation and 
consultation rights. In this regard, according to the HR manager the trade union 
officials strongly argued that “…we do not want anything that would circumvent the 
trade union”. 
In general, on both sites, union-based negotiation arrangements have evolved over 
time and are reported by both management and union representatives to be highly 
effective, although with there having been some conflict during the 1990s. At the 
Felixstowe site, there is a hybrid form of union and non-union consultation for all the 
employees. More specifically, as the HR manager claimed, there is an open culture 
and high level of trust at this site and on the whole there is not “…the cut and thrust 
of the trade union and management…”. He also stressed the main role of the CCC 
meetings, explaining that it is different to that of the trade union negotiation body: 
“…we communicate [directly] to everyone…we consult with the representatives and we 
negotiate with the trade unions…[if the legislation changes and we need to amend our 
policies] we consult and say ‘this is what we are proposing’…one of the 
representatives might come back with an alternative way and we discuss it, and we 
come to an agreement…negotiation is basically where perhaps we have different views 
[with the trade union officials]…” (HR Manager). 
In Manchester, there is clearly only union-based representation for the direct workers. 
The HR manager provided an explanation for the union’s wary approach towards the 
setting up of a consultative council or any other form of representation by saying that: 
“from the trade union view, setting up anything else apart from the trade union 
negotiation/consultation machinery would shed the power of their rights…”. 
He also attributed the union avoidance to the fear that the influence of union 
representatives could easily be marginalised through broader forms of representation 
because: 
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“they [i.e. the union representatives] are still in line with the blue-collar people…they 
only discuss with the management and their own representatives…they would not like 
to sit with other non-union representatives”. 
Consequently, from the evidence acquired during the case-study research at the 
Manchester site, it would appear that setting up anything else apart from trade union 
negotiation and consultation machinery could engender the sense in trade union 
officials that their negotiation rights were becoming undermined. That is, under these 
circumstances and using the arguments of Redfern (2007), unionised employees may 
be afraid “…of intrusion on traditional approaches to collective bargaining…” (p. 
293), because union representatives could be forced to relinquish their power in 
relation to negotiation and consultation rights. As a consequence, there is different 
machinery for communication and consultation with the union and non-union 
employees for the Manchester site. 
The different style of representation between the two sites was attributed to various 
factors by the HR manager who argued that: 
“both sites have different histories and backgrounds...they have different terms and 
conditions as well…it is a different culture and set up…different consultation and 
communication channels, which makes it very interesting…at the Felixstowe site, we 
have a nice-open culture where everyone works together, but here [in the Manchester 
site] they are 15-20 years behind [in relation to  employee voice mechanisms], because 
they are still going through the fights and do not have the security that we have at the 
other site…” (HR Manager). 
Similarly, the chairman of the CCC commented on the different: culture, attitudes and 
employee representation at the Manchester site, noting that: 
“…they are very closed because of the hammer and tongs with the union in the 
past…they are not interested in anything aside their site! Personally, I am not much 
interested in anything aside from my site here unless it is going to have an effect. 
Because, at the end of the day, I am looking after the employees here… But you have 
got to have a view of what it is going on at the other site…” (Employee Representative 
- Chairman of the Consultative Council). 
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5.4.2 Benefits and Problems of Sustaining the Information and Consultation 
Arrangements 
It is evident that management has been quite forthcoming in relation to the 
development of information exchange and consultation with employees. This has 
been especially the case at the Felixstowe site, where there is a very open culture that 
has been evolving strongly since 1998 and in which management has generally been 
seeking to encourage an open door policy involving an informal approach. However, 
even though in both cases the employer has chosen to implement a high road 
approach, as termed by Dundon et al. (2006), in relation to employee voice 
mechanisms, the outcomes have actually been quite different at the two sites. In this 
regard, at Felixstowe this approach has been largely successful, in that there is:  
“…a mix of direct and representative mechanisms suited to a given organisational 
context, encouraging both information and consultation; [these mechanisms are] broad 
in scope and would facilitate employee cooperation as well as the opportunity to 
question management decisions and shape the agenda for employee voice…” (ibid: p. 
508). 
By contrast, the features of a low road approach are more evident at the Manchester 
site, as there inadequate representation structures for the non-unionised employees. In 
particular, these features are evident for the indirect workers and the rest of the staff, 
where “…mechanisms would tend to be direct, limited in terms of scope and geared 
more towards information than consultation…” (ibid). 
At the Felixstowe site, both the employee representatives and trade union officials 
have positive perceptions about: the CCC meetings, the climate regarding employee 
relations and the attitude of management. In particular, according to the chairman of 
the CCC, “management is very dedicated to our site”. Similarly, all the interviewees 
confirmed that the consultation arrangement has further empowered employee voice 
and enhanced the sense of ownership/partnership amongst employees. The chairman 
of the committee also added that for some employees there had been the sense of there 
being a wall between management, on the one side, and employees/unions on the 
other side, with these people “paying lip service” to the “attitude” of “us and them”. 
However, in his opinion, the CCC meetings are now helping people to be more open 
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and forthcoming with their opinions, which are subsequently weakening the earlier 
negative attitudes. 
However, there is still evidence that some employees consider that these meetings are 
not very effective. For instance, the chairman gave an example where the 
manufacturing associates asked for a change in the shift cover and shutdown weeks 
during the summer vacation, but management said this was impossible and 
consequently, some of the employees in relation to the CCC “think that it is a waste 
of time” (Chairman of CCC meeting). But overall, both the chairman and the trade 
union official stressed their opinion that employees’ views are heard, they are actively 
involved in decision making and that the level of their influence depends on the nature 
of topic. This was additionally confirmed by the HSE manager who added that 
depending on the nature of the issue: 
“…employees are normally involved in putting plans into place and their involvement 
in the planning stage can be important before final decisions are taken...”. 
As was argued by all the interviewees, the perceptions of management and employee 
representatives, in relation to the effectiveness of the CCC meetings and power of 
employee voice, are positive. In the eyes of the HR manager, the main benefits of: 
informing, communicating and consulting in the workplace, are related to the sense 
that the employees have the opportunity to air their views. In support of this, during 
the CCC meeting (on 11th May 2006), everyone was very open and this was obviously 
helping to empower employee voice in that workplace. In addition, the HSE manager 
emphasised the benefits of the CCC forum, in particular pointing out that:  
“it provides ‘a shared vision’, enhances mutual trust and confidence, ensures the 
timely actioning of what has been agreed and discussed in a transparent way and 
demonstrates to all employees that representatives views are heard” (HSE Manager). 
Both the chairman of CCC meeting and the trade union representative confirmed that 
the council has further empowered employee voice and also enhanced the sense of 
ownership/partnership amongst employees. More specifically, the chairman 
highlighted the fact that at the Felixstowe site there is a very open culture which has 
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strongly evolved since 1998 and added that “…the fact that the company’s council 
works here, it adds to the open culture…”. 
In general, there were positive perceptions expressed by all the interviewees about the 
CCC meetings and the current information and consultation arrangements. This can 
be attributed to the fact that the evidence shows that management on the Felixstowe 
site places great emphasis on giving employees a ‘greater say and voice’ in order to 
meet their expectations and to fulfil union demands. Therefore, taking into account 
the argument of Gollan (2006b) that there should be “an alignment of interests 
between employee behaviour and organisational goals” (p. 645), it would appear that 
the CCC meetings are effectively working towards this goal. Moreover, this positive 
perception can be also attributed to the current good business conditions, and 
according to the HR manager, “…the business has been growing since 1998…without 
any major problems…”. This is in line with the argument of Gollan (2006b) in which 
various contextual factors can have an influence upon arrangements. In particular: 
“in ‘good times’, when economic and market conditions are positive, information is 
provided on large profits and subsequent prospects of wage increases, perceptions of 
information and effective voice would rise” (p. 646). 
By contrast, when there are constraints, such as: profit pressures, cost cutting and 
restructuring, employee representatives and management can be in an “adversarial 
struggle” (HR Manager), and under these conditions evidence from other research 
projects similarly indicates that “the information that the company is providing is 
almost uniformly unwelcome” (Gollan, 2006b: p.646). In addition, it is argued that 
there is a tendency for management to be less forthcoming in the development of 
information exchange and consultation when “having to deal with tough and 
unpalatable issues” (Terry, 1999: p. 27). Within the context of the case-study 
organisation, both sites had to deal with such serious constraints and redundancy 
actions during the 1990s, but the implications in relation to the information, 
communication and consultation’ mechanisms differed significantly between the two 
sites. 
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Furthermore, the HR manager emphasised that the setting up of the CCC helped the 
company to “move from the confrontational style of management” (due to the 
redundancies) and “come closer into the partnership”, because “…it was a very 
energised and happy time…people were being trained…they were secure in their jobs 
[and] business was growing…”. In addition, it has also helped to create: 
“a ‘reality check’ … where the union and employees have their own role and 
management has its own role … with a mutual respect, where anybody can work 
together for the benefit of everyone…” (HR Manager). 
Similarly, the HSE manager argued that it is an important vehicle, because it gives the 
opportunity to communicate important issues in a timely manner and helps to 
facilitate decision-making. The role and usefulness of the CCC meetings were also 
highlighted by the trade union representative and chairman, with the former stating 
that: 
“…we do not have to go through many channels of communication in order to get 
heard, and within the council hall we have ‘them’ [i.e. the management], we have ‘cut 
the ladder!’…if anything directly affects the employees, they [the management] do take 
it into consideration…if something can be done, they would take action about 
it…otherwise, they may set up a different committee [i.e. sub-group] to look into 
that…” (Trade Union Representative). 
and the latter reporting: 
“… you can ask people questions, make suggestions to anyone, comment anything…I 
see the openness and know actually how the business is doing…everything is very open, 
there is an agenda…and employees’ views are aired…it is an open forum, where 
anyone can come and sit in the meeting, ask anything that they would like to ask and 
get the reply…we have also the subgroups” (Employee Representative - Chairman of 
the Consultative Council). 
Another positive example given by the chairman was the change in relation to job 
evaluation, where a group was formed from the different organisational areas in order 
to formulate an improved procedure for the assessment of workers on the shop floor. 
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As a result, there was active participation in the decision making by the workers’ 
representatives about an issue that directly affected them. This sort of active 
participation was also confirmed by the trade union representative who added that: 
“…if you have got anything to say, you do not fear to ask a question…it is an open 
atmosphere, you can get your and other people’s opinion out…”. 
Therefore, the purpose of the CCC meetings is in accordance with the British 
government’s consultation article on the ICE Regulations (DTI, 2003a), which 
stresses the positive correlation between employee participation and higher levels of 
performance. From the theoretical standpoint, this is has been termed: an “integrated 
approach”, “high involvement management”, or “high commitment management” 
(Gollan, 2006a: p. 429). In addition, it is argued that through better communication 
and consultation between management and employees, these management approaches 
can: achieve a better climate in employee relations, enhance organisational 
performance and increase profitability (Wall and Wood, 2005). These goals can also 
be reached by other methods, such as team-working, where there is: minimal status 
differentiation and a strong consensus for co-operation aimed at achieving employee 
satisfaction, through a commitment by management to support effective employee 
participation processes (Guest and Peccei, 1998). In addition, drawing on the view of 
Pyman et al. (2006), an effective management strategy should focus on the 
development of “…organisational commitment through legitimate and effective 
participative decision-making and consultation procedures…” (p. 547). In terms of 
specifics, in case-study one the management strategy would appear to have involved 
the above approach, but there have been different outcomes between the two sites, 
which can be mainly attributed to the different employee voice history and the forms 
of representation structures that have evolved.  
5.4.3 Evaluation of the ICE Regulations: An Opportunity for Changes and 
Reviewing 
It is noteworthy that the HR manager pointed out the significant influence that the EU 
directives have had in the past: 
“…the European directives probably changed some of the things we are doing... for 
instance, we say in our meetings: ‘well, we have just put a policy change because it is 
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the law… this is legal now…we have to consult, inform and make sure that the people 
are aware’…”. 
Regarding the level of awareness in relation to the ICE Regulations, this emerged as 
being fairly comprehensive for all the interviewees and amongst the: management, 
employee and union representatives who attended the observed council meeting that is 
described above. The ICE Directive was tabled by the HR department as an issue for 
discussion and review in one of the CCC meetings, but it was not considered 
necessary to make any changes (further details are provided in section 5.3.1). 
Moreover, both the chairman and trade union representative confirmed that any 
regulation that could directly affect the employees is always brought onto the agenda 
of the CCC meetings. In terms of the shop floor workers, it was reported by their 
representatives that about 50 per cent knew something about the ICE Regulations, but 
generally not in any great depth and also, according to the chairman of the CCC, a fair 
proportion of them were quite satisfied with the way that the meetings work. 
Furthermore, it transpired that management, employee and union representatives 
believed that after review the constitution was consistent with the PEA for the 
Felixstowe site and therefore needed no amendments. 
Whether or not the constitution of the CCC formally meets the legal requirements of a 
PEA (which was reviewed before the implementation of the legislation at the 
Felixstowe site), at the time of empirical research, the positive perceptions of the 
employees regarding the existing arrangements meant that they felt there was no need 
to trigger negotiations for amendments to these agreements. In addition, the review of 
the Constitution Agreement and its acceptance by the employees, served to reinforce 
the current arrangements, in that it enabled the company to establish information and 
consultation mechanisms according to its needs, with there being little likelihood of 
any challenge towards these arrangements or any attempt of invoking the statutory 
provisions of the legislation by any section of the workforce. The overall result has 
been that the ICE Regulations have not prompted any changes, either in the 
Constitution Agreement of the CCC at the Felixstowe site, or in unionised 
representation structure at both sites.  
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The company is a good example of one where proactive management strategies were 
implemented before the ICE Regulations came into force. In this regard, the HR 
manager, when referring to the legislation, claimed that the company was already 
ahead of it: 
“…we have the machinery…the forums to communicate the legislation…so, we do not 
wait for the employees to come and tell us, we actually tell them …we are upfront…” 
(HR Manager). 
The chairman also underlined the contribution of the management team to the 
development of the CCC meetings, pointing out that: 
“…they wanted to have it; so, basically it was pushed by management not the 
employees; they came to employees saying that they wanted to achieve consultation, 
communication and information-sharing…” (Employee Representative - Chairman of 
the Consultative Council). 
The company also abides with the guidelines published by ACAS (2005) and EEF 
(2005), which encourage employers to be proactive and thus it can be seen to have 
adopted the compliance approach, as coined by Hall (2006). However, consistent with 
the arguments of Dundon et al. (2006) and Gollan (2006b), the outcomes at the two 
sites have been different, because of the diverse mix of external and internal factors 
(i.e. business and economic pressures, management and employee attitudes, union 
demands, employee expectations or other contextual conditions). Moreover, these 
varying outcomes have influenced the “contemporary perceptions” (as similarly 
suggested by Beaumont et al., 2005: p. 94) of all the partners and thus the way that 
employee voice mechanisms and representation structures have developed, to date, at 
both sites. For instance, the case of the Manchester site conforms to the research 
findings of other projects in which trade union approaches to the ICE Directive have 
tended to be “defensive” rather than “proactive” (Hall, 2005a: p. 17). 
As it is mentioned in section 5.1.2, the main driver for setting up the CCC meetings 
was the EU directives on collective redundancies, which were introduced by the 
British government in 1996 and 1998. In line with the arguments of Ramsey (1997), 
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the evidence from case-study one shows how management used the meetings in order 
to make employees more receptive to changes as a result of economic and financial 
difficulties, which had led to redundancy activity. As the HR manager suggested, the 
setting up of the CCC meetings helped the company to move away from the 
confrontational relationship (between management, employees and union 
representatives) towards a partnership agreement, where the forms of employee 
information and consultation are more collectivist. In particular, according to the HR 
manager, the Constitution Agreement has been an “evolution process” with the active 
participation of both management and employee representatives, where all the 
employees are working and developing things together rather than management 
simply “…bringing a model and just planting or imposing it…”. He also added that, 
generally, by working with all the employees in the development of the procedures 
(such as information and consultation arrangements) and involving them in any 
improvements, they can get ownership, because they are part of the evolution process. 
In his own words: 
“…all we can do is to prepare the machinery and periodically listen to feedback about 
what people want to be informed and consulted…by involving people in these 
procedures, you help them to get the feeling of ownership…” (HR Manager). 
With reference to the academic literature, this situation represents, both politically and 
practically, a convergence of interests and a desire for co-operation (Stuart and 
Martinez-Lucio, 2005). 
It is worth mentioning that the HR manager underlined, as another important element, 
the involvement of ACAS in the site employee voice arrangements, which as a neutral 
body went through the Constitution Agreement and this promoted the feeling that the 
change was not imposed by the management, but it was for the benefit of all the 
employees. In addition, this manager stressed the beneficial role of Investors in 
People, in that it gave the opportunity for the majority of employees to express their 
opinions about: management issues, training and development. Similarly, the 
chairman also stressed the involvement of ACAS in the development of the 
constitution, stating that: 
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“it was positive, open and held very well in that respect. […] We had ACAS within our 
group, providing training for the constitution and the makings of the council” 
(Employee Representative – Chairman of the Consultative Council). 
According to the description in the British government’s consultation document, it 
could be suggested that the company developed “its own arrangements tailored to its 
particular circumstances, through voluntary agreements” (DTI 2003a: p. 5). 
Moreover, taking into consideration the review of the Constitution Agreement at the 
beginning of 2005 and the employment history of the organisation, it can be argued 
that there has been consistent development of organisation specific information and 
consultation arrangements that have been primarily based on ad hoc temporary 
business needs (e.g. collective redundancies). In terms of the relevant literature, the 
impact of the ICE Regulations for this firm can be explained as having been 
consistent with the conceptual framework of “legislatively prompted voluntarism” 
(Hall and Terry, 2004: p. 226). In this regard, the HR manager contended that it is 
good to have this legislation, because it can force companies to have specific 
procedures and yet in most cases will not lead to big changes because: 
“most of the big companies [may] already comply to this – especially the unionised – 
they should see it as a ‘positive thing’ and they may be proactively doing this…” (HR 
Manager). 
5.4.4 Evaluation of the ICE Regulations: Limitations and Challenges 
At the Felixstowe site, apart from the fact that some employees may still have the 
attitude of “us and them” in relation to management or are concerned that the council 
meeting may be “a waste of time”, no other significant problems or complaints were 
mentioned. However, as it appears from the constitution document (which is briefly 
outlined in table 5.2, in section 5.3.2), for collective bargaining issues (including 
distributive issues, such as: pay and terms and conditions), the management 
prerogative provides a strictly limited scope regarding the opportunities for: 
consultation, reviewing and negotiation. More specifically, according to the 
Constitution Agreement document, the CCC is not a negotiation forum and all 
collective bargaining issues and negotiation procedures are to be brought up in a 
separate forum, as defined in the trade union recognition agreement. 
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It is a fact that there is no definite provision of any negotiation and co-determination 
rights in the Constitution Agreement. Furthermore, it is questionable to what extent 
the employee and union representatives can challenge management prerogative and 
decision-making within the context of the CCC Constitution Agreement. In other 
words, the primary features of the CCC would appear to conform to the concept of 
pseudo-consultation. That is, there is no explicit and definite reference to 
“consultation with a view to reaching an agreement” as defined in the standard and 
default provisions of the ICE Regulations (Hall, 2005b: p. 112). On the other hand, 
the agreement defines consultation as a process by which management and employees 
seek “…acceptable solutions to issues through genuine exchange of views and 
information…” (further details are provided in section 5.3.1). In general, a number  of 
academics have pointed out that negotiating and bargaining are problematic, in that it 
is the level of strength that the employee representatives are able to exert that 
determines their effectiveness and degree of their influence over decision-making and 
not simply any statutory arrangement (Upchurch et al., 2006; Terry, 1999 and 2003; 
Gollan, 2000; Lloyd, 2001). 
On both sites, only the direct workers are covered under a trade union recognition 
agreement, and consultation and negotiation procedures mainly take place through 
meetings between: the union representatives, the HR manager and manufacturing 
management. Under these circumstances, the management prerogative can be more 
effectively challenged as union representatives have a greater influence in the 
decision-making process. However, at the Manchester site the administrative staff and 
indirect workers are directly informed and consulted without there being any formal 
process of collective representation, but there is an open door policy with 
management for these staff and any issue can be discussed on informal basis. Taking 
in conjunction the academic literature and the arguments of HR manager, the 
empirical findings indicate that the “history of antipathy” towards the company’s 
council “for fear of intrusion on traditional approaches to collective bargaining” 
(Redfern, 2007: p. 293), has led to the refusal of the local GMB union representatives 
to accept any form of change to the forms of representation (apart from the union-
based arrangements for information-sharing, communication, consultation and 
negotiation, with the seven or eight trade union officials) during the last 20 years.   
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Taking into consideration the empirical findings from other research projects (Kelly, 
1998), the: adversarial employee relations, industrial conflicts and grievance 
procedures, faced by the company in the 1990s, would seem to have further 
stimulated the employees’ perceived need for collective representation and organised 
action through their GMB union representatives at the Manchester site. Using the 
terminology of Hall (2006: p. 470), such attitudes and perceptions can be described as 
a “reflection of trade unions’ ambivalence towards the Regulations and their priority 
of protecting existing union-based arrangements”. This contrasts with the fact that the 
TUC and other trade unions, including Amicus, have been encouraging employees to 
submit requests and trigger statutory negotiation procedures for new arrangements in 
accordance with the ICE Regulations.  
In other words, the evidence indicates that the senior shop floor representatives from 
the GMB union have been trying to avoid the “substitution effect”, which is 
commonly described in the literature (Dundon et al., 2006: p. 498). More specifically, 
it is contested that these forms are set up so as to exclude trade union representation in 
preference to non-unionised employee councils (Dundon and Rollinson, 2004; Gollan, 
2002), thereby neutralising and/or marginalising union involvement (cited in Watling 
and Snook, 2003: pp. 268-269). In addition, “employer-initiated structures” (Bonner 
and Gollan, 2005: p. 241) may not provide effective employee voice, especially if 
they focus on worker co-operation that attempts to by-pass trade unions (Kelly, 1996; 
Lloyd, 2001), which as other research evidence suggests may potentially undermine 
the unions’ power and their negotiation or consultation rights (e.g. Cully et al., 1999; 
Brewster et al., 2007a). Thus, employer initiated councils have been characterised by 
some scholars as “cosmetic….fig-leaves of consultation and participation masking 
managerial unilateralism” (Terry, 1999: p.16) and “symbolic” (Wills, 2000: p. 88), 
because they are perceived as a management strategy to circumvent the influence of 
trade unions. 
Therefore, the attitude expressed by union representatives from the GMB can be 
attributed to their concern that the employer could set up alternative forms of 
representation (i.e. consultative councils) with limited or no power of negotiation. 
More specifically, there is criticism of this sort of employee representation by many 
academics because it does not provide ‘bargaining power’ and there is great scope in 
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terms of the action that employers can resort to regarding the ‘final decision-making’ 
(Charlwood and Terry, 2007: p. 322). This interpretation was backed up by the HR 
manager, as discussed in section 5.4.1, where he emphasised the reluctance of the 
union representatives to relinquish any of their extant power to new forms of 
employee voice. Furthermore, the union’s scepticism is in line with Hall’s (2006: p. 
466) findings that union-based arrangements are easily undermined and hence there is 
an overall scepticism towards any employer initiated change:  
“…there is considerable degree of union ambivalence about organisational 
implications [towards the implementation of ‘information and consultation’ 
regulations], especially for unionised workplaces. Unions have tended to take a 
primarily defensive stance towards the new legislation, reflecting concern that the 
introduction of workforce-wide information and consultation arrangements could 
potentially threaten union-based representation where it exists…”. 
Given the above, it is perhaps not surprising that the GMB union executives initially 
stressed their concerns about the ICE Regulations (TUC, 2004) and this could well 
have influenced the proceedings in Manchester.   
Currently, it appears unlikely that the non-unionised employees would trigger the 
regulatory statutory procedures, because according to the HR manager they are 
content with the existing informal arrangements of direct information and 
consultation. Moreover, the minimal legal prerequisite (10 per cent threshold for the 
workforce) for triggering the statutory negotiation procedures is an additional barrier 
for the: indirect workers, administrative staff and rest of the non-union employees, as 
the evidence from the case-study shows that they lack the communication avenues for 
instigating any challenge to the status quo. This is consistent with the literature, in 
which it has been suggested that the insufficient current formal systems in relation to 
employee voice mechanisms may “prove problematic to identify the individuals 
necessary to articulate the case of representation” (Hall and Terry, 2004: p. 221). 
As a result, serious questions can be raised about whether there is full compliance 
with the requirements of the legislation at the Manchester site. That is, the lack of 
formal representation (for the indirect workers and rest of the staff) may mean that the 
     141 
Chapter 5: Case-Study One
current arrangements do not fulfil the provisions of the article 2 of the ICE Directive, 
which defines “information and consultation as procedures taking place between the 
employer and employee representatives” (Hall, 2005b: p. 114). Moreover, it is 
important that any form of employee voice mechanism should be collective and 
independent in order to be effective, otherwise trade union representation is the best 
alternative (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Upchurch et al., 2006), and this would appear 
to be the case at the Manchester site at the time of the research. Further, even though 
there is recognition of the GMB and thus trade union representation, this does not 
meet the requirements of the legislation, because the requirement is that all employees 
should be covered, rather than there only being a representative body “for one section 
of the workforce” (as similarly suggested by Gollan, 2006b: p. 642). The possible 
non-compliance of the Manchester site with the provisions of the ICE Regulations 
was also recognised by the HR manager: 
“I am not sure if in the  Manchester site we actually comply to the legislation; however, 
I have learned that it is better to work and develop things with your employees together 
rather than trying to impose something [such as new ‘information and consultation 
arrangements’]…so, if it works, do not try to fix it! I am not sure that the legislation is 
thought through very well [for such instance]…” (HR Manager). 
In addition, there is an obvious lack of communication and interaction between the 
employee representatives (including the local trade union officials) from the two sites, 
which has been one reason for the distinct forms of employee voice and representation 
that have developed. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly the fact that these two 
sites were actually two different companies before the beginning of 1990s can explain 
their different employee representation trajectories. At the Manchester site, when 
management tried to bring the issue of reviewing the information and consultation 
arrangements before the trade union representatives, so as to be seen to comply with 
the implementation of the legislation, these representatives were reluctant to make any 
amendments. In fact, their attitude was decidedly negative and instead they reasserted 
their adherence to the union-based arrangements, by stressing that the “…trade union 
is the boss…” (HR Manager). This attitude demonstrates their strong reliance upon 
the collective rights of the extant negotiation forum and consequently their 
indifference to any other form of representation (e.g. consultative council) that can be 
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considered as providing relatively inferior rights. Nevertheless, according to the HR 
manager, the management team still has the ultimate goal of setting up a wider 
council similar to that at the Felixstowe site. 
However, as it was previously noted, the avoidance by the regional trade union 
officials can be mainly attributed to the fear that any review of the arrangements could 
weaken their role in relation to their consultation and negotiation rights and thereby 
strengthen management’s prerogative in the decision-making process. This argument 
is further confirmed in terms of the outcomes of a research project carried out by Hall 
et al. (2007), who suggest that “sometimes the line between negotiation on pay and 
consultation over payment systems is hard to draw” (p. 74), whilst unions may see 
consultation forums “as a threat to their existing collective bargaining rights” (p. 
73). Furthermore, as other researchers point out, union representatives are likely to 
fear that they will lose their “autonomy” and “be more closely [tied] to managerial 
agendas” (Brewster et al., 2007a: p. 55). It is worth mentioning that the ICE 
Regulations do not explicitly provide specific statutory rights to unions and this 
partially explains the union representatives’ sceptical attitude; a position also 
recognised by Lorber (2006). This has prompted Hall (2006: p. 460) to contend that 
“unions have been ‘written out of the script’ as far as the standard information and 
consultation provisions are concerned”. 
5.4.5 The Importance and Influence of Trade Union Strategies in the 
Development of Information and Consultation Arrangements 
In relation to the relevant literature, it would appear that the notion of partnership is in 
the process of being developed at the Felixstowe site (at the time of research), where 
there is mutuality in employee voice mechanisms and employment relations appear to 
be co-operative (similarly cited in Dundon et al., 2004: p. 1153). However, this is less 
apparent at the Manchester site, where union members appear to be alienated from 
any potential partnership agreement, because as previous research results suggest this 
is perceived as potentially weakening trade union influence and worsening terms and 
conditions (e.g. D’Art and Turner, 2005; Geary and Roche, 2003; Kelly, 2005; 
Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004). 
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Both management and union representatives are content with the current form of 
employee voice at the Manchester site and they believe that there is no satisfactory 
alternative. Moreover, the main features of the current arrangements on this site fit 
with the “incorporationist” organisational type, as similarly defined by Dundon et al. 
(2006: p. 499), which are based on single union-management channels involving 
collectivist (union) forums that run alongside direct information and consultation 
mechanisms. Any attempts from the management side to introduce reviews or minor 
changes, even those that are in accordance with the legislation, are not generally 
welcomed by senior trade union representatives. This attitude can be explained by the 
fact that: 
“you have to set the culture and trust…develop the consultation, and communication 
procedures…and build on this over a period of time rather than trying to impose 
something[…]. So, evolution not revolution!” (HR manager). 
Relevant empirical findings, as illustrated by Bonner and Gollan (2005: p. 253), 
similarly reveal  that “…representative structures within firms need to have the full 
support of the majority of employees and be seen as organic to the workplace rather 
than an imposed arrangement between management and trade unions…”. In sum, the 
different style of employee representation between the two sites can be attributed to 
the variance in the perceptions of management and employees about the effectiveness 
of these representation mechanisms and to the different levels of trust that exist. 
In addition, Marchington et al. (2001) argue that organisational culture, historical 
attitude and other events, in relation to employee voice mechanisms and 
representation, are significant factors. In this regard, as it has been already noted, the 
diverse mix of contextual conditions (i.e. business and economic pressures, 
management and employee attitudes, union demands, different strategies between the 
union representatives across the two sites etc) have led to different outcomes among 
the two sites, in relation to: management strategies, employee perceptions regarding 
information and consultation arrangements, general attitudes about employee 
involvement techniques and representation structures.  
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In line with the arguments of Gollan et al. (2006: pp. 505-506), it appears that other 
contextual unionised conditions can influence the effectiveness of union-based 
arrangements, such as: the “legitimacy” and “effectiveness” of unions in the 
representation of “employees’ interests”, and also their “perceived” ability by the 
workforce to “act independently”. With respect to this, the openness of Amicus and 
TGWU representatives at the Felixstowe site enabled all parties to implement legally 
the CCC Constitution Agreement that consequently provides evidence to confirm the 
rationale that “Amicus is among the most active unions on the issue of information 
and consultation” (Hall, 2006: p. 467). On the other hand, the GMB union has 
officially expressed its concerns about the ICE Regulations (TUC, 2004) and this 
partially could explain the reserved attitude of union representatives at the Manchester 
site. 
5.5 ICE Regulations: Potential Developments and Options to 
Enhance Employee Voice and Democracy at the Workplaces. 
Discussion and Summary 
5.5.1 The Manchester Site 
As suggested by academics, significant “in-company events” that are triggered by 
internal or external pressures (Hall, 2006: p. 461), such as collective redundancies (i.e. 
business and economic conditions etc), can potentially affect the mechanisms of 
employee voice and hence the information and consultation arrangements. Such 
events could well be the driver that affects the style of representation at the 
Manchester site in future years, which is a view supported by the HR manager. More 
specifically, he provided one example which could engender significant change in 
relation to the forms of non-union-based representation at the Manchester site: 
“…I think that…if we had redundancies here, which we have not had for many years, 
maybe that would be the start of some form of elected representatives …and maybe this 
would be the precipitation of setting up some sort of formal group…” (HR Manager). 
According to the legal requirements, a representative forum must be set up that will 
cover all the employees, rather than there being just an indirect voice mechanism for a 
proportion of employees (i.e. the unionised workforce). However, as noted in the 
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previous sections, at the time that fieldwork was conducted, there was a reluctance on 
the part of the GMB union representatives, coupled with indifference from the non-
unionised employees, for there to be any review of or amendments to the existing 
information and consultation arrangements, which subsequently rendered it unlikely 
that there would be any changes in the near future at this site. In particular, this can be 
attributed to the lack of any strong coordination between the direct workers and the 
rest of the employees. In addition, other factors that are hindering any potential 
changes include the established tradition of informal direct voice mechanisms for the 
non-unionised employees and the reluctance of the union officials to take part in a 
forum with non-unionised representatives or even to cooperate with non-unionised 
employees in any way. In this regard, Beaumont and Hunter (2007: p. 1235) argue 
that union representatives may be reluctant to accept non-union representation, 
because the former adopt the view that the latter are “weak in their dealings with 
management”. Hall (2006: p. 461) also suggests that in such cases it can be difficult 
to “organise an employee request” in relation to the threshold requirements contained 
in the ICE Directive.  
As was highlighted in previous sections, the scepticism of union representatives 
mainly stems from their fear of the substitution effect, through which their role could 
be eliminated or at least curtailed. That is, as has been pointed out in the literature, 
management may follow “a covert employee relations strategy” by: enhancing non-
unionised structures (Watling and Snook, 2003: p. 268), preventing the strong 
development of union’s presence (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007; Terry, 2003; Ramsey, 
1997), and marginalising the influence of union representatives by establishing 
broader forms of consultation with the employees (Hall, 2006). Moreover, the ICE 
Regulations do not provide additional consultation and negotiation rights to the union 
representatives and it is argued that they actually provide “much scope for 
management unilateralism or inaction” (Tailby et al, 2007: p. 211), which may pose 
“a threat to the survival of a single-channel of trade union representation” in the 
workplace (Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 447).  
Consistent with much of the academic literature, the evidence suggests that the ICE 
Regulations are making no difference to the unionised workforce at the Manchester 
site, owing to their “minimalist provisions” (Gollan 2006a: p. 432). More 
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specifically, at the time of the empirical fieldwork the minimal legal threshold was 
seen as being an additional barrier, for it was considered unlikely that 10 per cent of 
the workforce would take the initiative to trigger the statutory negotiations. 
Furthermore, at the time of the case-study research, according to the HR manager, any 
initiative in relation to changes (regarding any type of employee voice mechanisms) 
was considered to be highly improbable. On the other hand, he did indicate that a 
wider company council could be set up that covers all employees at the Manchester 
site, as soon as: trust, co-operation, honesty and notion of partnership were allowed to 
develop. In particular, in his opinion this would require convincing the regional trade 
union officials that their negotiation and consultation rights were not being usurped by 
such action. Hall et al. (2007: p. 74), endorse the feasibility of this perspective, 
arguing that “ingenious ways”48 can be found that “accommodate both union and the 
employee forum”. Moreover, according to the HR manager, this could happen, 
provided that the trade union officials were co-operative and open to any discussion in 
relation to the potential development of a consultative council for both unionised and 
non-unionised employees. For in his view: 
“…we respect each other’s roles…union has a role, management has a role… there is 
a mutual respect that we work together for the benefit of everybody…” (HR Manager). 
He also emphasised the role of a trade union, which was described as an “asset” and 
“a part of employee voice process”, in other words accepting that union officials can 
give very useful advice on a range of issues. By contrast, information and consultation 
arrangements can be ineffective in a “command and control culture”, where there is 
no “consensus to decision making” (Sisson, 2002: p. 16) and therefore, “creating and 
sustaining trust becomes increasingly important” in order to achieve “a shared 
understanding” of management and all employees’ interests and thus be able to 
establish acceptable “ground rules” to all parties concerned (Beaumont et al., 2005: 
p. 103). 
48 According to Hall et al. (2007: p. 74), these “ingenious ways” may include: “… parallel meetings on 
the same day, joint meetings but with two sets of minutes produced and non-union forum members 
being asked to leave when negotiating items come up...”. 
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Moreover, Hall and Terry (2004: p. 223) suggest that consultation should be extended 
beyond union-based representation. In this regard, complementary channels of 
information, communication and consultation for both union and non-union 
employees can represent a ‘best’ alternative “dualistic arrangement” (Tailby et al., 
2007: p. 218) or “dual track approach” (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005b: p. 417), 
which comes within the statutory requirements of the legislation. Given the threshold 
of 10 per cent for triggering negotiations, it is not overly “insurmountable” (Hall, 
2006: p. 471) for employees to call for the establishment of new arrangements or even 
require the development of customised forms of representation. There is much 
evidence from this particular case-study that the management team appears to be quite 
open to the setting up of consultative councils. In sum, assuming that there is an 
agreement to set up a wider information and consultation forum that will cover all the 
employees in the Manchester site, this could require the establishment of multiple49 
arrangements or agreements that cover all the employees in both undertakings of the 
case-study organisation. 
As Bonner and Gollan (2005: p. 242) suggest, traditional trade union structures and 
alternative forms of employee representation can “complement each other – 
dovetailing in terms of form and function”, thus consolidating the development of 
employee voice and the accompanying communication channels and thereby helping 
to align the interests of: management, all individual employees and union 
representatives. In general, analysis from the WERS 2004 shows that a “…hybrid is 
likely to be the form of representation adopted in many companies that recognise 
trade unions and are stimulated by the ICE Regulations to extend such rights to non-
union employees…” (Charlwood and Terry, 2007: p. 325). Therefore, taking into 
consideration the aforementioned arguments, it is suggested that a broader 
consultation forum, as a representation body for all employees, could operate 
independently alongside the union forums to enable complete compliance with 
statutory requirements of the legislation. Moreover, this would potentially fill the 
representation gap as highlighted in the empirical findings of other researchers 
(Towers, 1997; Hall and Terry, 2004), by promoting employee voice and democracy 
 The DTI Guidance (2006: sections 21 and 22) provides a detailed overview of how multiple 
arrangements can be set up in one or more undertakings.  
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for the non-unionised section of workforce, thus reducing the possibility of serious 
industrial conflict and adversarial employee relations, as occurred in the 1990s.  
5.5.2 The Felixstowe site 
The unilateral initiative from management representatives to put on the agenda of 
CCC meetings a review of the Constitution Agreement, so that they could get signed 
approval from the employee and union representatives before the ICE Regulations 
came into force, in essence strengthened the pre-established information and 
consultation arrangements and reduced the possibility that the employees would 
trigger further negotiations. Consequently, the current voluntary arrangements have 
been developed and adjusted according to the needs of the establishment. In other 
words, organisation-specific information and consultation arrangements have been 
developed that are consistent with the conceptual framework of legislatively prompted 
voluntarism. Since 1998, the substantial reduction in industrial conflict and a 
subsequent development of trust have improved employee cooperation, leading to a 
sense of mutual recognition in relation to the legitimate roles of: management, 
employee and union representatives (as similarly found in other research projects – 
e.g. IPA, 1992). The relations between union/non-union employees and management 
are positive and they have managed to achieve the “social legitimacy” of their own 
roles and activities, as described by Boxall and Purcell (2003: p. 182).  
In terms of any future developments regarding the CCC meetings and the overall 
forms of employee representation, the HR manager claimed that, in general, the 
mechanisms of employee voice should be based on “an ongoing continuous 
improvement”, so as to counter the claim from some employees that “management 
does not tell us everything”. In this regard, every year there is an employees’ survey 
which is used as a tool for evaluation and benchmarking of all the company’s 
procedures. In relation to this, in the opinion of one interviewee:  
“…employees want to be consulted but do not want to be seen as the decision maker or 
responsible for reaching a particular decision…they need to become more forward 
thinking and not just bring issues to the table…” (HSE Manager). 
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The chairman of CCC did not identify any specific reasons for changes or 
amendments and added that “…we do not have any major issues to deal with…there 
is nothing to fix, and I think it is good…”. However, he did suggest that it would be 
“worthwhile to have additional training and updates from ACAS” in order to improve 
the effectiveness of the CCC meetings. Nevertheless, the senior trade union 
representative stressed that “…the forum does change [through custom and practice] 
50…anyone can bring up a suggestion, if there is a need for a change…”. 
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the Constitution Agreement provides a strictly 
limited scope for negotiation over any sort of employment issues and collective 
bargaining issues cannot be brought up in the CCC meetings, being only valid in a 
separate forum as defined in the trade union recognition agreement. Consequently, 
union and non-union representatives can face difficulties in addressing collective 
issues in these CCC meetings and hence there is still a scope for management 
“manipulation and control”, as similarly found in other research projects (Redfern, 
2007: p. 303). However, despite the limited provisions regarding CCC meetings and 
negotiation rights, there is full compliance with the requirements of the ICE 
Regulations. Moreover, it is noted by Sisson (2002), and additionally suggested by 
Geary and Roche (2005: p. 195) that these provisions can enable the company to 
insulate their information and consultation mechanisms “from the more adversarial 
tendencies associated with negotiation and collective bargaining”. 
In addition, the positive perceptions expressed by all the representatives about the 
current procedures preclude any possibility for further amendments in the near future. 
Moreover, although the union-based forum/council provides the only opportunity for 
negotiation of procedures and discussion in relation to collective issues, the CCC does 
provide the second channel of a dualistic employee voice mechanism. In sum, the 
case-study evidence indicates that the existing arrangements have been legally 
underpinned through the review of the Constitution Agreement and what is more, 
there is limited spectrum for the employees to trigger further negotiations within the 
terms of the regulatory procedures. In this regard, the legal requirements of the ICE 
Regulations denote a relatively high threshold for endorsing negotiations for changes 
In other words, there is a consensus amongst all employees and management representatives in the 
way that the forum changes. Therefore, the forum evolves through custom and practice. 
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and improvements, with 40 per cent of employees being the threshold required for a 
ballot. Taking into consideration that the current voluntary agreements at the 
Felixstowe site already comply with the legislation and every effort was made to 
secure employee approval, it is considered very unlikely that either management or 
the employees will challenge the well-structured and pre-established arrangements in 
the coming near future. 
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CHAPTER SIX 

CASE-STUDY TWO 

6.1 Organisation’s Structure and Employee Representation 
The second case-study of the research is a retail company with approximately 54,000 
employees in Great Britain, and several retail stores. Interviews and visits were 
conducted in the head office in Somerset (in which approximately 1,000 people are 
employed) and also in one of the company’s depots. The number of employees in the 
depots is approximately 4,000 to 4,500 and they are located in five different regions. 
It has to be noted that the company was public (plc) until December 2005. Since then 
(and at the time of research), the company became private and new directors were 
recruited. 
There is no trade union recognition agreement within the head office, while such 
agreements only exist in the depot sites where the majority of employees are members 
of USDAW. In some of them there is  also trade union recognition with the TGWU. 
Research took place in a depot located in Bridgwater, where there are approximately 
550 full-time employees, of which approximately 50 to 70 per cent are members of 
the two aforementioned trade unions. More specifically, there are three different trade 
union recognition agreements covering three different sections of the workforce. In 
addition, there are two separate Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) at the two sites 
comprising the main councils at the depot, one with USDAW representatives and the 
other one with members of the TGWU. 
6.2 Interviews and Collection of the Qualitative Data 
For the purposes of the research, semi-structured interviews were conducted in three 
subsequent visits to the head office and one visit to the depot and limited access was 
granted for collection of relevant documentation. More specifically regarding the 
latter, as already noted, a detailed staff newsletter (including the Constitution 
Agreement) was provided by the head office and also one signed agreement and 
minutes from a JCC meeting with USDAW representatives from the depot.   
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The first interview was conducted in May 2006, with the HR manager at the head 
office. Two subsequent visits followed in July 2006 and interviews were conducted 
with the director of finance, and the director of group logistics and IT, again at the 
head office. Furthermore, four interviews took place with employee representatives 
from different grades and constituencies (table 6.1 illustrates all the employee 
representatives that participate as members in the consultative council – those who 
were interviewed are highlighted and underlined). It is noteworthy that all the 
interviewees participate in the consultative council and most of them have worked for 
many years in the organisation. (At the time of research, the HR manager in the head 
office had worked in the company for 2 years and apparently one of her first 
initiatives was to set up the Constitution Agreement for the establishment of the 
consultative council). 
Group Departments Included A B C 
1 
Buying, Marketing and 
Merchandising 
Buying, B 
Grade 
Buying F 
Grade Buying H Grade 
2 
Central HR, Retail HR and 
Property, CEO 
Property, D 
Grade HR, F Grade HR, H Grade 
3 Logistics and Business Systems 
Logistics, D 
Grade 
Business 
Systems, F 
Grade Logistics, H Grade 
4 Finance 
Finance, D 
Grade 
Sales/Ledger 
Finance, F 
Grade 
Finance, Associate 
Director 
5 
Retail Services (Field and 
Central), CBU, Divisional 
Executives 
Retail Services, 
C Grade 
Security, G 
Grade 
Divisional Executive, 
H Grade 
Table 6.1: Composition of the Participant Representatives on the Consultative Council (Staff 
Forum) at the Head Office in Somerset (Source: Constitution Agreement Document). 
In particular, one representative is a technical manager of non-edible products (F 
grade – constituency of buying), one is from the constituencies of property 
management (D grade), and the other two are coming from grades D and F and being 
employed in the finance department. Three interviews were conducted in the depot in 
December 2006, these being with: the depot director, the HR manager and one 
management representative. The HR manager of the depot has worked for many years 
in the organisation and provided a very good insight into the history of consultation 
arrangements at these sites. Finally, in March 2007 one of the union representatives 
from the depot independently filled out an interview schedule, from which it could be 
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seen that he has a thorough knowledge of the ICE Regulations and he provided 
valuable insights into the: operation of employee voice mechanisms, consultation 
arrangements (i.e. JCCs) and the union-based negotiation forums.  
6.3 Employee Voice Arrangements 
6.3.1 Information and Consultation Arrangements 
6.3.1.1 The Head Office in Somerset – Impact of the ICE Regulations 
In January 2005, a staff forum was set up in response to the requirements of the ICE 
Regulations. More specifically, it can be argued that the prime reason for the 
establishment of the forum was based on the requirements of the legislation on 
collective redundancies, as prompted by the British government in 1996 and 1998, 
rather than the general statutory provisions of the ICE Regulations. In this regard, 
during 2005 and 2006 TUPE scenarios and massive collective redundancies (i.e. 
1,000 employees were made redundant) took place, and subsequently, the setting up 
of a consultative forum became a legal requirement. The HR department was aware 
that the ICE Regulations were coming into force and well in advance set up the 
constitution and terms of reference of the staff forum with the help of legal 
department, in order to secure compliance with the requirements of legislation. In 
other words, the establishment and development of this forum was predominantly led 
by management and based on an opportunistic and unitarist initiative, as a result of 
the necessity for restructuring and collective redundancies. Consequently, this case-
study illustrates another example where the features of information and consultation 
arrangements conform to the concept of legislatively prompted voluntarism. All the 
employees were notified through an email about the setting up of the forum and 
nominations for volunteers were invited from all the constituencies. 
Elections for the employee representatives took place in autumn 2004. Once the 
forum was formed, there was a provision of training for two to three days so that 
employee representatives could develop the ability to communicate and interact 
effectively in the meetings. Furthermore, during the first meetings an external speaker 
was invited to give advice about the protocols in relation to the redundancies. 
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“The staff forum made aware of it [i.e. the ICE Regulations]. We had a date with a 
legal counsellor. We were made aware of certain items. If we need to make a decision 
on something, the company always makes sure that we have got the training to make 
the decision. We had [someone] from a legal consultancy firm that gave us a day’s 
education on certain part of issues [sic] that we needed to know about. The company 
would not let us to make decisions [by ourselves] [sic] if we were not properly 
informed about the legalities…especially around the redundancies and legal 
[employee] rights…” (Employee Representative – D Grade – Constituency of Finance). 
“We did have a training session about restructuring and difference between inform and 
consult… And then obviously, the differences between redundancy, outsourcing, 
TUPE… We had a day long session going through all that… [There] was an external 
solicitor that came in. It is good for an external to come in rather than someone from 
here [and] trying to steer us [sic] into their own way of thinking” (Employee 
Representative – D Grade – Constituency of Property Management). 
The main function of the current forum is to “consult with the employee 
representatives and give feedback to the directors” (HR manager at the head office). 
Previously, there were some forms of information-provision, but there were 
difficulties in consulting with the employees. More specifically, in 2003 a 
consultative group was set up. However, as the HR manager noted, “the experience 
has shown that they [i.e. consultative groups] were not meaningful” and people 
tended to discuss trivial issues and ignored “issues of high levels”. 
There is a regular provision of training in the process of consultation, which is also 
included on the company’s internal website. It is also worth mentioning that employee 
attitude surveys normally take place and subsequently are being discussed as part of 
‘Viewpoint’ sessions. The management unilaterally established the staff forum in 
2003 and this possibly led to employee indifference, which resulted in there being a 
number of unfilled vacancies for employee representatives. As a consequence, the 
consultative forum was largely ineffective and the incidence of non-participation 
further exacerbated the knowledge gap that already existed amongst the employees. 
Finally, one further weakness was the complete absence of the involvement of outside 
officials or advisors in setting up of the forum that was actually being solely 
developed by the HR and legal departments. 
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6.3.1.2 Consultation and Negotiation Union-Based Arrangements at the Depot 
Sites in Bridgwater 
Research took place in one of the company’s depots in Bridgwater, which consists of 
two sites. Until 2001, one site was separate and run by a third party and it had a trade 
union recognition agreement with the TGWU. Since then, both sites have become part 
of the same undertaking, but they are jointly run by the same third party. Employee 
voice mechanisms have emerged through composites and hence are quite 
sophisticatedly structured. More specifically, there are three different union forums 
with representatives from the TGWU and USDAW, along with three separate trade 
union recognition agreements and two JCCs across the two sites. In particular, the 
general manager described the union activity of USDAW as very strong and closely 
compliant with the negotiation procedures.   
6.3.2 The Composition of the Staff Council at the Head Office in Somerset 
As previously highlighted (in section 6.2), approximately 20 people (managers, 
directors and 15 employee representatives from various departments) participate in 
the staff forum and there is a two year rotation in terms of membership. It was agreed 
by all parties that the forum meetings were normally to be held two times per year, but 
during the first year of its operation they were more regular, because the organisation 
had to deal with a redundancy situation. There are five departments/constituencies in 
the company which are all represented in the forum, these being: 
• Buying, marketing and merchandising 
• Central HR, retail HR and property, CEO 
• Logistics and business systems 
• Finance 
• Retail services (field and central), CBU (Convenience Business Unit), DE’s. 
Employees are classified in different categories, such as: 
• A-D grade representatives 
• E-G grade representatives 
• H+ grade representatives 
• Various directors, executive committees, and the board. 
     156 
Chapter 6: Case-Study Two
Usually, at least three people represent each constituency across the different grades. 
In addition, according to their location, there are four different staff forums for the 
whole company that are denoted in the following way: South, Central and North, and 
the Support Centre Staff Forum. 
6.3.3 Agenda and Issues of Discussion on the Consultative Council at the Head 
Office in Somerset 
The agendas of all meetings are pre-circulated to all members of the staff forum and 
the main issue for discussion during the early meetings was the take-over process, 
involving a change of ownership and a redundancy situation. Subsequently, the 
agenda came to include a wide range of issues that were connected with the 
company’s policies and direction, such as: hours of work, pay and conditions and 
training and development, but items of trivial importance are avoided wherever 
possible. 
“The staff forum tends to be reserved for more serious or legislative things… [i.e.] for 
those issues which are more pressing, urgent and have legal consequences for the 
company…” (Employee Representative – F ‘Buying’ Grade – Technical Manager of 
non-edible products). 
“At the moment, it is purely redundancies and outsourcing… Because we are still 
going through the restructuring… Everything that we are dealing with [is purely 
about] people losing their jobs [sic]” (Employee Representative – D Grade – 
Constituency of Property Management). 
Detailed minutes and the staff forum’s newsletter from one of the first meetings in 
June 2005 were collected, in which it emerged that there had been a two day event 
including a ‘familiarisation day’ and this was followed by a meeting day comprising 
six presentations and two discussion sessions. Subsequently, all the representatives 
participated in communication feedback sessions to discuss the communication 
process, particularly in relation to staff forum meetings. The representatives were 
asked for feedback on: the summary of the previous minutes, the contents of the 
newsletter and the Q&A sessions from the training days and they were also invited to 
suggest ideas for improving communication mechanisms in the near future. In the 
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opinion of the HR manager these suggestions could potentially improve the way that 
communication of key messages would be conveyed in the forum meetings. 
The aforementioned communication feedback sessions took place four times, on 
different dates over a two week period. They were chaired by the HR manager (or an 
employee relations executive member) and comprised employee representatives and 
at least one executive committee member. The following items were included in the 
agenda: “how can we increase sales?”,  “provision of executive feedback on the 
suggestions made by representatives at the January meetings”, “general business 
update”, “customer feedback presentation”, “ethical trading presentation” (based on 
the ‘ethical trading initiative’51) and “viewpoint staff survey results presentation”. 
Furthermore, there was an update on suggestions from the previous staff forum 
meetings and presentations with regard to the business update, including corporate 
priorities and current approaches.  
As previously mentioned, the most important issue that was discussed during the first 
meetings of the staff forum was the conditions of employment within the framework 
of the redundancy situation. All the relevant information was given to the employee 
representatives, with the aim of ensuring that the whole procedure was taking place in 
a fair and transparent way. 
6.3.4 Agenda and Issues for Discussion on the Consultative Council at the Depot 
Sites in Bridgwater52 
One of the issues included in the staff forum meetings was the establishment of new 
technology that would change the way in which one of the sites operated. In fact, 
management decided to involve employees and invited volunteers to participate in a 
separate committee in order to discuss this development. The union representatives 
 The company has been a member of Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) since it was originally 
established in 1998. ETI is an independent tripartite organisation and its members include: retailers, 
manufacturers, importers, non-government organisations, trade union organisations etc, while its 
objective is better living conditions for workers and their families supplying the UK market. In April 
2006, a UK labour bill came into force following recommendations by the ETI.  
52 Further detailed information, about the level of direct and indirect voice mechanisms at the depot 
sites, and also the content and issues included in the information-sharing and consultation are provided 
in the appendices and notes. 
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were also greatly involved in the negotiation process so that they could achieve a 
consensus about various working issues, such as: work rates and working practices.  
The HR manager for the depot sites provided minutes of the meetings that led to the 
operative bonus scheme agreement for one of the sites, in Bridgwater, where there is a 
trade union recognition agreement with USDAW. More specifically, after “lengthy 
negotiations” with the site representatives, it was agreed to introduce, for a trial 
period, a bonus scheme for all the employees (HR Manager at the Depot Sites). 
Initially, in June 2005 the scheme was given a three month trial period with a review 
at the end, but after the trial the scheme was extended for approximately one year. A 
final agreement was signed in May 2006, regarding the terms for continuation of the 
aforementioned scheme in the warehouse and this even covered the non-TUPE 
operatives. The scheme was devised in order to increase productivity, allow flexibility 
for the workforce, reward its employees for attaining a minimum productivity 
standard, and thus, enhance their potential earnings. Furthermore, the scheme and 
standards are fully in line with all the company’s health and safety compliance 
requirements and the agreement is reviewed on an annual basis. From a wider 
perspective, according to the union representative, issues of discussion at the union 
forum may include: “… pay bargaining, terms and conditions, disciplinaries, appeals 
and investigations…and regular updates, meetings and feedback down to the shop-
floor…”. 
An additional item that is normally included on the agenda of JCC meetings is “the 
non-payment of company sick pay”, which was difficult for the workers’ 
representatives to understand at first, but after an ACAS course they were able to 
comprehend better the company’s responsibilities regarding this matter. Other agenda 
items that have been brought to such meetings are: “protocol for dealing with 
accidents”, “despatch/clerical issues”, “transport pay negotiations”, and “awards for 
employees that have a long-service record”, but occasionally discussions have strayed 
into trivial issues, such as canteen/vending facilities.  
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6.4 ICE Regulations: Current Attitudes of Trade Unions, Individual 
Employees and Management 
6.4.1 Employee Involvement Arrangements and Representation Structures 
The different style of representation between the head office and the depot sites is 
clearly apparent and this is primarily due to the fact that there is union representation 
only at the latter, where consultation and negotiation forums are very regularly used 
as employee involvement mechanisms. Nevertheless, the three distinct trade union 
recognition agreements with different sections of workforce, in conjunction with the 
two separate JCCs for the two sites, have made the overall representation structure 
quite fragmented for the depot sites. More specifically, for practical negotiating and 
consultative reasons, the union forums are split into three groups. That is, on one site 
there is a forum for USDAW representatives, whereas at the other there are two 
further union forums, one for USDAW and another for the TGWU. In other words, 
the two engaged unions do not “share a common bargaining unit” and two distinct 
union recognition agreements with USDAW apply across the two sites; similar cases 
are found in other workplaces in the UK (Beaumont and Hunter, 2007: p. 1238).  
As with case-study one, the different historical backgrounds of employment relations 
among the depot sites and head office have shaped their notable variances in 
representation structures, for as Harney and Dundon (2006) elicit from their research, 
external and internal conditions can affect the forms of employee voice in the 
workplace. In this case, regarding the depot sites, these are independently run by a 
professional third party and this would appear to have had an impact on how 
consultation arrangements have developed, because this third party was perceived as 
being more supportive of employee voice mechanisms (HR Manager at the Depot 
Sites). 
The HR manager from the head office put an emphasis on the failure of a previous 
attempt (2002-03) to set up a consultative group, the perceived reasons for which 
were taken into account when establishing the current staff forum. More specifically: 
“[We] did have some sort of consultation group about three years ago… and it fell into 
disrepute because they did not discuss issues of high-level [sic]. They [i.e. employee 
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representatives] started to talk about the paint on the wall and things like that – rather 
than business results and changes about the plan for the business. [Therefore] we were 
very clear that we would only discuss strategic issues and business results. […] We 
said to the employee representatives: ‘you should stop bringing issues from your own 
area to a board members meeting – if you have got an issue in your area, talk to your 
manager about it’… because of the experience before, none of the people from the 
previous group are on the staff forum now!” (HR Manager at the Head Office). 
The apparent absence of a trade union recognition agreement hindered the 
establishment of structured representation for employees at the head office prior to the 
implementation of the ICE Regulations. However, the director of group logistics and 
IT clearly made the distinction between the role of the staff forum at the head office 
and trade union forums at the depot sites. More specifically, he argued that the staff 
forum at the head office is a body or vehicle in which “…we communicate in a 
positive sort of environment… but not negotiate…”. 
Furthermore, he added that: 
“…a negotiable item would not go through the staff forum particularly, although we 
would consult… for example, we would do consultation on selection and payment for 
redundancy when the organisation changes. [However] we would not do negotiation 
on rates of pay because they [i.e. members of the staff forum] are not there to represent 
the employees in that way… [the staff forum] is not a substitute for the union… I see it 
as a vehicle for engagement rather than negotiation… subjects [of discussion] can be 
many and varied, but they would be more related to the business, [rather than] pure 
negotiation on terms and conditions, and things like that…”(Group Logistics and IT 
Director). 
At the time of research, employee representatives at the head office underlined clearly 
the current limited scope of their involvement, stressing the absence of collective 
bargaining, and the low degree of influence in relation to management’s prerogative. 
This is similar to the findings of Gollan and Wilkinson (2007a: p. 1138), who have 
found that consultation mechanisms are usually considered just “…as a vehicle for 
communication…” by managers. In other words, the absence of trade union 
recognition and the relatively recent establishment of a staff forum do not allow for a 
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great scope of consultation for employees. Moreover, this forum is predominantly a 
body of communication with limited influence over decision-making, rather than an 
instrument of collective consultation and hence features of pseudo-consultation are 
evident. Furthermore, the representative from the property section emphasised that the 
forum is more about a one-way rather than a two-way communication process, whilst 
other employee representatives stressed the actual distinction between consultation 
and negotiation. 
“There is no real aspect of negotiation – not within our experience. We have not been 
informed to negotiate; we have been informed to be informed! ‘Negotiate’ suggests that 
you have an equal balance of power… we have not got that…” (Employee 
Representative – F Grade - Technical Manager of Non-edible Products). 
“There is not a lot of involvement… there is a lot of informing. But we tend to get e-
mails. We then have team-meetings or departmental meetings for major informing, but 
other than this, we are not involved in the decision-making process.  To be honest, we 
do not communicate anything back – I do not bring anything into meetings from them. 
Considering what we had done in the last year, it was just informal meetings really – 
just telling us about ‘what was happening’…” (Employee Representative – D Grade – 
Constituency of Property Management). 
“[The staff forum] is not for negotiating with people… [we may] try and negotiate 
company issues but not individual issues…[the staff forum] is not for that sort of level. 
In the redundancies, there is not a lot in negotiating that we can do, apart from the 
selection criteria and process. They only have to consult with us – they do not have to 
agree with us…” (Employee Representative – D Grade – Constituency of Finance). 
Therefore, from the responses of the interviewees it is clear that collective negotiation 
on important issues, such as: pay and conditions, rates of pay and hours of work, is 
strictly under the remit of the union representatives and thus the staff forum at the 
head office is mainly a communication and consultation body. In addition, contractual 
matters, which are related to collective bargaining, rely upon the trade union 
recognition agreement: 
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“If we want to change [the contractual] rights and negotiate with [employee 
representatives], we will do that with the union; if we want to communicate all the 
changes and bring in all these changes, we will do that through a broader community. 
We will always recognise the union, but we will have a communication vehicle that 
does not rely on unions… [in order to] be broader than that…” (Group Logistics and 
IT Director). 
The aforementioned statements indicate that the attitude of the management team in 
relation to the setting up of the staff forum at the head office was primarily based on 
their willingness to engage in information-sharing and communication, rather than the 
engagement of establishing authentic or true consultation. Under these circumstances, 
the organisation is ensuring the minimal required compliance with the provisions of 
the legislation regarding the information and consultation arrangements. To underline 
this perspective, at the depot sites there is a clear reference in the constitution 
documents that the staff forums and the JCCs are only for: information, 
communication and consultation and not for collective bargaining and negotiation 
purposes. 
There is no set schedule for regular rotation of the members of the JCCs at the depot 
sites and thus they can continue to participate in these meetings until they choose not 
to do so. In addition, the union representatives participate in the staff forums, but they 
have opted to have separate meetings with management representatives alongside the 
other forms of representation so as to be able to continue to exercise their rights of 
negotiation as established under the recognition agreement.  
“… we have regular meetings and team briefings for the shop floor… union and 
management meetings are weekly… health and safety meetings are every four 
weeks…” (Trade Union Representative). 
This also suggests that union representatives are cautious, preferring to retain the 
power of their collective rights through the negotiation process and within the union 
forum meetings. This strategy prevents any attempts by management to establish 
broader forms of consultation, which could undermine the collective negotiation 
rights of union representatives. In this regard, Hall et al. (2007: p. 74) have pointed 
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out, with reference to such forms of representation, that companies have been known 
to devise constructive and “ingenious ways” by which they can accommodate both 
the union collective bargaining and consultation arrangements. The demarcation line 
between the two JCCs and negotiation forums was emphasised by the director of the 
depot sites: 
“… I meet with the regional organisers, separately… interestingly enough, the shop 
stewards do not prefer to have regional organisers on the JCC… they would prefer to 
deal directly with us…” (Depot Director). 
Thus, this illustrates another example of the clear separation between consultation and 
negotiation arrangements. Usually the JCCs comprise 8 to 10 people and the meetings 
are held two to three times per year, whereas those between management and the trade 
union representatives take place much more frequently (i.e. every one to three weeks) 
and are based very much on an open door policy. In general, at these meetings each 
depot site is represented by three or four union officials and there are three or four 
managers present. 
“You need to have a link between the workforce and management as a company … It 
[i.e. JCC] is quite an open forum in terms of people… we rely on the union body – they 
[i.e. union representatives] come to the table and say what the issues are from the 
floor. We have got an open-door policy… if there is a big project that goes on, I would 
see them every week…we meet roughly every 2 weeks…” (Management Representative 
at the Depot Sites). 
The HR manager of the depot sites clearly emphasised the different roles between the 
JCCs and meetings with the union representatives, pointing out the demarcation line 
in relation to consultation and negotiation and also the importance of establishing the 
notion of partnership. She also highlighted the financial difficulties that the company 
had faced in recent years, which had resulted in re-negotiation of employment issues, 
such as pay and conditions: 
“We consult with pay issues…in the JCCs, there is no negotiation… we have 
negotiation separately with the union…we tend to work in partnership with the union. 
We have tried not to make the situation of them and us. I mean the union has got its 
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own role: in disciplinary [issues], pay negotiations etc. They [i.e. the union 
representatives] will go for the best deal that they could have – this is what they have 
got to do, this is why they are here. On the other hand, the company is in a certain 
financial situation. It cannot afford so much, and then, we have to negotiate [about pay 
issues, working hours etc]… [afterwards], they [i.e. the union representatives] ballot 
and members [of trade union] decide…” (HR Manager at the Depot Sites). 
Another form of employee involvement is the ‘listening groups’, in which non-union 
employees from the shop floor and administrative staff participate. The HR manager 
also made reference to ACAS involvement as an example of assistance in one 
particular case: 
“We did use ACAS for the drivers’ pay negotiations. [Quite a long time ago] the unions 
were happy, the full-time officials were happy, but the drivers were not – that is when, 
we involved ACAS”. 
Moreover, both the HR manager of the depot and the director of group logistics/IT 
commented on ACAS involvement: 
“Every now and then, [ACAS] do half-day training courses [in order to] get people 
updated with the employment law changes, and that sort of things… or we would ask 
them to do a half-day course on disciplinary and grievance procedures” (HR Manager 
at the Depot Sites). 
“Specifically, within the depot sites, we do go to ACAS for mediation and ultimately 
there could be arbitration, depending on the union agreement. But, we do not like to go 
for arbitration, because we do not want to get into a ‘win-lose’ [situation]. We are OK 
with mediation, but not arbitration. [Therefore], we use them [i.e. ACAS] for support 
when we cannot reach agreement and go to certain level, but we do not use them three 
months ahead of time for setting directions or strategy – we do not use anybody for 
doing that, other than our third parties that run the depot sites for us. We would set the 
strategy, budget and plan for the year, and then we would go ahead and run it” (Group 
Logistics and IT Director). 
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6.4.2 Benefits and Problems of Sustaining the Information and Consultation 
Arrangements 
One of the biggest problems that the organisation faced was the establishment of the 
original consultation forum at the head office, in particular because the employee 
representatives did not have the necessary consultation skills, a fact that was 
mentioned by most of the interviewees. In reality, for most of the employee 
representatives their lack of experience resulted in it being difficult for them to engage 
in meaningful consultation (especially when the staff forum was novel), rather than 
simply being informed. The employees showed a great deal of interest in relation to 
filling the available vacancies on the forum, but as the HR manager pointed out many 
were not aware that consultation on redundancies could be included as one of the 
items on agenda and subsequently those on the committee expressed some discomfort 
at being exposed to this situation once they were elected. More specifically, according 
to the HR manager at the head office, the employees pointed out that: 
“…we did not realise that employee representatives could be consulted on 
redundancies – if we had, we might have picked up different people”. 
This clearly indicates the lack of co-ordination and knowledge amongst the employees 
so as to ensure that they elected the representatives who could best serve their 
interests. Furthermore, it shows that the employees did not possess the expertise to 
take the initiative and request the setting up of a forum, and perhaps more 
importantly, they did not have sufficient information about the Constitution 
Agreement and role of the staff forum under the ICE Regulations. According to the 
HR manager, during the first meetings it was also difficult for the employee 
representatives just to bring up issues of great importance, because they were under 
strong pressure from their colleagues to discuss trivial matters. Consequently, further 
information was sent out to all employees making clear which issues could be 
included on the agendas of the meetings.   
However, the empirical findings indicate that the management representatives were 
actively engaged in the training process, which was providing the necessary skills and 
knowledge so as to ensure that the employee representatives were able to participate 
in the forum effectively. Moreover, it was clearly recognised by both parties that the 
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whole process involved a steep learning curve, especially because they had to get 
involved very quickly in crucial issues, such as the impending collective 
redundancies, as soon as these issues had to be dealt with adequately and fairly. 
“I was very pleased that the employee representatives were very open and honest by 
giving feedback. And the directors appreciated that … I think that it benefited the 
company because all these directors did actually change the things that they were 
doing. This year [i.e. 2006], from a purely legal perspective, it has been very useful to 
have a group of people who were used to work and have some prior knowledge of the 
business, and could respond quickly when we had to do redundancy consultation…” 
(HR Manager at the Head Office). 
“…The more we do, the better we are getting at… [afterwards] we are trying not to 
waste too much time debating stuff [sic] that we know for a fact that we cannot 
change…it is a learning curve…[for example], people in the staff forum felt that they 
could negotiate more about pay…[but] that was not the case, and we obviously learnt 
from that…” (Employee Representative – D Grade – Constituency of Property 
Management). 
“It always useful for the employees to be kept informed - it adds a sort of security and 
makes people feel that their views are welcomely received [sic]…the employees like the 
idea of having someone to represent them and looking after them. On the whole, they 
are happy that there is someone there fighting for them...they have got a voice to be 
heard [sic]…” (Employee Representative – D Grade – Constituency of Finance). 
Similarly, the director of group logistics and IT emphasised the objectives and 
benefits of information and consultation mechanisms both at the head office and the 
depot sites: 
“[The staff forum meeting] is led by management team and general manager… it is 
part of his [i.e. general manager] objectives to improve employee communication…I 
think [that] the employees have to be a part of the community [and we should] engage 
them in the long-term… that could hopefully lead ourselves to be ‘differentiated’ [sic] 
from other companies and thus a further reason why people want to work for us … we 
work quite hard particularly in the depots to ‘differentiate’ within the community and 
within our employees as opposed just paying more money…”. 
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The finance director also expressed his contentment with the establishment of the staff 
forum at the head office, and also in the other central locations where the rest of the 
staff forum meetings are held: 
“We are pleased of what as a company get out of it [i.e. the staff forum] and as a 
business improvement. It is having an effect within employees – they feel that they have 
‘a say’ and can see changes as a result of what they are saying. We are giving it really 
good credibility – by turning up and engaging, which shows that actually we are 
listening and do care. We are dealing with the good practices, and we have to do it”. 
He also commented on the change of board directors, which brought a different style 
of management that involved the initiative by the HR team of establishing the staff 
forum, and consequently, the benefits that have accrued. 
“It [i.e. the staff forum] is definitely changing the way that we work. As a director, I 
want to know that we have a loyal-committed motivated workforce. [Two years ago 
there were borders between management and employees]. Today, we have a far more 
open style of management, which creates a better business environment. We have been 
pretty open in answering directly to them [i.e. employee representatives], and the 
hierarchy vanishes [through the staff forums]” (Finance Director at the Head Office). 
Since 2001, many changes have also been made at the depot sites. In particular, the 
two sites were run independently until approximately four years before the conducting 
of research. However, during 2004 and 2005, management started to implement 
common practices at both depot sites, in relation to pay-award systems and the set of 
terms and conditions and these changes took place through negotiations under the 
union recognition agreement with USDAW. Initially there was resistance to change 
from the employees and some managers, with employment relations at these sites 
being described as confrontational and attitudes of ‘us’ against ‘them’ still being 
prevalent (Depot Director).  
The overall purpose of management has been to apply consistent and common 
practices at both sites and also to build up the notion of a partnership agreement with 
union representatives. For instance, (as it is already discussed in section 6.3.4) a trial 
agreement was approved in June 2005 in relation to the bonus scheme. Ultimately, 
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with respect to this, in May 2006, a reviewed agreement was signed by the regional 
general manager and senior shop steward of USDAW, which formally sets out the 
terms for the continuation of the warehouse operative-productivity bonus scheme and 
these have to be reviewed annually by both the company and union representatives. 
The HR manager pointed out that the successful implementation of these changes also 
relies on there being a good relationship with the union. Moreover, she identified 
important parameters for having a constructive engagement with the trade union, such 
as: the general beneficial outcomes from the positive climate, the development of trust 
with the union representatives and all the employees and effectiveness of consultation 
and negotiation arrangements. In other words, as other researchers strongly suggest, 
trust is considered to be one of the most “important constructs throughout the JCC 
process” (Dietz and Fortin, 2007: p. 1163). In addition, the HR manager emphasised 
that the JCCs enable people from management to understand better the thinking of 
employees and also their needs and problems. In this regard, in her own words: 
“…we are always looking to improve - there is no doubt about that. It has worked very 
well. Our relationship with them [i.e. union officials] is good. By involving them, you 
build upon a very strong bound of trust and if people can trust you, they will work for 
you. If you can speak to the representatives in confidence, they could do the same with 
you. We do not always agree. [Therefore], we will always have the arguments [and] we 
will always have the disagreements – but at least, they [i.e. union and employee 
representatives] sit down and talk about…and we are always going to negotiate…” 
(HR Manager at the Depot Sites). 
On the other hand, she referred to some problems related to when the company 
decided to bring the two depot sites under the same management structure. More 
specifically, she argued that there was some reluctance to change and it was difficult 
to bring together two different cultures, which involved “…a very interesting 
[learning] curve…” for all employees on both sites. She also added that there is 
always the need to improve the communication process and employee voice 
mechanisms: 
“…our drivers go to different sites [and] they pick up rumours and information. A lot 
of people would speak [with someone from] the head office. If they do pick up rumours, 
and these rumours eventually work out to be true, then they would say to us ‘well, you 
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could tell us that a long time ago, you knew this sort of information but you did not tell 
us’. And we can only tell to somebody something that is officially announced, we 
cannot do anything about a rumour [but] only work on facts. How do we improve it 
[i.e. the communication mechanism]? We continuously try to improve it and we will 
always do that” (HR Manager at the Depot Sites). 
The trade union representative pointed out the benefits of having established 
information and consultation arrangements: 
“… in moving forward in today’s industry we feel things run smoother and more 
efficiently if you have the information up-front … everything is open – with no hidden 
agendas…there is a need [to have] a balance of views and work methods/practices… ” 
(Trade Union Representative).   
He also made a reference to some difficulties concerning the communication process 
between the workforce and their representatives in relation to the information and 
consultation arrangements: 
“… too much information, until things have been confirmed, can be bad for the 
members… [other problems include] time factors and getting people from different 
shift patterns together…any new developments [should be] understood and worked 
through before they happen…making sure the information is passed back and down the 
line… and also the members’ issues are being raised and discussed…” (Trade Union 
Representative).  
The employee representatives also commented on the false impression that they and 
individual employees initially had about the staff forum at the head office. Moreover, 
due to its evolving nature they also pinpointed the fact that employees were still not 
well informed about the purposes and objectives of the staff forum, which was 
described as a major problem, in practice, as neither the employees nor their 
representatives could reap its full potential benefits. More specifically: 
“People thought that it was a body of people, who were going to talk about smaller 
things – the sort of day-to-day issues rather than the bigger picture. And I think that 
they are aware of it now. [But] still people do not take full advantage of the fact that 
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they have a staff forum…I am not sure, whether they do not care or they are not aware. 
Generally, they are not aware of the full potential of the staff forum or they are not 
sufficiently interested to raise issues or bring issues to the staff forum’s attention…” 
(Employee Representative – F Grade - Technical Manager of non-edible products). 
“I do not think [that] we were expecting to have to deal with such personal issues as 
redundancies…it was quite a shock really to deal with that kind of thing…” (Employee 
Representative – D Grade – Constituency of Property Management). 
“My expectations were completely different from what it is… I thought that I would 
bring issues from employees to the board’s attention…[employees] thought that this is 
how they would be able to use the employee representatives - [i.e.] about more 
personal issues rather than what it is. Most of the constituencies believed that they had 
a shining voice for individuals’ subjects. But [it is about] the board bringing issues to 
the table [sic] and us representing our constituencies…” (Employee Representative – 
D Grade – Constituency of Finance). 
One of the employee representatives also underlined the insufficient knowledge of the 
ICE Regulations on the part of the employees and the fact that he had just tried to 
learn about the ICE Directive when the HR manager asked for volunteers to be 
interviewed for the conduct of research. More specifically, he stated:  
“It seems strange that, [ourselves] as a staff forum, we are not really aware of the 
[ICE] Directive…or if we were, it was not mentioned as to ‘why’ the staff forum was 
going to be formed. But I do not think, at any time, we have actually studied [the ICE 
Directive] very closely…” (Employee Representative – F Grade - Technical Manager 
of Non-edible Products). 
In addition, the representatives realised that the scope of their collective bargaining 
power is fairly constrained and, in particular, no specific negotiation procedures are 
explicitly included in the remit of the staff forum. Moreover, employee 
representatives expanded profusely on the difficulties that they faced, especially in the 
beginning when they had to deal with the collective redundancy situation. At that 
time, there was lot of distrust from their workmates with regard to the extent to which 
management decision-making could actually be challenged. 
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“We got the feeling that they [i.e. employees] hold you responsible. Just because I sat 
in the meeting, they thought that it was me who was making the decision… [and, in 
fact] they grudged me for knowing information before they did. Afterwards, once they 
realised what was happening [i.e. that we only had the best interests for them], they 
were getting over that [sic] and they were quite grateful actually once everything was 
sorted out. Even though, it is not me who is making the decision, it is still quite hard to 
try to deal with their own issues for them. Especially, when I am one of the people that 
is staying in and they have to go… that is the hard part I think…I found it quite 
stressful and wanted to pull out…I just did not like it at all […] But as it goes on, I get 
used to how things are being dealt…” (Employee Representative – D Grade – 
Constituency of Property Management). 
The finance director also mentioned a few initial concerns regarding the setting up of 
the staff council and in particular highlighted the fact that time was a constraining 
factor: 
“We were initially concerned about confidentiality - and about individuals coming to 
these staff forums to create trouble [sic] but this did not happen. If we can do 
[meetings] every month [and] more often, [it] would be better – but we have not the 
time to devote for it” (Finance Director at the Head Office). 
As was previously noted, during the initial stages of the operation of the staff forum 
the majority of employee representatives lacked experience and, in addition, the 
majority of the individual employees had the wrong impression about its actual 
objectives. In fact, access to the agendas of meetings was not given in advance to 
most of the employees, which further increased their confusion as to the exact 
responsibilities of their representatives. Moreover, the serious challenges, such as: 
restructuring, collective redundancies etc, which were faced by the organisation at the 
inception of the forum, further increased the tension between the workforce and their 
representatives and clearly threatened the level of trust amongst them. 
“…I knew a lot of people that were going to be made redundant. It was such a big 
restructure…which was just bolted out of the blue… then, we would go back to our 
desks and get bombarded with questions from the people in our department. It was 
really-really difficult. But that was probably because it was such a big redundancy 
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package. I get used now to it and am fairly happy to sit here!” (Employee 
Representative – D Grade – Constituency of Property Management). 
“The only problem is the perceived [view] that we were involved in whatever the 
company is doing, and keep secrets… which is completely wrong. But, it can be 
sometimes perceived in that way…” (Employee Representative – D Grade – 
Constituency of Finance). 
Overall, the establishment of the consultation council at the head office is a significant 
development as it provides a relatively coherent form of representation for the 
employees, which did not exist beforehand. However, it is based on a management 
initiative and at the time of the research the employee representatives lacked the 
required expertise and were still heavily involved in the process of acquiring the 
necessary training and knowledge. Therefore, their influence in relation to 
management decision making was significantly limited at that time. On the other 
hand, the already established dual channel of representation at the depot sites indicates 
a more effective and coherent form of employee voice, which is based on the three 
different trade union recognition agreements and two JCCs that have operated for a 
number of years. In other words, at the depot sites both the union and employee 
representatives have a superior expertise in promoting employee interests through the 
consultation and negotiation mechanisms, when compared with the head office. In 
fact, at the time of the research, the main employee voice mechanism at the head 
office was formally labelled as being collective consultation and was still in the early 
stage of its operation, resulting in its provisions being inferior to those under the 
union-based arrangements at the depot sites. In sum, even though the consultative 
forum at the head office complies with the statutory requirements of the ICE 
Regulations, it appears that it focuses mainly on the transparent communication of 
business decisions. 
6.4.3 Evaluation of the ICE Regulations: An Opportunity for Changes and 
Reviewing 
In accordance with the model of “strategies and objectives of non-union voice 
arrangements” (adapted by Gollan 2000: p. 415; cited in Dundon and Gollan 2007: p. 
1190), it is argued that the staff forum at the head office can be described as a 
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“complement to management decision making”. In addition, issues related to harsh 
decision making (such as: collective redundancies and restructuring) have dominated 
during the meetings and, therefore, this staff forum has the features of a “conflictual 
(win-lose)” situation that is “legally-imposed” and based on “management initiative” 
(ibid). Furthermore, at the time of the research, there was no sign at all that the newly 
established consultation arrangement at the head office could actually provide any sort 
of true joint consultation, in comparison with the dual channels of representation at 
the depot sites. Using the description provided by Beaumont and Hunter (2007: p. 
1240), this is an example of where an “external event”, in the form of collective 
redundancies and restructuring at the head office, has led to the establishment of 
consultative machinery in order to comply with the minimal requirements of the ICE 
Regulations. In other words, these external events can be described as drivers that 
prompted the necessity to set up the staff forum at the head office, in which the 
consultation process was mainly triggered by “unforeseen developments” (ibid: p. 
1242). However, as was previously pointed out, it was an initiative taken by the HR 
department, which was subsequently unilaterally applied by management without any 
negotiation with employee representatives.  
“It was the employer who came up with the idea for the staff forum, but I mean that 
they obviously saw that the legislation was on its horizon… they had to do it [and] have 
been broadly supportive of it…” (Employee Representative – F Grade - Technical 
Manager of Non-edible Products). 
“The staff forum was probably set up because of the legislation, [which] has had an 
impact on certain issues…regarding, for instance, redundancies. If there was no staff 
forum, there would be no-one for the company to consult with… I think the legislation 
has worked for us [sic]” (Employee Representative – D Grade – Finance 
Constituency). 
This is consistent with the findings of Hall et al. (2007: pp. 20-21), in that “the 
experience of crisis or major change” (such as: the redundancies and change of 
ownership) and “the arrival of new management” have contributed to the 
development of the staff forum and this has largely been instigated so as to comply 
with the statutory requirements of the ICE Regulations. The finance director at the 
     174 
Chapter 6: Case-Study Two
head office emphasised the importance of legal requirements and change of ownership 
as being the main drivers for setting up the staff council and also the necessity to 
develop more formalised communication and consultation mechanisms: 
“The staff forum, its formality and discipline have undoubtedly been born out of the 
legal requirement, although it [i.e. the setting-up of the staff forum] was something that 
would probably have happened anyway because we were moving towards that. But, it 
happened probably quicker, more formally, and it has been done better, because of the 
legal requirement. Due to the fact that the business has changed ownership, we are 
going through a simplification process in the business to make it easier to communicate 
and make it easier for people to communicate up and down. The [ICE] Regulations 
have definitely been a catalyst to make it happen and probably give it more structure” 
(Finance Director at the Head Office). 
Within the depot sites, the situation is different and the ICE Regulations have not 
brought any changes. This is because consultation and negotiation rights were already 
recognised for the unionised workforce and also, the union negotiation forums 
operated alongside the two JCCs before the legislation came into force. In fact, the 
senior union representative pointed out that they only came to hear about the ICE 
Regulations when there was an update by the firm’s legal department and trade union 
officials, who contended that the legislation made no suggestion that they needed to 
take any action with regard to the employee representation structure. Moreover, he 
expressed his contentment with the pre-established union-based arrangements and 
made reference to the fact that the provisions of the union agreement are superior 
when compared with those of the ICE Regulations. 
“We already got an agreement that more than [enough] covers [the] ICE 
Regulations…union and representatives sit down, consult and move forward with 
compromise from both parties…” (Trade Union Representative).  
The HR manager also confirmed that all the necessary arrangements were already in 
place before the legislation came into force (as is the case with most unionised 
organisations): 
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“It [i.e. the ICE Directive] has not had a big effect, simply because we consult anyway. 
It is the way that we work as a company. And I think you will probably find that a lot of 
large companies already do work in this way…” (HR Manager at the Depot Sites). 
In relation to the opportunities that the legislation may provide, she made reference to 
the value of employee consultation and commented on the fact that the ICE 
Regulations could bring beneficial outcomes to smaller companies: 
“I think it is very important because you have got to get the workers value. If you want 
to progress and develop a site or company, your people are the most [valuable] asset 
and you have to bring them along with you [through involvement]. I think it [i.e. the 
legislation] is good, I think it is necessary, and I think for the small companies, which 
do not have this kind of thing, it will formalise the communication system” (HR 
Manager at the Depot Sites). 
In sum, the ICE Regulations have only provided the opportunity for change at the 
head office, where the marked absence of unionised employees and lack of trade 
union recognition agreement hindered the establishment of collective representation 
for the employees prior to the implementation of the legislation. Nonetheless, in line 
with the arguments of Gold (1998), the consultation forum at the head office 
developed in an “opportunistic way” (p. 130) and was triggered by the necessity to 
conduct restructuring and collective redundancies through transparent and legal 
means. Overall, it appears that the ICE Regulations do not provide any opportunity 
for further improvements at the highly unionised depot sites, because the pre-
established voice mechanisms are substantially superior when compared with the 
statutory provisions of the legislation. 
6.4.4 Evaluation of the ICE Regulations: Limitations and Challenges 
The unilateral setting up of the Constitution Agreement at the head office indicates the 
lack of co-ordination by the employees and their poor expertise, which weakened their 
ability to seize the initiative so as to request and trigger the process for negotiations 
that may have subsequently resulted in their achieving a more favourable consultation 
arrangement for collective representation whereby their primary concerns could be 
addressed effectively. In reality, the HR management team established the staff forum 
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with the view of meeting the statutory requirements of the ICE Regulations, so as to 
avoid more protracted negotiations with the employee representatives. Therefore, this 
is another example of proactive management strategic positioning in relation to the 
implementation of the ICE Regulations. Moreover, the pre-emptory character of the 
staff forum at the head office is evident, as the employee representatives did not have 
the opportunity to challenge management decision-making with regard to the setting 
up of the forum in the first place. This allowed the board of directors and management 
to set it up in accordance with the organisation’s needs and interests so as to comply 
with the minimum statutory provisions of the legislation.  
In addition, with the establishment of the agreement at the head office, it will now be 
very difficult for the employees to challenge the current arrangements and request 
negotiations for a change in the representation structure, in particular because they 
lack the necessary co-ordination to organise a formal request for negotiations. 
Moreover, in this regard, the minimal threshold for triggering the negotiation 
procedures is now much higher (i.e. 40 per cent of the employees should vote), 
because information and consultation arrangements in all parts of the organisation, 
including the depot sites, comply with the requirements of the ICE Regulations.    
From a different perspective, one of the employee representatives emphasised the fact 
that the staff forum was still in its early days and expressed the belief that it had the 
potential to provide good opportunities for the workforce in the future: 
“…it is still too early for a lot of people to realise that they have that vehicle, the 
opportunity to use that staff forum more, and take more advantage of that facility than 
they currently do…” (Employee Representative – F Grade - Technical Manager of 
Non-edible Products).  
Nevertheless, at present the influence of employee representatives, in relation to 
management decision making, seems to be very limited and the consultation process 
is actually more about upward and downward communication. In other words, using 
terms cited in the relevant academic literature, the consultation forum can be 
described as a form of pseudo-participatory or pseudo-consultation process (Dundon 
et al., 2006; Pateman 1970; Brannen, 1983), where the company complies with the 
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statutory requirements and the employee representatives perceive that they are being 
consulted, but the final decision making strongly rests in management prerogative. 
Moreover, such a form of consultation often involves the communication of decisions 
that have already been taken and, therefore, the notion of consultation is only engaged 
in a minimalist manner. Furthermore, the unilateral initiating action by management, 
in relation to the establishment and development of the staff forum at the head office, 
has left little scope of influence for the employee representatives. In this regard, the 
employee representatives initially brought various personal issues from the individual 
employees, but subsequently it was made clear to them what the main agenda items 
and issues for discussion had to be.  
“The company would bring the issues that they wanted us to discuss…they would bring 
the queries to the table…the company is bringing the issues as deciding what is best for 
our constituencies…[at the first meeting] employees brought issues, but [after that] we 
had a covering of global e-mail explaining [the procedures of staff forum]…” 
(Employee Representative – D Grade – Constituency of Finance).  
Certainly, the development of the staff forum at the head office has provided, for the 
first time, a consistent opportunity for the employees to have a structured form of 
representation for consultation with the accompanying potential benefits. Nonetheless, 
in line with the empirical findings of pertinent research, it can be similarly suggested 
that harsh “business priorities” (i.e. collective redundancies, organisational 
restructuring etc) necessitated the implementation of management’s “forcing 
strategy”, through which in practice there is a limited scope of action for the 
employee representatives (Beaumont and Hunter, 2007: p. 1243). In addition, the fact 
that there is no trade union recognition agreement means that the employees do not 
have collective bargaining and negotiation rights. Moreover, the lack of training for 
employee representatives raises serious questions about the efficacy of their voice on 
the staff forum and, more specifically, their ability to exert strong influence in 
management decision-making. 
Drawing on the comments by Blanpain (1983) on Vredeling’s proposal, the staff 
forum at the head office is a typical example in which the consultation process is 
“within the scope of managerial prerogative” (p. 22), rather than being a joint 
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decision-making body. That is, it actually seems to work so as to fit with the legal 
requirements, but only provides limited scope for influence by the employee 
representatives over management decision making.  
In addition, there is no involvement by employee representatives at the head office in 
any collective bargaining process and their scope for action, with regard to the way 
that they can become engaged in the consultation process, is relatively limited. For 
instance, some of the employee representatives mentioned that they could only 
bargain about ‘how’ and ‘when’ the redundancy procedure would take place, but not 
about the actual process and potential outcomes. More specifically, according to the 
interviewees, employee representatives appear to have limited influence over 
management prerogative and they described a situation that is consistent with the 
features of pseudo-consultation. Moreover, this perspective is supported by the fact 
that they are mainly consulted on critical issues (such as: collective redundancies), 
which under the ICE Directive is a prerequisite. 
“All they [i.e. management representatives] have to do is to listen. They do not have to 
react in any particular way to us. Because we are not unionised to any significant 
degree here, I suppose it is a fairly toothless [sic] organisation really! I think we are 
probably ticking a box to show that the company has consulted and informed. But at 
least, we do that. In the recent period of redundancies, we were useful…whether we 
have actually improved any conditions for those who were made redundant, I am not 
sure! We may have done it, but I am not entirely sure that we broke any ground as 
such” (Employee Representative – F Grade - Technical Manager of Non-edible 
Products). 
“We are not involved in the decision making process…it is just that: we are actually 
being told what is being happening after the events. If I do feel personally about 
something that does hit a nerve [i.e. that is very important], I speak out. But whether it 
has been put into practice afterwards, it is another thing. We do not have a major 
influence…and at the end of day, they [i.e. board of directors] have decided what they 
are going to do and how they are going to do it – regardless of what we propose, it is 
not going to make that much difference… I think that is about the level that we can 
affect really…that is beyond [our] control…” (Employee Representative – D Grade – 
Section of Property Management). 
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“I would like to say that we had a great impact…at least we have been consulted… the 
decisions have been made but with the employees in mind. [Nonetheless] I cannot think 
of any real serious company decisions [that] would have been changed by the staff 
forum. Our gains/wins are very limited in that process – it depends on what the subject 
is. When it comes to the redundancies, the company is going to do it anyway – and they 
can legally do it. The only win is [whether] you want to allow them to do it quickly [or 
not]… because that is the only thing that you have to bargain with: the time!” 
(Employee Representative – D Grade – Finance Constituency). 
Therefore, the ability of employee representatives to have effective voice, through the 
consultation forum at the head office, comes in for serious questioning. At the time of 
the research, they did not have sufficient bargaining power and experience to 
challenge the decision making and the operation of forum was mainly reactive rather 
than proactive. In accordance with the arguments of Cressey (2009: p. 158), the staff 
forum appears to be a “[functional mechanism] of participation” but is “voluntary 
and unitary in [its] outlook”. In addition, it can be described as a talking shop, where 
employee representatives have a limited influence over decision making and 
management prerogative is hardly challenged. 
“On the surface, it [i.e. consultation forum] seems to work fine. The company advises 
and allows us to consult. It [i.e. the company] has done what it is required. Regardless 
of what we may say or ask for, the company does not have to necessarily take any 
action from what we say. In theory, it is a very good idea - in practice, I think that 
sometimes it may be just a talking-shop… [i.e.] it does not necessarily mean that it is a 
powerful group of people…” (Employee Representative – F Grade - Technical 
Manager of Non-edible Products). 
“Especially, [for finance issues] we are not going to make any changes. [Once] the 
company has decided what the pay is, that is it! We have come to get used to that now, 
there is no point in negotiating it.  If we think that something is really wrong and 
people are getting undercut and not being paid what they are due, then we bring it up 
[for discussion]” (Employee Representative – D Grade – Constituency of Property 
Management). 
By contrast, at the depot sites employee representatives and especially trade union 
representatives have stronger power and greater ability to challenge management 
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prerogative. In particular, the long standing operation of the JCCs, combined with the 
trade union recognition agreements, has enabled the employees at these sites to have 
effective voice through consultation and negotiation mechanisms within an 
environment of mutual trust. In addition, at the time that the research was conducted, 
they had not had to deal with serious challenges and external events (i.e. 
organisational restructuring, collective redundancies etc), such as those faced at the 
head office and other depot sites. 
In sum, it appears that the potential impact of the ICE Regulations, with regard to the 
establishment and development of information and consultation mechanisms, may 
diverge substantially between unionised and non-unionised workplaces. Furthermore, 
trade union recognition agreements may provide a greater level of influence and 
power for employee representatives, in the context of management decision making. 
In other words, collective union recognition agreements can strengthen these sorts of 
arrangements, and also potentially enrich the agenda of employee forums. On the 
other hand, the absence of union recognition agreements can hamper the effectiveness 
of employee forums and severely limit the scope of collective bargaining. In this case-
study, the evidence suggests that simply adopting information and consultation 
arrangements, as required by the statutory provisions, is not sufficient enough for 
securely establishing an effective and coherent body of representation for the 
employees. In reality, although the employee representatives conceded that from their 
perspective these arrangements are transparent and legally satisfactory, this does not 
allow for much scope in terms of their sphere of influence.  
“The duty of the company to inform and consult with the union is a stricter discipline 
than in a situation where there is not a union presence… we have no bargaining power 
[i.e. at the head office]… we are not powerful collective representatives. We have no 
power at all other than to listen, consult, talk back and that is it about really! We are 
exposed in a way!” (Employee Representative – F Grade - Technical Manager of Non-
edible Products). 
“The legislation has allowed us [i.e. the elected representatives of the staff forum] to 
happen [sic]…but, it only gives us a certain amount of power…it is basically [just 
something] that the company has to go through – it gives no real power to the staff 
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forum… the legislation is still stuck [sic] in the company’s favour…it is the same with 
the redundancies. If the company does not agree with us, they can just wait, until the 
consultation period finishes, and do whatever they want anyway… There is no 
obligation legally – and definitely not morally - for the company to actually listen to the 
staff forum. It is just, what I would call, a touchy-feely exercise, just to make people feel 
better!...” (Employee Representative – D Grade – Constituency of Finance).  
At the head office, the change of ownership and support for employee participation by 
the new board team, in conjunction with the statutory requirements of the ICE 
Regulations, were the key drivers for establishing a consultation forum. The 
consultation mechanism was structured in a transparent way, but it remains to be seen 
to what extent the employee representatives can take advantage of this opportunity 
and be able to have an influence in decision making. In addition, according to the 
pertinent academic literature (Coupar and Stevens, 2005), training and guidance are 
necessary pre-requisites for attaining sustainable and effective employee participation 
mechanisms, such as those relating to the information-sharing and consultation 
arrangements at the head office.  
During the early operation of the staff forum there was scepticism about the actual 
involvement of employee representatives. Moreover, there was some sort of 
uncertainty about the future potentialities of this body of representation, owing to the 
fact that redundancies were continuing to be experienced. According to Beaumont and 
Hunter (2007), this sort of uncertainty may harm the operation of consultative 
councils, because any negative external “events away from the consultative arena” (p. 
1243) may hamper the establishment of trust and, therefore, both management and 
employee representatives should be prepared to “face periodic challenges” (ibid), 
such as unforeseen collective redundancies. In fact, during the conducting of the 
empirical research, the employee representatives highlighted their unpreparedness and 
ignorance with regard to the potentialities of the staff forum at the head office: 
“Generally, they [i.e. employee representatives] are not aware of the full potential of 
the staff forum or […] they are not sufficiently interested to raise or bring issues to the 
staff forum’s attention… it [i.e. the staff forum] could be a more valuable tool for the 
people who are working here… I do not think that they have grasped the potential that 
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the staff forum has for them…we need to educate the employees [as to] what the staff 
forum is about? What it can do?” (Employee Representative – F Grade - Technical 
Manager of Non-edible Products).  
“I do not think that we can have any expectations, because nobody knows where they 
stand at the moment… as far as we are concerned, it is not over yet, until it does come 
to some kind of standstill…people in the whole business do not know what is going to 
happen from one day to another…it is really difficult to plan ahead…” (Employee 
Representative – F Grade - Technical Manager of Non-edible Products). 
“We are in a transitional change in the company, there is nothing on the board…We 
need to get through this current transitional period first…” (Employee Representative 
– D Grade – Constituency of Finance).  
6.5 ICE Regulations: Potential Developments and Options to 
Enhance Employee Voice and Democracy at the Workplaces. 
Discussion and Summary 
Case-study two provides an example of the unilateral establishment of information 
and consultation arrangements by management in a non-unionised workplace, i.e. at 
the head office. This has enabled the organisation to comply securely with the 
statutory requirements of the legislation, whilst the employees previously lacked the 
co-ordination to request negotiations before the development and implementation of 
the Constitution Agreement. Consequently, it is now difficult to challenge this 
agreement because the votes of 40 per cent of the employees are needed to request 
negotiations for altering the current arrangements. In line with the argument of Hall 
(2006), this can also be described as a management strategy of pre-empting any 
initiative by employees as the legal threshold for triggering the negotiation procedures 
is now likely to be insurmountable. 
In sum, all of the undertakings of this case-study organisation now comply securely 
with the statutory provisions of the ICE Regulations. The pre-existence of 
consultation and negotiation forums at the unionised depot sites provides a strong 
indication that consistent and influential forms of employee voice are more evident in 
unionised workplaces. Moreover, in such workplaces the ICE Regulations do not 
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provide an opportunity for any significant change, because the provisions of union-
based agreements are relatively superior when compared with the information and 
consultation arrangements. More specifically, at the depot sites, union and employee 
representatives had already acquired their collective consultation rights through the 
JCCs, and union forums can currently allow the representatives to negotiate and even 
have a strong influence on decision making. 
Interviews with the employee representatives at the head office reveal that the 
company established and enforced (i.e. strengthened) a fair and transparent form of 
representation for: information disclosure, communication and consultation in 
accordance with the statutory provisions. However, the lack of involvement by the 
employees in the development of the constitution at the head office has resulted in the 
imposition of a management-led consultation forum that is functional, but quite 
unitarist in its form. Moreover, the necessity to conduct redundancies in accordance 
with the requirements of the legislation was the main stimulus that provided the 
impetus to establish the consultative council. This development did allow the 
employees to have a say regarding business decisions that severely affected them (i.e. 
collective redundancies), and employee representatives did express the view that it is 
an important voice mechanism for improving employee involvement and participation 
arrangements that function in accordance with the legislative provisions of the ICE 
Regulations. In other words, at the head office, an organisation-specific information 
and consultation arrangement has been established and developed with strong reliance 
on the need to conduct collective redundancies, which is subsequently pertinent to the 
conceptual framework of legislatively prompted voluntarism. 
Moreover, at the head office, the management prerogative is broad and strong, as final 
decision making cannot be seriously challenged by the employee representatives. In 
particular, hitherto the employee representatives have not acquired the required 
expertise in order to ensure the efficacy of the consultation process, although intensive 
training has taken place so as to deal with this issue. In addition, the lack of a trade 
union recognition agreement at the head office does not allow any negotiation rights 
for the employees who are also considered to be “exposed” to the management 
prerogative, thereby just being able to participate in a “talking shop” (Employee 
Representative – F Grade - Technical Manager of Non-edible Products). In other 
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words, the lack of union recognition agreement has resulted in the absence of a dual 
channel of representation, which could otherwise help to ensure the existence of 
coherent and effective forms of employee voice.  
Furthermore, even though the ICE Regulations have provided a very good opportunity 
for the establishment of a structured consultation arrangement that sustains employee 
representation at the head office, it can be primarily described as opportunistic with 
the main real focus being on the communication of business decisions. In particular, 
although the actions carried out by the head office securely comply with the minimal 
statutory provisions, they do not assist for the enforcement of effective collective 
consultation arrangements. In other words, coherent employee voice and workplace 
democracy are poorly supported under these circumstances, but hopefully the current 
provisions can act as a potential vehicle for greater employee influence over 
management decision making in the future.  
It remains to be seen whether employees can use such arrangements in order to build 
up more coherent forms of employee voice and participation and this is particularly 
problematic because their representatives do not, as yet, have the required expertise at 
the head office. Nevertheless, the situation could be improved if the organisation 
provides greater opportunities for training and learning, so as to improve the efficacy 
of employee representation. In other words, time and the active involvement of all the 
parties are required in order to enhance workplace democracy at the head office and 
the focus should lie in restoring the trust and job security that were seriously impaired 
due to the collective redundancy situation.  
By contrast, at the depot sites the long-lasting union-based arrangements are certainly 
more effective. In fact, the potency of employee voice at the depot can be primarily 
attributed to the culture that has been developed, which promotes workplace 
democracy through dual channels of employee representation and the strong 
involvement of the trade unions. In this regard, one trade union representative 
strongly emphasised that consultation involves mutual compromise between both 
parties and added that “…management on this site works in partnership with union on 
all matters…in moving forward, there needs to be a balance of views and work 
methods/practices…”. In relation to the future prospects, he pointed out that the main 
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objective is to “…carry on, as we are, as a partnership…”. Overall, the employee 
participation arrangements at the depot sites are superior in comparison with the 
provisions of the ICE Regulations and as a consequence amendments owing to the 
implementation of this legislation are unlikely to take place.    
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CHAPTER SEVEN 

CASE-STUDY THREE 

7.1 Organisation’s Structure and Employee Representation 
The third case-study of the empirical research is a British owned retail company, with 
twelve stores in England being part of the same group together with a head office. 
Originally, the company was founded in 1881, as a fancy fair, and subsequently 
continually expanded, with the last store being acquired in 2006. As noted on the 
company’s website, it “…seeks to differentiate itself by focusing its offer on specific 
merchandise categories – principally womenswear, menswear, gifts, cosmetics and 
light home-wares – and targeting the particular needs of the ABC1 customer…”. 
Three of these stores trade under their individual names and research took place in 
one located in Yeovil, which became part of the group in 1999. In particular, this store 
was originally a family-run business and currently this family is the main shareholder, 
but without executive powers. In each store there is a Store/Staff Council, which is the 
main representation body for the employees and in particular, the one at the Yeovil 
store has operated under the current formal arrangements since 1999. 
The total number of employees at the Yeovil store, across two sites, is approximately 
300 of whom about 150 to 160 are contracted employees, with the rest being known 
as concession employees53. The Store Council and training sessions are the main 
communication tools and there is no formal trade union recognition agreement for 
collective bargaining purposes. 
7.2 Interviews and Collection of the Qualitative Data 
For the purposes of the research, ten semi-structured interviews (on 7th June 2006) 
were conducted with: an HR officer, an employee from catering department, an 
employee from the finance team, a representative from section management in 
fashions (DSM1), the secretary of the Store Council, an employee representative from 
the warehouse, a representative from section management in the furniture store 
53 Approximately 90 to 100 concession employees are at site 1 and 50 to 60 are at site 2. 
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(DSM2), the section manager in the cook-shop (DSM3), an employee representative 
from the finance group and the HR manager. In addition, a semi-structured interview 
was conducted with the store director (on 25th October 2006) and all relevant 
documentation was collected (such as: the ‘Store Council Constitution’, 
‘Communication Policy’ and the minutes from ten different meetings), and finally a 
non-participant observation of one of the Store Council meetings took place (on 25th 
October 2006). 
Most of the interviewees participate in the Store Council meetings, but not all of 
them. More specifically, at the time of empirical fieldwork, both the HR manager and 
HR officer had worked in the company for four years, and they were taking turns to 
participate in these meetings. The employee representative from the finance group had 
worked at the firm for nearly four years and it is noteworthy to mention that she 
became an employee representative and participated for the first time in a Store 
Council meeting in August 2006. At the time of research, the other employee from the 
finance team had worked for a similar amount of time, but she was not a 
representative and, likewise, the employees from the catering and warehousing 
departments were not representatives either. The section manager from the department 
of fashions (DSM1) had worked in the store for nearly twenty years (at the time of the 
fieldwork) but she did not participate in the Store Council meetings. The section 
manager in the furniture store (DSM2) is a representative, who regularly participates 
in the meetings as a member of the Store Council and has worked at the store for more 
than twenty years. 
At the time of research, the section manager from cook-shop (DSM3) was not a 
representative, but had worked for about ten years in the store. The secretary was a 
member of the council and had worked in the store for approximately six months and 
previously she had worked in the HR department in another organisation. The store 
director always chairs the meetings of the Store Council and at the time of research he 
had worked for about 30 years in the company. He originally started as a sales 
assistant and progressed slowly to the upper levels of the firm, starting from the post 
of being an executive in various services, including section and department manager, 
and eventually becoming the store director. 
     188 
Chapter 7: Case-Study Three
It is noteworthy to point out the different perceptions amongst the representatives and 
individual employees about the Store Council. More specifically, individual 
employees appear to lack sufficient knowledge about the operation of the Store 
Council in comparison with the representatives. Overall, it was revealed from the 
interviews that most of the employee representatives do not have good knowledge 
about the ICE Regulations. On the other hand, the HR team and secretary have in-
depth awareness and, in particular, it was the HR manager who took the initiative to 
bring the legislation as an item for discussion to the Store Council meetings.    
7.3 The Store Council Meeting in Yeovil 
7.3.1 Adjustments and Reviews – The Impact of the ICE Regulations 
The Communication Policy and Staff Council Constitution Agreement were included 
on the agenda of a council meeting in all the stores after having been reviewed by the 
company’s head office and their subsequent advice had been cascaded down (in 
October 2006). However, this advice made no explicit reference to the ICE 
Regulations and no substantial changes were subsequently made to the existing 
Constitution Agreement, which had been in place in all stores since 1999, because it 
already complied with the requirements of the legislation. The current agreement 
covers all employees in all undertakings of the group and even though minor 
amendments were carried out whilst this research was in progress, it was generally 
accepted that they already complied with the necessary information, communication 
and consultation mechanisms. In other words, the head office of the organisation had 
already ensured that there was the equivalent of multiple ‘PEAs’ across all of the 
stores, prior to the transposition of the ICE Directive in the UK, and within the 
aforementioned Constitution Agreement the organisation “…recognises that effective 
communication between itself, its employees and its customers is crucial to its 
operation and maximisation of profits…” (Communication Policy, October 2006:  p. 
1). 
In addition, formal reviews of the Store Council Constitution Agreement would 
appear to be considered highly important, as the effectiveness of the councils has to be 
formally reviewed every three years, with comments pertaining to this issue being 
given to the HR executives for “…co-ordination of responses and amendment of 
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constitution if required…” (Staff Council Constitution, October 2006: p. 5). 
Employees are also encouraged to offer their comments on matters that are of concern 
to them and the HR department should regularly review and evaluate the effectiveness 
of the Communication Policy and “any recommendations for amendments will be 
made to the Board” (Communication Policy, October 2006: p. 5). In addition, high 
emphasis is placed on the confidentiality and disclosure of information based on the 
Data Protection Act. 
7.3.2 The Composition of the Store Council 
All the company’s employees are eligible to become representatives provided that 
they have completed six months service. However, concession employees cannot 
become representatives at the council meetings, but they are allowed to have their 
own representative who can take part in a separate meeting between concession 
managers and the store director twice a year. The elections are co-ordinated by the 
secretary who also ensures that the nomination/voting forms and ballot papers are 
prepared and issued. Table 7.1 illustrates the composition of the Store Council. 
Chairperson: the store director [i.e. ex-officio] 
Vice chair 
Secretary 
Health and safety competent person (who attends the H & S part of meeting only) 
1 Representative per selling floor 
1 Representative for catering 
1 Representative for non-selling employees e.g. cleaners etc 
1 Representative of department managers 
1 Representative for weekend teams 
Table 7.1 Composition of the Participant Representatives on the Consultative/Store Council in 
Yeovil (Source: Constitution Agreement Document). 
The total number of members who participate in the Store Council meetings is 
typically between 10 and 15 (depending on the amount of selling floors for each 
store), and in particular, in the Yeovil store 12 people normally attend. The store 
director is the chairperson and does not have to be a formally elected representative, 
whilst all the other members of the council have to be formally elected. There is no 
definite period regarding the rotation, but as soon as there is a vacancy the formal 
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process of recruiting a representative is applied. The chairman should “set dates of bi-
monthly meetings at the beginning of the corporate year, discuss with the secretary 
issues for the agenda, chair fairly and in a way which allows all to air their views…” 
(Staff Council Constitution, October 2006: p. 1). If an issue cannot sufficiently be 
dealt with at the time of meeting, it should be referred to the most appropriate 
department or the head office for resolution and if deemed necessary, extraordinary 
meetings can be called by senior managers. The secretary has to liaise with the 
chairman and all employee representatives about all the issues/items proposed for the 
agendas, two weeks in advance prior to the meetings. As soon as the issues/items are 
mutually agreed, then they are distributed. Finally, the secretary has to prepare and 
distribute the minutes within one week after the meeting. 
7.3.3 The Purpose and Role of the Store Council Meetings 
The main objectives of the Store Council meetings are: (a) to facilitate two-way 
communication and (b) to build and maintain mutual trust and co-operation by: 
“…ensuring employees are kept informed on key issues, policies and procedures; 
defining and communicating company’s aims and objectives; maximising employee 
potential through effective communication and training; adopting consistent and 
reliable methods of keeping employees informed, providing opportunities for them to 
feedback their views and suggestions, and consulting on issues that may affect 
employees’ work; and finally, ensuring all employees receive the information to which 
they are entitled (e.g. contracts of employment, payslips, health and safety information 
etc)…”  (Communication Policy, October 2006: p. 1). 
The co-ordination of fundraising activities for nominated charities may be also 
included on the agenda. However, in the Constitution Agreement there is no explicit 
definition regarding the term “consultation” or how any such procedure should take 
place and instead, the main emphasis would appear to be placed on two-way 
communication, so as to enable the delivery of suggestions and recommendations by 
the employees to the senior management and vice-versa. 
According to the company’s Communication Policy and Staff Council Constitution 
Agreement documents, employees are entitled to: 
     191 
Chapter 7: Case-Study Three
“…participate in regular team meetings, have objectives set in relation to their job, 
access policies and procedures relevant to their job, be consulted in relation to 
proposed changes to their job, contact and consult with their employee representative 
on the Staff Council…” (Communication Policy, October 2006: p. 1). 
In addition, employee representatives should: 
“…participate in the communication process, appreciate that communication is a two-
way process, ensure that appropriate information is shared and understood…” (ibid). 
Another key responsibility of employee representatives is to “make known the views 
of the colleagues they represent and act as their ‘voice’ on the Staff Council” (Staff 
Council Constitution, October 2006: p. 3). More specifically, they should, well in 
advance, consult and decide with their colleagues about matters and issues that they 
would like to have included on the agenda of meetings. After the meetings they 
should report back to their colleagues all the decisions taken and matters arising, 
through face-to-face meetings or circulation of the minutes (ibid). 
The Chief Executive should “ensure that all employment regulations are complied 
with, appropriate policies and procedures are introduced in accordance with the 
legislation, and employees are given the information to which they have a right (e.g. 
employment contracts)…”. Furthermore, the Chief Executive has the overall 
responsibility to identify and disseminate the company’s corporate aims and 
objectives. The HR Executive is responsible for “implementing and evaluating the 
Consultation and Communication policy” and also “briefing the Chief Executive and 
Board on changes to employment legislation”, whilst the executives or heads of 
department should ensure: the implementation of communication policy, “the timely 
and efficient dissemination of information to appropriate employees” and decide upon 
the information that has to be communicated to employees and as deemed necessary 
(Communication Policy, October 2006: p. 2). 
Overall, the Staff/Store Council aims to: 
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“…(a) facilitate two-way communication between employees and senior management, 
(b) provide suggestions, views and recommendations on behalf of colleagues to senior 
management, (c) ensure that effective channels of communication are kept open 
between employees and senior management, (d) contribute to building and maintaining 
mutual trust and co-operation” (Communication Policy, October 2006: p. 2). 
7.3.4 Agenda and Issues for Discussion During the Store Council Meetings 
Various issues can be included on the agenda of meetings and the terms of reference 
provide a list of examples concerning the topics that can be included at any meeting, 
such as: sales figures, store successes, test shopping results, store budgets, current 
product promotions, account openings, employee turnover rates, sickness absence 
levels, social activities, welfare issues, health and safety issues, training requirements, 
store charity and fundraising events. Other issues, which are included on a less regular 
basis, are: the corporate plan, store business plans, company results, new company 
policies and their possible impact on the employees, such as: working hours, opening 
hours during the Christmas/Easter periods and any issues potentially affecting job 
security. 
7.3.5 Non-Participant Observation at the Store Council Meeting in Yeovil 
A non-participant observation of one of these meetings was conducted in October 
2006 and matters arising from previous minutes, an update and other department and 
business issues were included on the agenda. In addition, there was an announcement 
concerning the forthcoming election of two store council representatives for the 
ground floor of the fashion store and second floor of the furniture store. Furthermore, 
as previously noted, the reviewed Store Council Constitution Agreement and the 
Communication Policy, as addressed by the head office, were included on the agenda, 
but there was no explicit reference or briefing regarding the ICE Regulations. 
7.4 ICE Regulations: Current Attitudes of Individual Employees and 
Management 
7.4.1 Employee Involvement Arrangements and Representation Structures 
The change of ownership has affected the formulation of employee voice mechanisms 
within the store. In this regard, before 1999 the store was independently run by the 
owner, who was also the director and employee voice mechanisms tended to be quite 
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informal. Moreover, concerning the past experience the store director expressed the 
view that although there were council meetings, which were operating in compliance 
with the legislative provisions, these were not entirely necessary because of the open 
culture that existed across the store. Since 1999, when the store became part of a 
wider group of a large company, the employee involvement practices, election 
procedures for the employee representatives and composition of the Store Council 
have all become more formal, as advised by the head office. However, there is no 
formal trade union recognition for collective bargaining purposes. According to the 
store director, representatives from USDAW were invited in the past, but the 
employees were not interested in becoming members or creating any type of union 
based representation. 
The Store Council and weekly training sessions are the main or “big” communication 
tools (HR Officer). In addition, meetings between managers are held every month and 
concession meetings take place twice a year. The store directors meet regularly with 
other executives at the head office and other common methods of communication for 
the whole group are: noticeboards, briefings in the stores and at the head office, team 
meetings, annual board and executive seminars, role specific meetings, one-to-one 
meetings, store communication files, newsletters, training and development, induction 
programmes for new employees, performance and development reviews and 
suggestion schemes54. Moreover, the secretary of the council provided a brief outline 
concerning the range of the structured voice mechanisms that exist in the company:  
“[employees] get handouts, memos, bulletins… [they have] the council…they get the 
training every Tuesday…there are plenty of platforms there to get their views 
across…”. 
The Yeovil store comprises two sites and four representatives from each site are 
usually elected to the Staff Council. Concession employees have their own 
representatives, who do not formally participate in the main communication and 
consultation mechanisms, but they are still involved, to a certain extent, in the 
54 Further detailed information, about the level of direct and indirect voice mechanisms at the store and 
also the content and issues included in information-sharing and consultation with the employees are 
provided in the appendices and notes. 
     194 
Chapter 7: Case-Study Three
company’s voice arrangements (such as meetings with the store director) as they have 
their own HR department and forms of communication. The HR manager emphasised 
the importance of the Store Council, but mainly from the perspective of 
communicating and providing information-sharing, by saying that: 
“… it gives the opportunity for two-way communication, certainly allows top-level 
information to come down and bottom-level information to come up…”. 
In addition, the HR officer pointed out that all communication policies, memos, the 
agreements and issues regarding training sessions are kept in files, with employee 
representatives being required “to sign [and] say that they have been told about it”. 
Consequently, regarding the employee involvement practices in general, there are 
elements of both high and low road approaches, but the main features of the latter 
strategy dominate. In other words, using the terms of the academic literature, there is 
“…a mix of direct and representative mechanisms…” and a tendency for greater 
emphasis on “information [rather] than consultation” (Dundon et al., 2006: p. 508). 
More specifically, at the Yeovil store, direct forms of employee involvement 
evidently exist alongside the Store Council. 
Furthermore, the store director emphasised the open culture and open-door policy 
within the store, and also the direct communication with employees along with other 
forms of employee involvement, when he pointed out that “…I do not need the Store 
Council personally, because I communicate by getting out…”. These sort of open-
door and direct communication policies have been referred to as examples of “non-
union bypassing channels” in the academic literature (Dundon et al., 2006: p. 506). 
Furthermore, in this regard, it is noteworthy to mention that direct forms of 
involvement are generally more widespread “in less complex organisations” (Jirjahn 
and Smith, 2006: p. 656). However, one of the main criticisms concerning these forms 
of participation is the limited organisational influence that employees may have on 
decision-making (Marchington, 2000; cited in Hyman and Summers, 2007: p. 369), 
because the management prerogative cannot be easily challenged.    
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7.4.2 Benefits and Problems of Sustaining the Information and Consultation 
Arrangements 
All the interviewees expressed positive perceptions about the Store Council at the 
time that the research was conducted, with many of them stressing their opinion that it 
is an effective communication and employee voice tool. With respect to this point of 
view, the HR manager contended that through the council meetings the employees 
feel that they are part of the business, and also: 
“[they] take ownership with their job…[and] are more ‘loyal employee’ to the 
company because they know where they stand …[furthermore, the Store Council] 
allows pre-voice to come stronger…[and employees] may have ideas of how to improve 
certain ways of working…it certainly allows for greater flexibility and movement of 
staff…[it] is a good forum - very interactive - and people feel able to talk openly and 
honestly…” (HR Manager). 
DSM1 suggested that information-sharing and consultation can contribute to better 
working relations and conditions. Furthermore, the secretary of the Store Council 
pointed out that this sort of mechanism is helpful for both sides (i.e. management and 
employees), because no one wants “…to be kept in the dark…it is far better and 
healthier for the company to be more open…”. She also added that such legislative 
provisions can be a “major breakthrough” in workplaces where communication is 
based on a “closed-door” policy and subsequently, this may potentially “break the 
barriers” of hierarchy between the employees and management.  
Similarly, the HR officer emphasised that one of the main benefits is the fact that the 
Store Council gives “motivation” to the employees, “involves them” in business 
decisions, and consequently they are becoming “less resistant to change”. In general, 
she also added that the ICE Regulations may help organisations that do not “come up 
to the same level” with other organisations as prompted by the “minimal provisions”. 
Moreover, DSM2 confirmed that the efficacy of communication is very good within 
the store, adding that the HR officer regularly sends out a form to all the 
representatives, who should initially speak with their colleagues, so that the 
employees can raise issues that can be put on the agenda of the Store Council 
meetings. In fact, according to her view, “…we are setting the meeting for ourselves 
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really…” (DSM2). Furthermore, she argued that information, communication and 
consultation mechanisms can improve team-working.  
In general, all the interviewees suggested that there is a very good and co-operative 
atmosphere in the Store Council meetings. As the store director argued, “it is relaxed, 
you listen to what they are saying…today’s meeting [i.e. on 25th October 2006] is 
typical”. In other words, using the phrasing of Jirjahn and Smith (2006), it would 
appear that the Store Council Constitution Agreement has helped the company to 
build-up “trustful and cooperative employer-employee relations” (p. 651), and hence 
this can lead to the facilitation of “information flow” (p. 653). More specifically, both 
the HR team and store director emphasised that the information and consultation 
arrangements are contributing to the alignment of organisational goals and values, 
which can subsequently enhance trust and mutual understanding. Similar findings 
have also been confirmed in other research projects (such as: Hall et al., 2007: p. 72).  
The HR manager referred to the difficulties that arise when harsh decisions have to be 
made which “could be detrimental to the employees and their general well-being 
within the workplace in terms of any general concerns over the future of the 
business”, but fortunately the company has not faced such problems as yet. In this 
regard, other researchers (Taras, 2000; Kaufman, 2003) have similarly found that 
employee involvement practices can become less successful in more difficult times. 
However, in spite of there being no such crisis at the time that the case-study research 
was conducted, some interviewees expressed their opinion that communication with 
the head office is not adequate in practice. In fact, some of them criticised the head 
office, because it simply sets up the agenda without providing sufficient information 
in advance for vibrant debate to take place, and it appears that it is just concerned, 
primarily, with promoting the business philosophy. In this vein, DSM3 stated that it is 
hard to establish effective communication with the head office. More specifically:  
“…they [i.e. the people from the Head Office] talk to us when they need to… telling us 
things [as soon as decisions have been already made]…when we have got all [i.e. 
employee voice arrangements] in one store, it is a lot easier…it is not too bad 
throughout the actual store itself…the store director talks to us and tells us 
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everything…but they [i.e. the board directors and managers at the Head Office] are not 
so good!...” (DSM3).  
At the time that the empirical research was conducted, DSM3 had worked in the store 
for approximately 10 years and therefore she had a very good knowledge of employee 
voice mechanisms, both before and after the change of the store’s ownership. She also 
pointed out that actually “there is no [true] consultation”, and “what is needed to be 
known” is communicated through training. Notwithstanding her frustration with the 
current communication policy of the head office, she said that she was content with 
the arrangement of employee voice mechanisms within the store and did not consider 
that it was necessary to have any further amendments or improvements due to the ICE 
Regulations. Similarly, DSM2, whose view is worth mentioning because she had 
worked more than twenty years in the store, commented that “not everything is 
always communicated down to the shop floor level from the Head Office” and 
suggested that some representatives from the head office should start to attend some 
Store Council meetings so that they can have a better insight about the stores, because 
each one has its own individual needs. In addition, the employee from the warehouse 
department suggested that a wider range of issues regarding communication should be 
provided and believed that not all the relevant information that managers have in their 
possession is being passed down to the staff. 
Regarding the extent to which authentic consultation is implemented, the interviews 
with the individual employees provide a very insightful angle. More specifically, the 
employee from the catering group was asked about the process of consultation and 
responded that “…I am not sure that it touches me at all…perhaps the managers and 
deputy managers would be involved in various decisions…but I think that I am too 
‘lower-down’ to be bothered…”. Similarly, the employee from the finance team 
suggested that consultation is limited in practice, because it is mainly focussed on the 
communication of business decisions by the management. Furthermore, the employee 
pointed out that “…the major issues that might be discussed may not be directly fed 
down to us…but if there is something relevant that we need to be informed of, at shop 
level, yes, we would be told…”. Thus, the features of the Store Council would appear 
to mainly conform to the concept of pseudo-consultation rather than authentic-
consultation. The formal information and consultation mechanisms also appear to 
     198 
Chapter 7: Case-Study Three
work quite well at the store level, but there is still some degree of frustration 
regarding the current communication process with the head office, especially since the 
store became a part of a wider group. It is also noteworthy to mention that the HR 
manager described the Staff Council as an “information-giving forum”, which is 
consistent with the findings of other research projects (such as: Hall et al. 2007). In 
other words, much empirical evidence showing that there is a strong tendency for the 
consultative forums to be dominated by the communication of business decisions 
rather than the establishment of effective and authentic consultation.  
Similarly, it emerges that the extent to which employees’ views are reflected in final 
decisions is currently limited. In this regard, the employee representative from the 
finance team pointed out that the communication process is sometimes slow and it is 
mainly concentrated on trivial matters. She also added that there are numerous 
incidents of absenteeism concerning the attendance of the Store Council meetings, 
because some representatives are part-timers and it is difficult for them to participate 
on a regular basis. This is confirmed through scrutiny of the minutes, in which it can 
be noted that, on average, two people fail to attend these meetings. As a result, she 
suggested that all the people who participate in the meetings should be full-timers and 
highly committed in representing the employees’ interests. 
On the other hand, DSM2, DSM3 and the employee representative from the finance 
team claimed that the information, communication and consultation arrangements, 
and employee relations, in general, are quite good within the store. The positive 
perceptions of most of the employees can be attributed to the argument of Jirjahn and 
Smith (2006: p. 656) that they usually “prefer direct modes of involvement that 
provide more responsibility at work and promote their perceptions that the firm 
listens to them”. The attitude of the store director has also significantly contributed to 
the development of positive perceptions by the employees, regarding employee voice 
mechanisms and the employment relations climate within the store. 
“…I am a great believer in participation, and the best way to get [it] is through 
involvement and ownership…” (Store Director). 
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Another criticism made by one of the employees is the fact that no representative 
from the concession employees is allowed to participate in the Store Council meetings 
(Employee Representative from the Finance Team). In particular, she argued that at 
least one representative from the concessions should also participate in the Store 
Council meetings, because “they are part of the store” and should be involved in the 
decision-making process, and were this to happen, it would provide the opportunity 
for “more information to be shared” (Employee Representative from the Finance 
Team). Nevertheless, despite the fact that concession employees can not participate in 
the Store Council meetings, they do have separate meetings with their managers and 
the store director twice per year, because it is important for them to “have a say and 
understand what is going on in the store” (HR Officer). Besides, the concession 
employees comprise “52 per cent of [the store’s] business…[and it would be] foolish 
[sic] to ignore them…” (Store Director). 
7.4.3 Evaluation of the ICE Regulations: An Opportunity for Changes and 
Reviewing 
The level of awareness of the ICE Regulations, concerning the HR management team, 
is quite good and the secretary of the Store Council had acquired substantial in-depth 
knowledge of the legislation when she was previously working in the HR department 
of another organisation. On the other hand, at the time of conducting the interviews, 
almost all the employee representatives and even the store director were not aware of 
the specific details regarding the contents of the legislation. In particular, most of the 
individual employees severely lacked any sort of knowledge about the ICE 
Regulations and only had a rough idea about the function of the Store Council. For 
instance, the employee from the warehouse department, who had worked for the 
organisation for approximately one year, had only learnt about the existence of the 
Store Council from his colleagues in the warehouse six months after the beginning of 
his employment.  
In general, the majority of interviewees emphasised the positive potential outcomes of 
the EU directives on employee participation. More specifically, it was suggested that 
the ICE Directive can generally “bring into line…more structured” arrangements 
across organisations (Individual Employee from the Warehouse Department). The 
empirical findings from this case-study reveal that the review of the Store Council 
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Constitution and the adoption of the Communication Policy, as set out by the head 
office, have enabled the company to establish information and consultation 
mechanisms that are consistent with its organisational needs and goals. At present, it 
seems unlikely that the employee representatives will challenge the current 
arrangements and prompt negotiation procedures for amendments, in particular given 
the fact that the minimum statutory threshold for triggering such change is 40 per cent 
of the employees. This situation concurs with the argument of Hall (2006), in which it 
is anticipated that in the context of the ICE Regulations, there will be numerous 
instances where “broad employee satisfaction” (p. 460) is identified regarding pre-
established arrangements.   
The situation in the organisation illustrates another example of a proactive 
management strategy that is aimed at bringing about compliance with the minimal and 
default requirements of the ICE Regulations, for as the HR officer argued: 
“the Head Office is always in front of new legislation and policies…we obviously knew 
that it [i.e. the ICE Directive] was coming out, and we made sure that we were 
complying…”. 
Similarly, the HR manager suggested that: 
“…we certainly found that we obviously complied with everything included in the ICE 
Regulations…”.  
Both of these people confirmed that they use the ACAS and CIPD websites for 
downloading brochures and booklets with regard to the developments in the 
employment law and also for getting advice on various issues, such as: the 
implementation of the ICE Regulations. However, it should be noted that this 
legislation was not brought explicitly into discussions during the Store Council 
meetings and the level of knowledge appears to be relatively low amongst the 
employee representatives. In general, the company takes a pro-active stance when 
required to deal with issues concerning the new employment legislation. Nevertheless, 
it is evident that all the main employee involvement practices were primarily initiated 
and driven by management, with the actual level of influence of employees in the 
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participation mechanisms being substantially limited. Moreover, the secretary of the 
council claimed that the organisation had instantly and effectively responded to the 
legislative requirements of the ICE Directive. In particular, she argued that: 
“…this particular company has already put into practice a lot of what is said in the 
document [of the ICE Regulations] … there are always plans to make things better, and 
generally they are coming from the HR department…and [information] is fed down 
through them [the HR people] ” (Secretary of the Store Council). 
7.4.4 Evaluation of the ICE Regulations: Limitations and Challenges 
As previously noted, the review of the Communication Policy and the Staff Council 
Constitution Agreement (in October 2006) were brought onto the agenda at all the 
company’s stores in England, thereby leading to the implementation of the 
information and consultation arrangements in compliance with the requirements of the 
legislation. Nevertheless, most of employee voice mechanisms have been initiated by 
management, and thus, in terms of the academic literature, there has been a wide 
scope for “managerial unilateralism” (Charlwood and Terry, 2007: p. 322; Tailby et 
al., 2007: p. 211). That is, the company has actually reached a “pre-emptory 
agreement”, which is greatly shaped by its own “particular circumstances” (Geary 
and Roche, 2005: p. 192) and thus an organisation-specific information and 
consultation arrangement has been developed.  
Furthermore, the HR manager and one of the section managers pointed out that the 
Store Council is actually an information-giving and communication forum, but 
without making any explicit reference to the process of consultation. In this regard, 
the majority of interviewees emphasised the critical role of communicating rather than 
referring directly to the consultation process (similar empirical findings are identified 
in Dundon et al., 2006: pp. 505-506). More specifically, DSM3 stated that “rarely are 
the representatives consulted”. The Communication Policy and Constitution 
Agreement documents, which were circulated by the HR manager during the Store 
Council meeting in October 2006, provide the opportunity for the employee 
representatives to “consult with colleagues about matters they would like to have 
raised at the Staff Council meetings” (cited in Communication Policy and Staff 
Council Constitution, in October 2006), but the actual scope and depth of the 
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consultation process is debatable, because there is no precise definition of 
consultation rights in the Constitution Agreement. 
In addition, even though the Store Council Constitution Agreement provides the 
opportunity for consultation, it seems that employee representatives do not take full 
advantage of it and usually management is apt to set up, unilaterally, the agenda in 
accordance with its organisational objectives. Therefore, consistent with the empirical 
findings of other researchers, there is the potential pitfall for employee representatives 
to be “…usually informed on decisions rather than consulted…”, with the Store 
Council being largely “peripheral”, thus having “negligible effect” in the eyes of the 
majority of the employees (Redfern, 2007: p. 303). 
Furthermore, as noted in the section 7.4.2, there is a frustration amongst some section 
managers regarding the communication process with the head office, for as similarly 
identified by other researchers, management is actually trying to restrict the influence 
of employees by ensuring that their representatives are “being informed about 
organisational decision-making rather than being involved in it” (Tailby et al., 2007: 
p. 226). Another consideration concerns the way that some employees appear to 
perceive the nature of the formal types of representation. More specifically, the 
employee from the catering department emphasised that a mechanism for employee 
representation does not actually exist since “…we do not have any unions at all within 
the company…” and similarly the employee from the finance team concurred with 
this view by saying that “…I do not think that there is [such a mechanism]…not that I 
am aware of…”. In other words, the evidence suggests that the employees perceive 
the Store Council as inferior to a trade union recognition agreement, because the 
former involves no negotiation rights. 
The formally agreed information and consultation arrangements are applied through 
the Store Council and training sessions, but the level of influence for employee 
representatives, in terms of actual decision-making, is relatively low and the 
management prerogative remains intact. The store director tried to justify this by 
arguing that: 
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“…you listen, you consult…at the end of day, I ultimately have to make a decision, and 
not everybody may agree with it but at least I have been through the process… [I have 
done] the talking, consulting, thinking and so on…”. 
Consequently, as Gollan (2006b) posits, under such circumstances there is the risk 
that the operation of the Store Council may result in being part of a “weak employer-
dominated” partnership, with marginal forms of “collective consultation” and direct 
mechanisms of employee involvement (p. 643). In concurrence with the concerns of 
many researchers as to whether the ICE Regulations can enhance employee voice in 
non-unionised workplaces (Butler, 2005; Charlwood and Terry, 2007) and taking into 
consideration the empirical findings of this case-study organisation, it is suggested 
that it appears to be unlikely for the employee representatives to challenge 
management prerogative effectively within the current employee participation 
arrangements at the Yeovil store. 
In addition, under these circumstances, it is argued that the ICE Regulations do not 
provide additional scope “for employee inputs into decision making” (Roper et al., 
2003; cited in Hyman and Summers, 2007: p. 370). Moreover, both management and 
employee representatives highlighted the fact that the Staff Council meetings are 
mainly about information and communication rather than true-consultation and in the 
words of Hall et al. (2007: p. 52) the agenda usually includes “decisions that have 
already been taken”. In other words, the operation of the Store Council exhibits 
features of pseudo-consultation, where the employees, in practice, are chiefly 
informed about business decision-making and yet they have the perception that they 
are being consulted in a transparent and fair way.    
7.5 ICE Regulations: Potential Developments and Options to 
Enhance Employee Voice and Democracy at the Workplaces. 
Discussion and Summary 
Case-study three exemplifies a non-unionised organisation where well-structured and 
pre-established arrangements sufficiently comply with the statutory requirements of 
the legislation. On the other hand, interviews with the individual and employee 
representatives suggest that the organisation illustrates a typical case found in other 
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research projects, which has been termed as a “weak employer-dominated 
partnership”, where communication mechanisms prevail at the expense of “collective 
consultation” (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007a: p. 1138). More specifically, along with 
the minimal compliance of employee representation with the ICE Regulations through 
the review of the Store Council Constitution Agreement, there is a predominance of 
direct communication mechanisms that take place through the staff training sessions. 
The open culture and good climate of employment relations, in conjunction with the 
absence of other business or economic pressures, have not hitherto necessitated the 
triggering of negotiations towards more coherent forms of consultation.  
According to the employee representatives, the organisation has standard basic 
structures for information-sharing and consultation, with limited scope for them to 
exert any strong influence in management decision-making and thus true-consultation 
is not being provided. Moreover, the voice of the employee representatives is 
restricted to the local level without there being any additional roles, i.e. there is no 
forum or body of representation at the head office. In this vein, taking into 
consideration the empirical findings of the conducted research, it is argued that 
extending the spread of information and consultation arrangements within a multi-
tiered framework would give further opportunities for the employees to articulate their 
voice throughout the organisation in a more consistent manner. For instance, a 
separate Staff Council with representatives from the head office and all the stores is 
one potential way of enlarging the scope and coherency of employee voice. In this 
regard, Hall (2005c) provides a very good example from similar case-study research, 
where a multi-level consultation framework was developed, with the establishment of 
various consultative forums at different levels of the company (store, regional, 
divisional and national), which resulted in enhancing employee voice mechanisms, 
where “employee representatives are exhibiting a growing professionalism and 
effectiveness in the way they operate” (p. 252). In addition, ACAS guidance 
encourages multi-tiered consultative structures in more complex organisations and 
identifies the need to have appropriate divisions of responsibility between the 
different levels (ACAS, 2005). Moreover, DTI guidance (2006) provides a detailed 
overview of how multi-tiered agreements can be set up across multi-site 
organisations. 
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The reviewed Constitution Agreement of the Store Council complies with the ICE 
Regulations and every effort has been taken to ensure that the legal compliance has 
been accomplished across all stores. However, these initiatives were solely based on a 
management initiative with the subsequent formal approval of the employee 
representatives. The legislation, in general, provides the opportunity for multi-tiered 
information and consultation arrangements that can significantly improve the 
communication mechanisms (Hall, 2005c; DTI Guidance, 2006). Nonetheless, the 
Yeovil case-study is an example where it is unlikely that the employees will challenge 
the well-established arrangements in the near future, because the minimal legal 
threshold, i.e. 40 per cent of the workforce, is considered a challenging standard in 
order to trigger and initiate such an action. In addition, the majority of employee 
representatives appear to lack the necessary expertise in order to co-ordinate any 
challenge to management prerogative and, in particular, they have poor knowledge 
with regard to their legal rights on employee involvement.  
The absence of a trade union recognition agreement and the lack of union-based 
arrangements are important factors that need to be brought into consideration, for as 
the findings from this case-study organisation suggest, because without these being in 
place there is difficulty in sustaining coherent and efficient forms of collective voice. 
In other words, as similarly suggested by Terry (1994: pp. 244-245 and 1999: pp. 28-
29), the empirical evidence suggests that legislative provisions by themselves are not 
sufficient enough to provide “effective employee representation” that can be 
subsequently sustained in a non-unionised workplace and thus all parties concerned 
need to provide their input equally and consistently towards the establishment of 
effective and pluralist employee representation structures. Finally, taking into 
consideration the lack of expertise and limited ability of employee representatives to 
challenge management prerogative through the Store Council, the evidence of case-
study three serves to provide strong evidence that concurs with the arguments of 
Geary and Roche (2005), who suggest that “robust forms” of information and 
consultation mechanisms are most likely to exist in “strongly unionised companies” 
(p. 196). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 

CASE-STUDY FOUR 

8.1 Organisation’s Structure and Employee Representation 
The fourth case-study of the conducted research concerns a US owned company, 
which is a supplier and merchandiser of home entertainment products, with its main 
customers including supermarkets and chain stores. The data collection took place at a 
UK site located in Warrington (where the main head office is also located) that 
became part of the group in 1999 and operates as a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
US parent company. The UK head office was relocated to Warrington in 2001 and the 
organisation also has a number of warehouses or district fields (in Scotland, 
North/South England and Midlands). After the relocation the organisational structure 
of the head office changed including the senior management team and managing 
director. The main US-company was established in 1934 for distributing 
pharmaceuticals and health-and-beauty aids and during the 1950s it started to 
distribute other home entertainment products. Currently its products include: CDs, 
DVDs, books and greeting cards and in addition, it provides marketing services to its 
customers, such as: advertising, promotions, inventory management and a varied 
assortment of planning services. According to the managing director of the UK site, it 
is “a rapidly growing and developing company bringing a new and innovative 
approach to the retail distribution industry”. 
Just prior to the conducting of research and after the taking over of another 
undertaking (in October 2006), the total number of employees in the UK increased 
from 500 (350 field sales staff, 70 distribution staff and 80 head office staff) to 1,000. 
However, the number of employees was reduced to approximately 500 (in April 2007) 
after the “TUPE-ing off [sic]” of the same undertaking (HR Manager). It is worth 
mentioning that there is no trade union recognition agreement for collective 
bargaining purposes. Nevertheless, there is trade union membership (UNISON, Unite 
and TGWU) for a portion of employees that work at one of the warehouses, where 
approximately 150 people are employed. In September 2006, a Constitution 
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Agreement for information disclosure and consultation purposes was set up at the 
main head office of the company with a separate Constitution Agreement being 
devised for one warehouse in August 2007. 
8.2 Interviews and Collection of the Qualitative Data 
For the purposes of the research, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the 
HR and field support managers (November 2006), both of whom participate in the 
forum meetings. At the time of research, the HR manager, who had worked for the 
company for many years, initiated the establishment of the constitution and now 
chairs all of the meetings of the Consultative Council/Forum. The field support 
manager is an elected member of the council, who had worked for the company nearly 
eight years and she was able to provide a thorough insight into the workings of the 
Consultation Council/Forum and employee voice mechanisms within the 
organisation. Moreover, the interview with the HR manager lasted for about 90 
minutes and provided detailed information about the recent establishment of the 
Constitution Agreement. In November 2007, an additional phone interview was 
conducted with the HR manager, who provided further evidence about the latest 
developments in the organisation. Finally, access was granted for the collection of 
relevant documentation, including the: Constitution Agreement, company’s 
policies/practices, detailed minutes and agendas from various council meetings.  
8.3 Information and Consultation Arrangements 
8.3.1 Setting up of the Information and Consultation Forum – The Impact of the 
ICE Regulations 
Evidence suggests that the impact of the ICE Regulations on the company has been 
quite substantial. In this regard, as a response to the requirements of the legislation, a 
forum was set up in 2006. Initially, an advisor was recruited in order to work on the 
Constitution Agreement and make some presentations to the senior management team 
and other managers about the main purpose and usefulness of having a Consultation 
Forum. Subsequently, the head of the HR department took the initiative of creating a 
Constitution Agreement document for the Information and Consultation Forum 
(initially was called ICF), with the help of the aforementioned external legal 
advisor/consultant. In particular, she stated that the advisor took a constitution 
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template (as defined by the DTI) and she “personalised it” according to the 
organisational objectives of the company. However, the HR manager explicitly made 
reference to the fact that the Constitution Agreement lacks innovation and is 
essentially a duplicated template of the statutory provisions as defined in the ICE 
Regulations. The Constitution Agreement took effect in September 2006 and the first 
meetings were held in September and November of that year. Prior to that, an election 
process took place through mailed letters to home addresses of employees from the: 
field, warehouse and vending areas. Information was given to all employees about the 
setting up of the forum and 79 out of approximately 500 employees requested 
information packs, which included all the necessary information about the forum, 
such as: the role of employee representatives and the purpose of meetings. In relation 
to this, the HR manager expressed disappointment about the level of “apathy” that 
was shown by most employees (about 2/3 of the total number of employees), who 
were not employed in the main warehouse in Warrington, but worked in the field 
districts. In particular, as the HR manager pointed out, communication with these 
employees was not direct and was mainly carried out by the post. Eventually, 
nominations and elections normally took place during the summer of 2006. 
On the other hand, the election procedures at the main warehouse and head office 
were very straightforward. Nevertheless, there was still a general lack of interest, with 
only, on average, one or two nominees for each area of representation. It is 
noteworthy that beforehand there was no form of representation or any sort of 
Constitution Agreement and thus, the implementation of the ICE Regulations brought 
significant changes to the forms of employee voice and the representation structure at 
the UK site. In November 2006, the name of Consultation Forum was included as an 
issue for discussion, and thereafter it was renamed as BRIDGE or Bridge. According 
to the head of the HR department, it is a group of elected representatives, who meet 
quarterly and are updated on organisational issues that can include proposed changes 
within the business or any other events that the management team deems appropriate 
for discussion. In addition, the name of Consultation Forum was conceived and 
founded on the principle that it should: 
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“bridge the gap between all employees or between management and employees, and 
also stands for the Board for Representation, Information, Debate, and Guidance for 
Employees” (HR Manager). 
The Constitution Agreement, which covers the main warehouse and head office, was 
signed in September 2006 and was subsequently approved by the management and 
employees, including: the site manager, the senior operative, the operative manager, 
the field support manager, the marketing co-ordinator, and the elected employee 
representatives. It is explicitly noted in the Constitution Agreement document that 
“the signatories recognise their responsibilities in seeking to establish the forum in 
such a way as to improve the exchange of information and facilitate 
consultation…[and] also agree to abide by the confidentiality clause…” (Constitution 
Agreement, September 2006: p. 5). Officially, the organisation recognises the 
importance of “involving employees”, because it can “lead to improvements in 
performance and the success of its business”, which can be achieved through “direct 
dialogue” in a “spirit of co-operation” with the employee representatives (ibid: p. 1). 
Using the arguments of Hall (2005b), the Constitution Agreement seems to provide a 
similar scope of influence as can be normally enabled through the “Default 
Requirements” and terms of the ICE Regulations (p. 112). In particular, there is 
explicit reference that the organisation “…will seek to ensure that consultation takes 
place with a view to reaching agreement…” (Constitution Agreement, September 
2006: p. 1). Nonetheless, it allows to the employee representatives the opportunity to 
articulate their opinion on the issues under consideration and subsequently to discuss 
with management before final decisions are taken. More specifically, consultation is 
clearly assigned as “the exchange of views and establishment of dialogue between the 
employees’ representatives and employer” (ibid: p. 1), but without explicit provision 
for any additional scope of influence in decision-making. As the HR manager noted 
during the interview, “we introduced the information and consultation panel as a 
direct result of the ICE Regulations”. However, according to the Constitution 
Agreement, the primary objective of the forum is to “further develop the 
communication” (ibid) within the company, which is mainly associated with the 
downward communication of business decisions and the development of pseudo-
consultation and thus there is limited influence upon management prerogative by the 
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employee representatives. In addition, the forum was set up in a transparent and fair 
way so that compliance with the default provisions of legislation would be achieved 
(Dix and Oxenbridge, 2003). 
A virtually identical Constitution Agreement was agreed upon for implementation at 
one of the warehouses that had recently been acquired by the organisation. More 
specifically, this forum was described by the HR manager as the Small Bridge or 
Bolton Bridge and has eight employee representatives, two of whom also participate 
in the wider Bridge Forum of the company. There is a considerable level of union 
membership at the Bolton warehouse and consequently, as the HR manager noted (in 
November 2007), there was an effort by the employees to endorse some sort of a trade 
union recognition agreement. Nonetheless, according to the HR manager, there was 
opposition from the employer to concede to this and through the establishment of the 
Small Bridge (in August 2007) the company, in effect, was introducing information 
and consultation arrangements so as to dissuade the employees from considering the 
necessity to establish a union-based form of representation. In this regard, the HR 
manager made a considerable effort to convince the unionised employees of the 
usefulness of establishing the Small Bridge, arguing that its formation would provide 
sufficient safeguards for them so that they would not have to follow the route of 
having a formal recognition agreement. In other words, the management 
representatives claimed that the current arrangements precluded the need for further 
representation, even for those already belonging to a trade union.   
In sum, the company acted in order to comply with the regulations, through the 
enhancement of employee voice mechanisms and also used the opportunity to 
encourage better communication between the managers and employees with a primary 
focus of improving business performance. To this end, the HR manager55 took the 
initiative and secured a “pre-emptory” agreement with employee representatives (as 
described in Geary and Roche, 2005: p. 192) in order to meet company’s needs and 
yet still comply with the default requirements of the legislation. Using the arguments 
of Charlwood and Terry (2007: p. 335), it is suggested that this case-study represents 
one of the few early post-legislation examples where a “pre-emptive” action took 
55 The HR manager attended seminars about the ICE Regulations, which actually led her to take the 
decision to create the new Constitution Agreement. 
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place so as to provide “representative consultation” at a workplace where previously 
there had been no such mechanism56 . 
Moreover, a joint review of the Constitution Agreement was scheduled to be carried 
out in September 2007, but as the HR manager noted in a phone interview (in 
November 2007) when the time came no amendments were deemed necessary by 
those concerned. However, a separate Constitution Agreement had been finally signed 
for one of the organisation’s warehouses in August 2007. In general, both agreements 
shall remain in force unless terminated by the company or at least two thirds of 
employees ask from their representatives to do so, in which case three months written 
notice to the other party must be given stating the intention to terminate the 
agreement. In addition, the agreement can be amended by the “mutual consent of both 
parties” (Constitution Agreement, September 2006: p. 5). 
8.3.2 The Composition of the Information and Consultation Forum 
The ICF (as initially named) or Bridge meetings are normally chaired by the Head of 
the HR department (or one of HR representatives), who also at the time of the 
research was the co-ordinator responsible for: organising the dates and venues for the 
meetings, taking the necessary notes and acting as a co-secretary. Ten representatives 
were initially elected (in September 2006) to represent the different areas of the 
company, as illustrated in table 8.1 and in August 2007 two more employees were co-
opted from the Bolton Bridge Forum. 
When elections take place, on the date that nominations normally close, permanent 
employees are entitled to nominate and vote57 for candidates from their designated 
election area, whilst the eligible candidates must normally have a minimum of three 
months service. Following the election, the candidates who top the ballot for each 
designated area become the representatives. Unless the circumstances require a 
56 Charlwood and Terry (2007: p. 335) have used WERS 2004 results and elicited that “…over 80% of 
workplaces have no form of indirect representation, confirming that, to this point at least, few, if any, 
employers had been stimulated by the imminent enactment of the ICE Regulations to take pre-emptive 
action by introducing representative consultation where none existed before. However, that does not 
mean that nothing is happening…”. 
57 The voting for all elections is based on the first past the post (FPTP) electoral system. Furthermore, a 
variety of voting options can be additionally used. Voting normally takes place in the workplace but e-
mail and postal voting are also used. 
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change, the minimum term of office is one year and the maximum is three and at the 
end of each year representatives are asked to confirm whether they wish to continue 
with their duties.  
Area of Representation Location/District Post 
Field Districts Scotland and North England FSR 
Field Districts North/Midland FSR 
Field Districts 
East, West and South 
Midlands FSR 
Field District South England FSR 
Field Management South England DM 
ADC58 Management Irlam Site Manager 
ADC 1st Shift Warrington Senior Operative 
ADC 2nd Shift Warrington Operative 
Head Office Management Warrington 
Field Support 
Manager 
Head Office Warrington 
Marketing Co-
Ordinator 
Table 8.1: Composition of the Participant Representatives on the Information and Consultation 
Forum (i.e. the Bridge Council) at the Main Head Office and Warehouse (Source: Minutes of the 
Bridge Council, November 2006: p. 1). 
8.3.3 The Purpose and Role of the Information and Consultation Forum 
Meetings 
As stipulated in the Constitution Agreement, the ICF or Bridge meetings involve the 
exchange of views on a range of issues that appear to closely match with the default 
requirements of the ICE Regulations:  
“…recent and probable developments of company’s activities and economic situation; 
changes in company’s activities, production and sales; changes to employment and 
potential threats to employment; changes in work organisation; changes in contractual 
relations; specific statutory provisions and their impact, such as collective 
redundancies, business transfers, health and safety; company policies, training and 
development, equal opportunities”  (Constitution Agreement, September 2006: p. 
1). 
 Automated Distribution Centres (ADCs) are used for product packaging and shipment to the 
customers’ stores.  
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The HR manager claimed that the company wide council’s ability to “serve 
[company’s] purposes in terms of TUPE and Redundancies”, was the guiding factor 
that stimulated her and the HR management team to set up the Constitution 
Agreement. Similar to most of the findings in the other three case-studies of this 
research, the Bridge Council conforms to the ad hoc development of an organisation-
specific information and consultation arrangement that is based on the temporary 
needs and organisational objectives of the company. In other words, the consultative 
council, in this case-study organisation, has evident features that conform to the 
concept of legislatively prompted voluntarism. 
The chairperson is responsible for compiling the agenda, which is subsequently sent 
to all management and employee representatives prior to the meetings. Changes can 
be proposed by the meeting participants, who contact the chairperson if they wish to 
do so and the final decision on contents of the agenda rests with the chairperson. 
Therefore, this indicates that HR management is still in control of the setting up and 
structuring of the agenda meetings. In exceptional circumstances, extraordinary 
meetings can be called and all representatives are given “as much notice and 
information as possible” (Constitution Agreement, September 2006: p. 3). The 
chairperson is also responsible for ensuring the preparation of minutes, which should 
be distributed to all representatives within four weeks after the meeting. In addition, 
the company is responsible for providing training to the representatives on: specific 
business matters, the interpretation of financial data, the conduct of the meetings and 
communication skills. 
Employee representatives are expected to communicate to the employees concerned 
all the information that they have received during the meetings. They can also use the 
company’s internal communications tools in order to disseminate information to their 
respective areas, in line with the company rules. During the meeting that was held in 
November 2006, the roles and responsibilities of employee representatives were put 
on the agenda and discussed. In addition, according to the minutes, they were asked to 
gather the views and ideas of their colleagues regarding their roles and issues that can 
be raised at the forum meetings. Subsequently, the representatives were expected to 
listen, understand and question information presented at these meetings and 
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afterwards they had to feedback the relevant information to the employees that they 
represent. 
Every effort had been made to ensure that the Constitution Agreement complies with 
the minimal provisions of the regulations and provides a well-structured forum so that 
effective communication can take place. Nevertheless, the scope of consultation has 
been constrained within specific boundaries and management prerogative cannot be 
challenged under these arrangements. More specifically, according to the Constitution 
Agreement: 
“… the consultation process will not affect management’s prerogative to take 
appropriate decisions at the time required by the business and does not therefore need 
to take place before the decision is taken …”  (Constitution Agreement, September 
2006: p. 3). 
In spite of the limited influence that the employee representatives can exert upon 
management decision-making, the Constitution Agreement explicitly defines that the 
consultation process has the goal of reaching an agreement through the exchange of 
views and establishment of dialogue between the employee representatives and 
employer. In accordance with the arguments of Millward et al. (2000), it can be 
argued that under these circumstances consultation is actually downgraded to 
communication of business-decisions. That is, features of pseudo-consultation are 
evident when management is simply ensuring that employee representatives perceive 
the process of business decision-making as fair and transparent and is not concerned 
with effective consultation. Taking into consideration the default provisions of the 
statutory rights, as explicitly assigned by the ICE Regulations, the Constitution 
Agreement in this case can be described as a relatively inferior arrangement where 
collective rights of true consultation are hardly sustained in practice, as the key aim is 
to conform to the minimum provisions under the legislation.  
8.3.4 Agenda and Issues for Discussion During the Information and Consultation 
Forum Meetings 
Before the first meeting that was held in September 2006, there was a morning 
training session and this was to be replicated for the forthcoming council meetings in 
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the foreseeable future. The issues covered at this meeting were: company business 
results (including comprehension of the balance scorecard), new business issues, the 
first and second forthcoming TUPE scenarios, HR issues, changes in employment 
legislation, training and development issues, follow-up actions and items for the next 
agenda. Most emphasis was placed on issues to do with the first TUPE scenario, 
involving Q&A sessions for the employee representatives and briefings to the 
management team that were led by the HR manager, who noted that the first meetings 
were more about “me giving the information” and highlighted the early nature of the 
council. 
The following meeting, held in November 2006, was the first to have a fixed agenda, 
with the main issues discussed being the laying out of the remit and purposes of the 
forum. According to the minutes of the council meeting, as issued on 16th November 
2006, the main areas that the forum is to cover are: financial/production/employment 
issues, future and current legislative changes, future plans, training strategy, diversity 
issues and technology changes. The areas that are excluded include: health and safety 
issues (these are dealt with in a separate committee), ‘tea and toilets’ issues, 
individual areas (these should be covered by the manager in locality or brought to the 
attention of facilities), pay negotiations and also areas that management should 
directly communicate or manage in accordance with its expected role. From this it can 
be seen that it is explicitly documented that the Bridge Council is not a negotiation 
forum and that there are no opportunities for management prerogative to be 
substantially challenged. In addition, if everyday issues are brought forward by the 
representatives for discussion, they will not be put on the agenda and the employees 
or their representatives who are expressing these concerns will be advised to talk 
about them directly with their own manager (HR Manager). 
A training session was also held on the same day, which took the form of a finance 
awareness workshop. In particular, there was a presentation entitled Business 
Awareness workshop, which covered: terminology, company structure and policies, 
understanding finance and financial jargon, and interpretation of performance. The 
field support manager referred to the agenda of the forum: 
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“… we did some financial training… we are progressing now with new projects [i.e. 
TUPE scenarios]… if [someone] is unhappy with the bonus scheme/structure that is 
something that we can bring to the table…” 
Legislative changes regarding maternity leave and pay, which were to come into 
effect in April 2007, were also included on the agenda. Another issue that was 
brought up was the second TUPE scenario that was connected with one of the 
organisation’s projects (the first TUPE scenario had occurred on 23rd October 2006). 
The head of the HR department brought up the implications of transferring staff and 
pointed out the potential effect of having slightly different terms and conditions. More 
specifically, the agenda involved the TUPE scenario, which included: implications 
and measures, the date that the transfer is going to take place (i.e. in April 2007) and 
its reasons, legal, economic and social implications of the transfer, the potential 
measures that are envisaged to be taken in relation to the affected employees, and 
finally the consultation process. Another important issue that was pinpointed 
afterwards, in March 2007 session, was the lack of team meetings, which had been 
making communication between employees and management more difficult. As a 
result, it was advised by the HR manager that managers in the head office and field 
districts should address this problem and consequently, ADCs began to have daily 
team meetings.  
As the HR manager argued, if the Bridge Council continues to be a company wide 
employee voice arrangement, then the discussions will have to stay focussed on the 
issues set out in the Constitution Agreement, as outlined above. On the other hand, if 
they become site-based, then the nature of council will be open to debate. In sum, in 
this evolving environment, it is the management that has been controlling the 
structure and agenda of the meetings and owing to this, the management has been 
mainly dominating the Bridge Forum in terms of what sort of information is shared, 
which is in accordance with the company’s policy. In other words, the case-study 
illustrates an example in which a unitarist establishment of a Constitution Agreement 
is imposed and results in a functional form of employee participation, but one that has 
no impact upon management prerogative.  
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8.4 ICE Regulations: Current Attitudes of Trade Unions, Individual 
Employees and Management 
8.4.1 Employee Involvement Arrangements and Representation Structures59 
At the head office and main warehouse there are usually employee briefings once a 
month, in which the managing director and manager of the warehouse also participate. 
A variety of issues are normally covered during these briefings, such as: recognition 
awards, long-service awards and computer-based training awards. Newsletters are 
also regularly issued and it should be noted that changes in communication strategy 
were implemented during the previous years, especially since the undertaking became 
a subsidiary of the US parent company. For instance, four years before the conducting 
of the research, employee voice arrangements were mainly based on downward 
communication to the employees. 
“my communication strategy, of the first two or three years, was just to feed the 
information down, and not worry about information feeding-up through formal 
channels…then, (say three years ago)… [in order to] strengthen the communication 
channels, we needed to start and have a more upward communications, and I started to 
put some pressure on managers to do team-meetings” (HR Manager). 
In addition, at the time of the research, management forums were recently instigated 
and now usually take place once a month. The HR department also sets up employee 
round tables with the purpose to get feedback from employees, in particular from 
those that have been recently recruited to the company. 
The HR manager also tries to encourage team meetings in all the company’s 
departments, because at the time of the research there was no consistency in this 
matter. For instance, in the IT and Finance departments, such meetings were rarely 
held, mainly due to the fact that the managers did not express much enthusiasm for 
them. Whereas in the ADCs and warehouses, team or operational meetings were 
taking place everyday in the morning and the outcomes were cascaded down to all 
team members. In addition, the HR manager also pointed out that the situation at the 
59 Further detailed information, about the level of direct and indirect voice mechanisms at the head 
office and main warehouse, and also the content and issues included in the information and 
consultation meetings are provided in the appendices and notes. 
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head office needed to be improved and was encouraging the holding of more regular 
team meetings. Furthermore, the communication with the fields takes places in 
various ways including: emails, verbal communication with managers, the newsletter 
entitled as Company’s Staff and product updates with booklets and hardcopies. In 
fact, it turns out that until the establishment of the ICF or Bridge meetings, employee 
voice mechanisms were based on forms of direct participation. Moreover, the forms 
of communication were actually a downward flow of information to the employees, 
which left managerial prerogative completely intact. Even now, after the creation of 
the forum, employees have relatively limited influence and input in the decision-
making process. The fact that there is no union recognition agreement is another 
reason why the management prerogative cannot be substantially challenged and this 
also restricts employee voice. Moreover, because the employee representatives have 
not received comprehensive training they have been unable to effectively intervene 
when harsh decision-making events arise. 
8.4.2 Benefits and Problems of Sustaining the Information and Consultation 
Arrangements 
Both the HR manager and field support manager have positive perceptions about the 
importance of the consultative council: 
“Information-sharing helps the people, within an organisation, to understand the 
bigger picture and make connections that will improve things in immeasurable ways…I 
believe communication is vital and employees should have a voice and should be 
consulted as they often have a better understanding of what actually happens…” (HR 
Manager). 
It is noteworthy to mention that both pointed out the importance of communication, 
rather than making an explicit reference to the notion and significance of consultation: 
“We can find out what people need to know… [employees] want to hear things but they 
just do not know who to approach, [they] do not have the time to do it, [but] now, there 
is an established group to deal with it…I think communication is the key for any 
successful business…” (Field Support Manager). 
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On the other hand, according to the HR manager, one of the main problems in 
developing information and consultation arrangements is deciding upon the optimum 
number of employee representatives. More specifically, she added that it is 
questionable to what extent it is possible to deal effectively with employee 
representatives, who are “scattered across the whole country” in different districts. 
Furthermore, “time and cost are prohibitive” in developing further the company’s 
council and thus she proffered that “we have a way to go on [in order] to make it 
more effective, [but] lack of knowledge of how to move it forward”. Similarly, during 
the interview, the field support manager suggested that lack of time is a hurdle and 
needs to be overcome, whilst communication mechanisms need to be enhanced so as 
to become broader, given that a substantial number of employees are remote from the 
main head office (i.e. employees that work in the field districts).  
Another issue that was pinpointed by the HR manager is the fact that it is necessary 
to: 
“gain commitment from other senior managers to support the information flow… 
[and]… time or resources to have a proper flow of information”. 
At the time that the research was conducted, the field support manager emphasised 
that the Bridge Council was still in its early stages and she and other members of the 
forum were still finding it difficult to understand clearly their own role: 
“…we are just learning about what is a consultation panel [in November 2006]…we 
are just setting out on learning curve at the minute, but I think that after maybe a year 
we may all feel and know exactly what we are aiming for…[at the beginning] I was 
slightly confused about what my role was.  Now, my role is established – I feel a bit 
more comfortable with it. Just knowing what actually I expect from it!” (Field Support 
Manager). 
The HR manager pointed out also the benefits and usefulness of having the Bridge 
Council meetings, by stating that they improve “…communication and give the 
employees an outward feedback channel…” and as a result there is “a better 
motivated workforce”. In addition, in her view, the main aims are to “keep the 
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momentum going”, by ensuring that the necessary reviewing takes place and 
employee representatives are consistently trained so that the council will be more 
effective. Another issue, which was highlighted by her, was the fact that it is 
important for the company to be ready when harsh decision making is needed (e.g. 
collective redundancies) and yet comply with the statutory requirements of the ICE 
Regulations. 
8.4.3 Evaluation of the ICE Regulations: An Opportunity for Changes and 
Reviewing 
Similarly to the head office in case-study two, where “strategies and objectives of 
non-union voice arrangements” (as adapted in Gollan 2000: p. 415; cited in Dundon 
and Gollan 2007: p. 1190) are in evidence, it can be argued that the ICF is an 
arrangement that has been set up to be a “complement to management decision 
making” (ibid); one that has been legally-imposed and is based on management 
initiative. 
In terms of the academic literature, the constitution of the ICF or Bridge forum is a 
prime example of the “flexible” and “reflexive” nature provided by the ICE 
Regulations, given that it allows a great range of choices for the employer to develop 
information and consultation mechanisms so that they are tailored to meet 
organisation’s strategic objectives (Barnard and Deakin, 2000: p. 341; cited in Hall, 
2006: p. 456). It can be also described as a “managerially-motivated” device of 
involvement and participation that seeks “co-operation” through information-sharing 
and consultation (Marchington, 2005: p. 24). In general, the HR manager expressed 
the view that the ICE Regulations “facilitated the move towards the ‘Information and 
Consultation’ group”. 
In accordance with the arguments of Johnstone et al. (2004), the situation that is 
revealed in this case-study is an example in which the ICE Regulations have provided 
“management with an ideal opportunity to introduce non-union consultative 
structures” (p. 373). Furthermore, the absence of a trade union recognition agreement 
has meant that management can deal directly with the employees without running the 
risk of being drawn into a partnership agreement that could potentially “slow down 
decision making” or “challenge managerial prerogative” (ibid: p. 355). In addition, 
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given the current situation, it is unlikely that there will be any potential outside 
involvement (i.e. by a trade union) in the decision-making process in the near future, 
because under the constitutional arrangements, which were introduced due to the ICE 
Regulations, the bargaining process is being contained within the organisation and 
thus, management prerogative still prevails. 
Drawing on the academic literature, case-study four illustrates a scenario where the 
legislative developments have led to responses within the “traditional voluntarist 
policy” (Hall and Terry, 2004: pp. 208-209), as typically found in most of UK 
workplaces. That is, in this case-study organisation the established employee 
representation mechanism had been guided by the management team, so as to fit with 
the minimum standards before more challenging arrangements emanating from the 
workforce could be proposed. In particular, the main stimulus, which would appear to 
have “influenced the HR manager thinking” (HR Manager), was the TUPE scenarios 
of two undertakings that were connected with the company’s projects. That is, these 
events formed the triggering means for setting up the consultative forum, which 
subsequently resulted in the organisation-specific information and consultation 
arrangements. In this regard, the HR manager pointed out: 
“one of the aims of yesterday’s meeting [held on 16th November 2006] was to talk 
about the TUPE scenario… and the fact that at the end of it, it may mean that [sic]… 
we may have some redundancies…due to economic and financial constraints”.  
Likewise, the field support manager emphasised the importance of the forum in 
relation to the TUPE scenarios: 
“I think it [i.e. knowing about the objectives of the Bridge Forum] would be nice for all 
the new people that are transferred over from another company to our business 
…[because] they may feel now that they know a bit more about our company and [can 
become] part of it…”.  
In sum, the key factor, with regard to the reason that led the HR manager to decide on 
setting up the Bridge Council, was to enable a safe compliance with the requirements 
of the legislation and to establish ad hoc consultation rights in relation to 
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redundancies and transfer of undertakings (as it is also defined in the Constitution 
Agreement). In particular, the TUPE scenarios described above were key drivers in 
the formation of the council and important focal points during the early years of its 
existence. Using the terminology of Hall et al. (2007: pp. 18-19), it can be argued that 
the TUPE scenario was a “strategic factor”, which was employed by the HR 
management team in order to establish and develop the consultation forum as soon as 
the organisation had to comply with the statutory requirements of the legislation. 
8.4.4 Evaluation of the ICE Regulations: Limitations and Challenges 
Certainly, it can be argued that the ICF or Bridge meetings were a major development 
for the company, because no equivalent form of representation structure had existed 
beforehand. Moreover, the empirical evidence reveals that the company was trying to 
address the representation gap by setting up an “indirect non-union representative 
participation”, as has been recognised in similar circumstances by other researchers 
(Gollan et al., 2006: p. 505). However, one of the main limitations of the Bridge 
Council is connected with the fact that it was an initiative taken by the HR manager, 
which was essential because the employees did not have the necessary co-ordination 
skills or other expertise so as to be able to engage proactively in the composition of 
the information and consultation arrangements. As a result, the Constitution 
Agreement, as compiled by the head of HR department, was approved without any 
opposition by the employee representatives, and thus compliance with the default and 
minimal provisions of the ICE Regulations was achieved by the employer.  
Similar to case-study three, the absence of a union-based arrangement has resulted in 
low levels of expertise for employee representatives in relation to their collective 
consultation and negotiation skills. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to mention that the 
head of the HR department has been organising workshops and training sessions so as 
to improve the skills of representatives and thus enable them to have a more effective 
voice. Drawing on the academic literature, the current Constitution Agreement at this 
company provides a good example of a “pre-emptory agreement” (Geary and Roche, 
2005: p. 192), which is based on the principles of “legislatively prompted 
voluntarism” (Hall and Terry, 2004: p. 226) and is likely to remain functioning as an 
organisation-specific arrangement that is strongly connected with the company’s 
objectives and given circumstances. 
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One of the main criticisms that can be made about the contents of this Constitution 
Agreement is concerned with the limited scope of action for employee 
representatives, because there is certainly no provision for questioning and 
challenging management prerogative. In this regard, the Constitution Agreement 
explicitly states that: 
“consultation process will not affect management’s prerogative to take appropriate 
decisions at the time required by the business and does not therefore need to take place 
before the decision is taken” (Constitution Agreement, September 2006: p. 3).  
Moreover, the scope of consultation rights appears to be constrained within a set of 
specified issues and this matter is also explicitly written in the agreement document. 
Apart from this, in one of the meetings (in November 2006) it was clearly denoted 
that the forum cannot involve negotiations over distributive issues, such as: pay, terms 
and conditions etc. The HR manager, as chairperson of the forum, explicitly referred 
to this issue and argued that: 
“…we do not want to get into pay negotiations with them [employee representatives], it 
has been very clear that this is consultation not negotiation…and that is the part of 
training: the difference [between consultation and negotiation]!”. 
As a result, management prerogative remains evident even under the new 
arrangements, because the ability for employee representatives to challenge 
management decision-making is still strictly limited. In fact, the Bridge meetings 
cannot cover “areas that management should communicate or manage” (Minutes of 
the Bridge Forum, November 2006: p. 3), while issues concerning pay and 
negotiations are explicitly excluded. This brings into question whether there is scope 
for any meaningful consultation for the employee representatives. Moreover, the 
limited opportunities for the representatives are underlined further by the fact that the 
Bridge Council appears to rest upon management initiatives (including: the setting up 
of agenda, information-sharing, communication of business-decisions, reviewing etc) 
that have been generated primarily by the HR department. As a result, in accordance 
with the terminology that is used in the academic literature, the Bridge Council may 
end up to be an “element of employee voice [that is] very weak”, in particular because 
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the agenda and organisational objectives are set unilaterally by management 
(Marsden, 2007: p. 1263). 
Taking into consideration the arguments of other researchers (such as: Redfern, 2007; 
Tailby et al., 2007), case-study three illustrates an example where information-sharing 
and communication procedures are more evident than effective involvement of 
employee representatives in the consultation process. In this regard, Wilkinson et al. 
(2007) concur with the view of Hall (2005a) and suggest that “…management may 
aspire to inform employees [but] this is not the same as consulting or engaging with 
workers…” (Wilkinson et al., 2007: p. 1289), because managers are generally 
reluctant to introduce consultation arrangements “as these threaten their prerogative” 
(ibid: p. 1294). During the period of empirical research, the HR manager pointed out 
that employee consultation had not hitherto been a significant issue for debate or 
concern at her workplace. This concurs with the view of Butler (2005: p. 285) that in 
non-unionised workplaces it is highly unlikely for management to cede power in 
relation to its “traditional prerogative” or even to abolish the “right to unilaterally 
determine key issues”, because the provisions of the ICE Regulations cannot enforce 
the introduction of effective employee voice arrangements under such circumstances.  
According to the available literature (Williams and Adam-Smith, 2006: pp. 185-186), 
non-union systems of employee representation are usually ineffective, lacking 
“legitimacy among the workforce”, “being seen as too closely controlled by 
managers”, and as a result, the employees do not have an “independent voice”. 
Furthermore, similarly with the findings of this case-study organisation, Terry (1999) 
generally points out that the influence of unfavourable economic and business 
conditions, such as collective redundancies and TUPE scenarios, may constrain the 
ability of employees to challenge management prerogative, especially in relation to 
distributive issues (cited in Williams and Adam-Smith, 2006: p. 186).  
Using the terminology of other researchers, with regard to the management strategy 
towards a union recognition agreement, this case-study organisation clearly has 
engaged in the strategy of “union avoidance” (Dundon and Gollan, 2007: p. 1189), 
with “ideological hostility” (ibid: p. 1191) towards any sort of union representation. 
In this regard, the HR manager emphasised that: 
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“…they [i.e. the owners of the company] would look upon it very badly if we got trade 
union recognition request – seeing me as having failed in my job!!!” (HR Manager). 
In particular, the employer opposition towards any form of union-based representation 
is clearly illustrated by the recent attempt of employees in the Bolton warehouse to 
establish a union recognition agreement, as the HR manager pointed out that such 
developments would not be welcomed by the US owner. Moreover, as similarly found 
in the available literature and already discussed, case-study four actually provides an 
example of an employer who is trying to develop forms of “direct participation” 
along with “indirect non-union representative participation” (Gollan et al., 2006: p. 
505), resulting in what Dundon and Gollan (2007) describe as a “non-union employee 
voice outcome” (p. 1185) driven by orientations of “union avoidance” (p. 1189) and 
“ideological hostility” (p. 1191). 
Therefore, even though the Constitution Agreement provides a substantial scope for 
information-sharing and communication in accordance with the contextual framework 
of the ICE Regulations, it is questionable to what extent employee representatives can 
have a real influence on decision making and establish effective voice, especially 
when pay and conditions come under threat during times of harsh economic and 
business conditions. For instance, the implementation of the TUPE projects caused 
financial difficulties and job losses, affecting also the terms and conditions of the 
employees, such as pay and compensation schemes, while the evidence of this case-
study underlines the fact that the employee representatives cannot challenge the 
management decision making on such matters. In essence, taking into consideration 
the strategies that are identified in the academic literature (such as: Gollan and 
Wilkinson, 2007a), it emerges that the case-study organisation has mainly enhanced 
information-sharing and communication arrangements that ensure the minimal 
compliance with the required consultation provisions of the ICE Regulations rather 
than really promoting true-consultation or collective bargaining.  
During the conduct of the case-study research, it was still unclear what would be the 
actual impact of the TUPE scenarios with regard to the extent to which the employee 
representatives could effectively respond to this challenge. Taking into consideration 
the agreed constitution, the strictly limited scope of consultation and the lack of 
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negotiation rights, it is contended that the findings indicate that the Bridge Council is 
a well-structured forum that: entails full compliance with the statutory requirements, 
improves significantly the internal communication mechanisms and establishes a 
legitimate information and consultation body of collective representation for the first 
time at this organisation, as required by the ICE Regulations. However, given the poor 
coordination amongst the employees and their lack of knowledge with regard to their 
statutory rights, it appears that the employees are not able to take full advantage of the 
provisions that are granted to them through the establishment of the Bridge Council. 
In fact, the general lack of awareness of the employees about the ICE Regulations has 
led to a unitarist imposition of a non-union based arrangement that is functional for 
the organisation and yet compliant with the statutory legal framework. 
On the one hand, the Constitution Agreement provides a consistent device for 
establishing and enhancing employee voice, whereas on the other hand, it is evident 
that: collective consultation rights are relatively constrained, managerial prerogative 
remains unchallenged, management still appears to control the agenda and employee 
representatives lack the required experience. Similar to the research findings of other 
projects (Hall et al., 2007: p. 52), it is suggested that management tends to just inform 
employee representatives about the “company developments rather than seeking to 
engage in consultation”, though this conclusion could be attributed to the fact that the 
Bridge Council/Forum was still in its early stages of its development at the time of 
research. However, despite this, given the provisions of the Constitution Agreement, 
the Bridge Council is actually an inferior arrangement that grants minimal provisions 
to the employee representatives, whilst securely complying with the default 
requirements of the legislation and therefore, it is argued that the Constitution 
Agreement should have been developed in a more pluralist manner involving a wider 
agenda of issues for consultation with the employees. 
Using the terminology that is cited in the academic literature, the Bridge Forum can 
be described as a non-union indirect channel of employee voice and it can be argued 
that its effectiveness depends on the extent to which “high levels of trust between 
management and employees” can be sustained (Dundon and Gollan, 2007: p. 1186) in 
order to achieve “the expected long-term mutual benefits” through the established 
information and consultation arrangements (Beaumont and Hunter, 2007: p. 1242). 
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Currently, it is a great challenge for the employee representatives to become actively 
engaged in the forum, in terms of developing open and honest communication with 
the management team and being allowed to play an effective role in decision-making. 
Finally, the findings of the case-study research concur with the view of other 
researchers that the effectiveness of such a forum depends on the development of trust 
(Dundon and Gollan, 2007) and the mutual consideration of “the changing needs of 
both parties” (Marsden, 2007: p. 1263). 
8.5 ICE Regulations: Potential Developments and Options to 
Enhance Employee Voice and Democracy at the Workplaces. 
Discussion and Summary 
Case-study four involves the most recently established new employee voice 
arrangement of the four cases of this research and the organisation now complies with 
the statutory provisions of the legislation after an HR led initiative to develop a 
Constitution Agreement in September 2006. Similar to the findings at the head office 
in case-study two, the main stimulus for establishing the two new arrangements was 
the necessity to conduct collective redundancies and TUPE scenarios, in accordance 
with the legislative provisions. As a result, the arrangements in this case-study have 
emerged as being in line with the framework of legislatively prompted voluntarism, 
with organisation-specific information and consultation arrangements being 
developed. 
The lack of co-ordination among the employees, coupled with their lack of the 
necessary knowledge, discouraged them from taking the initiative and triggering 
negotiations for the establishment of new consultation arrangements. Moreover, there 
was the complete absence of any union-based arrangements and all of this combined 
to allow the HR manager to take the initiative unilaterally with regard to the 
development of the Constitution Agreement, thereby enabling the development of an 
indirect form of employee involvement that is functional, but it appears to be unitarist 
to all intents and purposes. Furthermore, the lukewarm enthusiasm from the 
employees, as evidenced by the limited number of them who volunteered to 
participate in the elections, led management to establish a Constitution Agreement 
that is strictly based on organisational objectives and needs. In sum, this case-study 
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reflects an example where the ICE Regulations can provide opportunities for 
substantial changes and adjustments in information and consultation arrangements in 
non-unionised workplaces that lack strong representative traditions.  
Once established, the vibrancy of consultation arrangements, such as the efficacy of 
the Bridge Forum, depends on the active involvement of all parties (i.e. management 
people and employees), while mutual consideration is also essential for their 
“changing needs”, as similarly suggested by Marsden (2007: p. 1263). Other authors 
have cited that “mutual trust” and “high commitment” amongst the partners are 
important prerequisites for the development of true and authentic consultation (Dix 
and Oxenbridge, 2003: p. 73). Nevertheless, the predominance of unitarist features in 
the established indirect employee voice arrangement at the case-study organisation is 
quite evident, with the agenda of meetings explicitly precluding “pay negotiations 
and also areas that management should communicate or manage” (Minutes of the 
Bridge Forum, November 2006: p. 3), whilst the Constitution Agreement defines 
consultation as a process which “will not affect management’s prerogative to take 
appropriate decisions at the time required by the business and does not therefore 
need to take place before the decision is taken” (Constitution Agreement, September 
2006: p. 3). Therefore, this coincides with the findings of Hall et al. (2007), who 
contend that “…the balance of activity on information and consultation bodies was 
weighted towards information rather than consultation, and often concerned 
decisions that had already been taken…” (p. 52). In other words, the unilateral setting 
up of this Constitution Agreement has actually resulted in a mechanism of 
communication with strictly limited consultation rights for the employees and evident 
features of pseudo-consultation, rather than effective collective representation or a 
form of true-consultation. The introduction of the Bridge Council also precludes, or at 
least minimises to a great extent, the possibility of the employees challenging and/or 
re-negotiating the information and consultation arrangements, because the support of 
40 per cent of the employees would be needed to initiate this process. Taking all the 
above into account and using the academic terminology, it can be concluded that at 
this particular company a “pre-emptory agreement” (Geary and Roche, 2005: p. 192) 
was established, in which the roots of voluntarism are strongly evident, but this 
agreement can be hardly challenged because of the aforementioned threshold 
requirement for triggering any adjustments towards employee voice arrangements.   
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In August 2007, the establishment of the Small Bridge Council, in the weakly 
unionised warehouse in Bolton, was made under a climate where the employer and 
management showed a strong aversion to any sort of a trade union recognition 
agreement. Within the context of anti-union companies, the ideological hostility 
towards collective agreements has also been highlighted by other researchers (Hall et 
al., 2007, 2008 and 2009; Dundon and Gollan, 2007). In this particular case-study 
organisation, the HR management team deftly rejected the attempt by the unionised 
employees to acquire a trade union recognition agreement, arguing that there was only 
a small minority of unionised employees while the Small Bridge Council would cover 
the entire workforce. Eventually, the unionised employees were unable to have 
sufficient support to counter this position. As yet, although the employees have union 
representatives on the consultation forum, there is still no formal trade union 
agreement.  
Nevertheless, the two established Bridge Councils provide a mechanism of employee 
voice that did not exist beforehand. Both councils can be seen as giving the unionised 
workforce a foothold in the realm of consultation that may be subsequently converted 
into a trade union recognition agreement, in the future, if the unionised representatives 
enhance further their influence and the efficacy of their voice. That is, even though 
there is no current trade union recognition agreement in the Bolton warehouse, the 
statutory provisions of the legislation can provide further opportunities that can act as 
“a catalyst” for potential changes to the current representation structures and 
additionally stimulate the involvement of organised labour (as it is similarly suggested 
in Ewing and Truter, 2005: p. 641). In other words, the ICE Regulations can also 
create opportunities in unionised workplaces, especially if there is minority 
membership and absence of a trade union recognition agreement. Nonetheless, the 
employees in case-study four did not challenge the Constitution Agreement and there 
were no protracted negotiations when its template, which had already been adopted in 
the head office and main warehouse, was likewise proposed and subsequently 
accepted for replication in the Bolton warehouse. In particular, on the one hand, it 
appears that the lack of high union membership constrained the available options for 
the employees, but on the other hand, the aforementioned developments in response to 
the ICE Regulations have led to the establishment of consultation arrangements that 
can possibly provide an alternative pathway for the development of collective 
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representation for the unionised employees. In this regard, in concurrence with 
terminology that is used in the academic literature, the unionised employees can 
potentially use the consultation forum as a “prelude to negotiations” and 
subsequently in the future they can also expand the scope of their voice (Bratton, 
2007b: p. 460). Such an instance is also described by Gospel and Willman (2005: p. 
142), who suggest that: “… where unions have no [formal] presence, [they] will have 
little choice but to accept what employers may put into place…” and consequently the 
employees will have to assess whether such arrangements will become an effective 
form of employee voice. As previously noted, if the employees are dissatisfied with 
the outcomes of employee voice arrangements, the ICE Regulations still provide the 
opportunity to challenge the current agreed constitution, but a higher threshold is 
needed in order to trigger this process for negotiations as soon as a PEA is already in 
place (i.e. 40 per cent). Thus, although in theory the legislation allows for employees 
to call for negotiations for better and more effective employee voice arrangements in 
the future, in reality this is hardly likely to happen in such circumstances, because the 
employees lack the required co-ordination. 
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CHAPTER NINE 

DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS AND EMPIRICAL 

EVIDENCE 

9.1 Organisational Responses to the ICE Regulations: Evidence and 
Comparative Overview of the Case-Studies 
This case-study research provides original evidence and thorough insight about the 
initial responses of British organisations and implications in light of the 
implementation of the ICE Regulations (table 9.1 provides an overview of the 
empirical findings). In this regard, according to the academic literature a notable 
debate has been developing about the potential outcomes and prospects of the ICE 
Directive before and after its official transposition and implementation in the UK 
context. The issue is still at the centre of academic research that focuses on employee 
participation and involvement at UK workplaces and it is anticipated that it will 
remain so in the forthcoming years, because the last stage of the phased 
implementation of the legislation, concerning the lowest threshold of organisations, 
was just rolled out on 6th April 2008. 
As it has been similarly suggested in previous empirical findings compiled by Hall et 
al. (2007), the evidence from the case-studies indicates that the transposition of the 
ICE Directive has not led to any significant changes in unionised workplaces, where 
the trade union recognition agreements already provide sustained consultation and 
negotiation rights. In relation to the research in this thesis, at the Manchester site in 
case-study one, the analysis indicates that employee voice is already powerful enough 
for the union representatives to exert some control in decision-making, as consultation 
and negotiation arrangements were established before the implementation of the ICE 
Regulations. That is, in general the pre-established union-based arrangements are 
considered to constitute a superior form of employee voice, in comparison with the 
statutory provisions of the ICE Regulations. However, also in line with the findings of 
other research projects, in some non-unionised workplaces and especially in those 
where there has been no structured representation beforehand, the regulations 
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emerged as being a “catalyst for change” (ibid: p. 72), such as the introduction of the 
consultative council at the head office in case-study two and the Bridge Forum in 
case-study four. Nevertheless, in relation to the direct forms of employee 
involvement, especially where these already existed, the evidence indicates that the 
ICE Regulations have not brought any substantial changes or improvements.  
Workplace 
Number of 
Employees 
(approximately) 
Sector 
Union 
Recognition 
Agreement 
Trade Union 
Membership 
Information & 
Consultation 
Arrangements 
Case-
Study 1 Felixstowe site 250 
Manufacturing 
of electricity 
meters 
Yes (agreement 
with Unite, i.e. 
former 
recognition 
agreement with 
AMICUS and 
the TGWU) 
51%-70% (only 
for production and 
direct workers) 
1) Pre-existing 
Information and 
Consultation Council 
and Review of the 
Constitution 
Agreement in March 
2005 (coverage for 
all employees). 2) 
Separate union-based 
negotiation body (for 
production and direct 
workers) 
Manchester site 180 Manufacturing of gas meters 
Yes (agreement 
with the GMB) 
91%-100% (only 
for production and 
direct workers) 
1) Non-compliance 
with the ICE 
Regulations. 2) No 
arrangements for the 
non-unionised 
employees (indirect 
workers). 3) Union-
based consultation 
and negotiation body 
for production and 
direct workers 
Case-
Study 2 
Head office in 
Somerset 1000 
Central 
administration  No N/A 
Setting up of 
Information and 
Consultation Council 
in January 2005 
Depot sites in 
Bridgwater 550 
Warehousing, 
retailing and 
distribution 
Yes (three 
separate 
agreements 
with USDAW 
and the TGWU 
for different 
sections of 
workforce) 
51%-70% 
(coverage for all 
the employees)  
1) Two JCCs (pre-
existing 
arrangements already 
in place). 2) Three 
separate union-based 
consultation and 
negotiation bodies  
Case-
Study 3 Yeovil store  300 
Retailing, 
fashion and 
home-ware 
No N/A 
Pre-existing 
Information and 
Consultation Council 
Case-
Study 4 
Head office in 
Warrington  600 
Warehousing, 
wholesale and 
distribution 
No 
Only at the Bolton 
warehouse: 
(approximately 
10% membership 
of UNISON and 
Unite) 
1) Setting up of 
Information and 
Consultation 
Forum/Council in 
September 2006. 2) 
Setting up of a 
separate Information 
and Consultation 
Forum at the Bolton 
warehouse in August 
2007 
Table 9.1: Overview of Empirical Findings from the Case-Study Research. 
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In relation to the indirect forms of employee involvement, no changes were made at 
unionised workplaces as a result of the legislation and even the review of the 
Constitution Agreement, in case-study one, did not bring about any significant 
changes. In addition, at the Felixstowe site, the consultation forum dates back to 
actions taken (in 1998-99) with regard to the statutory provisions on “Employees’ 
Information and Consultation Rights on Transfers of Undertakings and Collective 
Redundancies”60 and not as a direct result of the ICE Directive. Similarly, the 
employer initiated consultation arrangements, as observed in case-study four, were 
initially stimulated due to harsh decision making on issues that included collective 
redundancies and TUPE scenarios in 2006 and 2007. 
In case-studies: one, two and three, there were a variety of constitution agreements for 
information-sharing, communication and consultation with the employees, even 
before the implementation of the legislation, but only in case-study three did the 
company fully comply with the statutory requirements before the transposition of the 
ICE Directive. In case-studies one and two, there were pre-existing agreements for 
specific undertakings or sites of the organisations, whilst only at the Felixstowe site in 
case-study one was there a review of the Constitution Agreement as advised by the 
HR management. Furthermore, the case-study four and the head office in case-study 
two, are examples in which the ICE Regulations are viewed “as a catalyst for the 
change” with regard to employee involvement arrangements, where the HR 
management unilaterally took the initiative to: develop, modify and establish 
information and consultation arrangements in accordance with the statutory and 
legislative provisions, a situation that has similarly been identified in other case-study 
research (Hall et al., 2007: p. 72). 
Considering case-study two in some detail, the organisation had managed to underpin 
multiple and different agreements between the head office and the depot sites. The 
arrangements that are in place could be described as multi-tiered, as there are four 
regional forums that operate alongside the main head office forum and the depot in 
Bridgwater also has a separate union-based arrangement. In addition, as discussed in 
chapter 6, employee voice arrangements appear to be well-structured and fairly 
 Department of Trade and Industry (1998a), Employees’ Information and Consultation Rights on 
Transfers of Undertakings and Collective Redundancies, Public Consultation Document URN 97/988. 
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complex within the depot sites, as two separate JCCs operate across the sites and 
representatives from two unions (USDAW and TGWU) do not share a common 
bargaining unit and as a consequence three trade union recognition agreements apply 
for different sections of workforce. 
By contrast, the recent establishment and development of employee voice 
arrangements at the head office of case-study two and also the two separate 
consultation forums in case-study four, provide good examples where the ICE 
Regulations have become a driver for a change in non-unionised workplaces as 
employee representation arrangements had not existed beforehand. However, in the 
aforementioned cases the main issues included on the agendas of the meetings were 
collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings, especially during the early 
operation of these forums, rather than general employment issues as stipulated 
through the provisions of the ICE Regulations. Moreover, as with the findings of 
other researchers, such as: Hall and Terry (2004), Hall et al. (2007, 2008 and 2009) 
and Deakin and Koukiadaki (2007), in all the relevant cases it was the management 
that took the initiative in relation to the: introduction, establishment or modification of 
the information and consultation arrangements in response to the statutory 
requirements. As a consequence, it is still questionable whether the operation of the 
recently established councils in the aforementioned case-study organisations can 
actually promote the interests of employees by giving greater impetus to the 
establishment of a dialogue on: business, organisational and employment issues. In 
other words, it is not evident that the ICE Regulations have actually further promoted 
the concept of industrial democracy in these workplaces. In concurrence with the 
empirical findings of other researchers, it is argued that “there is [still] a significant 
democratic deficit” at several workplaces in the UK (Richardson et al., 2010: p. 30). 
Nevertheless, the legislation has at least provided the opportunity for the formation of 
a standard and basic non-union representation structure that did not previously exist in 
any form.  
The case-studies included in the research vary, in terms of: size, ownership, sector, the 
presence of union or non-union representation etc, and as such provide a 
representative cross-sample for evaluating, quite comprehensively, the various ways 
in which companies are responding to the implementation of the ICE Regulations. 
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Moreover, the examples that have been discussed in the case-study analysis cover 
both unionised and non-unionised workplaces, which can allow for the elicitation of 
clear understanding regarding the differences in the information and consultation 
arrangements between these two types of workplaces. With respect to this, it has been 
revealed that orientations towards the provisions of the ICE Regulations are clearly 
different when comparing unionised and non-unionised workplaces. 
With regard to unionised workplaces, only on one site have the ICE Regulations led 
to the consideration as to whether changes to existing direct and indirect arrangements 
needed to be made. This situation occurred at the Felixstowe site in case-study one, 
where a review of the current arrangements took place in order to assess whether there 
was compliance with the requirements of the legislation. As previously noted, the 
original stimulus for setting up the Constitution Agreement, from which the 
consultation forum initially emerged, was a collective redundancy situation and this 
body of representation runs alongside the existing regular meetings with the union 
representatives of AMICUS (or Unite) and the TGWU. When this Constitution 
Agreement was reviewed in March 2005 no significant changes were eventually 
deemed necessary. That is, the ICE Regulations did not stimulate any remarkable 
changes to what was already in place and the unionised arrangements continued as 
before. By contrast, at the Manchester site, there is only a trade union recognition 
agreement and no sort of any Constitution Agreement for consultation arrangements 
with the non-unionised employees. Therefore, the case-study evidence indicates that 
one of the most significant factors that can shape the response of companies in 
relation to the implementation of the ICE Directive in Great Britain is the pre-
existence or not of a trade union recognition agreement. 
The fact that the ICE Regulations emerged as mattering most in non-unionised 
workplaces, as they provide a good opportunity for a change, is also evident in the 
results of the postal survey that was conducted in collaboration with ACAS, which 
mainly served as a tool for finding potential case-studies for the main empirical 
research. More specifically, as previously pointed out in chapter 4, JCCs existed and 
were regularly used prior to the implementation of the ICE Regulations, in unionised 
workplaces (according to the findings of the survey, 32 out of the 50 companies that 
are regularly using JCCs, are predominantly unionised – more details are provided in 
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table 9.2). In addition, most of the companies that decided to take no action are 
unionised, while those that plan to set up a negotiating body are mainly non-
unionised. It is noteworthy that sixteen companies had put (or probably intended to 
put) on the agendas of union forums the issue of the ICE Regulations, which indicates 
that unionised employees tend to be more active in taking action on such matters 
(further details are provided in table 9.3). 
Table 9.2: The Use of Joint Consultative Committees in the 

Unionised and Non-Unionised Sectors.

Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Joint Consultative 
Committees 
Not at all 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
7 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
10 
7 
7 
Often 10 18 28 
Total 
A great deal 8 
33 
14 
41 
22 
74 
Table 9.3: Organisational Responses to the ICE 
Regulations. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Organisational 
Responses to 
Design a pre-existing 
agreement 15 8 23 
ICE 
Regulations 
Discuss with a 
recognised trade union - 16 16 
Ballot the workforce 2 1 3 
Set up a negotiating body 7 1 8 
Decide to take no action 5 13 18 
Other 4 2 6 
Total 33 41 74 
The evidence from the four case-studies, in conjunction with the findings of the 
survey and the issues discussed in the academic literature, subsequently lead to the 
identification of the following questions that need to be addressed in the light of the 
implementation of the ICE Directive in the UK: 
•	 What are the strategies that have been adopted by management, the trade 
unions and individual employees? 
     237 
Chapter 9: Discussion of the Research Findings and Empirical Evidence
•	 What opportunities have the ICE Regulations provided for union and 
employee representatives to challenge management prerogative and 
dominance in decision-making? 
•	 Do the ICE Regulations offer opportunities for true-consultation or just 
pseudo-consultation? 
•	 Is legislatively-prompted voluntarism an accurate description of how the 
implications of the ICE Regulations will be viewed in the near future?  
•	 Can the evolutionary impact of the ICE Regulations be considered as a) 
being an opportunity for strengthening industrial democracy and 
employee voice arrangements in the workplace? And/or b) an opportunity 
to harmonise British industrial relations with EU employment policy? 
9.2 Changes and Modifications due to the ICE Regulations: 
Strategies Adopted by Management, the Trade Unions, and 
Individual Employees. 
9.2.1 Employers and Management 
This case-study research reveals that through the establishment of new or pre-emptory 
consultation arrangements the main intention of management has been to exclude 
discussion on distributive issues, such as: pay, terms and conditions etc on the 
agendas of consultation meetings. For example, in case-study one, consultation and 
negotiation mechanisms have been restricted to the unionised sections of employees 
under the trade union recognition agreements. As a result, at the Felixstowe site when 
a ‘hybrid’ representation structure was developed, the agenda of the council was 
controlled by management in such a way so as to ensure that the negotiation 
arrangements are separate from the consultative council. In this regard, it is important 
to emphasise the specific reference in the Constitution Agreement of the consultative 
council (CCC) that “…all collective bargaining issues relevant to the union 
recognition agreement may be brought up in the separate [union-based] forum as 
defined in that agreement. The ‘CCC’ is not a negotiation forum…” (Constitution 
Agreement Document, April 2005: p. 4).  In other words, this confirms the previous 
findings of other researchers (such as: Wilkinson et al., 2007; Beaumont and Hunter, 
2007; Hall et al., 2007) that management often tries to ensure that any sort of 
collective bargaining process, such as negotiations on wages, is not included in the 
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agreed constitution in relation to information and consultation arrangements. Thus it 
is evident that the existence or not of a collective trade union agreement shapes 
significantly the strategies adopted by the management in this particular case. 
Using the model of “Voice Systems and Management Style”, as developed by Boxall 
and Purcell (2003: p. 180), the operation of the CCC forum and the review of the 
Constitution Agreement at the Felixstowe site are based on the principles of high-
commitment/involvement management and the relationship with the trade union is co-
operative (i.e. box 6 of the model, as illustrated in figure 2.4). Moreover, there is a 
dual channel of representation through the CCC meetings and a trade union 
recognition agreement. Furthermore, using the aforementioned model it can be argued 
that in this case-study organisation the management strategy has basically relied on 
the principles of “partnership with organised labour”, “extensive voice systems” and 
the potential development of “high trust” (ibid). This is similar to the features found 
at the depot sites of case-study two, where management has been following a co-
operative and harmonious relationship with the union representatives, through the 
institutionalisation of three different trade union recognition agreements. 
At the unionised sites in case-studies one and two, where trade union recognition 
agreements exist, the impact of the ICE Regulations has been very slight. By contrast, 
the relatively recent establishment of a new consultation forum at the head office in 
case-study two illustrates that the implementation of the ICE Regulations is having a 
salient effect on non-unionised workplaces. This is further confirmed in case-study 
four of the research project, where at the time of fieldwork there had been the 
relatively recent establishment of a consultation forum (in September 2006), in 
response to the implementation of the ICE Directive in the UK. In similar vein, at the 
head office of case-study two, it was the HR team that took the initiative to set up the 
Constitution Agreement document. More specifically, this action was taken by the HR 
management team in order to dissuade the employees from establishing a union-based 
arrangement. In fact, in this regard, when a separate consultative forum was set up in 
one of the warehouses in Bolton (in August 2007), the HR manager explicitly stated 
that one of the company’s objectives was to reject any request for trade union 
recognition agreement. 
     239 
Chapter 9: Discussion of the Research Findings and Empirical Evidence
In general, it would appear that when there is a lack of expertise on the part of the 
individual employees, coupled with superior knowledge of managers about 
information and consultation forums, as in case-study four, then the latter are more 
likely to be pro-active in taking the initiatives and establishing forums of their own 
design. By contrast, the employees and their representatives in such situations behave 
in a reactive fashion to any initiative taken by management. Moreover, under these 
conditions the main management strategy is aimed at legally underpinning the 
information and consultation agreements through a formal voluntary agreement, 
thereby limiting the possibilities for the employees to challenge the arrangements as 
they will need to muster 40 per cent support from the workforce in order to trigger 
any further negotiations. 
The “conceptual map of factors influencing non-union employee voice mechanisms”, 
as defined by Dundon and Gollan (2007: p. 1185), may provide an explanation for the 
contextual parameters that can lead management to take the initiative and set up the 
consultation forums. A good example of this can be seen in relation to the setting up 
of a separate forum at the Bolton warehouse in case-study four, where “ideological 
hostility” (ibid: p. 1191) or employer aversion to the establishment of union-based 
arrangements can be clearly observed. More specifically, the HR management used 
the current “regulatory environment” to take pre-emptive action and establish 
employee voice arrangements based on the organisational objectives (ibid: p. 1186). 
In sum, this can be viewed as being an attempt by management to lessen the 
possibility of any external involvement by organised labour and securely establish the 
formal communication and consultation mechanisms within the organisation. 
In line with the empirical findings of Hall et al. (2007), it is argued that in some cases 
management uses information and consultation arrangements “as a means of staving 
off union demands for recognition” (p. 72) or with the goal of convincing the 
employees that there is no need to join a trade union, since the established 
consultation forum is a good and “viable” option. This coincides with the notion of 
“union avoidance”, as described by many academics (for example, Bratton, 2007a: 
pp. 409-410), which constitutes an attempt by employers to establish a non-union 
employee representation structure, rather than bestowing a trade union recognition 
agreement. Moreover, such employee voice arrangements can be used as a device for 
     240 
Chapter 9: Discussion of the Research Findings and Empirical Evidence
promoting communication and consultation mechanisms, rather than granting 
negotiation rights. This management strategy has also been termed as a “covert” 
tactic that promotes non-union representation by which the employer is refusing to 
concede any union recognition agreement (Watling and Snook, 2003: p. 268) and this 
has especially been observed in the workplaces with relatively low union 
membership. In fact, employers are usually adopting such strategies “as a means of 
weakening collective bargaining and the union role more broadly” (Brewster et al, 
2007b: p. 1249). 
Likewise, the empirical findings from other projects, which are also based on case-
study research, indicate that management has been using the statutory provisions of 
the legislation in order to dissuade the development of union-based arrangements. 
More specifically, management can use the provisions of the ICE Directive as “an 
ideal opportunity to introduce non-union consultative structures” (Johnstone et al., 
2004: p. 373) with the view to persuade employees that they have “a viable 
alternative” (Hall et al., 2007: p. 72) instead of choosing to join a trade union. This 
position was also recognised in the past by Ramsey (1977), who pointed out that non-
union consultation arrangements can be established by employers as a strategy to 
deter any attempt for trade union recognition agreement, and more recently by Butler 
(2009a), who has suggested that such actions by management exemplify the “desire 
to pre-empt union organisation” (p. 209). Similarly, this strategy has also been 
described as entailing the desire to promote and establish “union suppression [or] 
substitution” (Dundon and Wilkinson, 2007: p. 1189).  
9.2.2 Individual Employees and Trade Unions 
Avoidance of the establishment of modified or new consultation arrangements is a 
strategy that has been adopted by many of the unionised employees, especially in the 
manufacturing sector (Edwards et al., 2007). For instance, at the Manchester site in 
case-study one it is evident that there is a strong reliance on union-based 
representation bodies. Moreover, at this site there is no compliance with the statutory 
requirements and thus there is no form of representation for the employees that are not 
members of the GMB union. In fact, the lack of co-ordination amongst the non-union 
employees has led to their consequent failure to take the initiative and request 
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negotiations for the setting up of a constitution agreement, as defined in the provisions 
of the ICE Regulations. 
Moreover, the defensive attitude of the representatives from the GMB union at the 
Manchester site is an example of avoidance or ambivalence towards the establishment 
of more extensive forms of employee voice.  In this regard, similar to the findings of 
Doherty (2008), it would appear that the avoidance strategy was adopted because the 
consultation forum was perceived as being a threat to collective bargaining, in that 
management may try to put items on the agenda of the forum that were previously 
considered as issues included in collective bargaining, thus superseding the 
negotiation process. In such circumstances, union representatives primarily try to 
defend the already acquired collective consultation and negotiation rights, rather than 
attempting to use the ICE Regulations for their own benefit. In parallel with the 
aforementioned rationale, Gospel and Willman (2005: p. 142) suggest that: 
“…on the part of unions, they fear that employers may use the Directive to exclude or 
eject them, and that they have neither the leverage nor the capability to mobilise 
workers to achieve and operate new information and consultation arrangements”. 
The reactions of the GMB union representatives provide a good example of an 
avoidance or ambivalence strategy being adopted to thwart any attempt by 
management to establish a hybrid consultation forum. Moreover, the representatives 
expressed their reluctance to sit alongside non-unionised representatives who lacked 
legitimate collective rights. The evidence from other research projects indicates that 
union representatives may be against non-union or hybrid-based arrangements, 
because they perceive that this will weaken their “dealings with management” 
(Beaumont and Hunter, 2007: p. 1235) and non-union representation can be also 
considered as “ineffective in providing a true voice for employees due to the lack of 
independence” (Pyman et al., 2006; cited in Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007a: p. 1139). 
The evidence from case-study one would appear to support the posited view that the 
development of hybrid forums is actually seen as a potential threat to the collective 
power of the union representatives, because negotiation rights can be dropped by 
management in favour of broader and less robust consultation and communication 
mechanisms. In line with the aforementioned arguments, Hall et al. (2007: p. 59) 
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argue that the avoidance or defensive strategy of unions stems from their 
apprehension that such arrangements can possibly “erode their exclusive rights to 
represent staff in negotiations and thus the legitimacy of their on-site role”. 
In general, another factor that can account for the union’s defensive approach towards 
the ICE Regulations relates to the demarcation line between union-based negotiation 
and joint consultation bodies, where it is a given “fact that collective bargaining deals 
with substantive or procedural matters, and consultation addresses other matters of 
common interest…” (Bratton, 2007b: p. 460). This highlights one of the main 
weaknesses of the ICE Regulations, in that in their provisions there is no explicit 
designation “between representative consultation and negotiation” (Coupar and 
Stevens, 2005: p. 51). In particular, the unwillingness of union representatives at the 
Manchester site to review their agreement in accordance with the legislative 
provisions is an indication of their lack of trust towards the management and their fear 
of losing the power of their collective role, if broad consultation arrangements were 
allowed to evolve. At this site, this non-compliant strategy indicates that the union 
representatives have a strict adherence to the upholding of their consultation and 
negotiation rights. Moreover, the ICE Regulations do not provide any additional 
rights to union representatives and actually their statutory provisions would probably 
lead to inferior agreements when compared to the union-based arrangements. In sum, 
the legislation does not assign “an explicit role” to the trade unions (Lorber, 2006: p. 
257) and in fact, as Doherty (2008: p. 618) has emphasised, it does allow for the 
development of “non-collectivist” employee representation, which can give some 
justification for the negative or ambivalent trade union stance.  
At the Manchester site, the clearly evident poor relations of the past owing to the 
collective redundancies had led to a continuing highly adversarial climate. In 
particular, low levels of trust could be identified and employee voice arrangements at 
the time of the research were restricted, because there was no representation structure 
for the non-unionised sections of the workforce (i.e. box 3 of the model, as illustrated 
in figure 2.4). According to the HR manager, it appears that more recently the climate 
has been improving, with there being more cooperation between the trade union 
representatives and HR management that may potentially lead to more extensive voice 
systems of a similar nature to those at the Felixstowe site. Even though this has not 
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yet taken place, it could be achieved through the development of a Constitution 
Agreement that covers both the non-unionised and unionised employees in the form 
of a ‘hybrid’ information and consultation forum. 
The flexibility of the legal framework and provision of minimum rights, as defined by 
the ICE Regulations, do not actually provide great scope for action by the employees, 
especially in relation to the establishment of collective consultation. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the survey findings, in chapter 4, indicates that for the vast majority of the 
companies there is no likelihood that employees would vote to endorse a request for 
triggering any negotiation procedures for new arrangements, in accordance with the 
statutory provisions. In fact, only in five organisations it was underlined that it was 
quite likely that employees would make such a request (further details are provided in 
table 9.4). In an interview with the HR manager of one of these companies61, he 
pointed out that the issue had been brought up for discussion by the union 
representatives in the context of reviewing the Constitution Agreement of the JCC and 
evaluating the operation of a separate negotiation forum that had been established 
with the union representatives of Amicus. The issue was discussed for approximately 
six months and afterwards there was a mutual agreement and consensus that there 
would be no changes, as it was generally acknowledged by both parties that the 
company already complied with the legislation. Eventually, the union representatives 
came to the conclusion that the ICE Regulations, in terms of communication, 
consultation and negotiation arrangements, offered no improvements to the union-
based arrangements. 
61 This organisation is not included in the selected sample of the case-study research, as it has already 
been explained in chapter 3, because there was limited access for conducting the fieldwork. In this 
regard, no permission was given for documentary collection and thus no further interviews were finally 
conducted. 
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Table 9.4: Likelihood of Endorsing a Request for New Information and 
Consultation Arrangements. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Potential Requirement Not at all likely 10 14 24 
for new I&C Not very likely 20 19 39 
Arrangements Unsure 0 4 4 
Quite likely 1 4 5 
Not answered 2 0 2 
Total 33 41 74 
The minimal threshold that is required so that employees are able to make a valid 
request for negotiations can create an insurmountable barrier (Hall 2006), especially 
for those sections of the workforce that are not union-members and thus usually lack 
the required expertise. In particular, some academics have been very critical of this 
threshold, pointing out also the fact that the ICE Regulations are not binding for the 
employers. 
“By not obligating employers to, at least, begin negotiations, the legislation does little 
to more strongly institutionalise voice and involvement arrangements, does nothing to 
promote employee awareness of their rights, makes accessing rights largely dependent 
on managerial attitudes and gives little or no incentive to management to take a 
proactive approach” (Doherty, 2008: p. 617). 
From the trade union point of view, in a number of formal guides published by them, 
including those of Unite and USDAW, there is explicit advice to union 
representatives to be careful when management seeks to establish, unilaterally, a 
formal arrangement, because of the strong possibility of inferior agreements being 
developed that are very difficult for the employees to challenge or renegotiate later 
on, owing to the aforementioned higher threshold of 40 per cent. In other words, the 
threshold for endorsing the request for negotiations dissuades and seriously precludes 
the possibility of employees being able to challenge pre-established arrangements. In 
sum, trade unions have published guidelines and urged their members to react against 
any such pre-emptory attempts by employers to use the provisions of the ICE 
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Regulations in order to undermine the interests and collective rights of unionised 
employees.  
Furthermore, the case-study evidence, with regard to the conducted research, suggests 
that in workplaces where trade union recognition agreements already pre-exist and 
especially where union membership is high, the unionised employees are more able to 
protect themselves against the establishment of comparatively inferior information 
and consultation arrangements. The empirical findings in other case-study research 
projects indicate that in workplaces where trade unions have minority membership, 
“ingenious ways” can be implemented within the organisation so that both unionised 
and non-unionised employees can be represented in “parallel meetings” (Hall et al., 
2007: p. 74), thereby achieving complementary voice arrangements. In such cases, it 
will be interesting to see whether unionised representatives on recently established 
consultative councils will be able to avail themselves of the opportunity to request a 
recognition agreement as the operation of these councils further evolve. In this regard, 
the Bolton warehouse in case-study four provides an example where unionised 
employees have been able to use the ICE Regulations and formed a Constitution 
Agreement that gives them a place on the consultation forum. Hence, although there is 
no trade union recognition agreement, at least the employees can have a legitimate 
voice. That is, in such scenarios the statutory provisions of the legislation have 
provided the opportunity to the unionised employees to have a substantial 
involvement in the establishment and development of information and consultation 
arrangements, especially “in workplaces where they have no current presence” 
(Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: p. 1153).  
Consequently, the statutory provisions of EU directives on employee participation, 
such as the ICE Directive, can and do allow trade unions to “have legal supports that 
they can potentially turn to their advantage” (Gospel and Willman, 2005: p. 142). In 
other words, in some weakly unionised workplaces, especially those with minority 
membership and no formal trade union recognition agreement, the ICE Regulations 
can help the unionised employees to get a foothold, if they secure a place for 
representation on consultation forums. Some unions, including Unite and USDAW, 
have advised their members in organisations where they have weak representation to 
use this as a strategy to ensure that collective consultation is enforced and viewing 
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this as a potential avenue for the eventual acquiring of a collective agreement. This 
union perspective concurs with the claim made by some employers and anti-unionists 
who have expressed the view that the ICE Regulations can become a “Trojan horse” 
(Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: p. 1154), because the introduction of consultative 
councils may eventually lead to the establishment of a trade union recognition 
agreement. 
From the empirical findings of the conducted research, it has emerged that in most of 
cases trade union representatives and individual employees have not been developing 
a pro-active approach in relation to the legislation. It is evident that in unionised 
workplaces the already established consultation and negotiation forums provide better 
employee rights than the statutory provisions of the ICE Regulations. As a result, 
employees in these settings tend to be content to continue to use the union-based 
arrangements and are indifferent or even hostile to the introduction of new 
consultation mechanisms. Consistent with the findings of other researchers (such as: 
Hall et al., 2007, 2008 and 2009), the trade unions representatives turned out to be 
largely “silent, only reacting when the companies [or management] took the 
initiative” (cited in Hall et al., 2007: p. 17) to establish more extensive and/or hybrid 
forms of consultation mechanisms. With regard to the individual employees, in non-
unionised workplaces there is an obvious lack of expertise and therefore, it is not 
surprising that they have not been proactive in triggering negotiation procedures. 
Even in the workplaces, where consultation councils are not existent, it appears that 
the threshold of 10 per cent may be a considerable barrier when individual employees 
wish to initiate the negotiation process. 
Recently, many trade unions, e.g. Unite and USDAW, have encouraged their union 
officials to promote the instigation of greater involvement by their members in the 
development of information and consultation arrangements in their workplaces. 
Nonetheless, there is no significant evidence that union representatives have been 
actively involved in the negotiation of agreements as assigned by the standard 
provisions, which from the research outcomes can be primarily attributed to their lack 
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of knowledge concerning the ICE Regulations. From a wider perspective, using the 
findings of CHA62 (2005: pp. 4-5), Gollan and Wilkinson (2007a: p. 1138) argue that: 
“…more than eight in ten employees in the UK have not heard of the ICE Regulations. 
Only 12 per cent of employees have been informed of these requirements from their 
employer, and almost all (94 per cent) have not been told about these requirements 
from their trade union. Only 13 per cent of employees were aware that the 
requirements gave them a right to ask their employer about the future of their 
organisation”. 
In general, similar empirical findings have been highlighted by other researchers, 
where in particular it has been argued that management predominantly makes “all the 
running”, whilst the involvement of employees, in relation to the procedures for 
establishing or modifying consultation arrangements, appears to be rather minimal 
(Cressey, 2009: p. 155). Finally, it is apparent that employees lack conviction with 
regard to their own rights and thus even if they are aware of the legislative provisions 
they may be “unwilling or unable to force their employer’s hand” (Doherty, 2008: p. 
617). 
9.3 ICE Regulations: An Opportunity for Trade Unions and 
Individual Employees? 
9.3.1 Challenging Management Prerogative and Influencing Decision-Making 
According to the empirical findings of the conducted research, the necessity to 
comply with the minimal requirements of the legislation has led management teams, 
in nearly all cases, to adopt a rather pre-emptive approach, which subsequently has 
resulted in non-pluralist or unitarist agreements that have the primary purpose of 
attaining organisational goals, rather than protecting the interests of employees. 
More specifically, at the head office of case-study two, management adopted a pre-
emptive strategy in order to comply with the requirements of the ICE Regulations. 
Furthermore, in this case although the company was forced to act (i.e. through the 
establishment of a consultative forum in 2005) due to the implementation of the ICE 
62 CHA: ‘The Workplace Communications Consultancy’ (http://www.chapr.co.uk/). 
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Directive, the main driver was actually the need to execute collective redundancies in 
accordance with the legislative requirements. With regard to the introduction of 
consultation arrangements, the initiative was taken by the HR department and this was 
further stimulated by the fact that there had been a recent change of ownership. 
Consequently, the company now safely complies with the minimal provisions of the 
ICE Regulations (in accordance with its organisational objectives and needs), a 
situation that has essentially emerged through the unilateral establishment of a formal 
Constitution Agreement by management. As a result, there is restricted input available 
to the employee representatives, which has limited their influence on the decision-
making process and thus provided them with no effective means to challenge the 
management prerogative. By contrast, at the highly-unionised depot sites, where JCCs 
and negotiation forums are regularly held, the company fully complies with the 
statutory provisions and thus employee voice arrangements are considered relatively 
more influential when compared to the consultative forum at the head office. 
In unionised workplaces, the case-study evidence indicates that consultation and 
negotiation procedures are more coherent and effective, because the union 
representatives have the necessary experience and expertise to be more influential in 
relation to management prerogative. In other words, the information and consultation 
arrangements and representation structures tend to constitute stronger forms of 
employee voice in unionised rather than in non-unionised workplaces, as has also 
been suggested by other researchers (Cully et al., 1999; Gospel and Willman, 2005; 
Kersley et al., 2006). 
In fact, in non-unionised workplaces, what has been termed as a consultation 
arrangement often turns out to be largely a communication process, which involves 
limited opportunities for influencing decision-making. This perspective was 
confirmed by the interviewees from the head office of case-study two and the retail 
outlet of the Yeovil store in case-study three, who emphasised that their opinions are 
heard but the actual decision-making is made by the management and thus the 
influence of employee representatives is seriously curtailed. In sum, in all non-
unionised sites included in the case-studies of the research there is much evidence that 
employee representatives can hardly influence the decision-making process, with the 
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result being that the employee representatives are able to make very few, if any, 
challenges towards management prerogative through the consultation forums.   
The CCC meetings in case-study one and the operation of the JCCs at the depot sites 
in case-study two can be described as typical hybrid forms of employee 
representation. More specifically, they constitute examples of consultation 
forums/councils that have co-existed for many years alongside union-based 
negotiation forums. These arrangements would appear to have provided the employee 
representatives with more influence over management decision-making, when 
compared to the forums/councils that were established in the other case-studies in 
response to the ICE Regulations. The evidence from the case-study research supports 
the view that once a trade union recognition agreement is established, management 
tends to accept the notion of partnership with organised labour and any consultation 
mechanisms are perceived by both sides as containing more enforceable 
arrangements, thereby being more effective. By contrast, in non-unionised 
workplaces, employee voice arrangements tend to be mostly direct and forms of 
representation appear to be weaker, largely because they have been initiated by 
management exercising its role as the main authority.  
Turning to the terminology of Gollan (2000: p. 415), with regard to the “strategies 
and objectives of non-union voice arrangements” (cited in Dundon and Gollan, 2007: 
p. 1190), the establishment of consultation forums in case-study four and at the head 
office of case-study two can be described as “conflictual (win and lose)” situations, 
because although through the single channels of representation employee interests are 
supposed to be addressed, these arrangements mainly serve organisational objectives 
that include collective redundancies and TUPE scenarios and in reality there is 
“limited workplace decision-making” afforded by management. By contrast, the 
operation of the Store Council in case-study three can be claimed to be a “mutual 
(win-win)” situation, as it is based on mutual “co-operation”, with the primary focus 
being on “productivity improvement”. Figure 2.4 illustrates this model as adapted by 
Gollan (2000: p. 415; cited in Dundon and Gollan, 2007: 1190). 
At the time of research, the recently established consultation forums/councils at the 
head offices in case-studies two and four were operating according to the guidelines 
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of their constitution agreements, with the HR management exhibiting strong 
enthusiasm in relation to the promotion of information and consultation mechanisms. 
In these cases, management decision-making had to take into account the views of 
their employees in relation to the redundancies and transfer of undertakings, but 
discussions on such matters were mainly restricted to the process that would be 
involved, rather than whether these events could be avoided. For instance, all the 
interviewees in case-study two confirmed that the directors and managers listened to 
their opinions and followed the formal procedures in relation to consulting with them 
about the redundancies, as laid down by the law. Nonetheless, it was pointed out that 
the final decision-making rested with management team and thus the scope of 
influence for the employees was severely limited and consequently management 
prerogative could not be challenged. 
Through the council meetings held at the head offices in case-studies two and four, 
management communicates all the necessary information and business decisions are 
also announced to the employee representatives. Thus it is evident that this serves as a 
management strategy to promote the notion of “participative decision making” 
(Riordan et al., 2005: p. 473), which has the purpose of creating the perception 
amongst the employees that they have “control [or] say” in the decision-making 
process (ibid). Moreover, as some of the case-study outcomes have revealed, the 
flexible standard provisions of the legislation have provided management 
representatives with a lot of leeway regarding the way that new consultation 
arrangements can be developed and often they have taken great care to ensure that the 
interests of the organisation are protected, rather than granting decision-making 
opportunities to their employees. To this end, it emerges that the HR managers, most 
of the directors and other managers have made considerable effort to obtain effective 
levels of awareness about the ICE Regulations and their implications. 
The widespread absence of an active involvement by the employee representatives, 
which was evident across the cases during the development and enforcement of the 
constitution agreements, has resulted in limited scope of influence for the employees 
with their interests not being strongly promoted. Given the fact that the initiatives are 
mainly driven by management, Doherty (2008) argues that consultation arrangements 
can hardly “address employee concerns about real involvement in decision making” 
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and employees will potentially be unable to “prevent a management-dominated 
agenda without external [and] independent assistance” (p. 618). In line with the 
aforementioned findings, Gollan and Wilkinson (2007a) support Marsden’s (2007) 
argument. 
“The element of employee voice may be very weak when new work goals and priorities 
are imposed unilaterally by management, and they may be strong when full 
consideration is given to the changing needs of both parties” (Marsden, 2007: p. 1263; 
cited in Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007a: p. 1141).  
Despite these shortcomings, in general, the case-study interviews with management 
and employee representatives have generated strong evidence that information-
sharing and consultation are considered to be beneficial for organisations, because 
they provide the opportunity to employees to have a say, whilst simultaneously giving 
the impression to all concerned that business decisions are being made in a transparent 
way, which can result in beneficial outcomes, such as mutual trust, commitment and 
increased productivity. In a similar vein, other researchers argue that information and 
consultation arrangements should be regarded “as the ‘right things to do’ as part of a 
wider approach to modern management” (Hall et al., 2007: p. 71). In general, the 
findings in the case-study research support this perspective, in that the outcomes as a 
result of the implementation of the ICE Regulations are considered by both 
management and workers to have led to functional participation mechanisms, which 
in some cases did not exist previously. However, some academics suggest that the 
available evidence shows that activities in response to this legislation are 
predominantly managerial-based and thus although the established arrangements are 
“functional”, they are still “voluntary and unitarist in outlook” (Cressey, 2009: p. 
158). 
In sum, in accordance with the findings of other researchers, the evidence from the 
case-studies indicates that the trade unions and individual employees, as yet, have 
been only minimally involved in decision-making through the information and 
consultation arrangements and in addition, their inputs into the establishment and 
subsequent developments of these arrangements have been rather limited. This state 
of affairs can change if the trade unions provide further advice and guidelines to their 
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members and simultaneously, external independent bodies and agencies, such as: 
ACAS, CAC and EAT contribute significantly towards the wider enforcement of the 
ICE Regulations, thereby enhancing the potential implications of the legislation. If 
this happens, it may provide a further impetus for all parties (i.e. management, trade 
unions and individual employees) to collaborate equally in the establishment of new 
constitution agreements at their workplaces. In other words, this can eventually lead 
to more coherent and effective voice arrangements, with employees having a greater 
say in business decisions through consultation forums.  
In general, this legislation does not provide opportunities for challenging management 
prerogative, as in particular there is no binding mechanism for the establishment of 
negotiation and co-determination rights. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the 
flexibility, which is provided through the statutory provisions, can challenge the 
widely encountered “unitarism” (Provis, 1996: p. 473), so as to give more favour to 
employee interests or to provide an impetus for the development of pluralist forms of 
participation. In reality, as confirmed in a number of the case-studies, the scope of 
influence for employees is still narrow since “…management reserves the right to 
make the final decisions and hence ignore workers’ views…” (Wood, 2008: p. 165). 
This perspective is similar to that of Truter (2003), who argues that the provisions in 
the ICE Regulations are insufficient for bringing the British system of employment 
relations closer to the “German-style social partnership model” (p. 28). Referring to 
the implementation of the EU Directive on EWCs, Bercusson (1996) expresses his 
general scepticism about the likely impact of such initiatives, being strongly critical of 
the fact that such directives have been used opportunistically by managers to ensure 
that companies comply with the absolute minimum requirements on employee 
participation mechanisms and thus stay on the right side of the law. Under these 
circumstances, the most likely impact of such directives is the development of 
organisation-specific arrangements that are based on temporary needs and objectives 
of organisations, in order to deal effectively with momentum issues of employee 
participation. In particular:  
“…directives apparently covering only narrowly defined situations involving labour in 
the enterprise (collective dismissals, transfers of undertakings, transnational 
enterprises) raise general and momentous issues of workers’ representation, the role of 
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collective agreements, [and] adequacy of sanctions…” (Bercusson, 1996: p. 221; cited 
in Bercusson, 2002: p. 212). 
9.3.2 True-Consultation or Pseudo-Consultation? 
In case-study three, there is a pre-existing agreement that covers all the employees in 
all the retail stores and thus a minimal safe compliance with the new statutory 
requirements has been achieved. The result has been that the pre-established Store 
Council can be described as a mechanism of employee voice that formally allows for 
a wide range of communication, but offers no opportunities for employee 
representatives to challenge management prerogative through true-consultation 
arrangements. Employee representation in this case is quite robust, with the evidence 
showing that the HR team is pro-active in the implementation of any legislation on 
employee rights, so as to sufficiently adhere to the statutory requirements, but without 
additional initiatives taken to enhance further the employee participation. Moreover, 
the final decision-making strictly remains under the aegis of the head office and 
during the Store Council meetings it is mainly management that puts the items on the 
agenda with the store director making most of the presentations. Employees have the 
perception that they have their own input through the company’s council meetings, 
but they recognise that their influence is limited and also acknowledge that 
management mainly uses the forum to inform them about business strategies and 
policy decisions when the decisions have already been made. Under such 
circumstances, pseudo-consultation is more apparent than true-consultation.  
The limited influence of employee representatives in a number of the observed cases 
can be attributed to the narrow remit of the ICE Directive, with its provisions being 
markedly inferior when compared with those of the European Company Statute 
Directive, in which board-level representation for employees is considered essential. 
Moreover, the ICE Regulations do not allow for any enforcement of negotiation rights 
nor do they contain any explicit reference for employees to have any substantial 
influence in management decision-making.    
In general, at all of the non-unionised case-study sites the consultation councils 
mainly constitute information and communication arrangements established by 
management initiatives.  This is particularly evident at the head office of case-study 
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two and in case-study four, where the consultation arrangements had only been 
recently set up at the time of the research. In these cases, the employee representatives 
lacked the expertise and thus they were not actively involved in the development of 
the formal agreements. In addition, the Constitution Agreement in case-study four 
lacks customisation from the main legislative template, thus closely resembling the 
minimal-default provisions of the ICE Regulations, thereby focusing on the 
communication process, particularly in relation to the transparent dissemination of 
business decisions, rather than on attaining true-consultation. 
More specifically, there is a clear reference in the Constitution Agreement, in case-
study four, that “…the consultation process will not affect management’s prerogative 
to take appropriate decisions at the time required by the business and does not 
therefore need to take place before the decision is taken…” (Constitution Agreement, 
September 2006: p. 3) and the consultation forum “cannot cover pay negotiations and 
areas that management should communicate or manage” (Minutes of the Bridge 
Forum, November 2006: p. 3). Nonetheless, there is explicit reference to the fact that 
the company will seek to ensure that consultation takes place with a view to reaching 
an agreement through the exchange of views and the establishment of dialogue 
between the employee representatives and employer, and consequently, it can be also 
described as an agreement that securely complies with the standard provisions. In 
addition, regular training courses have been organised for the representatives in order 
to make their involvement more influential and thus enhance the effectiveness of 
forum meetings. 
Another factor already highlighted is concerned with the existence or non-existence of 
a trade union recognition agreement, which potentially affects the development of 
consultation arrangements and level of influence over management decision-making. 
For instance, the Constitution Agreement of the CCC, which operates at Felixstowe 
site in case-study one, would appear to provide a more pluralist and broader definition 
of authentic and real consultation, because there is emphasis on promoting, mutually, 
the interests of all parties concerned under the written obligation that the employees’ 
views should be heard. More specifically, consultation is assigned as the process: 
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“…by which management and employees or their representatives jointly examine and 
discuss issues of mutual interest. It involves seeking acceptable solutions to issues 
through genuine exchange of views and information. It does not remove the right of 
managers to manage but imposes an obligation that the views of employees will be 
sought and considered before decisions are made…” (Constitution Agreement 
Document, April 2005: p. 3). 
In reality, the operation of the recently-established consultation forums in case-studies 
two and four can primarily be attributed to external/internal business pressures, rather 
than to managerial attitudes or employee demands and the former are commonly 
described by other researchers as “external events” (Beaumont and Hunter, 2007: p. 
1240). Moreover, during the conducting of the research, these forums, on the whole, 
accommodated and facilitated the implementation of harsh decision-making, with the 
desired aim being that employees would accept changes with less resistance, because 
they would be more likely to consider that the procedures were being followed in 
accordance with the statutory requirements. Furthermore, the information-disclosure 
and communication mechanisms are well structured and enforced in all the 
workplaces in order to comply with the ICE Regulations. However, the available 
evidence indicates that the communication of decisions is the primary function for the 
newly-established consultation councils and thus, authentic or true consultation is not 
taking place. Nevertheless, under these circumstances and given the low levels of 
knowledge of the representatives and individual employees, it may well be that these 
people believe that the business decisions are made in a transparent and fair way 
through the consultation forum, in accordance with the ICE Regulations, even if true-
consultation is not really sustained. 
In sum, the evidence from the case-studies indicates that the ICE Regulations have 
brought about opportunities for change in some non-unionised workplaces. 
Nevertheless, the actual consultation mainly relates to issues about collective 
redundancies and transfers of undertakings in the recently established 
forums/councils, rather than providing a platform for the employees to engage in an 
open social dialogue with the employers about other key business issues, such as 
employment and restructuring matters, as originally envisaged when the legislation 
came into force. In essence, in these cases the agenda is primarily led by management, 
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with the arrangements being set up in a unitarist way by the HR department, thereby 
resulting in evident features of pseudo-consultation.  
At the time of research, it emerged that the newly established councils were seen by 
nearly all the employees as a vehicle for communicating business decisions (and 
consultation to some extent), in order to securely comply with the statutory-legal 
requirements, rather than being an opportunity for engagement in an open dialogue 
with management that may potentially enhance their own voice. Moreover, through 
these forums employees are being predominantly informed of business-decisions 
instead of being effectively consulted. This can be primarily attributed to the 
unilateral setting up of Constitution Agreement documents by management, allowing 
for them to ensure that the information and consultation arrangements evolve “in an 
opportunistic way” (Gold, 1998: p. 130). Further, from this pessimistic perspective on 
the employees’ part, as other researchers have also posited (Gollan and Wilkinson, 
2007a: p. 1138), it is argued that the ICE Regulations could be used by management 
as a tool for the establishment of “weak employer-dominated partnerships” that 
actually “[marginalise] collective consultation” and promote communication 
mechanisms rather than encourage true or authentic consultation. Similarly, drawing 
on relevant empirical study on the implications of the ICE Directive, it is pointed out 
that: 
“…employee representatives frequently commented that the balance of activity on 
information and consultation bodies was weighted towards information rather than 
consultation, and often concerned decisions that had already been taken. This implies a 
tendency on the part of management to inform, in information and consultation bodies, 
about company developments rather than seeking to engage in consultation; there was 
little suggestion that employees were being consulted but that their ideas were not 
being listened to…” (Hall et al., 2007: p. 52). 
As Dundon et al. (2006) argue, employers may also attempt to impose and enforce 
pseudo-participatory mechanisms of consultation and consequently, it is doubtful 
whether the ICE Regulations, alone, can provide the impetus for the establishment of 
more collective forms of representation in workplaces. Moreover, the combination of 
other negative factors, such as: pre-emptive management strategy, strident 
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union/employee demands, business pressures and low levels of trust can have a 
serious impact on the efficacy of collective employee voice (ibid: p. 493). Regarding 
the foremost of these negative factors, it has emerged from other researchers that the 
prominence of management prerogative has actually resulted in that “…current 
regulations of voice mechanisms within the employment relations are consciously 
ambiguous and susceptible to manipulation…” (Perrett, 2007: p. 618). 
9.4 Legislatively Prompted Voluntarism: A Potential Conceptual 
Framework for Understanding the Implications of the ICE 
Regulations? 
Hitherto, the research findings from the case-studies indicate that information and 
consultation arrangements are strongly reliant upon unilateral initiatives by 
management, taking the form of ad hoc actions and predominantly based on the 
temporary needs and objectives of organisations. As a result, it appears that the 
transposition of such EU directives and the subsequent establishment of legal 
frameworks are not sufficient to bring dramatic changes to the sphere of employee 
relations. However, the ICE Directive can be seen as an opportunity for the UK (and 
Ireland) to move closer to the principles of the European social model, in the context 
of employment policy. Nevertheless, this involves a big challenge, because the 
contextual features of voluntarism, de-centralisation and light regulation are deeply 
rooted within UK industrial relations (Hardy and Adnett, 2006; Perrett, 2007). In 
other words, these “national idiosyncrasies” are discernible obstacles to any potential 
and substantial change (Keller, 2002: p. 441). 
Owing to the generalised nature of the wording of the legislation, there is much 
flexibility in developing the consultation process and therefore the imposition of 
effective employee voice arrangements is seriously problematic. That is, in this form 
the ICE Regulations are not sufficient to transform the context of British industrial 
relations, because they are not enforcing statutory rights for British employees that are 
already mandatory in other EU member states. With respect to this, co-determination 
rights are provided in many EU countries, such as: Germany, the Nordic countries, 
Austria and Benelux, where there is “…an obligation on employers to reach 
agreement with employee representatives on a range of issues…” (Broughton, 2005: 
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p. 211). However, it is posited that the ICE Regulations are unlikely to bring any 
major shifts in this direction, because “legislatively prompted voluntarism may not be 
enough to provide a platform for a fundamental change in employment relations” 
(Hall, 2005a; cited in Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007a: p. 1138). Moreover, other 
constraining factors may shape the “choices of actors” such as “existing 
transnational, national and sectoral structures and traditions” (Gilman and 
Marginson, 2002: p. 38). Likewise, it can be argued that the flexibility of the statutory 
provisions and lack of knowledge of the employees can allow for employers and 
management to set up unilateral consultation arrangements that predominantly serve 
organisational goals and their development is based on opportunistic needs. Under 
these circumstances, the ICE Regulations do not significantly alter the context of 
British industrial relations and on the contrary, they stimulate the continued “British 
industrial relations exceptionalism” when compared to other European countries, as 
originally portrayed by Bercusson (2002: p. 217) and also emphasised by Hall (2005a 
and 2005b). 
On the other hand, these statutory provisions could: enable, ensure, and even impose, 
under certain conditions, the establishment of structured mechanisms that allow for 
the emergence of formal and consistent: information, communication and consultation 
arrangements. Moreover, regardless of who initiates the establishment of such 
arrangements, these developments could “lead to a proliferation of employee 
representation structures for different purposes” (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: p. 
1148) that appear to flourish, predominantly, in non-unionised workplaces. According 
to Cox et al. (2006: p. 253), this outcome would stimulate the “centrality or 
institutional embeddedness” of non-unionised consultation councils (cited in Butler 
2009b: p. 178) in the workplaces, where previously employees had poor 
representation. More specifically, as shown in case-studies two and four, the ICE 
Regulations have provided the opportunity for the employee representatives in non-
unionised organisations to become involved in communication and consultation 
procedures and to be allowed to participate in discussions regarding important 
business decisions. In a strongly unionised workplace, such as the Manchester site in 
case-study one, the management unilaterally attempted to introduce arrangements that 
would extend involvement to non-union employees. However, because of the 
defensive attitude of the union representatives they were unable to push through their 
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own initiative and consequently the non-unionised workers remained outside of any 
representation structure. By contrast at the Felixstowe site in the same case-study 
organisation, a hybrid system was established, because the union representatives did 
not object the establishment of a broader consultative council and in fact, union 
representatives were elected to this council.   
Consistent with the arguments of Geary and Roche (2005: p. 192), some of the case-
study outcomes revealed that management has been proactive in achieving “pre-
emptory agreements”, thus resulting in organisation-specific arrangements, which 
mainly address pressing organisational needs and yet being in accordance with the 
statutory provisions. Under these circumstances, the information and consultation 
arrangements serve as temporary solutions to organisational challenges, rather than 
promoting the legitimate interests of employees in a pluralist way. This illustrates that 
the provisions of the ICE Regulations may encourage the development and spread of 
“tailor-made” or “voluntary pre-emptive arrangements” (similar to the experience in 
relation to EWCs, as quoted in Cressey, 1998: p. 69), which are based on “enterprise-
specific rules” (Keller, 2002: p. 442) and “employer-initiated events” (Doherty, 
2008: p. 611), rather than lead to the establishment of a standard model, as defined in 
the statutory provisions of legislation. With this understanding, the ICE Regulations 
may be engendering the frequent emergence of a conceptual framework that is 
described as “legislatively-prompted voluntarism” (Hall and Terry, 2004: p. 226; 
Hall, 2005b: p. 122), which mainly includes opportunistic forms of organisation-
specific or event-driven consultation arrangements that heavily rely on “employers’ 
goodwill”, similar to the reported experiences arising from the implementation of 
other EU directives on employee participation (Sako, 1998: p. 12; cited in Cressey, 
2009: p. 158). 
With respect to this issue, Keller (2002: p. 442) has turned out to be visionary, in that 
he predicted this outcome (i.e. legislatively-prompted voluntarism) to be the likely 
impact of such EC/EU directives. In addition he has expressed serious reservations 
about their capacity to establish a European social model that includes the “social 
dimension of the internal market” (ibid) with “fundamental social rights”, as 
originally envisaged by Jacques Delors. More specifically, he has conceived as a 
potential implication that: 
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“…a variety of voluntaristic, tailor-made, enterprise-specific rules will be the result of 
the proceduralisation of [such EU] regulation – instead of generally binding, and, 
therefore, comparatively homogeneous and equalising legal prescriptions…strict new 
models for social partnership and ‘co-decision-making’ or ‘joint-regulation’ of 
strategically important company affairs are not provided…” (ibid). 
Turning to consider the UK specifically and how the transposition of the ICE 
Directive into British employment legislation has affected the industrial relations 
landscape, strong consideration should be given to “…the role that the voluntarist 
dimension of industrial relations continues to play in the mind-set of policy makers 
and in the calculations of social actors such as trade unions and employers…” 
(Perrett, 2007: p. 620). In this regard, if management chiefly takes the initiative to 
make use of the ICE Regulations, employer-dominated arrangements will be imposed, 
and consequently, collective consultation will fail to mature in many workplaces, 
especially where there is a poor history of advocacy with regard to employee rights. 
Where this is the case, the information and consultation arrangements will potentially 
end up being just a form of symbolic participatory mechanism which is: “functional, 
voluntary and unitarist in outlook” (Cressey, 2009: p. 158), one that takes the form of 
a “managerialist process”, rather than a consistent mechanism that promotes “social 
dialogue” at the national level (Gold et al., 2007: p. 7).  
Drawing on the above analysis and considering the idiosyncrasies and different belief 
system that characterise the context of UK industrial relations, when compared with 
other EU countries, it would seem that this context cannot be altered solely by the 
implementation of the ICE Regulations. That is, the distance from some other EU 
countries is likely to remain unless the voluntarism and non-regulatory tradition, 
which results in “unitary forms of worker involvement” (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: 
p. 259), is fundamentally challenged by statutory and binding requirements. 
Unfortunately, there is very little evidence, in particular from the research outcomes, 
to support the contention of the imminent “demise of voluntarism” (Roche, 2005; 
cited in Doherty, 2008: p. 610), within the context of British industrial relations. 
Moreover, in this regard, given the prevailing philosophy and institutionalisation of 
employee involvement and workplace democratisation, as revealed in much of the 
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literature, the UK will probably continue to forge a quite distinct route from those EU 
countries that are following the principles of the European social model.  
In terms of the conditions found in the UK, the conducted research supports the view 
that substantial developments in employee voice arrangements are unlikely to be 
achieved by “legislatively grounded promptings” (Doherty, 2008: p. 619) or “legally-
prompted forms of employee participation” (Hall and Terry, 2004; cited in Dundon 
and Wilkinson, 2009: p. 415). In fact, the most feasible scenario that will continue to 
predominate is that of “legislatively prompted voluntarism”, which cannot stimulate 
radical changes in employee involvement practices in the UK (Hall and Terry, 2004: 
p. 5; Hall, 2005a: p. 16; Tailby and Winchester, 2005: p. 447; Gollan and Wilkinson, 
2007a: p. 1138 and 2007b: p. 1153). In other words, the transposition of the EU 
Directive (2002/14/EC), into the UK employment legislation, may actually result in 
“maintaining the voluntarist tradition albeit within a statutory framework” (Gollan 
and Wilkinson, 2007b: p. 1156), with the consequent outcome being the diffusion of 
organisation-specific information and consultation arrangements, rather than leading 
to a binding and statutory imposition of a default model in relation to employee 
participation (Hall and Terry, 2004; Hall, 2005b; Hall et al. 2009; Dundon and 
Wilkinson, 2009). In concurrence with the arguments of Doherty (2008) and Gospel 
et al. (2003), the empirical evidence from this research indicates that under these 
circumstances the newly established information and consultation arrangements are 
based on the “event driven disclosure model” (Gospel et al., 2003: p. 346; cited in 
Doherty, 2008: p. 611), in that they are predominantly triggered by employer-induced 
events. As a result, such arrangements are best characterised as “palliative” rather 
than “preventative”, having a minor and temporary impact on the employment 
relationship (Doherty, 2008: p. 611). That is, employee voice and participation 
arrangements that come into fruition under the ICE Regulations are more likely to 
continue to flourish within the current context and thus imitating “a robust form of 
legislatively-prompted voluntarism” (Hall, 2006; cited in Doherty, 2008: p. 616). 
     262 
Chapter 9: Discussion of the Research Findings and Empirical Evidence
9.5 The Evolutionary Impact of the ICE Regulations 
9.5.1 An Opportunity to Strengthen Industrial Democracy and Employee Voice 
Arrangements in the Workplaces? 
From the optimistic point of view, the ICE Regulations could bring significant 
changes in those workplaces that hitherto have lacked sufficient forms of 
representation. Moreover, although employees usually have limited knowledge about 
the rights provided under the legislation, management usually has the expertise and 
ability to establish information and consultation arrangements. In particular, HR 
people can provide the necessary resources for the workforce representatives to 
acquire in-depth knowledge about the ICE Regulations and thus the employees can be 
better informed regarding their own statutory rights. Furthermore, on the positive 
front, Gollan and Wilkinson (2007a) highlight the fact that management could be 
motivated to set up new employee voice arrangements, on the one hand, so as to 
comply with the legislation and on the other, because they perceive that this may: 
improve employee commitment, lead to better organisational performance and result 
in more co-operative employment relations. Nevertheless, the case-study evidence has 
revealed that whilst the Constitution Agreement documents have been based on the 
logic of having communication and consultation bodies or councils that provide 
opportunities for discussions on a range of organisational aspects, the main focus is on 
using these entities to improve business performance. For instance: 
“[in the case-study one]…to provide a framework in order to continually improve 
business performance through the involvement of all employees in the decision 
making…” (Constitution Agreement Document, April 2005: p. 3), 
“[in the case-study three]...effective communication between itself [i.e. the 
organisation], its employees and its customers is crucial to its operation and 
maximisation of its profits…” (Communication Policy, October 2006: p. 1), 
“[in the case-study four]… involving employees in matters concerning the company 
and its workforce will lead to improvements in performance and the success of its 
business…” (Constitution Agreement, September 2006: p. 1).  
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The above quotes show that there are still powerful “barriers”, with regard to the 
instigation of industrial democracy in UK workplaces, because many employers still 
exhibit “deeply rooted” unitary behaviour when it comes to employment relations 
(Brannen, 1983: p. 155). Moreover, according to the Bullock Report (1977: p. 171), it 
is still evident that “it is unwise to impose ‘[industrial] democracy’ on those who are 
unready or unwilling to receive it” and that the active role of all parties is considered 
to be essential for the efficacy of employee voice arrangements. Within this 
perspective, the introduction of new arrangements in case-studies two and four on an 
ad hoc basis, with the purpose of supporting business goals and strategies, cannot be 
considered good practice towards the real enhancement of workplace democracy. The 
conducted research indicates that full consideration should be given to the needs and 
interests of employees, because the consultation process will be more effective if trust 
is developed between all parties concerned, as this is more likely to result in a 
sustained notion of partnership. The following quotes from the Constitution 
Agreement documents in three of the four case-studies illustrate that on paper 
mutuality and trust are clear goals: 
“[in the case-study one]…consultation is the process by which management and 
employee representatives jointly examine and discuss issues of mutual interest. It 
involves seeking acceptable solutions to issues through a genuine exchange of views 
and information…” (Constitution Agreement Document, April 2005: p. 3), 
“[in the case-study three]…[one of the objectives of the Store Council is] to build 
mutual trust and co-operation…” (Communication Policy, October 2006: p. 1), 
“[in the case-study four]…[the role of the Bridge Forum is achieved through] direct 
dialogue, in a spirit of co-operation, with elected employee representatives…” 
(Constitution Agreement, September 2006: p. 1). 
However, in spite of the above quoted goals, only in case-study one is there much 
evidence from the interviews with the employee representatives, which confirms that 
such objectives are actually achieved on the ground. In some highly unionised 
workplaces, such as the Manchester site of case-study one, where coherent and 
consistent forms of representation are already widespread, the ICE Regulations could 
be the stimulus in leading to further improvement of employee voice mechanisms, 
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especially for non-unionised sections of employees, but this does not appear to be the 
reality, as yet. As soon as the union representatives could have more open and flexible 
attitude at this site, separate information and consultation arrangement could be 
developed that would cover both unionised and non-unionised employees, with the 
union representatives sharing their own expertise and learning with the non-unionised 
employees. Subsequently, such an arrangement could improve the efficacy of 
employee voice, by resulting in a consistent form of dual channel of representation at 
this particular workplace and moreover, it could be employed at other workplaces of a 
similar nature. With respect to this, a number of authors have supported the 
perspective that complementary mechanisms of representation can co-exist together 
and lead to more effective employee voice, under certain circumstances (Gollan and 
Wilkinson, 2007a; Pyman et al., 2006). On the practical level, employee voice 
arrangements at the Felixstowe site and Bridgwater depot sites (in case-studies one 
and two respectively) illustrate typical examples of good practice, with regard to the 
effective operation of dual channel of representation. In a similar vein, Edwards et al. 
(2007) argue that the ICE Directive can have a substantial impact, if “consultation-
based” advocacy is permitted to evolve alongside “traditional union-based 
arrangements” (p. 86). 
Nevertheless, the conducted research indicates that strong consideration needs to be 
given to the legitimate role of trade union representatives and the employees should 
have an explicit understanding of where the demarcation line between consultation 
and negotiation lies. In this regard, serious reservations were expressed just before the 
transposition of the ICE Directive into UK legislation, with works councils and union 
forums being starkly seen in some cases as “competitors rather than being 
complementary to one another” (Watling and Snook, 2003: p. 268). Under this 
perspective, it is contended that if the legitimacy of union rights is challenged and 
trust is damaged, both joint consultation and collective representation will be 
undermined. With respect to this, the guides published by Unite and Amicus section 
officers provide a comprehensive analysis about the possible ways that employers 
could seriously imperil trade union roles through the imposition of inferior 
information and consultation arrangements. Moreover, a guide published by USDAW 
(2006) quotes an example of an inferior arrangement, through which the employer 
was able to put items on the agenda of the consultation forum meetings that 
     265 
Chapter 9: Discussion of the Research Findings and Empirical Evidence
previously used to be issues relating only to collective bargaining. In order to avoid 
such outcomes, this guide suggests that both unionised and non-unionised employees 
should endeavour to ensure that consultation and union-based arrangements are 
transparently established and clearly distinguished through a mutual agreement by the 
parties concerned. By so doing, it will be harder for management to introduce broad 
consultation councils that compromise the purposes of collective bargaining and 
negotiation. 
In general, simply establishing arrangements that predominantly involve 
communication mechanisms should not be considered sufficient enough in relation to 
the efficacy of employee voice (Bonner and Gollan, 2005). Vital and true consultation 
should be enforced and implemented through the active involvement of all parties and 
the agendas of meetings should be set in a pluralist manner. Commitment from top 
management is also necessary, especially if employee representatives lack the 
required expertise, and the provision of training and development activities has also a 
“critical role to play” (Sisson, 2002: p. 17). Otherwise, the effectiveness of such 
employee voice arrangements will be seriously limited and the ICE Regulations will 
end up to be just a “damp squib” (Hall 2006: p. 471; cited in Cressey, 2009: p. 155). 
The empirical evidence has shown that the ICE Regulations have mainly provided the 
opportunity for partnership in workplaces where compliance with the statutory 
provisions was previously lacking. However, it is questionable whether these changes 
have established strong and effective systems of employee representation (Hall et al., 
2007, 2008 and 2009), because only information sharing and communication have 
been introduced, in practice, and thus, consultation has failed to emerge. Finally, the 
statutory provisions of the legislation are predominantly providing opportunities in 
non-unionised workplaces, such as case-studies three and four, where there has been a 
need for regulatory enforcement that hitherto did not exist. By contrast, in highly 
unionised workplaces it appears that unionised employees prefer to adhere to their 
unmodified union-based arrangements, rather than to the relatively inferior and 
insecure arrangements that are often established through the implementation of the 
ICE Directive. 
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It is concluded that employees cannot rely exclusively on the statutory provisions 
contained within the ICE Regulations because all parties (management, employees 
and trade unions) need to be actively and equally involved in the formation of 
workplace partnership during the process of institutionalising the information and 
consultation arrangements (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004). Otherwise, as Marsden 
(2007) contends, these arrangements will end up being a weak form of employee 
involvement. In addition, other combined synergies, such as: trust, high commitment 
and involvement, management and employees attitudes, union strategies, external 
economic conditions and business pressures, together with the enforcement of 
legislative provisions and an active role being played by external independent 
bodies/institutions and agencies of enforcement, such as: CAC, EAT and ACAS, can 
contribute further to the development of these arrangements and establishment of 
more effective forms of employee voice, in concurrence with the key objectives of the 
EU Directive (2002/14/EC). In particular, Dix and Oxenbridge (2003) stress the role 
that ACAS can generally play in the arena of information and consultation 
arrangements.  
As well as providing opportunities for non-unionised employees, the transposition of 
the ICE Directive in the UK could also be beneficial for unionised workplaces, 
especially where there is minority membership and a formal trade union recognition 
agreement does not exist, because the legislation can help the trade union 
representatives to get a foothold on consultative councils. With respect to this issue, it 
has already been highlighted that Unite and USDAW have published very 
comprehensive guides to their members about the potential opportunities that the ICE 
Regulations can allow for them. This matter is underpinned by Brown and Nash 
(2008), who argue that: 
“…for many in the trade union movement, statutory consultation rights have offered a 
better prospect of bolstering union organisation than the blunt and unwieldy instrument 
of statutory recognition procedures of 1999…” (p. 101). 
That is, from this perspective, organised labour can use the ICE Regulations for its 
own benefit by participating in consultative councils and thereby gradually 
introducing industrial democracy in UK workplaces. In sum, now that the ICE 
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Regulations have been embedded in UK employment law, they can form a solid 
base that provides the impetus for future legislative developments that will 
potentially promote, more readily, the ideas of social partnership and workplace 
democratisation. 
9.5.2 An Opportunity to Harmonise the Context of British Industrial Relations 
with EU Employment Policy? 
The attempt to harmonise and establish similar employee voice arrangements for 
information sharing and consultation across EU countries is not a new idea and 
neither an innovative development, as it stems back to the EC debates of the 1970s 
with regards to EWCs (Gold and Schwimbersky, 2008). In their current manifestation, 
employee participation and consultation arrangements have their origins in the 1980s, 
with the main stimulus coming from the Vredeling proposal (Blanpain et al., 1983; 
Docksey, 1986; Gold, 2009). Before the official transposition of the ICE Directive, 
most of the EU countries63, with the exception of the UK and Ireland, had sufficient 
statutory and legislative frameworks for the consultation of employees on general 
business issues (Broughton, 2005). Moreover, the provisions of the ICE Regulations 
were introduced into British employment law in a very slow manner. The main 
reasons for this lie in: the strong opposition by the Conservative governments in the 
past, the vigour of employer resistance (i.e. CBI), and the wider context of the 
voluntarist tradition that strongly characterises UK industrial relations.  
With regards to workplace democracy and employee participation, the election of a 
Labour government in 1997 provided the grounds for optimism and it transpired that 
the UK became relatively more sympathetic towards the EU employment policy, 
when compared with the Conservative party. As a result, during the 1990s it was 
considered possible that EU initiatives might bring a convergence between the “social 
rights of British workers and other EC workforces” (Cressey, 1993: p. 103). In this 
regard, Carby-Hall (2006) argues that the ICE Directive can bring important changes 
in the context of British industrial relations. 
63 Before the transposition of the ICE Directive, the Republic of Ireland and the UK were the only EU 
countries without a general statutory and regulatory framework for consultation of employees. After the 
enlargement of the EU (in 2004 and 2007), there was a cluster of member states in a similar position to 
these two countries, namely: Bulgaria, the Republic of Cyprus, Malta, Poland, and Romania (Carley 
and Hall, 2008).  
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“There is little doubt that it is thanks to the influence of European legislation 
translated into British law that the UK is beginning to develop some kind of social 
dialogue, not only in limited fields but also...in wider spheres and more general spheres 
of information and consultation” (ibid: p. 441). 
Nonetheless, the antecedents of the ICE Directive are rooted in the debates of the 
1980s, when the circumstances and needs of the labour market were quite different 
and therefore, it is questionable to what extent this legislation is now sufficient, by 
itself, to bring substantial changes at the workplace level and result in convergence or 
harmonisation of employee participation arrangements across EU countries 
(Broughton, 2005). It is also noteworthy that the recent reservations expressed by the 
British Labour government towards the “Charter of Fundamental Rights”64 in 
summer 2007, has fostered further scepticism about the UK’s commitment towards 
the European social dimension65. 
As previously mentioned, several EU countries had a comprehensive statutory 
framework for employee consultation well in advance of the official transposition of 
the ICE Directive. In particular, many member states, such as: Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, Austria, Germany, Sweden and Finland have had coherent statutory 
provisions for co-determination rights, whereby for many years employers in these 
countries have been obliged to “reach agreement with employees on a range of 
issues” (Broughton, 2005: p. 211). Similarly, Milner (2001: p. 331) emphasises the 
coherent regulatory framework in relation to employment issues in some EU 
countries, such as: Sweden and Germany, and also cites the “relatively strong 
employment protection legislation” in France that strongly contrasts with the “lightly-
regulated labour market” of the UK. Therefore, it is argued that the phased 
implementation of the ICE Regulations in the UK, starting from 6th April 2005, has 
still left the regulatory and statutory context of British industrial relations relatively 
inferior and weak, when compared with other countries of the EU. However, the 
convergence towards “a genuine EC-level industrial relations area” is proving to be 
a rather “slow” process (Gold, 1998: p. 131). In this vein, the flexible statutory 
64 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2007/C 303/01), Official Journal of the 
European Union, 14th December 2007. 
65 Further details are provided at the website of Federation of European Employers: 
(http://www.fedee.com/histsoc.html). 
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framework of the ICE Directive has been described as an example of legislation that 
is actually causing “protracted political compromises” and it is unlikely to bring 
“binding, ...comparatively homogeneous and equalising legal prescriptions” between 
the UK and other EU countries at any time in the near future (Keller, 2002: p. 442).  
On the other hand, under certain circumstances the legislation can operate as a 
safeguard in the enforcement of structured information and consultation 
arrangements, which may eventually lead to harmonisation in employee participation 
practices in the majority of British workplaces. In this regard, the research outcomes 
indicate that from the theoretical point of view the ICE Regulations are definitely a 
significant development for the UK employment law, because they provide an 
enforceable legal framework that is applicable in most of the workplaces. 
Furthermore, at the community level this EU Directive could bring about an overall 
consistency between the EU member states, because it sets a basic standard for 
information sharing and consultation at the workplaces. From the optimistic 
perspective, it can be contended that the ICE Directive, in practice, signifies the 
completion of “a project for the harmonisation of employees rights that commenced 
back in the 1960s” (Cressey, 2009: p. 157). In addition, as already pointed out, if the 
implementation of the legislation becomes more widespread and is enforced further, it 
may prove to be a basis for changing the lightly-regulatory context of British 
industrial relations. However, the case-study evidence presented in this thesis gives 
little indication that such substantial changes are taking place on a widespread basis 
throughout the UK, as the barriers that hinder any move away from a voluntarist 
industrial relations tradition still remain in place. 
In highly unionised workplaces, there is much less likelihood for alterations to 
existing arrangements, because employees and union representatives tend to adhere 
strongly to the collective bargaining that has already been established. Even in the 
case-studies where changes were made, the relatively newly developed arrangements 
are based on unilateral and opportunistic initiatives by management on an ad-hoc 
basis, which one-sidedly prioritise business needs and would appear to lead to the 
proliferation of organisation-specific arrangements that take the form of legislatively-
prompted voluntarism. In these circumstances, the ICE Regulations turn out to be a 
weak form of legislation that can hardly “neutralise market influence, promote 
     270 
Chapter 9: Discussion of the Research Findings and Empirical Evidence
universal rights or inhibit national idiosyncrasies” (Keller, 2002: p. 442; cited in 
Cressey, 2009: p. 158) and thus the “demise of voluntarism” is quite unlikely to 
happen at any time in the near future (Roche, 2005; cited in Doherty, 2008: p. 610). 
Nevertheless, in spite of this, the ICE Directive, over time, can bring harmony 
between the UK and other EU member states in relation to basic statutory rights on 
employee consultation. 
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CHAPTER TEN 

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
10.1 Initial Implications from the Implementation of the ICE 
Regulations 
The four case-studies, in this thesis, provide an insight into the influence of the ICE 
Regulations on the first threshold of organisations. Certainly, the legislation has 
brought an impetus for catalytic changes and action, but this has been predominantly 
evident in the non-unionised sector (as was originally envisaged by other researchers, 
such as: Gollan, 2005 and Pyman et al., 2006), and especially in those workplaces 
where there is a high reliance on direct forms of employee voice and well-structured 
forms of representation did not already exist. It appears that highly unionised 
organisations have superior arrangements already in place in comparison with the 
statutory provisions of the legislation, and therefore it is posited that in many cases 
the ICE Regulations can contribute little, if anything, to the contemporary needs of 
most organisations. 
From the optimistic point of view, the ICE Regulations can be considered a good 
starting point for gradual convergence towards the establishment of basic and standard 
information and consultation arrangements amongst the majority of workplaces in 
Great Britain. Moreover, it could be argued that the ICE Directive will prove to be the 
catalyst for achieving and providing for most of the employees in UK workplaces 
minimal information and consultation rights that are in harmony with the European 
employment policy. Furthermore, within the wider context of European industrial 
relations, this EU Directive could result in bringing consistency in relation to the 
establishment of minimum and standard social rights for workers amongst all EU 
members as well the formation of common forms of collective consultation. 
Nonetheless, the empirical findings of this thesis indicate that enforcement of joint-
decision making or even co-determination rights in British workplaces will only be 
possible through the enactment and transposition of further directives and regulations. 
Moreover, such developments cannot emerge at once, because the deeply embedded 
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voluntarism and contextual particularities, which characterise British employment 
relations, are major obstacles towards the process of harmonisation of the UK with the 
practices of EU employment policy. In concurrence with this perspective, Cressey 
(2009) states that “… a strong European space for worker participation cannot be 
created overnight…” (p. 158). 
From a theoretical point of view, the efficacy of the newly established information 
and consultation arrangements is reliant upon various parameters and circumstances, 
such as: the active involvement and stance of all the partners concerned. In 
accordance with much of the relevant literature, the case-study evidence reveals that 
there are few signs of sustainable and effective consultation arrangements in non-
unionised workplaces in the UK, because management initiatives are often pre-
emptive, being primarily based on unitarism, voluntarism or opportunism rather than 
on the principles of pluralism (Veale, 2005; Coupar and Stevens, 2005). That is, these 
initiatives are mainly based on organisational aspects, i.e. business performance or 
harsh decision-making (including collective redundancies), and they pay much less 
heed to other issues, such as: mutual trust and co-operative relations in workplaces. In 
this regard, Ramsey (1997) describes this as a strategy that is adopted by management 
in order to make employees more receptive to changes arising from economic and 
financial difficulties, by using structured arrangements of employee representation so 
as to give the impression that business decisions are being implemented in a fair and 
transparent manner. 
In this thesis, the case-study evidence indicates that the voluntarist and reflexive 
nature of the ICE Regulations, in many cases, is actually leading to the diffusion and 
development of tailor-made information and consultation arrangements that are based 
on ad hoc temporary business needs that are specific for each organisation. 
Furthermore, in concurrence with the academic literature, these arrangements are 
usually in the form of “pre-emptory agreements” (Geary and Roche, 2005: p. 192) or 
“pre-emptive agreements” (Doherty, 2008: p. 616) and they have the purpose of 
ensuring no more than a minimal compliance with the requirements of the legislation. 
As such, these developments are consistent with the framework of “legislatively 
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prompted voluntarism66”, which can be used to project what will be the likely 
implications of the ICE Regulations for most British workplaces, as posited by Hall 
and Terry (2004: p. 226). 
The relative absence of initiatives being taken by individual employees in the 
examined cases can be mainly attributed to their lack of: knowledge, training and 
expertise and these deficiencies have resulted in being able to exert just a minimal 
scope of influence in the drawing up of the Constitution Agreement documents. 
Moreover, the minimal thresholds for endorsing the request to negotiate an agreement 
proved to be a barrier for employees (as it is illustrated in the Manchester site of case-
study one), when having the desire to initiate the establishment of broad consultation 
arrangements. In this regard, when a threshold of 10 per cent of the workforce is 
reached, the employees will be able to trigger the procedures for the establishment of 
new information and consultation arrangements. Furthermore in this context, the 
attitude of union representatives emerged as being another parameter that is having an 
effect on the implications of the ICE Directive.  In addition, if there are pre-existing 
arrangements already in place, it is difficult for the employees to challenge them, 
because in such cases the threshold rises to 40 per cent, which is likely in the vast 
majority of scenarios to constitute an insurmountable barrier (Hall, 2006). In sum, it 
would appear that the thresholds built into the ICE Regulations are proving to be a 
barrier for the employees if they wish to endorse a request to challenge the 
establishment or modification of information and consultation arrangements, in 
particular because it has emerged that it is difficult for the employees to coordinate 
themselves so as to challenge pre-established employee voice arrangements.  
There is a conspicuous inadequacy in the contents of the legislation regarding the role 
of unionised employees, whose input is considered by some academics as crucial in 
the establishment of effective employee voice arrangements (Lorber, 2006). In 
addition, the case-study evidence shows that, to date, active involvement by unionised 
employees is also quite minimal, mainly because the current union-based 
arrangements have emerged as being superior to the provisions of the legislation in 
these cases. Thus, the union ambivalence or outright opposition towards the ICE 
66 Cited in several publications, e.g. Hall (2006: p. 457), Hall et al. (2007: p. 7; 2008: p. 7; 2009a: p. 1; 
2009b: p. 1), Butler (2009a: p. 199) and Dundon and Wilkinson (2009: p. 415).  
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Directive, can be put down to the unions wishing to defend their existing consultation 
and negotiation arrangements, rather than conceding to the indefinite and inferior 
agreements provided under the legislation. In this regard, Coupar and Stevens (2005) 
proved to be quite visionary when they highlighted the failure of current legislation to 
distinguish clearly between union and non-union employee representation in relation 
to negotiation and consultation arrangements: 
“…designating the boundaries between information, representative consultation and 
negotiation has been one of the most intractable questions about the regulations…” (p. 
51). 
This does not mean that the ICE Regulations have not drawn the attention of the trade 
unions, on the contrary, as it has been highlighted in chapter two, comprehensive 
guidelines and newsletters have been published for the benefit and interests of trade 
union members, in relation to the possible opportunities and pitfalls that the ICE 
Directive entails. In particular, a number of the trade union publications point out that 
where there is minority membership and no formal trade union recognition agreement, 
the legislation can provide a foothold for the unionised employees by which union 
representatives can be elected onto the consultative council. Furthermore, in unionised 
workplaces, “strong workplace representative structures” and “high membership 
levels” are considered essential prerequisites in order to sustain considerable “benefits 
for all stakeholders” (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002: p. 275). 
In general, the case-study evidence confirms the argument of many academics that the 
transposition of the ICE Directive may subsequently lead to the growing 
“proliferation” of multiple forms of employee representation that are developed for a 
range of purposes (Bercusson, 2002; Gollan and Wilkinson 2007b: p. 1149). In 
addition, according to ACAS guidance, “commitment” and “mutual trust” are 
considered to be essential for developing effective mechanisms of consultation, 
especially where newly-established arrangements operate (Dix and Oxenbridge, 2003: 
p. 73). Moreover, unless all the social partners are provided with equal influence in 
the progression of these arrangements, it is doubtful whether true and authentic forms 
of effective consultation and hence industrial democracy or social dialogue can really 
emerge across UK workplaces.  
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Up until now, the available evidence suggests that the implementation of the 
legislation has not proved to be “a radical development” (Hall, 2005b: p. 104) that 
can bring considerable changes to collective consultation in British workplaces. 
Writing about the broader context of industrial relations, Gold (1998) presciently 
supported the view that EU legislative initiatives could not bring a substantial 
“breakthrough into European-level collective bargaining” (p. 130) and that the 
establishment of consistent and convergent arrangements of information-sharing, 
consultation and negotiation across all EU countries could only be accomplished in a 
rather “slow and opportunistic” way (p. 131). It is also argued that within the current 
UK industrial relations context, the establishment of a sustainable “social dialogue” 
at the EU level will be hardly achieved (Gold et al., 2007: p. 9). With respect to this, 
the scepticism and strong reservations that were initially expressed about the 
“Europeanisation of industrial relations” (Keller, 2002: p. 441), when the EU 
Directive (2002/14/EC) was still in the stage of its early development, have proved to 
be essentially right, largely because of the “national differences in social policy” 
(Scharpf, 2002; cited in Milner, 2005: p. 107). 
Nevertheless, in this thesis, it has been concluded that it is still too early to draw 
reliable conclusions about the full potentialities of the ICE Regulations, for 
notwithstanding its limitations and constraints, the legislation provides opportunities 
for all the stakeholders to challenge and thereby enhance the levels of employee 
participation in British workplaces. Moreover, the acceptance of the legislation by the 
UK government represents a significant shift in the prevailing voluntarist context of 
British industrial relations, because it has led to the establishment, for the first time, of 
enforceable information and consultation arrangements that are in conjunction with 
EU employment policy. 
10.2 Epilogue and Synopsis 
The evidence from this research endeavour, along with the empirical findings of other 
academic researchers (e.g. Hall et al., 2009), highlights the fact that the different 
interests of corporate actors and/or social partners are proving to be a difficult hurdle 
that needs to be overcome, in order to sustain effective and consensual information 
and consultation arrangements. Even in cases where the provisions of the ICE 
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Regulations have been used to make substantial changes, the newly-established 
arrangements have evolved as a result of unilateral activities by management and they 
have been initiated on an ad hoc basis, in order to deal effectively with specific 
business issues and challenges. Moreover, the empirical findings of the thesis show 
that the provisions of the ICE Regulations do not allow much scope in relation to 
employees’ level of influence in decision-making, especially in non-unionised 
workplaces, which means that the employee representatives are unable to challenge 
management prerogative and thus they cannot change the power relationship with 
management representatives.  
Thus, the “barriers” (Brannen, 1983: p. 155) to the promotion of industrial 
democracy in UK workplaces remain strongly embedded. The reluctance of British 
policy-makers to changing this state of affairs can be seen in the UK government’s 
opting out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in summer 2007, which is considered 
by many academics as an essential part of the European social agenda (e.g. Follesdal 
et al., 2007). Therefore, unless a binding legislation, which can provide “…strict new 
models for social partnership and ‘co-decision-making’ or ‘joint-regulation’…” 
(Keller, 2002: p. 442), is enacted with the support of the government, British 
employment policy will still remain divergent from the principles of the European 
social dimension. However, it is to be hoped that the transposition of the EWC and 
ICE Directives can represent the first steps towards a convergence with regard to the 
aforementioned matter. In particular, these latest developments can form the catalyst 
for the enhancement of employee participation across the majority of British 
workplaces in the future (Carby-Hall, 2006).  
The case-study outcomes in this research suggest that it is too simplistic to argue that 
“the [ICE] Regulations have been a damp squib” (Hall, 2006: p. 471), because some 
of the developments are quite positive or even groundbreaking in some cases. This is 
particularly so in the non-unionised sector, where it has been revealed that the ICE 
Regulations are proving to act as a stimulus for developing homogeneity in the 
majority of British workplaces, in terms of basic and standardised structures of 
information-sharing and consultation arrangements. However, at present it is doubtful 
whether these arrangements can deliver effective forms of employee voice, as the 
case-study evidence has mainly shown that the consultative councils, which were set 
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up as result of the adoption of the ICE Directive, have strong features of pseudo-
consultation. In other words, although the ICE Regulations provide the opportunity 
for the establishment of structured information and consultation arrangements, they 
do not provide a consistent basis for employees to challenge management prerogative. 
Regarding the unionised sector and especially in those workplaces with high levels of 
union membership, the provisions of the legislation have proved to add little value, 
because the pre-existing employee voice arrangements appear to be more advanced 
than those guaranteed by the statutory rights of the ICE Directive. 
In general, Cressey (2009) presents three possible scenarios regarding the potential 
implications and subsequent developments that may arise through the implementation 
of the EU Directive on employee consultation (2002/14/EC). The first is the most 
optimistic and stems from the view that the ICE Regulations are a substantial part of a 
project that originated in the 1960s, which will eventually lead to the realisation of the 
“harmonisation of employee rights” (Cressey, 2009: p. 157) at the EU level. In other 
words, those adopting this perspective envisage that a “European industrial relations 
area” (ibid) is a reality that can subsequently lead to the Europeanisation of employee 
participation in Great Britain in accordance with the principles of the European social 
model. 
Under the second scenario, the potential positive outcomes of the ICE Directive are 
acknowledged, but there are also serious concerns about its capacity to deliver 
harmonisation of employee rights. These concerns originate from the complexities 
that characterise industrial relations at the EU level (Marchington, 2005; cited in 
Cressey, 2009: p. 157) in combination with the dominant traditions and idiosyncrasies 
of each European country (Keller, 2002). Consequently, it is argued that the 
Europeanisation of employee participation in Great Britain cannot take place instantly 
through the simple transposition of the EU directives on employee rights, because 
consistent principles of employee participation cannot be “imposed by fiat on 
heterogeneous national systems and actors” (ibid: p. 158). 
The third scenario is the most pessimistic in relation to the likelihood of there being 
positive outcomes from EU directives in terms of employee participation. Under this 
scenario, employee representation structures are considered to continue to rely heavily 
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on unilateral initiatives by employers. In this regard, Weinz (2006) claims that the EU 
directives on employee participation are part of “an old discredited pluralist agenda” 
(cited in Cressey, 2009: p. 158), which has resulted in employee voice arrangements, 
in the modern era, being strongly reliant upon what Sako (1998: p. 12) has termed as 
“employers’ goodwill”. In conclusion, Cressey (2009: p. 158) adopts “the more 
sceptical viewpoint”, which predominantly supports the third scenario, in that he 
contends that homogeneous arrangements of employee voice and participation are 
unlikely to be established across all EU countries and that the most plausible outcome 
is the development of a participation model that is “…functional, voluntary and 
unitarist in outlook…”, as it appears in the cases of the UK and Ireland. 
The case-study evidence appears to concur with the view that the most likely general 
outcome from the implementation of the EU Directive (2002/14/EC) will involve 
features from both the second and third scenarios. Nevertheless, from the optimistic 
perspective there are some grounds from the empirical findings for claiming that the 
ICE Directive is effectively initiating the process of harmonisation of basic and 
structured information and consultation arrangements between the UK and other EU 
countries. In this regard, it ensures a minimum-threshold level (Peccei et al., 2008: p. 
362) or floor of rights for establishing information and consultation arrangements as 
soon as organisations seek to comply with the legislative provisions. In addition, the 
empirical findings from the case-studies clearly indicate that, to date, the established 
information and consultation arrangements have been heavily reliant upon 
management initiative and the corporate objectives of organisations and there is little 
evidence of sustained employee influence on management decision-making. 
Moreover, as previously noted, the case-studies have provided a number of examples 
of structured organisation-specific information and consultation arrangements, which 
are functional and minimally comply with the requirements of legislation, whilst 
simultaneously maintaining their voluntary and unitarist features (Hall, 2006; Hall et 
al., 2009; Cressey, 2009). In sum, even though the general context of British industrial 
relations will most likely maintain its core features of voluntarism, it is evident that it 
can be modified, to some extent, owing to the statutory framework on employee rights 
that originates from the EU directives on employee participation and the principles of 
European employment policy. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, it is very 
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dubious whether employee voice arrangements in UK workplaces will be 
substantially altered in the near term future.  
10.3 Future Prospects and Further Research  
The case-study research of this thesis has provided key insights into the potential 
opportunities and limitations consequent upon the transposition of the ICE Directive 
into UK law, within three years of their initial implementation. Nevertheless, in order 
to have a more in-depth and consistent analysis of the opportunities and beneficial 
outcomes that this EU Directive can bring within the context of British industrial 
relations, more time needs to elapse. More specifically, in this regard, further 
comprehensive research will need to be undertaken in order to evaluate thoroughly the 
extent to which the ICE Regulations are playing a significant role in transforming 
employment relations by enhancing employee participation in UK workplaces. 
Moreover, in this thesis the acquired sample of the case-studies only includes 
organisations within the first threshold, i.e. workplace sites with at least 150 
employees, while the lower thresholds coming under the more recent phases of the 
implementation of the ICE Regulations, in 2007 and 2008, do not fall within the time-
frame and objectives of the empirical research. As it has been already mentioned in 
chapters one and two, the two subsequent phases are currently being addressed by the 
BERR research project67 (Hall et al., 2007, 2008 and 2009), which is employing 
longitudinal case-study research, constituting the first thorough investigation into the 
full implications of the ICE Regulations that covers all the stages of the phased 
implementation. Early results report that there are “considerable similarities” 
regarding consultative councils across medium-sized (i.e. with at least 100 
employees) and large organisations (Hall et al., 2008: p. 1). Nevertheless, there are 
also some notable differences, such as: less formality in terms of employee relations, 
“lower incidence of contested elections for employee representatives” and “fewer 
‘strategic’ issues being tabled for discussion by management” (ibid) in the medium-
sized organisations. Furthermore, employee representatives in such organisations tend 
to receive a “greater recognition of their role” by their colleagues, when compared 
67 The Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) was created in June 2007, 
after the disbanding of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). In June 2009, BERR was 
disbanded and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) was subsequently created.  
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with “their counterparts in the larger organisations” (ibid). The provisional 
empirical evidence, regarding the lowest threshold number of employees, reveals that 
the information and consultation arrangements were established by “internal 
employment relations/company considerations and key individual managers rather 
than by external factors or the experience of major change” and thus, the impact of 
the ICE Regulations has been minimal or “slight” in many of these case-study 
organisations (Hall et al., 2009b: p. vii). 
Nevertheless, further longitudinal research is required, because given the slow pace of 
changes in most British workplaces, it is most likely that many companies have yet to 
take the appropriate action so as to comply with the provisions of the ICE Regulations 
and thus only future investigation and in-depth case-study research will fully capture 
their impact on UK industrial relations. Moreover, once there is a clearer 
understanding of how the context of employee participation has changed in response 
to the ICE Directive, comparative studies with other EU member states will prove 
prolific in assessing the degree to which there is convergence or Europeanisation 
across the countries concerned. In other words, such research endeavours would 
identify the extent to which employee voice, social partnership and workplace 
democratisation within the context of British industrial relations are conforming to the 
norms found in other EU countries, when it comes to issues relating to employee 
rights (e.g. co-determination rights), such as: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden. From the quantitative research perspective, 
further survey research is necessary in order to evaluate the impact of the legislation 
on various organisational aspects, such as the: employment relations climate, 
perceived benefits to stakeholders and social partners, levels of employee 
commitment and organisational productivity and performance (Peccei et al., 2007 and 
2008; Cox et al., 2007). In this context, the forthcoming WERS analysis, apart from 
revealing the current UK industrial relations environment, will also provide the 
foundation for more in depth research on the issues discussed above.  
Finally, it would appear from the research outcomes that the ICE Directive may have 
a greater impact in smaller organisations, because they tend to have less formalised 
types of employee representation. That is, the ICE Regulations may force changes on 
relatively small or medium-sized companies, which previously “have often by-passed 
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or ignored employment rights” (Wilkinson, 1999; Wilkinson et al., 2007: p. 1280). 
Thus, once the potential implications of the ICE Regulations become more notable in 
small or medium-sized companies, comparative investigation and research across 
different organisations from each of the three thresholds will be useful for eliciting 
whether or not employees in the smaller organisations have narrowed the gap, in 
terms of their consultation arrangements when compared with the larger 
organisations. 
     282 
Bibliography - References
BIBLIOGRAPHY - REFERENCES 

ACAS (2005) Information and Consultation: Good Practice Advice. ACAS Official 
Website, http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=383. 
Ackers, P., Marchington, M., Wilkinson, A., and Dundon, T. (2005) ‘Partnership and 
Voice, with or without Trade Unions: Changing UK Management Approaches to 
Organisational Participation’, in Stuart, M. and Martinez Lucio M. (eds.) Partnership 
and Modernisation in Employment Relations. Oxon and New York: Routledge, pp. 
23-45. 
Ackers, P., Marchington, M., Wilkinson, A., and Goodman, J. (1992) ‘The Use of 
Cycles? Explaining Employee Involvement in the 1990s’, Industrial Relations 
Journal, 23 (4): 268-283. 
Ackers, P., and Payne, J. (1998) ‘British Trade Unions and Social Partnership: 
Rhetoric, Reality and Strategy’, The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 9 (3): 529-550. 
AMICUS (2004) Information and Consultation at Work: An Amicus Guide for 
Members. 
Ashton, D., and Sung, J. (2002) High Performance Work Practices: A Comparative 
Analysis on Issues and Systems. Geneva: ILO. 
Bacon, N. (2003) ‘Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations’, in 
Ackers, P., and Wilkinson, A. (eds.) Understanding Work and Employment in 
Industrial Relations in Transition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 71-88. 
Bacon, N., and Storey, J. (2000) ‘New Employee Relations Strategies in Britain: 
Towards Individualism or Partnership?’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 38 
(3): 407-427. 
     283 
Bibliography - References
Baldry, C. (1994) ‘Convergence in Europe: A Matter of Perspective?’, Industrial 
Relations Journal, 25 (2): 96-102. 
Barnard, C., and Deakin, S. (2000) ‘In Search of Coherence: Social Policy, the Single 
Market and Fundamental Rights’, Industrial Relations Journal, 31 (4): 331-345. 
Beardwell, I. (1998) ‘Voices On’, People Management, 4 (11): 32-36. 
Beaumont, P. B. (1991) Change in Industrial Relations. London: Routledge. 
Beaumont, P. B., Fischbacher, M., Hunter, L., and Pate, J. (2005) ‘Explorations in 
Building Trust in Joint Consultation’, in Storey, J. (ed.) Adding Value through 
Information and Consultation. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan (in 
Association with The Open University Business School), pp. 89-105. 
Beaumont, P. B., and Hunter, L. C. (2003) Information and Consultation: From 
Compliance to Performance. London: CIPD. 
Beaumont, P. B., and Hunter, L. C. (2007) ‘The Process of Consultation: Responding 
to Challenge’, The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 18 (7): 
1228-1245. 
Benson, E. (2009) ‘Employment Protection’, in Gold, M. (ed.), Employment Policy in 
the European Union: Origins, Themes and Prospects. Hampshire (UK) and New 
York (USA): Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 93-118. 
Benson, J. (2000) ‘Employee Voice in Union and Non-union Australian Workplaces’, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 38 (3): 453-459. 
Bercusson, B. (1996) European Labour Law. London: Butterworths. 
Bercusson, B. (2002) ‘The European Social Model Comes to Britain’, Industrial Law 
Journal, 31(3): 209-244. 
     284 
Bibliography - References
Berg, B. L. (1989) Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, 2nd Edition. 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Blanpain, R. (1983) ‘Information and Consultation of Employees: A General 
Introduction’, in Blanpain, R., Blanquet, F., Herman, F., and Mouty, A. (eds.) The 
Vredeling Proposal: Information and Consultation of Employees in Multinational 
Enterprises. Kluwer, Deventer, The Netherlands, pp. 21-34. 
Blanpain, R., Blanquet, F., Herman, F., and Mouty, A. (1983) The Vredeling 
Proposal: Information and Consultation of Employees in Multinational Enterprises. 
Kluwer, Deventer, The Netherlands. 
Blinder, A. (1990) Paying for Productivity. New York: Brookings Institution. 
Blyton, P., and Turnbull, P. (2004) The Dynamics of Employee Relations, 
Management, Work and Organisations Series, 4th Edition. Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bonner, C., and Gollan, P. (2005) ‘A Bridge over Troubled Water: A Decade of 
Representation at South West Water’, Employee Relations, 27 (3): 238-258. 
Boxall, P., and Purcell, J. (2003) Strategy and Human Resource Management, 1st 
Edition. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Brannen, P. (1983) Authority and Participation in Industry. London: Batsford 
Academic and Educational Ltd. 
Bratton, J. (2007a) ‘Union-Management Relations’, in Bratton, J., and Gold, J. (eds.) 
Human Resource Management: Theory and Practice, 4th Edition. Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 401-439. 
Bratton, J. (2007b) ‘Employee Involvement and Relations’, in Bratton J., and Gold, J. 
(eds.) Human Resource Management: Theory and Practice, 4th Edition. Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 440-478.  
     285 
Bibliography - References
Brewster, C. (2007) ‘Comparative HRM: European Views and Perspectives’, The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 18 (5): 769-787. 
Brewster, C., Wood, G., Croucher, R., and Brookes, M. (2007a) ‘Are Works Councils 
and Joint Consultative Committees a Threat to Trade Unions? A Comparative 
Analysis’, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 28 (1): 49-77. 
Brewster, C., Croucher, R., Wood, G., and Brookes, M. (2007b) ‘Collective and 
Individual Voice: Convergence in Europe?’, The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 18 (7): 1246-1262. 
Broughton, A. (2005) ‘European Comparative Practice in Information and 
Consultation’, in Storey, J. (ed.) Adding Value Through Information and 
Consultation. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan (in Association with 
The Open University Business School), pp. 200-218. 
Brown, R. K. (1988) ‘The Employment Relationship in Sociological Theory’, in 
Gallie, D. (ed.) Employment in Britain. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 33-66. 
Brown, W. (1981) The Changing Contours of British Industrial Relations: A Survey 
of Manufacturing Industry. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Brown, W., and Nash, D. (2008) ‘What has been Happening to Collective Bargaining 
under New Labour? Interpreting WERS 2004’, Industrial Relations Journal, 39 (2): 
91-103. 
Bulletin of the European Communities (1975) Employee Participation and Company 
Structure in the European Community, Supplement 8/75. European Communities 
Commission,  
Bullock A. (Lord) (1977) Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Industrial 
Democracy. London: HMSO, CMND 6706. 
     286 
Bibliography - References
Butler, P. (2005) ‘Non-union Employee Representation: Exploring the Efficacy of the 
Voice Process’, Employee Relations, 27 (3): 272-288. 
Butler, P. (2009a) ‘Non-union Employee Representation: Exploring the Riddle of 
Managerial Strategy’, Industrial Relations Journal, 40 (3): 198-214. 
Butler P. (2009b) ‘Riding Along on the Crest of a Wave: Tracking the Shifting 
Rationale for Non-Union Consultation at FinanceCo’, Human Resource Management 
Journal, 19 (2): 176-193. 
Carby-Hall, J. R. (2006) ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
– The Social Dimension’, Managerial Law, 48 (4): 430-446. 
Carley, M., and Hall, M. (2008) ‘Impact of the Information and Consultation 
Directive on Industrial Relations’, European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions, Institution: SPIRE Associates/IRRU (University of 
Warwick), ID: TN0710029S, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn0710029s/tn0710029s.htm 
Casey, B., and Gold, M. (2000) Social Partnership and Economic Performance: The 
Case of Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Casey, H., and Gold, M. (2005) ‘Peer Review of Labour Market Programmes in the

European Union: What Can Countries Really Learn from One Another?’, Journal of 

European Public Policy, 12 (1): 24-43. 

CBI (2006) Employment Trends Survey, September 2006. London: Confederation of 

British Industry.  

CHA (2005) A Little More Conversation: Employee Communications Approaches 

and Their Impact, ‘A CHA Report’ (The Workplace Communications Consultancy). 

London: Autumn.  

http://zookri.com/Portals/6/reports/A%20little%20more.pdf 

     287 
Bibliography - References
Charlwood, A., and Terry, M. (2007) ‘21st-Century Models of Employee 

Representation: Structures, Processes and Outcomes’, Industrial Relations Journal, 

38 (4): 320-337. 

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2007/C 303/01) ‘Notices from 

European Union Institutions and Bodies’, Official Journal of the European Union, 

(European Parliament, Council and Commission), 14th December 2007, Official 

website: 

(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:SOM:EN:HTML). 

CIPD (2004) A Guide to Meaningful Information and Consultation. Published by the

‘Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development’, London: CIPD, Official Website: 

(http://www.cipd.co.uk/subjects/empreltns/comconslt/infoconsultguid.htm). 

Clegg, H. A. (1970) The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Clegg, H. A. (1979) The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Coats, D. (2003) What Next for Unions? London: Union 21. 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) (2004) Employers’ Guide to the Law on 
Informing and Consulting Employees. London: Confederation of British Industry. 
Coriat, B. (2002) Employee Participation and Organisational Change in European 
Firms: Evidence from a Comparative Overview of Ten EU Countries. CEPN-IIDE 
Research Unit 7115, University of Paris. 
Coupar, W., and Stevens, R. (2005) ‘The IPA Perspective’, in Storey, J. (ed.) Adding 
Value through Information and Consultation. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan (in Association with The Open University Business School), pp. 38-56. 
     288 
Bibliography - References
Cox, A., Marchington, M., and Suter, J. (2007) ‘Embedding the Provision of 
Information and Consultation in the Workplace: A Longitudinal Analysis of 
Employee Outcomes in 1998 and 2004’, Employment Relations Research Series No. 
72, DTI (in collaboration with EMAR), WERS 2004 Grants Fund, February 2007. 
Cox, A., Zagelmeyer, S., and Marchington, M. (2006) ‘Embedding Employee 
Involvement and Participation at Work’, Human Resource Management Journal, 16 
(3): 250-267. 
Cressey, P. (1993) ‘Employee Participation’, in Gold, M. (ed.) The Social Dimension: 
Employment Policy in the European Community. Hampshire and London: Macmillan 
Publishers, pp. 85-104. 
Cressey, P. (1998) ‘European Works Councils in Practice’, Human Resource 
Management Journal, 8 (1): 67-79. 
Cressey, P. (2009) ‘Employee Participation’, in Gold, M. (ed.), Employment Policy in 
the European Union: Origins, Themes and Prospects. Hampshire (UK) and New 
York (USA): Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 139-159. 
Cressey, P., Eldridge, J. E. T., and MacInnes, J. (1985) Just Managing: Authority and 
Democracy in Industry. Milton Keynes and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 
Printed by Alden Press, Oxford, Great Britain. 
Cressey, P., Eldridge, J. E. T., Norris, G., and MacInnes, J. (1981) ‘Industrial 
Democracy and Participation: A Scottish Survey’, Department of Employment 
Research no. 28, November. 
Creswell, J. W. (1994) Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Crouch, C. (1993) ‘A New Anglo-German Industrial Relations Agenda’, Paper 
Presented at a Workshop Organised by the Anglo-German Foundation, Berlin: 17-18 
July. 
     289 
Bibliography - References
Cully, M., Woodland, S., O’Reily, A., and Dix, G. (1999) Britain at Work - As 
Depicted by the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey. London: Routledge. 
D’Art, D., and Turner, T. (2005) ‘Union Recognition and Partnership at Work: A 
New Legitimacy for Irish Trade Unions?’, Journal of Industrial Relations, 36 (2): 
121-139. 
Daniel, W. W., and Millward, N. (1983) Workplace Industrial Relations in Britain: 
The DE/PSI/SSRC Survey. London: Heinemann.  
Davies, P. (1994) ‘A Challenge to Single Channel?’, Cases: C-382/92 and C-383/93, 
Commission v United Kingdom, Industrial Law Journal, 23 (3): 272-285. 
Davies, P., and Kilpatrick, C. (2004) ‘UK Worker Representation after Single 
Channel’, Industrial Law Journal, 33 (2): 121-151. 
Deakin, S., and Koukiadaki, A. (2007) ‘The Capability Approach and the Reception 
of European Social Policy in the UK: The Case of the Information and Consultation 
of Employees Directive’, Final Report, Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge, September 2007. 
Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.) (1994) Handbook of Qualitative Research. 
London: Sage Publications. 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (1996) Redundancy Consultation and 
Notification. PL 833 (rev 3). 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (1998a) Employees’ Information and 
Consultation Rights on Transfers of Undertakings and Collective Redundancies. 
Public Consultation Document URN 97/988. 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (1998b) Fairness at Work. London: HMSO. 
     290 
Bibliography - References
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2002) High Performance Workplaces: The 
Role of Employee Involvement in a Modern Economy. A Discussion Paper, July 2002. 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2003a) High Performance Workplace – 
Informing and Consulting Employees. URN 03/831. 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2003b) Trade Union Membership. Office 
for National Statistics, London: DTI. 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2006) The Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations 2004. DTI Guidance (January 2006), Official Website: 
(http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file25934.pdf).  
Dickens, L., and Hall, M. (2003) ‘Labour Law and Industrial Relations: A New 
Settlement’, in Edwards, P. (ed.) Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice, 2nd 
Edition. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 124-156. 
Dietz, G., and Fortin, M. (2007) ‘Trust and Justice in the Formation of Joint 
Consultative Committees’, The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 18 (7): 1159-1181. 
Directive (2002/14/EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council (11 March 
2002): ‘Establishing a General Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees 
in the European Community’, Official Journal of the European Communities, 
Published on 23rd March 2002, L80/29-L80/33. 
Dix, G., and Oxenbridge, S. (2003) Information and Consultation at Work: From 
Challenges to Good Practice. London: Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS). 
Docksey, C. (1986) ‘Information and Consultation of Employees: The United 
Kingdom and the Vredeling Directive’, The Modern Law Review, 49 (3): 281-313. 
     291 
Bibliography - References
Doherty, M. (2008) ‘Hard Law, Soft Edge? Information, Consultation and 
Partnership’, Employee Relations, 30 (6): 608-622. 
Dukes, R. (2007) ‘The ICE Regulations: Pre-Existing Arrangements and Standard 
Provisions: A Warning to Employers (Recent Cases – Commentary)’, Industrial Law 
Journal, 36 (3): 329-340. 
Dundon, T., Curran, D., Maloney, M., and Ryan, P. (2003) Organisational Change 
and Employee Information and Consultation. Centre for Innovation and Structural 
Change (CISC), National University of Ireland, Galway, CISC Working Paper No 12, 
August 2003. 
Dundon, T., Curran, D., Ryan, P., and Maloney, M. (2006) ‘Conceptualising the 
Dynamics of Employee Information and Consultation: Evidence from the Republic of 
Ireland’, Industrial Relations Journal, 37 (5): 492-512. 
Dundon, T., and Gollan, P. J. (2007) ‘Re-conceptualising Voice in the Non-union 
Workplace’, The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 18 (7): 
1182-1198. 
Dundon, T., and Rollinson, D. (2004) Employment Relations in Non-union Firms. 
London: Routledge. 
Dundon, T., and Wilkinson, A. (2009) ‘Employee Participation’, in Redman, T., and 
Wilkinson, A. (eds.) Contemporary Human Resource Management. Essex (England, 
UK): FT Prentice Hall, Pearson Education, pp. 405-425. 
Dundon, T., Wilkinson, A., Marchington, M., and Ackers, P. (2004) ‘The Meanings 
and Purpose of Employee Voice’, The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 15 (6): 1149-1170. 
Dundon, T., Wilkinson, A., Marchington, M., and Ackers, P. (2005) ‘The 
Management of Voice in Non-Union Organisations: The Managers’ Perspective’, 
Employee Relations, 27 (3): 307-319. 
     292 
Bibliography - References
Ebbinghaus, B. (1999) ‘Does a European Social Model Exist and Can it Survive?’, in 
Huemer, G., Mesch, M., and Traxler, F. (eds.) The Role of Employers, Associations 
and Labour Unions in the EMU. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 1-26. 
EC (European Commission) (1988) ‘The Social Dimension of the Internal Market’, 
Interservice Working Party, SEC (88) 99. 
Edwards, P. K. (1992) ‘Industrial Conflict: Themes and Issues in Recent Research’, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 30 (3): 361-404. 
Edwards, P., Edwards, T., Ferner, A., Marginson, P., and Tregaskis, O., with Adam, 
D., and Meyer, M. (2007) ‘Employment Practices of MNCs in Organisational 
Context: A Large-Scale Survey’, Report of Main Survey, De Montfort University, 
King’s College London, and Warwick Business School, June 2007. 
Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF) (2005) Information and Consultation: A 
Practical Guide to the Law. London: Engineering Employers’ Federation. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) ‘Building Theories from Case-Study Research’, Academy of 
Management Review, 14 (4): 532-550. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
European Commission (2002) Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 March 2002 - Establishing a General Framework for Informing 
and Consulting Employees in the European Community, Joint Declaration of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Employee Representation. 
EWCB (2002) ‘Final Approval Given to EU Consultation Directive’, European 
Works Councils Bulletin, no. 38, pp. 4-6. 
     293 
Bibliography - References
Ewing, K. D. (2003) ‘Labour Law and Industrial Relations’, in Ackers, P., and 
Wilkinson, A. (eds.) Understanding Work and Employment: Industrial Relations in 
Transition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 138-160. 
Ewing, K. D., and Truter, G. M. (2005) ‘The Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations: Voluntarism’s Bitter Legacy’, The Modern Law Review, 68 
(4): 626-641. 
Farnham, D. (2000) Employee Relations in Context, 2nd Edition. London: CIPD. 
Farnham, D., and Pimlott, J. (1995) Understanding Industrial Relations (Academic 
Business Practitioner), 5th Edition. London: Casell Publishers. 
Fetterman, D. (1989) Ethnography: Step by Step. London: Sage Publications. 
Forth, J., and Millward, N. (2002) The Growth of Direct Communication. London: 
CIPD. 
Follesdal A., Giorgi L., and Heuberger R. (2007) ‘Envisioning European Solidarity 
between Welfare Ideologies and the European Social Agenda’, Innovation: The 
European Journal of Social Science Research, 20 (1): 75-89. 
Foulkes, F. (1980) Personnel Policies in Large Non-union Companies. Englewood 
Cliffs (New Jersey, USA): Prentice-Hall. 
Fox, A. (1966) ‘Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations’, Royal Commission 
Research Paper No.3, London: HMSO. 
Freeman, R., and Medoff, J. (1984) What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books. 
Freeman, R. B., and Rogers, J. (1999) What Workers Want. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
     294 
Bibliography - References
Gall, G. (2004) ‘British Employer Resistance to Trade Union Recognition’, Human 
Resource Management Journal, 14 (2): 36-53. 
Geary, J., and Roche, W. (2003) ‘Workplace Partnership and the Displaced Activist 
Thesis’, Industrial Relations Journal, 34 (1): 32-51. 
Geary, J., and Roche, W. (2005) ‘The Future of Employee Information and 
Consultation in Ireland’, in Storey, J. (ed.) Adding Value through Information and 
Consultation. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan (in Association with 
The Open University Business School), pp. 170-199. 
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
Gennard J., and Judge, G. (2002) Employee Relations, 3rd Edition. London: CIPD. 
Gill, C., Gold, M., and Cressey, P. (1999) ‘Social Europe: National Initiatives and 
Responses’, Industrial Relations Journal, 30 (4): 313-329. 
Gilman, M., and Marginson, P. (2002) ‘Negotiating European Works Councils: 
Contours of Constrained Choice’, Industrial Relations Journal, 33 (1): 36-51. 
Gold, M. (1992) ‘Social Policy: The UK and Maastricht’, National Institute Economic 
Review, 139 (1): 95-103. 
Gold, M. (1993) ‘Overview of the Social Dimension’, in Gold, M. (ed.) The Social 
Dimension: Employment Policy in the European Community, 1st Edition. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 10-40. 
Gold, M. (1998) ‘Social Partnership at the EU Level: Initiatives, Problems and 
Implications for Member States’, in Hine, D., and Kassim, H. (eds.) Beyond the 
Market: The EU and National Social Policy, The State and the European Union 
Series. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 107-133. 
     295 
Bibliography - References
Gold, M. (2009) ‘Overview of EU Employment Policy’, in Gold, M. (ed.), 
Employment Policy in the European Union: Origins, Themes and Prospects. 
Hampshire (UK) and New York (USA): Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-26. 
Gold, M., Cressey, P., and Gill, C. (2000) ‘Employment, Employment, Employment: 
Is Europe Working?’, Industrial Relations Journal, 31 (4): 275-290. 
Gold. M., Cressey, P., and Leonard, E. (2007) ‘Whatever Happened to Social 
Dialogue? From Partnership to Managerialism in the EU Employment Agenda’, 
European Journal of Industrial Relations, 13 (7): 7-25. 
Gold, M., and Hall, M. (1990) ‘Legal Regulation and the Practice of Employee 
Participation in the European Community’, Dublin: European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
Gold, M., and Hall, M. (1994) ‘Statutory European Works Councils: The Final 
Countdown?’, Industrial Relations Journal, 25 (3): 177-186. 
Gold, M., and Schwimbersky, S. (2008) ‘The European Company Statute: 
Implications for Industrial Relations in the European Union’, European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 14 (1): 49-67. 
Gollan, P. J. (2000) ‘Non-Union Forms of Employee Representation in the United 
Kingdom and Australia’, in Kaufman, B. E., and Taras, D. G., (eds.) Non-Union 
Employee Representation: History, Contemporary Practice, and Policy. Armonk, 
New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 410-449. 
Gollan, P. J. (2002) ‘So what’s the News? Management Strategies towards Non-union 
Employee Representation at News International’, Industrial Relations Journal, 33 (4): 
316-331. 
Gollan, P. J. (2003) ‘All Talk but No Voice – Employee Voice at the Eurotunnel Call 
Centre’, Economic and Industrial Democracy Journal, 24 (4): 509-541. 
     296 
Bibliography - References
Gollan, P. J. (2005) ‘Silent Voices: Representation at the Eurotunnel Call Centre’, 
Employee Relations, 34 (4): 423-450. 
Gollan, P. J. (2006a) ‘Editorial: Consultation and non-union Employee 
Representation’, Industrial Relations Journal, 37 (5): 428-437. 
Gollan, P. J. (2006b) ‘Twin Tracks – Employee Representation at Eurotunnel 
Revisited’, Industrial Relations, 45 (4): 606-649. 
Gollan, P. J., and Perkins, S. J. (2007) ‘Conference Review - Voice and Value: 
Dilemmas of Workforce “Incorporation”? (Themes Emerging at a Conference Held at 
the London School of Economics on 31 March 2006)’, Human Resource Management 
Journal, 17 (1): 94-96. 
Gollan, P. J., and Perkins, S. J. (2009) ‘Conference Review – Voice and Value: 
Pandora’s ICE Box and Big Ideas Around Employer Branding (Themes Emerging at a 
Conference Held at the London School of Economics on 9 March 2007 and 14 March 
2008)’, Human Resource Management Journal, 19 (2): 211-215. 
Gollan, P. J., Poutsma, E., and Veersma, U. (2006) ‘Editors’ Introduction: New Roads 
in Organisational Participation?’, Industrial Relations, 45 (4): 499-512. 
Gollan, P. J., and Wilkinson, A. (2007a) ‘Contemporary Developments in Information 
and Consultation’, The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 18 
(7): 1133-1144. 
Gollan, P. J., and Wilkinson, A. (2007b) ‘Implications of the EU Information and 
Consultation Directive and the Regulations in the UK – Prospects for the Future of 
Employee Representation’, The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 18 (7): 1145-1158. 
Goodman, J., Earnshaw, J., Marchington, M., and Harrison, R. (1998) ‘Unfair 
Dismissal Cases, Disciplinary Procedures, Recruitment Methods and Management 
Style’, Employee Relations, 20 (6): 536-550. 
     297 
Bibliography - References
Gordon-Brown, I. (1972) Participation in Industry. Publisher: Industrial Co-
Partnership Association. 
Gospel, H., Lockwood, G., and Willman, P. (2003) ‘A British Dilemma: Disclosure of 
Information for Collective Bargaining and Joint Consultation’, Comparative Labour 
Law and Policy Journal, 22 (2): 101-123. 
Gospel, H., and Willman, P. (2003) ‘Dilemmas in Worker Representation – 
Information, Consultation, and Negotiation’, in Gospel, H., and Wood, S. (eds.) 
Representing Workers: Trade Union Recognition and Membership in Britain. 
London: Routledge, pp. 144-165. 
Gospel, H., and Willman, P. (2005) ‘Changing Patterns of Employee Voice’, in 
Storey, J. (ed.) Adding Value through Information and Consultation. Hampshire and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan (in Association with The Open University Business 
School), pp. 126-158. 
Grahl, J., and Teague, P. (1997) ‘Is the European Social Model Fragmenting?’, New 
Political Economy, 2 (3): 405-426. 
Grainger, H., and Holt, H. (2005) Trade Union Membership 2005. London: DTI. 
Guest, D., and Peccei, R. (1998) The Partnership Company: Benchmarks for the 
Future. London: Involvement and Participation Association. 
Gunningle, P., Heraty, N., and Morley, M. (2002) Human Resource Management in 
Ireland, 2nd Edition. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. 
Hakim, C. (1992) Research Design: Strategies and Choices in the Design of Social 
Research. London: Routledge. 
Hall, M. (1992) ‘Behind the European Works Councils Directive: The European 
Commission’s Legislative Strategy’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 30 (4): 
547-566. 
     298 
Bibliography - References
Hall, M. (2003) ‘Draft Information and Consultation Legislation Published’, 
European Industrial Relations Observatory, 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu/int/2003/07/feature/uk0307106f.html 
Hall, M. (2004) ‘Anticipating the Information and Consultation Regulations: 
Evidence from Four Companies’, Paper Presented at British Universities Industrial 
Relations Association Annual Conference. 
Hall, M. (2005a) ‘How are Employers and Unions Responding to the Information and 
Consultation of Employees Regulations?’, Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations, 
Number 77, Industrial Relations Research Unit (IRRU), Warwick Business School, 
University of Warwick, Coventry, England, UK. 
Hall, M. (2005b) ‘Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations’, Industrial Law Journal, 34 (2): 103-126. 
Hall, M. (2005c) ‘Using a Multi-level Consultation Framework: The Case of B&Q’, 
in Storey, J. (ed.) Adding Value through Information and Consultation. Hampshire 
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan (in association with The Open University 
Business School), pp. 240-253. 
Hall, M. (2006) ‘A Cool Response to the ICE Regulations? Employer and Trade 
Union Approaches to the New Legal Framework for Information and Consultation’, 
Industrial Relations Journal, 37 (5): 456-472. 
Hall, M., Broughton, A., Carley, M., and Sisson, K. (2002) Work Councils for the 
UK? Assessing the Impact of the EU Employee Consultation Directive. London: 
IRS/IRRU. 
Hall, M., Carley, M., Gold, M., Marginson, P., and Sisson, K. (1995) European 
Works Councils: Planning for the Directive. London: IRS. 
Hall, M., Hutchinson, S., Parker, J., Purcell, J., and Terry, M. (2007) ‘Implementing 
Information and Consultation: Early Experience under the ICE Regulations’, 
     299 
Bibliography - References
Employment Relations Research Series No. 88, Department for Business Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform (in Partnership with ACAS and CIPD), September 2007. 
Hall, M., Hutchison, S., Parker, J., Purcell, J., and Terry, M. (2008) ‘Implementing 
Information and Consultation in Medium-Sized Organisations’, Employment 
Relations Research Series No. 97, Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (in Partnership with ACAS and CIPD), September 2008. 
Hall, M., Hutchison, S., Purcell, J., Terry, M., and Parker, J. (2009a) ‘Implementing 
Information and Consultation: Evidence from Longitudinal Case Studies in 
Organisations with 150 or More Employees’, Employment Relations Research Series 
No. 105, Department for Business Innovation and Skills (in Partnership with ACAS 
and CIPD), December 2009. 
Hall, M., Hutchison, S., Purcell, J., Terry, M., and Parker, J. (2009b) ‘Implementing 
Information and Consultation: Developments in Medium-Sized Organisations’, 
Employment Relations Research Series No. 106, Department for Business Innovation 
and Skills (in Partnership with ACAS and CIPD), December 2009. 
Hall, M., and Marginson, P. (2005) ‘Trojan Horses or Paper Tigers? Assessing the 
Significance of European Works Councils’, in Harley, B., Hyman, J., and Thompson, 
P. (eds.) Participation and Democracy at Work: Essays in Honour of Harvie Ramsay. 
Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 204-221.  
Hall, M., and Terry, M. (2004) “The Emerging System of Statutory Worker 
Representation”, in Healy G., Heery E., Taylor P., and Brown W. (eds.) The Future of 
Worker Representation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 207-228. 
Hall, P. A., and Soskice, D. (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harcourt, M., Wood, G., and Harcourt, S. (2004) ‘Do Unions Affect Employer 
Compliance with the Law?’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 42 (3): 527-541. 
     300 
Bibliography - References
Hardy, S., and Adnett, N. (2006) ‘Breaking the ICE: Workplace Democracy in a 
Modernised Social Europe’, The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 17 (6): 1021-1031. 
Harney, B., and Dundon, T. (2006) ‘Capturing Complexity: Developing an Integrated 
Approach to Analysing HRM in SMEs’, Human Resource Management Journal, 16 
(1): 48-73. 
Hartley, J. F. (1994) ‘Case-studies in Organisational Research’, in Cassell, C., and 
Symon, G. (eds.) Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research: A Practical 
Guide. London: Sage Publications, pp. 208-226. 
Haynes, P., and Allen, M. (2001) ‘Partnership as a Union Strategy: A Preliminary 
Evaluation’, Employee Relations, 23 (2): 164-187. 
Heery, E. (2002) ‘Partnership versus Organising: Alternative Futures for British Trade 
Unionism’, Industrial Relations Journal, 33 (1): 20-35. 
Heery, E., Healy, G., and Taylor, P. (2004) ‘Representation at Work: Themes and 
Issues’, in Healy, G., Heery, E., Taylor, P., and Brown, W. (eds.) The Future of 
Worker Representation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-36. 
Higgins, P., and Croucher, R. (2008) ‘Employment Relations’, in Muller-Camen, M., 
Croucher, R., and Leigh, S. (eds.) Human Resource Management: A Case-Study 
Approach. London: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, pp. 317-337. 
HMSO (1989) People and Companies: Employee Involvement in Britain. UK 
Government Publication, Technical Communications Publishing Ltd. 
Hofstede, G. (2001) Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviours, 
Institutions, and Organisations Across Nations, 2nd Edition. Thousand Oaks, Sage 
Publications. 
     301 
Bibliography - References
Hope-Hailey, V., Farndale, E., and Truss, C. (2005) ‘The HR Department’s Role in 
Organisational Performance’, Human Resource Management Journal, 15 (3): 49-66. 
House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., and Gupta, V. (2004) 
Culture, Leadership and Organisations: the GLOBE Study of 62 Societies. New York 
(USA): Sage Publications. 
Houses of Parliament (2004) The Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations. London: Houses of Parliament.  
Hussey, J., and Hussey, R. (1997) Business Research: A Practical Guide for the 
Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students. Hampshire (England, UK): Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Hyman, R. (1987) ‘Strategy or Structure? Capital, Labour and Control’, Work, 
Employment and Society, 1 (1): 25-55. 
Hyman, R. (2003) ‘The Historical Evolution of British Industrial Relations’, in 
Edwards, P. (ed.) Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice, 2nd Edition. Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, pp. 37-57. 
Hyman, J., and Mason, R. (1995) Managing Employee Involvement and Participation. 
London: Sage Publications. 
Hyman, J., and Summers, J. (2007) ‘Work and Life: Can Employee Representation 
Influence Balance?’, Employee Relations, 29 (4): 367-384. 
IDS (2005) Information and Consultation Arrangements, IDS HR Study 790. London: 
Incomes Data Services. 
IELL (1980) International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations. 
Great Britain. 
     302 
Bibliography - References
Involvement and Participation Association (IPA) (1992) Towards Industrial 
Partnership: A New Approach to Relations at Work. London: IPA Publishing. 
Involvement and Participation Association (IPA) (2002) Towards the High 
Performance Workplace. London: IPA Publishing. 
IRS (2005) ‘High on the Agenda: Employee Information and Consultation’, IRS 
Employment Review, Volume 833, pp. 8-16. 
Jirjahn, U., and Smith, S. C. (2006) ‘What Factors Lead Management to Support or 
Oppose Employee Participation – With and Without Works Councils? Hypotheses 
and Evidence from Germany’, Industrial Relations, 45 (4): 650-680. 
Jones, B., and Cressey, P. (1995) ‘Introduction – “Europeanisation”: Motor or Mirage 
for Employment Systems’, in Cressey, P., and Jones, B. (eds.) Work and Employment 
in Europe: A New Convergence? Routledge Studies in the European Economy, 
London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1-27. 
Johhstone, S., Wilkinson, A., and Ackers, P. (2004) ‘Partnership Paradoxes: A Case-
Study of an Energy Company’, Employee Relations, 26 (4): 353-376. 
Kahn-Freund, O. (1959) ‘Labour Law’, in Ginsberg, M. (ed.) Law and Opinion in 
England in the 20th Century. London: Stevens, pp. 215-263. 
Kaufman, B. E. (2003) ‘The Organisation of Economic Activity: Insights From the 
Institutional Theory of John R. Commons’, Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organisation, 52 (1): 71-96. 
Keller, B. (2002) ‘The European Company Statute: Employee Involvement – and 
Beyond’, Industrial Relations Journal, 33 (5): 424-445. 
Keller, B., and Sorries, B. (1999) ‘The New European Social Dialogue: Old Wine in 
New Bottles?’, Journal of European Social Policy, 9 (2): 111-125 
     303 
Bibliography - References
Kelly, J. (1996) ‘Works Councils: Union Advance or Marginalisation?’, in McColgan, 
A. (ed.) The Future of Labour Law. London: Mansell, pp. 46-63. 
Kelly, J. (1998) Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilisation, Collectivism and Long 
Waves. London: Routledge. 
Kelly, J. (2005) ‘Social Partnership Agreements in Britain’, in M. Stuart and M. 
Martinez Lucio (eds.) Partnership and Modernisation in Employment Relations. 
London: Routledge, pp. 188-210. 
Kersley, B., Alpin, C., Forth, J., Bryson, A., Bewley, H., Dix, G., and Oxenbridge, S. 
(2006) Inside the Workplace: Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey. London and New York: Routledge. 
Kochan, T., Katz, H., and McKenzie, R. (1986) The Transformation of American 
Industrial Relations. New York: Basic Books. 
Kostova, T., and Roth, K. (2002) ‘Adoption of an Organisational Practice by 
Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations: Institutional and Relational Effects’, 
Academy of Management Journal, 45 (1): 215-233. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Labour Research Department (LRD) (1995) A Trade Unionist’s Guide to European 
Works Councils. London: Trade Union Congress. 
Labour Research Department (LRD) (2006) ‘Information and Consultation 
Regulations Make Their Mark’, Workplace Report, April 2006, pp. 15-17. 
Lamnek, S. (1988) Qualitative Sozialforschung. Band 1: Methodologie; Band 2: 
Methoden und Techniken. Munich (Germany): Psychologie Verlags Union. 
     304 
Bibliography - References
Linklaters (2005) Informing and Consulting: Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations 2004. London: Linklaters. 
Lloyd, C. (2001) ‘What do Employee Councils do? The Impact of Non-Union Forms 
of Representation on Trade Union Organisation’, Industrial Relations Journal, 32 (4): 
313-327. 
Lorber, P. (2003) ‘National Works Councils: Opening the Door on a Whole New Era 
in United Kingdom Employment Relations’, The International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 19 (3): 297-319. 
Lorber, P. (2006) ‘Implementing the Information and Consultation Directive in Great 
Britain: A New Voice at Work’, The International Journal of Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations, 22 (2): 231-258. 
Lourie, J. (1998) Fairness at Work. Cm 3968, Business and Transport Section, House 
of Commons Library, Research Paper 98/99, 17th November 1998, Official Website: 
(http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp98/rp98-099.pdf). 
Marchington, M. (1989) ‘Joint Consultation in Practice’, in Sisson, K. (ed.) Personnel 
Management in Britain. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 378-402. 
Marchington, M. (1994) ‘The Dynamics of Joint Consultation’, in Sisson, K. (ed.) 
Personnel Management in Britain, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 
662-693. 
Marchington, M. (2000) ‘Management-Union Partnerships in Britain: Who Gains 
What?’, Paper Presented at the Department of Management and Employment 
Relations Seminar Series, University of Auckland, New Zealand. 
Marchington, M. (2005) ‘Employee Involvement: Patterns and Explanations’, in 
Harley, B., Hyman, J., and Thompson, P. (eds.) Participation and Democracy at 
Work: Essays in Honour of Harvie Ramsay. Hampshire (UK) and New York (USA): 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 20-37. 
     305 
Bibliography - References
Marchington, M., and Armstrong, R. (1986) ‘The Nature of the New Joint 
Consultation’, Industrial Relations Journal, 17 (2): 158-170. 
Marchington, M., Goodman, J., and Berridge, J. (2004) ‘Employment Relations in 
Britain’, in Bamber, G. J., Lansbury, R. D., and Wailes, N. (eds.) International and 
Comparative Employment Relations: Globalisation and the Developed Market 
Economies, 4th Edition. Reprinted in 2005, London: Sage Publications, pp. 36-66. 
Marchington, M., Goodman, J., Wilkinson, A., and Ackers, P. (1992) New 
Developments in Employee Involvement. Employment Department Research Paper 
Series No 2, London: HMSO. 
Marchington, A., and Wilkinson, A. (2005a) Human Resource Management at Work: 
People Management and Development, 3rd Edition. London: Chartered Institute of 
Personnel and Development (CIPD). 
Marchington, A., and Wilkinson, A. (2005b) ‘Direct Participation and Involvement’, 
in Bach, S. (ed.) Managing Human Resources, 4th Edition. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, pp. 398-423. 
Marchington, M., Wilkinson, A., Ackers, P., and Dundon, T. (2001) Management 
Choice and Employee Voice. Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
Research Report, London: CIPD. 
Marginson, P., Gilman, M., Jacobi, O., and Krieger, H. (1998) ‘Negotiating European 
Works Councils: An Analysis of Agreements Under Article 13’, Report Prepared for 
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions and 
the European Commission, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities. 
Marginson, P., Hall, M., Hoffman, A., and Muller, T. (2004) ‘The Impact of European 
Works Councils on Management Decision-Making in UK and US-Based 
Multinationals: A Case Study Comparison’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
42 (2): 209-233. 
     306 
Bibliography - References
Marginson, P., and Sisson, K. (1994) ‘The Structure of Transnational Capital in 
Europe: The Emerging Euro-Company and its Implications for Industrial Relations’, 
in Hyman, R., and Ferner, A (eds.) New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 15-51. 
Marginson, P., and Sisson, K. (2004 & 2006) European Integration and Industrial 
Relations: Multi-level Governance in the Making. (Originally Published in 2004 and 
Re-printed in 2006), Hampshire (England, UK): Palgrave Macmillan. 
Marsden, D. (2007) ‘Individual Employee Voice: Renegotiation and Performance 
Management in Public Services’, The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 18 (7): 1263-1278. 
Marsh, A. (1979) Concise Encyclopaedia of Industrial Relations. Oxford and 
Westmead: Gower Press. 
Maylor, H., and Blackmon, K. (2005) Researching Business and Management. 
Hampshire (UK) and New York (USA): Palgrave Macmillan. 
McCabe, D., and Lewin, D. (1992) ‘Employee Voice: A Human Resource 
Management Perspective’, California Management Review, 34 (3): 112-123. 
McGlynn, C. (1995) ‘Recent Legislation - European Work Councils: Towards 
Industrial Democracy?’, Industrial Law Journal, 24 (1): 78-84. 
McKay, S., and Moore, S. (2004) ‘Union Recognition Agreements in the Shadow of 
the Law’, Industrial Law Journal, 33 (4): 374-376. 
Milner, S. (2001) ‘Globalisation and Employment in France: Between Flexibility and 
Protection?’, Modern and Contemporary France, 9 (3): 327-337. 
Milner, S. (2005) ‘Protection, Reform and Political Will: France and the European 
Social Model’, in Drake, H. (ed.) French Relations with the European Union. ‘Europe 
and the Nation State’ Series, New York (USA): Routledge, pp. 105-123.  
     307 
Bibliography - References
Millward, N., Bryson, A., and Forth, J. (2000) All Change at Work: British 
Employment Relations 1980-1998 as Portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey Series. London: Routledge. 
O’Kelly, K. P. (1995) ‘The Future of Employee Relations Within European 
Enterprises’, in Cressey, P., and Jones, B. (eds.) Work and Employment in Europe: A 
New Convergence? Routledge Studies in the European Economy, London and New 
York: Routledge, pp. 69-91. 
Oppenheim, A. N. (1992) Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude 
Measurement. London and Washington: Pinter. 
Oxenbridge, S., and Brown, W. (2002) ‘The Two Faces of Partnership? An 
Assessment of Partnership and Co-Operative Employer/Trade Union Relationships’, 
Employee Relations, 24 (3): 262-277. 
Oxenbridge, S., and Brown, W. (2004) ‘Achieving a New Equilibrium? The Stability 
of Cooperative Employer-Union Relationships’, Industrial Relations Journal, 35 (5): 
388-402. 
Pateman, C. (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge (England, UK): 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pateman, C. (1975) ‘A Contribution to the Political Theory of Organisational 
Democracy’, Administration and Society, 7 (1): 5-26. 
Pateman, C. (1983) ‘Some Reflections on Participation and Democratic Theory’, in 
Crouch, C., and Heller, F. A. (eds.) International Yearbook of Organisational 
Democracy for the Study of Participation, Co-operation and Power, Volume 1, 
Organisational Democracy and Political Processes. Chichester (England, UK): Wiley 
Publications. 
Peccei, P., Bewley, H., Gospel, H., and Willman, P. (2007) ‘Patterns of Information 
Disclosure and Joint Consultation in Great Britain – Determinants and Outcomes’, 
     308 
Bibliography - References
Employment Relations Research Series No. 73, DTI (in Collaboration with EMAR), 
WERS 2004 Grants Fund, February 2007. 
Peccei, R., Bewley, H., Gospel, H., and Willman, P. (2008) ‘Look Who’s Talking: 
Sources of Variation in Information Disclosure in the UK’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 46 (2): 340-366. 
Pendleton, A., and Deakin, S. (2007) ‘Corporate Governance and Workplace 
Employment Relations: The Potential of WERS 2004’, Industrial Relations Journal, 
38 (4): 338-355. 
Perrett, R. (2007) ‘Worker Voice in the Context of the Re-regulation of Employment: 
Employer Tactics and Statutory Union Recognition in the UK’, Work, Employment 
and Society, 21 (4): 617-634. 
Poole, M., and Mansfield, R. (1992) ‘Managers’ Attitudes to Human Resource 
Management: Rhetoric and Reality’, in Blyton, P., and Turnbull, P. (eds.) Reassessing 
Human Resource Management. London: Sage Publications, pp. 200-214. 
Provis, C. (1996) ‘Unitarism, Pluralism, Interests and Values’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 34 (4): 473-495. 
Purcell, J. (1991) ‘The Rediscovery of the Management Prerogative: The 
Management of Labour Relations in the 1980s’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 7 
(1): 33-43. 
Purcell, J. (1993) ‘The End of Institutional Industrial Relations’, Political Quarterly, 
64 (1): 6-23. 
Purcell, J. (1995) ‘Ideology and the End of Institutional Industrial Relations: Evidence 
from the UK’, in Crouch, C., and Traxler, F. (eds.) Organised Industrial Relations in 
Europe: What Future? Aldershot: Avebury, pp. 101-119. 
     309 
Bibliography - References
Purcell, J., and Ahlstrand, B. (1994) Human Resource Management in the Multi-
Divisional Company. Oxford (England, UK) and New York (USA): Oxford 
University Press. 
Purcell, J., Kinnie, N., Hutchinson, S., Rayton, B., and Swart, J. (2003) 
Understanding the People and Performance Link: Unlocking the Black Box. 
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development Research Report, London: CIPD 
Publishing. 
Pyman, A., Cooper, B., Teicher, J., and Holland, P. (2006) ‘A Comparison of the 
Effectiveness of Employee Voice Mechanisms in Australia’, Industrial Relations 
Journal, 37 (5): 543-559. 
Ramsey, H. E. (1977) ‘Cycles of Control: Worker Participation in Sociological and 
Historical Perspective’, Sociology, 11 (3): 481-506. 
Ramsey, H. E. (1980) ‘Phantom Participation: Patterns of Power and Conflict’, 
Industrial Relations Journal, 11 (3): 46-59. 
Ramsey, H. E. (1997) ‘Fools Gold? European Works Councils and Workplace 
Democracy’, Industrial Relations Journal, 28 (4): 314-322. 
Redfern, D. (2007) ‘An Analysis of the Role of European Works Councils in British 
Workplaces’, Employee Relations, 29 (3): 292-305. 
Regalia, I. (1995) Humanise Work and Increase Profitability? Direct Participation in 
Organisational Change Viewed by the Social Partners in Europe. Luxembourg: 
Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Rhodes, M. (1997) ‘The Welfare State: Internal Challenges, External Constraints’, in 
Rhodes, M., Heywood, P., and Wright, V. (eds.) Developments in West European 
Politics. Hampshire (England, UK): Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 57-74.  
     310 
Bibliography - References
Richardson, M., Danford, A., Stewart, P., and Pulignano, V. (2010) ‘Employee 
Participation and Involvement: Experiences of Aerospace and Automobile Workers in 
the UK and Italy’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 16 (1): 21-37. 
Riordan, C. M., Vandenberg, R. J., and Richardson, H. A. (2005) ‘Employee 
Involvement Climate and Organisational Effectiveness’, Human Resource 
Management, 44 (4): 471-488. 
Robson, C. (1993) Real World Research, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Roche, W. (1999) ‘In Search of Commitment-Orientated Human Resource 
Management Practices and the Conditions that Sustain Them’, Journal of 
Management Studies, 36 (5): 653-678. 
Roche, W. (2000) ‘The End of New Industrial Relations?’, European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 6 (3): 261-282. 
Rogers, J., and Streeck, W. (1995) ‘The Study of Works Councils: Concepts and 
Problems’, in Rogers, J., and Streeck, W. (eds.) Works Councils. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
Roper, I., Cunningham, I., and James, P. (2003) ‘Promoting Family-Friendly Policies: 
Is the Basis of the Government’s Ethical Standpoint Viable?’, Personnel Review, 32 
(2): 211-230. 
Rose, E. (2008) Employment Relations, 3rd Edition. Essex (England, UK): Financial 
Times - Prentice Hall. 
Sako, M. (1998) ‘The Nature and Impact of Employee “Voice” in the European Car 
Components Industry’, Human Resource Management Journal, 8 (2): 5-13. 
Sarantakos, S. (1998) Social Research, 2nd Edition. Hampshire (England, UK): 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
     311 
Bibliography - References
Scharpf, F. (2000) ‘The Viability of Advanced Welfare States in the International 
Economy: Vulnerabilities and Options’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7 (2): 
190-228. 
Scharpf, F. (2002) ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of 
Diversity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (4): 645-670. 
Schomann, I., Clauwaert, S., and Warneck, W. (2006) Information and Consultation 
in the European Community: Implementation Report of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
European Trade Union Institute for Research, Education, and Health and Safety 
(ETUI-REHS), Publisher: ETUI-REHS (Brussels, 2006). 
Scott, R. (2002) ‘The UK and the Information and Consultation Directive: 
Transposition or Transformation?’, BUIRA (London) Information and Consultation 
Seminar, 31st May, London. 
Scott, R., and Shore, A. (1979) Why Sociology Does Not Apply: A Study of the Use of 
Sociology in Public Policy. New York: Elsevier. 
Shackleton, K. (1996) ‘The Social Policy of the E.C.: Reporting Information to 
Employees, a UK Perspective Historical Analysis and Prognosis’, Estudos Do GEMF, 
No 5, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal. 
Silverman, D. (2001) Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text 
and Interaction, 2nd Edition. London (England, UK): Sage Publications. 
Sisson, K. (2002) ‘The Information and Consultation Directive: Unnecessary 
“Regulation” or an Opportunity to Promote “Partnership”?’, Warwick Papers in 
Industrial Relations, No: 67, Industrial Relations Research Unit (IRRU), Warwick 
Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, England, UK. 
Sisson, K. (2005) ‘Personnel Management and European Integration: A Case of 
Indelible Imprint?’, in Bach, S. (ed.) Managing Human Resources, 4th Edition. Oxford 
(England, UK): Blackwell Publishing, pp. 45-67. 
     312 
Bibliography - References
Sisson, M., and Marginson, P. (2003) ‘Management: Systems, Structures and 
Strategy’, in Edwards, P. (ed.) Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice, 2nd Edition. 
Oxford (England, UK): Blackwell Publishing, pp. 157-188. 
Smith, J. K. (1983) ‘Quantitative Versus Qualitative Research: An Attempt to 
Classify the Issue’, Educational Researcher, 12 (3): 6-13. 
Smith, P., and Morton, G. (2001) ‘New Labour’s Reform of Britain’s Employment 
Law: The Devil is not in the Detail but in the Values and Policy Too’, British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 39 (1): 119-138. 
Stebbins, R. A. (1992) ‘Concatenated Exploration: Notes on a Neglected Type of 
Longitudinal Research’, Quality and Quantity, 26 (4): 435-442. 
Stirling, J., and Tully, B. (2004) ‘Power, Process, and Practice: Communications in 
European Works Councils’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 10 (1): 73-89. 
Storey, J. (1992) Developments in the Management of Human Resources, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Storey, J. (2005) ‘Employee Information and Consultation: An Overview of Theory 
and Practice’, in Storey, J. (ed.) Adding Value through Information and Consultation. 
Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan (in Association with The Open 
University Business School), pp. 2-18. 
Streeck, W. (1997) ‘Citizenship under Regime Competition: The Case of the 
European Works Councils’, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Volume 1, 
no 005, Date of Publication in the EIOP: 10th April 1997, Online Source: 
(http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-005a.htm). 
Stuart, M., and Martinez-Lucio, M. (2005) ‘Partnership and Modernisation in 
Employment Relations: An Introduction’, in Stuart, M., and Martinez-Lucio, M. 
(eds.) Partnership and Modernisation in Employment Relations. London: Routledge, 
pp. 1-22. 
     313 
Bibliography - References
Supiot, A. (2000) ‘The Dogmatic Foundations of the Market’, Industrial Law Journal, 
29 (4): 321-346 
Tailby, S., Richardson, M., Upchurch, M., Danford, A., and Stewart, P. (2007) 
‘Partnership with and without Trade Unions in the UK Financial Services: Filling or 
Fuelling the Representation Gap?’, Industrial Relations Journal, 38 (3): 210-228. 
Tailby, S., and Winchester, D. (2005) ‘Management and Trade Unions: Partnership at 
Work?’, in Bach, S. (ed.) Managing Human Resources, 4th Edition. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, pp. 424-451. 
Taras, D. G. (2000) ‘Portrait of Non-Union Employee Representation in Canada: 
History, Law and Contemporary Plans’, in Kaufman B., and Taras, D. (ed.) Non-
Union Employee Representation: History, Contemporary Practice, and Policy. New 
York: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 121-146. 
Taras, D. G., and Kaufman, B. E. (2006) ‘Non-union Employee Representation in 
North America: Diversity, Controversy and Uncertain Future’, Industrial Relations 
Journal, 37 (5): 513-542. 
Taylor, R. (1994) The Future of the Trade Unions. London: Andre Deutch (Carlton 
Publishing Group). 
Taylor, S. J., and Bogdan, R. (1984) Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: 
The Search for Meanings, 2nd Edition. Chichester (England, UK) and New York 
(USA): Wiley. 
Terry, M. A. (1994) ‘Workplace Unionism: Redefining Structures and Objectives’, in 
Hyman R., and Ferner, A. (ed.) New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 223-249. 
Terry, M. A. (1999) ‘Systems of Collective Employee Representation in Non-Union 
Firms in the UK’, Industrial Relations Journal, 30 (1): 16-30. 
     314 
Bibliography - References
Terry, M. A. (2003a) ‘Partnership and the Future of Trade Unions’, Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, 24 (4): 485-507. 
Terry, M. A. (2003b) ‘Can “Partnership” Reverse the Decline of British Trade 
Unions?’, Work, Employment and Society, 17 (3): 459-472. 
Terzi, K. A. (2002) ‘Mergers, Customers Service and Integration: A Case in 
Insurance’, PhD Thesis, University of Bath, England, UK. 
Thelen, K. (2001) ‘Varieties of Labour Politics in the Developed Democracies’, in 
Hall, P. A., and Soskice, D. (eds.) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Competitive Advantage. Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 71-103. 
Thompson, P. (2003) ‘Disconnected Capitalism’, Work, Employment and Society, 17 
(2): 359-378. 
Threlfall, M. (2007) ‘The Social Dimension of the European Union: Innovative 
Methods for Advancing Integration’, Global Social Policy, 7 (3): 271-293. 
Torrington, D., Hall, L., and Taylor, S. (2005) Human Resource Management, 6th 
Edition. Essex (England, UK): Prentice Hall - Financial Times, (Pearson Education). 
Towers, B. (1997) The Representation Gap: Change and Reform in the British and 
American Workplace. Oxford (England, UK): Oxford University Press. 
Trade Union Congress (TUC) (1997) Meetings on European Multinationals: The 
Experience So Far. London: TUC. 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) (2004) Informed, Consulted, Organised. London: 
TUC. 
Traxler, F., Blaschke, S., and Kittel, B. (2001) National Labour Relations in 
Internationalised Markets. Oxford (England, UK): Oxford University Press. 
     315 
Bibliography - References
Trimming, A. R. (2007) ‘European Works Councils and the Dark Side of Managing 
Worker Voice’, Human Resource Management Journal, 17 (3): 248-264. 
Truter, G. M. (2003) Implementing the Information and Consultation Directive in the 
UK: Lessons from Germany. London: Institute for Employment Rights. 
Undy, R. (1999) ‘Annual Review Article: New Labour’s “Industrial Relations 
Settlement”: The Third Way?’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 37 (2): 315-
336. 
UNITE the Union (2007) The Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations 2004 (The ICE Regulations). Guidance for Unite Amicus Section 
Officers and Workplace Representatives, (1st Printing: June 2007), Published by Unite 
Amicus Section, (http://www.amicustheunion.org/pdf/ICERegsJuly2007.pdf). 
Upchurch, M., Richardson, M., Tailby, S., Danford, A., and Stewart, P. (2006) 
‘Employee Representation and Partnership in the Non-Union Sector: A Paradox of 
Intention?’, Human Resource Management Journal, 16 (4): 393-410. 
USDAW (2006) The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations. 
(Published on: 10th May 2006), 
(http://www.usdaw.org.uk/getactive/resource_library/files/RLFEmpRegs/EmpRegsRe 
sRep.pdf). 
Vaa Maanen, J. (1979) ‘Reclaiming Qualitative Methods for Organisational Research: 
A Preface’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 24 (4): 520-526. 
Veale, S. (2005) ‘Information and Consultation: A TUC Perspective on the Key 
Issues’, in Storey, J. (ed.) Adding Value through Information and Consultation. 
Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan (in Association with The Open 
University Business School), pp. 21-28. 
     316 
Bibliography - References
Von Wright, G. H. (1993) ‘Two Traditions’, in Hammersley, M. (ed.) Social 
Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice, 1st Edition. London: Sage Publications, 
pp. 9-13. 
Waddington, J. (2001) ‘What do EWC Representatives Think? Views from Five 
Countries’, European Works Council Bulletin, no. 33, pp. 12-16. 
Wall, T. D., and Wood, S. J. (2005) ‘The Romance of Human Resource Management 
and Business Performance, and the Case for Big Science’, Human Relations, 58 (4): 
429-461. 
Watling, D., and Snook, J. (2003) ‘Work Council and Trade Unions: Complementary 
or Competitive? The Case of SAGCo’, Industrial Relations Journal, 34 (3): 260-270. 
Weinz, W. (2006) Worker Participation in a Globalised World. IUF Secretariat, 
http://www.iuf.org/issues/ 
Weston, S., and Lucio, M. M. (1997) ‘Trade Unions, Management and European 
Works Councils: Opening Pandora’s Box’, The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 8 (6): 764-779. 
Wever, K. S. (1995) Negotiating Competitiveness: Employment Relations and 
Organisational Innovation in Germany and the United States. Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
Whitley, R. (1999) Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of 
Business Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wild, A. (1996) ‘Work Councils: The European Directive and Practical 
Implementation Models for Employee Communication and Involvement’, The Busy 
Manager Series – Best Practice Management Reports, Technical Communications 
(Publishing Limited). 
     317 
Bibliography - References
Wilkinson, A. (1999) ‘Employment Relations in SMEs’, Employee Relations, 21 (3): 
206-217. 
Wilkinson, A., Dundon, T., and Grugulis, I. (2007) ‘Information but not Consultation: 
Exploring Employee Involvement in SMEs’, The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 18 (7): 1279-1297. 
Wilkinson, A., Dundon, T., Marchington, M., and Ackers, P. (2004) ‘Changing 
Patterns of Employee Voice’, Journal of Industrial Relations, 46 (3): 298-322. 
Wilkinson, A., Gollan, P. J., Marchington, M., and Lewin, D. (2010) ‘Conceptualising 
Employee Participation in Organisations’, in Wilkinson, A., Gollan, P. J., 
Marchington, M., and Lewin, D. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Participation in 
Organisations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-25. 
Williams, K. (1988) Industrial Relations and the German Model. Aldershot 
(Hampshire, UK): Avebury. 
Williams, S., and Adam-Smith, D. (2006) Contemporary Employment Relations: A 
Critical Introduction, 1st Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Willman, P., Bryson, A., and Gomez, R. (2007) ‘The Long Goodbye: New 
Establishments and the Fall of Union Voice in Britain’, The International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 18 (7): 1318-1334. 
Wills, J. (1999) ‘European Works Councils in British Firms’, Human Resource 
Management Journal, 9 (4): 19-38. 
Wills, J. (2000) ‘Great Expectations: Three Years in the Life of a European Works 
Council’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 6 (1): 85-107. 
WMERF (2005) ‘Results of the WMERF Information and Consultation Survey’, by 
Hall, M., Adam, D., and Koukiadaki, A., 
(http://www.wbs.ac.uk/downloads/research/wmerf-1205.pdf). 
     318 
Bibliography - References
Wood, S. (2008) ‘Job Characteristics, Employee Voice and Well-Being in Britain’, 
Industrial Relations Journal, 39 (2): 153-168. 
Wood, S. J., and Fenton-O’Creevy, M. P. (2005) ‘Direct Involvement, Representation 
and Employee Voice in UK Multinationals in Europe’, European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 11 (1): 27-50. 
Wood, S., and Godard, J. (1999) ‘The Statutory Union Recognition Procedure in the 
Employment Relations Bill: A Comparative Analysis’, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 37 (2): 203-244. 
Yeandle, D. (2005) ‘An Employers’ Organisation Perspective’, in Storey, J. (ed.) 
Adding Value through Information and Consultation. Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan (in Association with The Open University Business School), pp. 
29-37. 
Yin, R. K. (1994) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd Edition. London: 
Sage Publications. 
     319 
Appendices and Notes: An Overview of the ICE Regulations 2004
APPENDICES AND NOTES 

Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) Regulations 2004: 
An Overview 
Adapted from: Hall et al. (2002); Hall (2005b: p. 112); Tailby and Winchester (2005: 
p. 445); DTI Guidance (2006); Gollan and Wilkinson (2007b: pp. 1150-1151); 
Dundon and Wilkinson (2009: pp. 412-415). 
Through the transposition of the EU Directive (2002/14/EC), the Information and 
Consultation of Employees (ICE) Regulations 2004 have been brought into the UK 
framework of employment law. The legislation applies to undertakings in Great 
Britain with 50 or more employees and give the right of information-sharing and 
consultation about business issues that may include: changes to the structure of the 
company, plans for the employment trends, and changes in work organisation or 
contractual relations (including redundancies and transfer of undertakings). An 
undertaking is considered to be a company, partnership or sole trader with a registered 
office, head office or principal place of business situated in Great Britain. 
Furthermore, ‘undertaking’ is essentially another word for a company or firm, and 
subsequently, it may include any organisation carrying out an economic activity, non-
profit making organisations and many in the public sector. Initially the legislation 
came into force on 6th April 2005 for undertakings with 150 or more employees. 
Then, on 6th April 2007, the minimal threshold was reduced to 100 employees; and 
finally, since 6th April 2008, the legislation has applied to undertakings with at least 
50 employees (separate but similar provisions apply in Northern Ireland, whilst the 
employment thresholds specified are related to the UK as a whole). 
Overall, according to Hall et al. (2002) and Hall (2005b), the EU Directive 
(2002/14/EC) requires all member states to establish a general statutory framework 
for information-sharing and consultation with the employees. In particular, employers 
must inform and consult elected employee representatives on: (a) the recent and 
probable development of the undertaking’s activities and economic situation 
(information only), (b) the situation, structure and probable development of 
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employment within the undertaking and any anticipatory measures envisaged – 
especially where there is a threat to employment within the undertaking (information 
and consultation), (c) decisions that are likely to lead to substantial changes in work 
organisation or contractual relations, including decisions covered by the legislation on 
collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings (information and consultation 
with a view to reaching an agreement). Information must be given in sufficient time 
and in such a fashion that the representatives can adequately study it and thus, where 
necessary, be prepared for the consultation process (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b). 
According to Regulation 20, the representatives, once elected, must have the 
opportunity to meet with the employer and give their opinion on matters subject to 
consultation, with a view to reaching agreement, whilst the employer must give a 
reasoned response to the representatives’ views. Nevertheless, concerning category 
(c), where employers come under a duty to consult trade union or employee 
representatives under the existing legislation on collective redundancies and transfers 
of undertakings, they are not obliged to consult the representatives under the ICE 
Regulations, provided they notify them accordingly on each occasion. 
The legal requirement for information-sharing and consultation with employees is not 
implemented automatically and can be triggered either by a formal request from 
employees or by an employer initiating the process (known also as employer 
notification). An agreement must set out how the employer shall inform and consult 
the employees or their representatives on an on-going basis. All employees are 
entitled to take part in the appointment or election of the representatives, with a view 
to have a full coverage of all employees. In addition, the employer must establish 
information and consultation arrangements/structures where a valid request has been 
made by employees. Nonetheless, the flexible and reflexive nature of the legislation 
(Hall, 2006) allows the arrangements and structures to be developed and tailored 
according to the given circumstances of each organisation. Most notably, the ICE 
Regulations do not specify: the nature of the representative body (i.e. whether it is a 
committee or council), the frequency of meetings, nor the facilities that should be 
granted to the representatives. More importantly, there is no definition for providing 
an explicit role to union representatives (Hall 2006; Lorber, 2006). The statutory 
provisions also allow the retention of pre-existing or voluntary agreements with the 
approval of workforce. An employer can continue with pre-existing information and 
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consultation arrangements (which may provide for either representative-based or 
direct means of information and consultation), provided that such arrangements have 
been agreed prior to an employee written request and: (i) the agreement is in writing, 
including any collective agreements with trade unions; (ii) the agreement covers all 
employees in the undertaking; (iii) the agreement sets out how the employer is to 
provide the information and seek employee views for consultation; and (iv) the 
arrangements have been agreed by the employees (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b: pp. 
1150-1151). 
Assuming that an organisation is complying with the statutory provisions, employees 
can trigger the required procedures and this must be done in writing by at least 10 per 
cent of employees in an undertaking. Overall, the ICE Regulations permit a single or a 
specified group of requests to be sent to the employer or the Central Arbitration 
Committee (CAC) and if employees prefer anonymity, they can submit their request 
to an independent body, such as: the CAC, ACAS, EAT etc. Even when an 
organisation has a voluntary and pre-existing agreement in place, employees can still 
request a change, but in this instance at least 40 per cent of employees must endorse 
such a request and subsequently, the employer is obliged to reach a negotiated 
agreement with genuine employee representatives. On the other hand, if fewer than 40 
per cent of employees endorse the request for a negotiated agreement the employer 
can ballot the workforce on whether they support the request for new negotiations (or 
otherwise, the employer might be able to continue with pre-existing arrangements). 
Where a pre-existing agreement covers employees in more than one undertaking, the 
employer(s) may hold a single ballot across the relevant undertakings. Both parties 
have six months to reach a negotiated agreement (extendable by agreement). There is 
also a three-year moratorium on employee requests and employer notifications from 
the date of a negotiated agreement (unless the agreement is terminated), the date on 
which the standard information and consultation provisions apply and the date of an 
employee request that was the subject of a ballot in which the employees did not 
endorse the request (Hall, 2005b). A complaint regarding a negotiated agreement or a 
failure to comply with standard provisions must be brought to the CAC within three 
months of the alleged failure (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007b).  
     322 
Appendices and Notes: An Overview of the ICE Regulations 2004
Unless, an agreement is reached following a valid employee request (or through 
employer notification), standard or default provisions shall apply, which require 
employers to inform and consult employee representatives on subjects and in a certain 
way (as highlighted by Regulation 18). Furthermore, where the standard information 
and consultation provisions apply, the employer shall arrange for a ballot to elect the 
employee representatives. According to Regulation 19, there should be one 
representative per 50 employees, or part thereof, with a minimum of two and a 
maximum of 25 representatives. However, whereas the range of topics covered by the 
statutory requirements is potentially quite wide, the default or standard provisions are 
considered rather minimalist, since they are mainly confined to the specification of 
electing the representatives (Hall et al., 2002; Hall, 2005b and 2006).  
The enforcement of the ICE Regulations and confidentiality provisions primarily 
apply to the negotiated agreements, within the context of statutory procedures, or 
where the standard or default information and consultation provisions are being 
implemented. Pre-existing arrangements are not enforced through the ICE 
Regulations and rely upon the nature of the agreement. However, if a pre-existing 
agreement is legally binding and employer is in breach, proceedings can be brought 
by the employees in the High Court so that the conflict will be resolved. Enforcement 
of the terms included in the negotiated agreements or imposition of standard or default 
arrangements (as defined by the statutory provisions of the legislation) can be 
achieved via complaints to the CAC. Subsequently, CAC may order the employer to 
take the necessary steps in order to comply with the provisions as defined by the ICE 
Regulations. Where the CAC uphold a complaint for failure to comply, the 
complainant may make an application to an Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) and 
any appeal must be made within 42 days of the date on which written notification of 
the CAC declaration is received. The EAT shall hear appeals and is responsible for 
issuing penalty notices. Failing to comply with a declaration made by the CAC may 
result in maximum penalty of £75,000. If it is considered necessary, enforcement of 
CAC orders can be also pursued through the courts (Hall 2005b; Gollan and 
Wilkinson, 2007b). 
Regulations 25 and 26 designate the confidentiality of sensitive information given to 
the employee representatives. More specifically, employee representatives and other 
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recipients have a statutory duty concerning the disclosure of information or 
documents that are considered by the employer as strictly confidential. For instance, 
employers can withhold the disclosure of information or documents that could 
potentially harm or prejudice the undertaking. Furthermore, disputes about 
employers’ decisions regarding the imposition of confidentiality restrictions or 
withholding information can be referred to the CAC. Employee representatives (or 
individual employees that endorse a request for negotiations) are legally protected 
against discrimination and unfair dismissal for exercising their rights (as defined by 
the ICE Regulations) and they can counter any punitive measures taken by 
management via Employment Tribunals. Finally, employee representatives can 
exercise the right to be compensated, in accordance with the time that they spend so 
as to carry out their duties.  
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Questionnaire for the Survey 

Dear Sir / Madam, 
Informing and consulting employees in the workplaces is of growing importance, 
especially now that the Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) 
Regulations are in force for enterprises with 150 or more employees. We know 
relatively little on the extent to which practices are developed and how, if at all, 
these are changing. This short questionnaire, which should not take more than 10 
minutes to complete, will potentially fill this gap and we will be very grateful for 
your invaluable help. It is a part of a wider research project funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), ACAS and University of Bath. 
The project has been initiated by Sofoklis Sarvanidis, a PhD student from the 
Work and Employment Research Centre (WERC, School of Management, 
University of Bath).  
As soon as you complete the questionnaire, please return it by 31st January 2006, 
if it is possible, in the pre-paid envelope to the School of Management, University 
of Bath. Full confidentiality is guaranteed and no organisation will be identified in 
the research. The results and findings of the research will be sent to you.  
Thank you in anticipation of your co-operation and support for this study. 
Peter Cressey 
Reader in Sociology and Industrial Relations 
Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Bath 
John Purcell  
Professor of Human Resource Management Robert Johnson 
Head of Work and Employment Research Centre  Area Director 
School of Management, University of Bath   ACAS - Southwest   
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Employee Involvement and Participation: Informing and 
Consulting Employees in Great Britain 
Main Purpose and Focus 
The purpose of the questionnaire is to assess the current 
agreements/arrangements of Information and Consultation and the extent to 
which the (ICE) Regulations are influencing current practices. It is anticipated 
that the results from this questionnaire will add a greater understanding about the 
mechanisms, schemes and structures adopted, the changes and adjustments in the 
nature of Information and Consultation Arrangements at workplaces in relation to 
the (ICE) Regulations; and also the potential impact, benefits, problems and 
outcomes expected by the various stakeholders at the organisations from 
introducing these arrangements. It is planned that an analysis of the results of the 
initial questionnaire, and other information on the specific research, will be 
available for wider circulation to participating companies after the completion of 
project. 
Instructions 
a) This questionnaire ought to take only a few minutes using mainly tick boxes 
and rating scale. 
b) Please complete all the sections that are relevant to your company. 
c) For further details about the Regulations please refer to the Overview of the 
(ICE) Regulations provided at the end of questionnaire. 
d) If you are uncertain about the meaning of a particular word or phrase please 
refer to the Glossary of Terms provided at the end of questionnaire. 
e) Please return the completed questionnaire in the envelope provided before 31st 
January 2006, if it is possible. 
Thank you very much for completing the questionnaire. 
Address Label 
The address label is a research tool used to measure the response rate. Total 
confidentiality is guaranteed for all respondents. Any information about the 
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company or name provided in this questionnaire will not be passed on to any 
individual, organisation, or official body in the analysis of results. 
Section 1: Background Information 
Question 1

What is your job title? 

Question 2 
What is the type of your organisation?  
(please tick the appropriate box) 
Public 
Private 
Question 3

What is the service/product of your organisation? 

Question 4 
Do you currently recognise a trade union for collective bargaining purposes? 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
Yes 
No 
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Question 5 
What proportion of your employees are members of a recognised trade union? 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
More than 
90% 
70%-90%  
51%-70% 
31%-50%  
10%-30% 
Less than 
10% 
Do not know 
Question 6 
Is your organisation 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
an independent organisation in its own right 
part of a wider organisation 
other 
(please specify): 
Question 7 
Approximately, how many people are employed in your establishment?  
(please tick the appropriate box) 
49 or less 50-149 150-249 250-499 500-749 750-999 1,000 or 
more 
       
(If your establishment is part of a wider organisation, please indicate the total 
number of employees in this organisation) 
49 or less 50-149 150-249 250-499 500-749 750-999 1,000 or 
more 
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Section 2: Current Employee Involvement/Participation Practices 
Question 8 
Please indicate in each box how often you use the following forms of direct 
involvement/participation in your organisation for most of the employees 
(please indicate in each box: 1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 
5=a great deal) 
team-working/self-management 
noticeboards 
team briefings/cascade communication 
quality circles/project groups/TQ circles 
suggestion schemes 
employee ballots 
employee opinion/satisfaction surveys 
team meetings 
meetings with the entire workforce 
focus groups or workshops 
staff newsletter/journal 
individual letters to all employees 
workplace-site intranet 
e-mail reporting/updates 
other (please specify) 
_____________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________ 
If you do not use any form of direct involvement/participation in your 
organisation, how likely is it that you will implement any type in the near future? 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
Not at all 
likely 
Not very likely Unsure Quite likely Very likely 
    

If it is quite/very likely that your organisation will implement any such form of 
direct involvement/participation in the near future, please provide details of the 
type and the reasons for doing this. 
     329 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Appendices and Notes: Questionnaire for the Survey
Question 9 
Please indicate in each box how often you use the following forms of indirect 
involvement/participation in your organisation with employee representatives 
(please indicate in each box: 1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 
5=a great deal) 
European work councils 
Joint Consultative Committees/employee representative 
bodies/employee forums 
non-routinised written communications or meetings between 
employee representatives and senior managers 
other (please specify) 
_____________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________ 
If you do not use any form of indirect involvement/participation in your 
organisation, how likely is it that you will implement any such form in the near 
future? 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
Not at all 
likely 
Not very likely Unsure Quite likely Very likely 
    

If it is quite/very likely that your organisation will implement any such form of 
indirect involvement/participation in the near future, please provide details of 
what form it will take and the reasons for doing this. 
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Section 3: Quality of Current Employee Involvement Practices 
Question 10 
In general, how would you describe the relations between managers and 
employees in your organisation? 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
Very poor Poor Neither poor nor 
good 
Good Very good 
    

Question 11 
How often do you provide information and consult with your employees or 
employee representatives about the following topics? 
(please indicate in each box: 1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 
5=a great deal) 
Information 
Sharing 
Consultation 
Financial issues (e.g. financial performance/prospects, 
budgets/budgetary cuts etc) 
Production issues (e.g. level of production/sales, quality of 
products/services, changes to products/services etc) 
Employment issues (e.g. redundancies, reducing labour turnover, 
changes to employment levels/status etc) 
Pay issues (e.g. wage/salary reviews, terms and conditions, bonuses, 
job evaluation etc) 
Future plans (e.g. company expansion/contraction etc) 
Leave and flexible working arrangements (including working time 
etc) 
Work organisation (e.g. changes to working methods, allocation of 
work between employees etc) 
Training strategy 
Equality/Diversity issues 
Pensions 
Health and safety 
Technological changes 
Changes to management/supervision arrangements 
Corporate social responsibility 
Other (please specify) 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
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Section 4: Current Knowledge of (ICE) Regulations 
Section 5: Plans for responding to (ICE) Regulations 
Question 12 
To what extent are you aware of the (ICE) Regulations? 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
Not at all Little To some extent Quite a lot Extensively 
    

Question 13 
Please state your organisation’s potential response to the (ICE) Regulations 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
design a pre-existing agreement and get the 
approval from the employees 
discuss with a recognised trade union how to adopt 
the existing arrangements in order to meet the (ICE) 
Regulations 
ballot the workforce in order to determine their 
views 
set up a negotiating body and plan for an agreed 
'information and consultation' procedure in order to 
meet the requirements of the regulations 
decide to take no action in response to the (ICE) 
Regulations 
other (please specify) 
_____________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________ 
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Question 14 
In your opinion, how likely is it that 10% or more of the employees will ask for 
new information and consultation arrangements/agreements in the next 12 
months at your organisation? 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
Not at all 
likely 
Not very likely Unsure Quite likely Very likely 
    

Section 6: Effects and Benefits from Informing and Consulting 
Employees 
Question 15 
How likely is it that the (ICE) Regulations will change the way that employment 
relations are conducted in your organisation? 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
Not at all Little To some extent Quite a lot Extensively 
    

Question 16 
How do you expect that the (ICE) Regulations will influence the climate of 
employment relations in your organisation? 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
Much worse A bit worse No change A bit better Much better 
    
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Question 17 
To what extent will the legal requirements for informing and consulting 
employees be beneficial for your organisation with regard to the following 
issues? 
(please indicate in each box: 1=not at all, 2=little, 3=some, 4=a lot, 5=a great 
deal) 
improved management of change 
enhanced productivity/efficiency 
improved problem-solving 
less employment disputes/grievances 
less labour turnover/absence 
other (please specify) 
_____________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________ 
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Section 7: Participating in the Research 
Question 18 
The Work and Employment Research Centre, at the University of Bath, plans to 
follow up the questionnaire with five case-studies in order to conduct meetings 
and interviews with some senior managers and, where appropriate, with 
employee representatives. We will provide feedback results to participating 
companies. Would you like to participate in this research? If yes, please give 
your contact details. We would greatly appreciate your invaluable help. 
Yes 
No 
Name: 
Address: 
Phone number: 
E-mail: 
Thank you very much for completing the questionnaire. For any 
queries/questions please contact: 
Sofoklis Sarvanidis 
PhD Candidate - Doctoral Researcher 
Work and Employment Research Centre 
School of Management 
University of Bath 
Bath 
BA2 7AY 
Phone Number: 07796 860991 
Email: s.sarvanidis@bath.ac.uk 
Webpage: people.bath.ac.uk/ss244 
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Overview of the ICE Regulations 
Glossary of Terms 
The Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) Regulations, which came 
into force in the UK in 6 April 2005, establish for the first time a general statutory 
framework that gives the employees the right to be informed and consulted by their 
employers on a range of key business, employment and restructuring issues; such as, 
changes to the structure of the company, plans for employment, changes in work 
organisation etc. These regulations have adopted the EU Directive (2002/14/EC), 
which is designed to “promote social dialogue between management and labour” 
(paragraph 1) within the European Community. They are initially applied in larger 
enterprises – those with 150 or more employees. More specifically, the (ICE) 
Regulations apply to undertakings with: 
• 150 or more employees (which came into force in 6 April 2005), 
• 100 or more employees, from 6 April 2007, 
• 50 or more employees, from 6 April 2008. 
Company, establishment or workplace: Refers to the place of work to which this 
questionnaire has been addressed. 
Consultation: Refers to the exchange of views and establishment of a dialogue 
between the employer and employees (or their representatives). 
Employee ballots and employee opinion or satisfaction surveys: Surveys or 
questionnaires used to assess the present opinions/satisfaction of employees about 
various issues, e.g. manager and employee relationships, communication etc. 
Employee involvement: Refers to management activities, typically focused on 
operational issues, and designed, primarily, to increase employee commitment. These 
activities can include a variety of techniques, such as: attitude surveys, team briefings, 
quality circles, employee focus groups etc. In addition, these practices/policies can 
provide employees with the opportunity to influence and where appropriate, take part 
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in the decision making on matters which affect them (for further details, please refer 
to the section: Employee Involvement and Participation). 
Employee participation: Refers to the extent to which employees are represented in 
organisational decision-making. It can include self-managed teams, Joint Consultative 
Committees, negotiating bodies etc. In addition, these practices/policies can promote 
the collective rights of employees to be presented in organisational decision making 
and establish collective representation in corporate decisions, including collective 
bargaining over terms and conditions of employment etc (for further details, please 
refer to the section: Employee Involvement and Participation). 
Employees: Refers to all of those individuals who are not managers. Other terms used 
for employees may include: staff/workforce/production workers or manual workers 
etc. 
Information/communication: Refers to the provision of data to employees (or their 
representatives) relevant to the organisation and their jobs. 
Communication: The communication of information can provide the opportunity for 
the employees and managers to exchange views and occurs through individual as well 
as collective consultation processes. Communication can be both one-way and two-
way. 
Joint Consultative Committees, Employee Representative Bodies or Employee 
Forums: Involve processes by which management seeks the views of employees, on 
matters of change, through elected representatives. JCCs are built upon the notion of 
indirect participation and worker representation in joint management-employee 
meetings, and can take a number of forms. 
Managers: Refers to those individuals whose job includes: planning, organising, 
controlling and directing resources or staff. 
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Quality Circles: Small groups of employees, usually from the same work team, who 
meet voluntarily on a regular basis to identify, analyse and solve quality and work-
related problems. 
Suggestion schemes: Employees can provide suggestions on production matters to 
managers via meetings or suggestion boxes. 
Team briefings or cascade communication: A system of communication operated 
by line management, based upon the principle of cascading information down the line. 
This can ensure that all employees know and understand what they, and others in the 
company, are doing. 
Team working or self management: Employees are grouped into work teams often 
with a team leader. Employees then work together on production lines etc. Both terms 
incorporate the following sorts of elements: responsibility for a complete task; 
working without direct supervision; discretion over work methods and time; 
encouragement for team members to organise and multi-skill; influence over 
recruitment to the team etc. 
Undertaking: The term undertaking is essentially another word for a company or 
firm, and includes any organisation carrying out an economic activity, including non-
profit making organisations and many in the public sector. 
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION 
Degree, form, level and range: 
•	 The degree denotes the extent to which employees are able to influence 
decisions about various aspects of management (such as, whether they are 
simply informed of changes, being consulted or actually making decisions 
etc), as illustrated below in the escalator of participation. 
•	 Involvement/participation has mainly two forms, and can be either indirect or 
direct. Indirect involvement/participation takes place where employees are 
involved through their representatives, who are usually elected from a wider 
group. Direct involvement/participation is concerned with face-to-face or 
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written communications between managers and subordinates that involves 
individuals rather than representatives. According to the academics, the direct 
form is referred as on-line involvement/participation, where workers make 
decisions as part of their daily job responsibilities, as distinct from off-line 
involvement/participation where workers make suggestions through a formal 
scheme. 
•	 Involvement/participation can take place at various organisational levels (such 
as, task, departmental, establishment, or corporate). 
•	 Involvement/participation can range from the relatively trivial to more 
strategic concerns (such as investment strategies). 
Control   
Co-determination 
Consultation 
Communication 
 Information 
Escalator of Employee Participation 
The glossary of terms is based on the following textbooks: 
Marchington, M., and Wilkinson, A. (2005a) Human Resource Management at Work: 
People Management and Development, 3rd Edition, London: CIPD. 
Marchington, A., and Wilkinson, A. (2005b) “Direct Participation and Involvement”, 
in Bach, S. (ed.) Managing Human Resources, 4th Edition, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, pp. 398-423. 
Other useful textbooks: 
Blyton, P., and Turnbull, P. (2004) The Dynamics of Employee Relations, third 
edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Boxall, P., and Purcell, J. (2003) Strategy and Human Resource Management, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Storey, J. (2005) Adding Value through Information and Consultation, The Open 
University Business School, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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Presentation and Analysis of Findings from the Survey 
I. Direct Forms of Employee Involvement and Participation 
The incidence of “Team-Working or Self-Management Teams” is more extensive in 
the non-unionised sector. In total, the figures are slightly scattered. More specifically, 
22 out of 74 organisations (i.e. 29.73 per cent) use often this type of involvement. In 
addition, 19 organisations (i.e. 25.68 per cent) use this mechanism to a great extent. 
On the other hand, 12 organisations (i.e. 16.22 per cent) denoted in their responses 
“infrequently” and 11 (i.e. 14.87 per cent) “sometimes”. The majority of non-
unionised workplaces use “often” (13 out of 33; i.e. 39.40 per cent) and “extensively” 
(11 out of 33; i.e. 33.33 per cent) this voice arrangement. Similarly, the majority of 
unionised workplaces use “infrequently” (10 out of 41; i.e. 24.39 per cent) this 
mechanism; whilst there is a relatively similar scattering for the unionised 
organisations that denoted “sometimes” (19.51 per cent), “often” (21.95 per cent) and 
“a great deal” (19.51 per cent). 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Team-Working/ 
Self-Management 
Not at all 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
2 
2 
3 
2 
10 
8 
4 
12 
11 
Often 13 9 22 
A great deal 
Not answered 
11 
2 
8 
4 
19 
6 
Total 33 41 74 
“Noticeboards” are very commonly used in the vast majority of the organisations. In 
total, 38 (i.e. 51.35 per cent) organisations often use “Noticeboards” and 24 (i.e. 32.43 
per cent) use them extensively. There is a slightly a stronger prevalence in the non-
unionised sector. More specifically, 19 out of 33 non-unionised organisations (i.e. 
57.58 per cent) use “extensively” this mechanism and nine out of 33 (i.e. 27.27 per 
cent) denoted “often”. The corresponding figures (with regard to the “extensive” and 
“often” use of “Noticeboards”) for the unionised sector are 19 out of 41 (i.e. 46.34 per 
cent) and 15 out of 41 (i.e. 36.59 per cent), respectively.      
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Noticeboards Not at all 1 0 1 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
1 
3 
2 
5 
3 
8 
Total 
Often 
A great deal 
9 
19 
33 
15 
19 
41 
24 
38 
74 
“Team-Briefings and Cascade Communication” are also very widespread in the 
majority of the organisations. In total, the majority of organisations (32 out of 74; i.e. 
43.24 per cent) use “often” this form of participation. In addition, 29 organisations 
(i.e. 39.19 per cent) use “extensively” this mechanism. Only two organisations use 
‘infrequently’ this type of voice arrangement and 10 responses denoted “sometimes”. 
Most of the non-unionised organisations (16 out of 33; i.e. 48.49 per cent) use 
“extensively” this form of employee involvement and a substantial number of 
responses denoted “often” (10 out of 33; i.e. 30.30 per cent). The corresponding 
figures for the unionised sector are 13 out of 41 (i.e. 31.71 per cent) and 22 out of 41 
(i.e. 53.66 per cent), respectively. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Team Briefings/ Infrequently 1 1 2 
Cascade Sometimes 5 5 10 
Communication Often 10 22 32 
A great deal 16 13 29 
Not answered 1 0 1 
Total 33 41 74 
According to the findings of the survey, a significant number of organisations do not 
use regularly “Quality Circles”. Overall, the responses for this type of direct voice are 
widely scattered. More specifically, organisations provided the same number of 
responses (19 out of 74; i.e. 25.68 per cent) for using this voice arrangement 
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“sometimes” and “often”. Predominantly, those organisations that use “often” this 
mechanism are non-unionised (13 out of 33; i.e. 39.39 per cent), whilst the relevant 
number of responses for the unionised sector is much lower (six out of 41; i.e. 14.63 
per cent). On the other hand, some organisations (15 out of 74; i.e. 20.27 per cent) 
denoted “infrequent” use; especially in the unionised sector, where the responses are 
more (nine out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent) compared with the non-unionised sector (4 
out of 33; i.e. 12.12 per cent). In addition, a significant number of organisations (14 
out of 74; i.e. 18.92 per cent) do not use at all “Quality Circles” and similarly, the 
responses, for such an instance, are more prevalent in the unionised (nine out of 41; 
i.e. 21.95 per cent) rather than the non-unionised sector (five out of 33; i.e. 15.15 per 
cent) 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Quality Not at all 5 9 14 
Circles/TQ 
Circles 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
4 
9 
11 
10 
15 
19 
Often 13 6 19 
A great deal 1 2 3 
Not answered 1 3 4 
Total 33 41 74 
There is a dispersed use of “Suggestion Schemes” amongst the organisations, but 
especially in the case of unionised workplaces there is less prevalence regarding this 
type of direct employee voice. In particular, 25 organisations (i.e. 33.78 per cent) do 
not use “at all” this form of employee involvement, which is substantially less 
widespread in the unionised sector (17 out of 41; i.e. 41.46 per cent) rather than in 
non-unionised workplaces (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent). Furthermore, 16 
organisations (i.e. 21.62 per cent) use “infrequently” this mechanism of employee 
voice, with a similar response rate between unionised workplaces (nine out of 41; i.e. 
21.95 per cent) and the non-unionised sector (seven out of 33; i.e. 21.21 per cent). A 
slightly smaller number of organisations (12 out of 74; i.e. 16.22 per cent) denoted 
“sometimes”, with equal number of responses between the unionised (six out of 41; 
i.e. 14.63 per cent) and non-unionised sectors (six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent). Quite 
     342 
Appendices and Notes: Presentation and Analysis of Findings from the Survey
similar is the number of organisations (10 out of 74; i.e. 13.51 per cent) that denoted 
“often”, with nearly identical responses between the unionised (six out of 41; i.e. 
14.63 per cent) and the non-unionised sectors (four out of 33; i.e. 12.12 per cent). It is 
noteworthy, that eight HR managers claimed that they use “extensively” “Suggestion 
Schemes” in their workplaces, and only one has a formal trade union recognition 
agreement. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Suggestion 
Schemes 
Not at all 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
8 
7 
6 
17 
9 
6 
25 
16 
12 
Often 4 6 10 
A great deal 
Not answered 
7 
1 
1 
2 
8 
3 
Total 33 41 74 
“Employee Ballots” are not extensive in the survey sample, especially for the non-
unionised sector, where this form of involvement is conspicuously absent. In total, 26 
organisations (i.e. 35.14 per cent) do not use at all “Employee Ballots”, 19 (i.e. 
response rate: 57.58 per cent) of which identified themselves as being within the non-
unionised sector and seven (i.e. 17.07 per cent) as having a trade union recognition 
agreement. In addition, 24 organisations (i.e. 32.43 per cent) denoted that they use this 
voice arrangement “infrequently”; 20 of them (i.e. 48.48 per cent) are unionised and 
four (i.e. 12.12 per cent) are non-unionised. On the other hand, 14 organisations (i.e. 
18.92 per cent) responded that they use this form of involvement “sometimes”, whilst 
the corresponding response rates between the unionised (eight out of 41; i.e. 19.51 per 
cent) and non-unionised sectors (six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent) are almost 
identical. Two of the unionised and non-unionised organisations denoted that they use 
this form of employee voice “often”, and only one unionised organisation is reported 
to use it “extensively” (i.e. “a great deal”). 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Employee 
Ballots 
Not at all 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
Often 
19 
4 
6 
2 
7 
20 
8 
2 
26 
24 
14 
4 
A great deal 
Not answered 
0 
2 
1 
3 
1 
5 
Total 33 41 74 
There is a scattered use of “Employee Opinion/Satisfaction Surveys” amongst the 
organisations, with a slight variance between the unionised and non-unionised sectors. 
For instance, 16 organisations (i.e. 21.62 per cent) do not use “at all” this form of 
involvement, and this is especially so in the non-unionised (nine out of 33; i.e. 27.27 
per cent) rather than the unionised sector (seven out of 41; i.e. 17.07 per cent). A 
similar percentage of organisations (i.e. 21.62 per cent) denoted that they use it 
“sometimes”, with higher prevalence of this response from the unionised 
organisations (10 out of 41; i.e. 24.39 per cent) than from the non-unionised sector 
(six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent). The majority of the organisations (21 out of 74; i.e. 
28.38 per cent) responded that it takes place “infrequently” with higher prevalence of 
this outcome in the unionised sector (14 out of 41; i.e. 34.15 per cent) as compared 
with non-unionised workplaces (seven out of 33; i.e. 21.21 per cent). It is noteworthy 
that only three non-unionised workplaces and one unionised organisation use 
“extensively” this form of employee voice.   
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Employee Not at all 9 7 16 
Opinion/Satisfaction 
Surveys 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
7 
6 
14 
10 
21 
16 
Often 7 8 15 
A great deal 3 1 4 
Not answered 1 1 2 
Total 33 41 74 
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“Team Meetings” are widely used by the vast majority of the organisations that 
responded to the survey, with higher response level from the non-unionised sector. 
More specifically, 33 organisations (i.e. 44.60 per cent) “extensively” (i.e. “a great 
deal) adopt this form of employee involvement. The corresponding figures for both 
the non-unionised (18 out of 33; i.e. 54.55 per cent) and unionised sectors (15 out of 
41; 36.59 per cent) are notably high, but they are relatively higher in the former 
sector. In addition, 23 organisations (i.e. 31.08 per cent) use “often” this form of 
employee voice practice with slightly different figures between the unionised (12 out 
of 41; i.e. 29.27 per cent) and non-unionised sectors (11 out of 33; 33.33 per cent). 
Furthermore, 14 organisations (i.e. 18.92 per cent) use “sometimes” “Team 
Meetings”, with a notable variance between the unionised (11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per 
cent) and non-unionised sectors (three out of 33; i.e. 9.09 per cent). A nominal 
number of organisations denoted “infrequent” and “not at all” concerning the 
incidence of “Team-Meetings”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Team 
Meetings 
Not at all 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
0 
1 
3 
1 
1 
11 
1 
2 
14 
Often 11 12 23 
A great deal 
Not answered 
18 
0 
15 
1 
33 
1 
Total 33 41 74 
There is a relatively balanced use of “Meetings with the Entire Workforce” amongst 
the unionised and non-unionised organisations, but they tend to be slightly more 
widespread in the non-unionised sector. In particular, 13 organisations (i.e. 17.57 per 
cent) do not use “at all” this form of employee involvement with a nearly split 
difference in responses between unionised (seven out of 41; i.e. 17.07 per cent) and 
non-unionised workplaces (six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent). 16 organisations cited 
“infrequent” use of this form of employee voice with similar number of response rates 
between the unionised (eight out of 41; i.e. 19.51 per cent) and non-unionised sectors 
(eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent). The majority of the unionised organisations (13 
out of 41; i.e. 31.71 per cent) implement “sometimes” “Meetings with Entire 
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Workforce”, whereas the responses for the non-unionised workplaces are less evident 
(three out of 33; i.e. 9.09 per cent). Moreover, in the non-unionised sector this form of 
employee voice is “often” used (10 out of 33; i.e. 30.30 per cent), with slightly lower 
incidence for the unionised organisations (nine out of 41; i.e. 21.95 per cent). Finally, 
five non-unionised and two unionised organisations extensively use it.  
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Meetings Not at all 6 7 13 
with the 
Entire 
Workforce 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
Often 
8 
3 
10 
8 
13 
9 
16 
16 
19 
A great deal 5 2 7 
Not answered 1 2 3 
Total 33 41 74 
Similar are the findings on the use of the “Focus Groups or Workshops”, whilst their 
use appears as being slightly more widespread in non-unionised workplaces. Overall, 
the majority of responses denoted that they do not use this form of mechanism “at 
all”, with a relatively higher response rate in unionised workplaces (12 out of 41; i.e. 
29.27 per cent) compared with the non-unionised sector (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per 
cent). Also, 16 organisations use “infrequently” this form of employee voice and the 
corresponding figures are 21.95 per cent for the unionised organisations and 21.21 per 
cent for the non-unionised organisations. A substantial number of unionised 
workplaces (11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent) denoted “sometimes” in their responses 
and six non-unionised organisations provided the same answer. In addition, most of 
the non-unionised organisations (nine out of 33; i.e. 27.27 per cent) ‘often’ use “Focus 
Groups”, whilst the corresponding incidence is less widespread in the unionised sector 
(seven out of 41; i.e. 17.07 per cent). Finally, three non-unionised organisations, and 
two unionised denoted that they use this form of mechanism “a great deal”.  
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Focus Groups 
or Workshops 
Not at all 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
8 
7 
6 
12 
9 
11 
20 
16 
17 
Often 9 7 16 
Total 
A great deal 3 
33 
2 
41 
5 
74 
A great range of responses can be identified about the incidence of “Staff 
Newsletters/Journals”, but their use is predominantly evident in organisations with a 
trade union recognition agreement. In total, 24 organisations “often” provide their 
employees with “Newsletters/Journals”, while the response rate being very high for 
the unionised sector (39.02 per cent). In addition, seven unionised and eight non-
unionised organisations adopt extensively this practice. On the other hand, this 
practice is not applied “at all” by a substantial number of organisations in the non-
unionised sector (nine out of 33; i.e. 27.27 per cent) and by relatively less number of 
unionised organisations (six out of 41; i.e. 14.63 per cent).  
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Staff 
Newsletter/journal 
Not at all 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
9 
3 
5 
6 
4 
8 
15 
7 
13 
Often 8 16 24 
Total 
A great deal 8 
33 
7 
41 
15 
74 
The practice of sending “Individual Letters to all Employees” tends to be equally 
spread amongst the unionised and non-unionised organisations. The majority of 
organisations (25 out of 74; i.e. 33.78 per cent) “sometimes” use this form of 
employee voice in both the unionised (13 out of 41; i.e. 31.71 per cent) and non-
unionised sectors (12 out of 33; i.e. 36.36 per cent). In addition, 16 organisations (i.e. 
21.62 per cent) reported that they use “often” this direct form of involvement with 
similar figures amongst the unionised (nine out of 41; i.e. 21.95 per cent) and non-
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unionised sectors (seven out of 33; i.e. 21.21 per cent). To a lesser extent, nine 
organisations denoted “a great deal” of use of this mechanism, with slightly different 
response rates between the unionised (four out of 41; i.e. 9.75 per cent) and non-
unionised sectors (five out of 33; i.e. 15.15 per cent). On the other hand, 17 
organisations (i.e. 22.97 per cent) “infrequently” use “individual letters”, with higher 
prevalence in the unionised sector (11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent) compared to the 
non-unionised organisations (six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent). Only three non-
unionised and three unionised organisations do not use “at all” this communication 
mechanism with their employees.  
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Individual Not at all 3 3 6 
Letters to all 
Employees 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
6 
12 
11 
13 
17 
25 
Often 7 9 16 
A great deal 5 4 9 
Not answered 0 1 1 
Total 33 41 74 
“Workplace-site Intranet” is widespread, while the majority of organisations (27 out 
of 74; i.e. 36.49 per cent) denoted that they employed this mechanism “a great deal”, 
with relatively high response rates both for the non-unionised (15 out of 33; i.e. 45.56 
per cent) and unionised sectors (12 out of 41; i.e. 29.27 per cent). In addition, some 
respondents from the unionised sector (nine out of 41; i.e. 21.95 per cent) reported 
that they use “often” this mechanism, but only three of non-unionised organisations 
(i.e. 9.09 per cent) denoted the same answer. Nearly identical responses (11 out of 74; 
i.e. 14.87 per cent) amongst the unionised (six out of 41; i.e. 14.63 per cent) and non-
unionised sectors (five out of 33; i.e. 15.15 per cent) denoted “sometimes”. However, 
the scope of responses is also widely scattered as eight non-unionised (i.e. 24.24 per 
cent) and 10 unionised organisations (i.e. 24.39 per cent) do not use “at all” this form 
of employee communication and two non-unionised and four unionised organisations 
use it “infrequently”. 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Workplace-site 
Intranet 
Not at all 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
8 
2 
5 
10 
4 
6 
18 
6 
11 
Often 3 9 12 
Total 
A great deal 15 
33 
12 
41 
27 
74 
Finally, the last form of direct involvement that is included in the questionnaire is 
“Email Reporting/Updates”. It appears to be, together with the “Workplace-site 
Intranet”, one of the most prevalent forms of direct communication, as 25 
organisations denoted that use it “a great deal”, with a higher response rate in this 
category from the non-unionised sector (15 out 33; i.e. 45.46 per cent) than for 
unionised workplaces (10 out of 41; i.e. 24.39 per cent). In addition, 16 organisations 
(i.e. 21.62 per cent) use this form of direct communication “often” with slightly 
different response rates between the unionised (eight out of 41; i.e. 19.51 per cent) 
and non-unionised sectors (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent). An identical number 
of organisations denoted “sometimes” with a varying response rate coming from 
unionised (11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent) and non-unionised workplaces (five out of 
33; i.e. 15.15 per cent). On the other hand, some unionised organisations (nine out of 
41; i.e. 21.95 per cent) and a limited number of non-unionised workplaces (two out of 
33; i.e. 6.06 per cent) denoted “infrequent” use of “Email reporting”. Finally, only one 
unionised and three non-unionised organisations do not use “at all” this form of direct 
communication. 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
E-mail Not at all 3 1 4 
Reporting/ 
Updates 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
2 
5 
9 
11 
11 
16 
Often 8 8 16 
A great deal 15 10 25 
Not answered 0 2 2 
Total 33 41 74 
II. Information-Sharing with Employees 
“Information-Sharing for Financial Issues” is prevalent in the vast majority of 
organisations. 24 organisations (i.e. 32.43 per cent) “often” follow this practice and 
identical number of responses denoted “a great deal”. Nearly similar are the response 
rates amongst the unionised (i.e. 14 out of 41; i.e. 34.15 per cent) and non-unionised 
organisations (10 out of 33; i.e. 30.30 per cent) that designated “often” dissemination 
of this sort of information, whilst the corresponding rates are converse and slightly 
different between the unionised (12 out of 41; i.e. 29.27 per cent) and non-unionised 
sectors (12 out of 33; i.e. 36.36 per cent) regarding the most regular provision of 
information. A bit lower are the response rates concerning those organisations that 
reported that “sometimes” they provide this sort of information, with slightly variant 
figures between the unionised (11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent) and non-unionised 
organisations (seven out of 33; i.e. 21.21 per cent). Quite nominal and relatively 
trivial are the responses that assigned “infrequent” and “not at all”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information Not at all 2 0 2 
about Financial 
Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
2 
7 
4 
11 
6 
18 
Often 10 14 24 
A great deal 12 12 24 
Total 33 41 74 
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Similar is the distribution of responses for information-sharing about “Production 
Issues”. Most of organisations (27 out of 74; i.e. 36.49 per cent) responded that they 
“often” provide this sort of information to their employees with higher figures for the 
unionised (18 out of 41; i.e. 43.90 per cent) as compared to the non-unionised sector 
(nine out 33; i.e. 27.27 per cent). Almost identical are the responses rates between the 
unionised (13 out of 41; i.e. 31.71 per cent) and non-unionised organisations (11 out 
of 33; i.e. 33.33 per cent) concerning the most regular dissemination of information 
for “Production Issues”. Relatively lower and similar are the responses that denoted 
“sometimes” for both the unionised (seven out of 41; i.e. 17.07 per cent) and non-
unionised organisations (six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent). Nominal are the responses 
regarding “infrequently” and “not at all”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information about Not at all 1 0 1 
Production 
Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
4 
6 
1 
7 
5 
13 
Often 9 18 27 
A great deal 11 13 24 
Not answered 2 2 4 
Total 33 41 74 
Very common is the provision of information for “Employment Issues” and especially 
for the unionised organisations where collective bargaining for this sort of issues is 
more coherent and effective. More specifically, a substantial number of organisations 
(16 out of 74; i.e. 21.62 per cent) also denoted that they follow this practice to “a great 
extent”, but with a much stronger dominance in the unionised (13 out of 41; i.e. 31.71 
per cent) rather than the non-unionised sector (three out of 33; i.e. 9.09 per cent). In 
addition, the vast majority of organisations (31 out of 74; i.e. 41.89 per cent) inform 
“often” their employees about such issues, with high response rates for both the 
unionised (16 out of 41; i.e. 39.02 per cent) and non-unionised organisations (15 out 
of 33; i.e. 45.46 per cent). Higher are also the responses from unionised workplaces 
(nine out of 41; i.e. 21.95 per cent) as compared with non-unionised workplaces (four 
out of 33; i.e. 12.12 per cent) for those denoting “sometimes”. Similarly with the 
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aforementioned issues, nominal are the responses regarding “infrequently” and “not at 
all”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information about Not at all 2 0 2 
Employment 
Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
4 
4 
1 
9 
5 
13 
Often 15 16 31 
A great deal 3 13 16 
Not answered 5 2 7 
Total 33 41 74 
Likewise, the provision of another sort of issues (i.e. Pay Issues), which are 
predominantly involved in the agenda of collective bargaining and directly affect 
employees, has a high response rate in the unionised sector. More specifically, 18 
organisations (i.e. 24.32 per cent) denoted that they extensively disseminate 
information about “Pay Issues”, with higher response rate in the unionised sector (i.e. 
12 out of 41; i.e. 29.27 per cent) when contrasted with the non-unionised sector (six 
out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent). In addition, the majority of organisations (26 out of 74; 
i.e. 35.14 per cent) provide “often” this sort of information, with nearly similar 
response rate in non-unionised workplaces (12 out of 33; i.e. 36.36 per cent) 
compared with unionised workplaces (14 out of 41; i.e. 34.15 per cent). Some 
responses (19 out of 74; i.e. 25.68 per cent) denoted “sometimes”, with slightly 
similar response rates amongst the unionised (11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent) and 
non-unionised organisations (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent). Quite nominal 
responses were denoted as “not at all” and “infrequently”.      
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information Not at all 2 0 2 
about Pay 
Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
3 
8 
1 
11 
4 
19 
Often 12 14 26 
A great deal 6 12 18 
Not answered 2 3 5 
Total 33 41 74 
Information-sharing for “Future Plans” is also widespread for the majority of 
organisations with nearly similar response rates for both sectors. More specifically, 
the vast majority of responses denoted “often” (31 out of 74; i.e. 41.89 per cent), with 
slightly lower response rate in the unionised sector (17 out of 41; i.e. 41.46 per cent) 
as compared with the non-unionised sector (14 out of 33; i.e. 42.42 per cent). In 
addition, fewer of organisations (14 out of 74; i.e. 18.92 per cent) denoted “a great 
deal”, with similar response rates amongst the unionised (eight out of 41; i.e. 19.51 
per cent) and non-unionised organisations (six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent). 
Likewise, a nearly identical number of organisations (16 out of 74; i.e. 21.62 per cent) 
denoted “sometimes”, with slightly higher response rate for the unionised sector (10 
out of 41; i.e. 24.39 per cent) as compared with non-unionised sector (6 out of 33; i.e. 
18.18 per cent). Finally, eight organisations denoted “infrequently”, whilst only three 
responses were designated as “not at all”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information Not at all 3 0 3 
about 
Future 
Plans 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
Often 
3 
6 
14 
5 
10 
17 
8 
16 
31 
A great deal 6 8 14 
Not answered 1 1 2 
Total 33 41 74 
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Information-sharing for “Leave and Flexible Working Arrangements” tends to be 
slightly more regular in non-unionised workplaces. The majority of organisations (28 
out of 74; i.e. 37.84 per cent) argued that they provide “often” this sort of information 
to their employees, with higher dominance in the non-unionised sector (15 out of 33; 
i.e. 45.46 per cent) as compared with the unionised sector (13 out of 41; i.e. 31.71 per 
cent). In addition, 19 responses (i.e. 25.68 per cent) declared “sometimes”, with lower 
rates in the non-unionised sector (6 out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent) in contrast with the 
unionised sector (13 out of 41; i.e. 31.71 per cent). On the other hand, slightly higher 
is the response rate for “infrequently” sharing this sort of information in non-
unionised workplaces (six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent) compared with unionised 
workplaces (six out of 41; i.e. 14.63 per cent). Nonetheless, seven organisations 
extensively provide information for such issues, with relatively equal response rate 
between the two sectors. Finally, a nominal number of responses denoted “not at all”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information about Not at all 1 2 3 
Leave and Flexible 
Working Arrangements 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
6 
6 
6 
13 
12 
19 
Often 15 13 28 
A great deal 3 4 7 
Not answered 2 3 5 
Total 33 41 74 
A marked variation in the responses was provided by organisations regarding the 
information-sharing about “Work Organisation Issues”, but predominantly the 
majority of responses (25 out of 74; i.e. 33.78 per cent) are denoted as “often” with 
slightly more evident response rate for non-unionised workplaces (12 out 33; i.e. 
36.36 per cent) in comparison with the unionised sector (13 out 41; i.e. 31.70 per 
cent). The majority of unionised organisations (15 out of 41; i.e. 36.59 per cent) 
denoted “sometimes”, whilst the corresponding figure for the non-unionised sector is 
lower (seven out of 33; i.e. 21.21 per cent). Some respondents (12 out of 74; i.e. 16.22 
per cent) designated an extensive provision of this sort of information, with higher 
incidence in the unionised sector (eight out of 41; i.e. 19.51 per cent) rather than the 
non-unionised sector (four out of 33; i.e. 12.12 per cent). On the other hand, only a 
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few non-unionised organisations (seven out of 33; i.e. 21.21 per cent) “infrequently” 
inform their employees about “Work Organisation Issues” and the corresponding rate 
for the unionised organisations is even lower (three out of 41; i.e. 7.31 per cent). 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information Not at all 1 0 1 
about Work 
Organisation 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
7 
7 
3 
15 
10 
22 
Often 12 13 25 
A great deal 4 8 12 
Not answered 2 2 4 
Total 33 41 74 
As previously noted, there is a moderate dissemination of information relevant to the 
“Training Strategy” with slight differences between the two sectors. The majority of 
organisations (21 out of 74; i.e. 28.38 per cent) “infrequently” provide this sort of 
information with slightly identical response rates between the unionised (12 out of 41; 
i.e. 29.27 per cent) and non-unionised sectors (nine out of 33; i.e. 27.27 per cent). 
Similarly, with a bit lower number in total (18 out of 74; i.e. 24.35 per cent) and 
nearly identical response rates, some unionised (10 out of 41; i.e. 24.39 per cent) and 
non-unionised organisations (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent) “often” inform their 
employees about “Training Issues”. Conversely, there are different response rates that 
denote “sometimes” (19 organisations in total), amongst the unionised sector (nine out 
of 41; i.e. 21.95 per cent) and non-unionised sector (10 out of 33; i.e. 30.30 per cent). 
Eight organisations (with equal split between the two sectors) extensively (i.e. “a 
great deal”) provide information about such issues, whilst one non-unionised and four 
unionised organisations do not provide such information “at all”. 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information Not at all 1 4 5 
about 
Training 
Strategy 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
Often 
9 
10 
8 
12 
9 
10 
21 
19 
18 
A great deal 4 4 8 
Not answered 1 2 3 
Total 33 41 74 
Similar is the range of responses regarding “Equality and Diversity Issues” in relation 
to “Training Strategy”. The majority of organisations denoted similar number of 
responses (22 out of 74; i.e. 29.73 per cent) for providing “infrequently and 
sometimes” information for this type of issues, with nearly identical response rates 
amongst the unionised (12 out of 41; i.e. 29.27 per cent) and non-unionised sectors 
(10 out of 33; i.e. 30.30 per cent). A lower number of organisations (12 out of 74; i.e. 
16.22 per cent) “often” provide this sort of information, with a slightly higher 
response rate in the non-unionised sector (six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent) when 
compared with the unionised sector (six out of 41; i.e. 14.63 per cent). Likewise, nine 
organisations extensively (i.e. “a great deal”) inform their employees about “Training 
Strategy” with almost identical response rates amongst the unionised (five out of 41; 
i.e. 12.20 per cent) and non-unionised sectors (four out of 33; i.e. 12.12 per cent). 
Nonetheless, on this matter there was a higher response rate of unionised 
organisations (six out of 41; i.e. 14.63 per cent), as compared with the non-unionised 
organisations (two out of 33; i.e. 6.06 per cent) that they do not provide “at all” this 
sort of information.  
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information about Not at all 2 6 8 
Equality/Diversity 
Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
10 
10 
12 
12 
22 
22 
Often 6 6 12 
A great deal 4 5 9 
Not answered 1 0 1 
Total 33 41 74 
The majority of organisations (23 out of 74; i.e. 31.08 per cent) “often” inform their 
employees about issues that involve “Pensions”, with this response rate being lower 
for the unionised sector (11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent), compared with the non-
unionised sector (12 out of 33; i.e. 36.36 per cent). In addition, 11 organisations (i.e. 
14.87 per cent) denoted “a great deal” in their responses, with similar proportion 
between the unionised (six out of 41; i.e. 14.63 per cent) and non-unionised sectors 
(five out of 33; i.e. 15.15 per cent). Slightly more organisations (14 out of 74; i.e. 
18.92 per cent) denoted “sometimes” in their responses, with nearly identical rates 
amongst the unionised (eight out of 41; i.e. 19.51 per cent) and non-unionised sectors 
(six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent). On the other hand, a substantial proportion of 
unionised organisations (11 out of 41; 26.83 per cent) “infrequently” provide 
information about “pensions”, whilst the figures are lower for the non-unionised 
organisations (five out of 33; i.e. 15.15 per cent). Only a nominal number of responses 
would be denoted as “not at all”. 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information Not at all 2 3 5 
about 
Pensions 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
5 
6 
11 
8 
16 
14 
Often 12 11 23 
A great deal 5 6 11 
Not answered 3 2 5 
Total 33 41 74 
It is noteworthy that a substantial number of organisations (31 out of 74; i.e. 41.89 per 
cent) provide “often” information about “Health and Safety Issues”, with higher 
incidence in the non-unionised sector (16 out of 33; i.e. 48.49 per cent) compared with 
the unionised sector (15 out of 41; i.e. 36.59 per cent). Apparently, the significance of 
this issue is evident through the response rates and especially for the unionised sector. 
In particular, very high proportion of organisations (29 out of 74; i.e. 39.19 per cent) 
denoted in their responses “a great deal”, with higher rate in the unionised 
organisations (19 out of 41; i.e. 46.34 per cent) in relation to the non-unionised 
organisations (10 out of 33; i.e. 30.30 per cent). Much less is the incidence for the 
remaining scope of responses. More specifically, five unionised and two non-
unionised organisations provide “sometimes” information about “Health and Safety 
Issues”, whilst one unionised and three non-unionised organisations denoted 
“infrequently” and none of the responses were designated as “not at all”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information 
about Health 
and Safety 
Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
Often 
A great deal 
3 
2 
16 
10 
1 
5 
15 
19 
4 
7 
31 
29 
Not answered 2 1 3 
Total 33 41 74 
A scattered scope of answers can be pinpointed for information-sharing about 
“Technological Issues”, but most of organisations responded “sometimes” with higher 
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incidence in the unionised sector (17 out of 41; i.e. 41.46 per cent), as compared with 
the responses from the non-unionised sector (nine out of 33; i.e. 27.27 per cent). A 
substantial number of organisations (15 out of 74; i.e. 20.27 per cent) provide “often” 
information about such issues, with nearly identical response rates amongst unionised 
(eight out of 41; i.e. 19.51 per cent) and non-unionised workplaces (seven out of 33; 
i.e. 21.21 per cent). A much lower proportion of responses can be pinpointed as 
“extensive” (i.e. “a great deal”), with only two unionised and four non-unionised 
organisations providing extensive information on such issues. On the other hand, 17 
organisations (i.e. 22.97 per cent) “infrequently” provide information about 
“Technological Changes”, with nearly similar response rates between the unionised 
(nine out of 41; i.e. 21.95 per cent) and non-unionised sectors (eight out of 33; i.e. 
24.24 per cent). Only six responses are denoted as “not at all” with equal split of 
respondents between the two sectors. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information about Not at all 3 3 6 
Technological 
Changes 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
8 
9 
9 
17 
17 
26 
Often 7 8 15 
A great deal 4 2 6 
Not answered 2 2 4 
Total 33 41 74 
The majority of organisations (28 out of 74; i.e. 37.84 per cent) inform “often” their 
employees about “Management/Supervision Arrangements”, with nearly parallel 
incidence in unionised (15 out of 41; i.e. 36.59 per cent) and non-unionised 
workplaces (13 out of 33; i.e. 39.39 per cent). A slightly identical number of 
organisations (26 out of 74; i.e. 35.14 per cent) provide less regularly (i.e. 
“sometimes”) information about such issues, with a higher incidence in the unionised 
sector (18 out of 41; i.e. 43.90 per cent) in comparison with the non-unionised sector 
(eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent). Nine organisations denoted “a great deal” in their 
responses, and five of them are from the unionised sector. On the other hand, six non-
unionised and two unionised organisations provide “infrequently” such information. 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information about Not at all 1 0 1 
Management/Supervision 
Arrangements 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
6 
8 
2 
18 
8 
26 
Often 13 15 28 
A great deal 4 5 9 
Not answered 1 1 2 
Total 33 41 74 
Finally, issues about “Corporate Social Responsibility” are not included so regularly 
in the process of information-sharing”. In particular, identical number of responses 
(18 out of 74; i.e. 24.32 per cent) denoted “not at all”, “infrequently” and 
“sometimes” with variant figures between the two sectors. The corresponding 
response rates for nominal information-sharing are slightly higher for the unionised 
sector (11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent) in contrast with the non-unionised sector 
(seven out of 33; i.e. 21.21 per cent). For “infrequent” dissemination of information 
the figures are much higher for the unionised organisations (13 out of 41; i.e. 31.71 
per cent) rather than the non-unionised organisations (five out of 33; i.e. 15.15 per 
cent). On the other hand, the majority of non-unionised workplaces (nine out of 33; 
i.e. 27.27 per cent) provide information about “Corporate Social Responsibility 
issues” quite moderately (i.e. “sometimes”), whilst the corresponding ratio for the 
unionised organisations is slightly lower (nine out of 41; i.e. 21.95 per cent). A 
slightly lower number of non-unionised organisations (seven out of 33; i.e. 21.21 per 
cent) denoted more regular information-sharing (i.e. “often”), whilst the ratio for the 
unionised companies is much lower (five out of 41; i.e. 12.95 per cent). Finally, only 
four non-unionised and two unionised extensively inform their employees about 
“Corporate Responsibility Issues”. 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Information about Not at all 7 11 18 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
5 
9 
13 
9 
18 
18 
Often 7 5 12 
A great deal 4 2 6 
Not answered 1 1 2 
Total 33 41 74 
III. Consultation with Employees 
There are scattered responses about consultation on “Financial Issues”, but mainly the 
majority of organisations (18 out of 74; i.e. 24.32 per cent) consult with their 
employees “sometimes” about such issues, with identical response rates amongst 
unionised (10 out of 41; i.e. 24.39 per cent) and non-unionised workplaces (eight out 
of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent). Some organisations (13 out of 74; i.e. 17.57 per cent) also 
denoted “often”, with slightly higher incidence in the unionised sector (eight out of 
41; i.e. 19.51 per cent) compared with the non-unionised sector (five out of 33; i.e. 
15.15 per cent). In addition, six unionised and three non-unionised extensively consult 
with their employees about “Financial Issues”. On the other hand, the responses 
indicate that four unionised and five non-unionised workplaces “infrequently” provide 
consultation for such issues, and 12 organisations (with equal split between the two 
sectors) do not consult “at all” on these issues. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation Not at all 6 6 12 
about Financial 
Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
5 
8 
4 
10 
9 
18 
Often 5 8 13 
A great deal 3 6 9 
Not answered 6 7 13 
Total 33 41 74 
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More coherent is the consultation about “Production Issues”, since 25 organisations 
(i.e. 33.79 per cent) “often” consult with the employees about this type of issue with 
much higher incidence in unionised workplaces (18 out of 41; i.e. 43.90 per cent) in 
contrast with the non-unionised sector (seven out of 33; i.e. 21.21 per cent). In 
addition, nine responses (i.e. 12.16 per cent) indicate that consultation is “extensive”, 
with slightly higher occurrence in the unionised sector (i.e. 14.63 per cent) than in 
non-unionised workplaces (i.e. 9.09 per cent). A substantial number of organisations 
(18 out of 74; i.e. 24.32 per cent) responded that they consult “sometimes”, with split 
difference between unionised (nine out of 41; i.e. 21.95 per cent) and non-unionised 
workplaces (nine out of 33; i.e. 27.27 per cent). On the other hand, six organisations 
do not consult “at all” about “Production Issues” (five of which are non-unionised) 
and an identical number of organisations consult “infrequently”, with there being an 
equal split between the two sectors. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
Total No Yes 
Consultation 
about Production 
Issues 
Total 
Not at all 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
Often 
A great deal 
Not answered 
5 
3 
9 
7 
3 
6 
33 
1 
3 
9 
18 
6 
4 
41 
6 
6 
18 
25 
9 
10 
74 
As it was previously noted, consultation about “Employment Issues” is quite 
widespread, especially in unionised workplaces. More specifically, the majority of 
organisations (22 out of 74; i.e. 29.73 per cent) do consult “often”, with higher 
incidence in the unionised sector (14 out of 41; i.e. 34.15 per cent) compared with the 
non-unionised sector (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent). Similar is the incidence of 
responses that denoted “a great deal” of consultation in the unionised organisations 
(i.e. 34.15 per cent), whereas in non-unionised workplaces this level of incidence is 
quite minimal (two out of 33; i.e. 6.06 per cent). Furthermore, some organisations (16 
out of 74; i.e. 21.62 per cent) denoted that they “sometimes” consult with their 
employees, with there being a slightly higher response rate in the non-unionised 
sector (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent) compared with the unionised sector (eight 
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out of 41; i.e. 19.51 per cent). On the other hand, since “Employment Issues” are 
regularly included on collective bargaining agendas, it is to be expected that mainly 
non-unionised organisations will consult less frequently about such issues and this is 
confirmed by the findings of the survey, since 10 responses (i.e. 13.51 per cent) 
denoted “infrequently” and eight of them are from the non-unionised sector. Only four 
responses indicated that there is no consultation “at all” and three of them are from 
non-unionised workplaces. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation about Not at all 3 1 4 
Employment 
Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
8 
8 
2 
8 
10 
16 
Often 8 14 22 
A great deal 2 14 16 
Not answered 4 2 6 
Total 33 41 74 
Similarly, the majority of unionised organisations (14 out of 41; i.e. 34.15 per cent) 
extensively consult with their employees about another core item of collective 
bargaining (i.e. “Pay Issues”), with there being a much lower incidence in the non-
unionised sector (three out of 33; i.e. 9.09 per cent). In addition, some organisations 
(18 out of 74; i.e. 24.32 per cent) denoted that “often” consult with their employees 
about payment issues, with slightly higher proportional incidence in unionised 
workplaces (11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent) compared with the non-unionised sector 
(seven out of 33; i.e. 21.21 per cent). Most of organisations, in total (20 out of 74; i.e. 
27.03 per cent), denoted “sometimes” in their responses, with higher rate in the 
unionised sector (12 out of 41; i.e. 29.27 per cent) compared with the non-unionised 
sector (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent). A limited number of responses referred to 
“infrequent” consultation; none of the unionised organisations do not consult “at all”, 
whilst five non-unionised companies actually do. 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation Not at all 5 0 5 
about Pay 
Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
4 
8 
2 
12 
6 
20 
Often 7 11 18 
A great deal 3 14 17 
Not answered 6 2 8 
Total 33 41 74 
Quite widespread is the consultation on “Future Plans”, with 20 organisations (i.e. 
27.03 per cent) denoting “often” on this matter and there is a much higher frequency 
in the unionised sector (15 out of 41; i.e. 36.59 per cent) when compared with the 
non-unionised sector (five out of 33; i.e. 15.15 per cent). Fewer organisations (i.e. 
12.16 per cent) extensively consult about such issues, with there being a slightly 
higher response rate for unionised workplaces (six out of 41; i.e. 14.63 per cent) in 
contrast with the non-unionised sector (three out of 33; i.e. 9.09 per cent). A 
significant number of responses (15 out of 74; i.e. 20.27 per cent) were denoted as 
“sometimes”, with nearly identical ratios between unionised (eight out of 41; i.e. 
19.51 per cent) and non-unionised workplaces (seven out of 33; i.e. 21.21 per cent). 
Six unionised and five non-unionised organisations “infrequently” consult about such 
issues; and finally, one unionised and six non-unionised organisations do not consult 
“at all”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation Not at all 6 1 7 
about Future 
Plans 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
5 
7 
6 
8 
11 
15 
Often 5 15 20 
A great deal 3 6 9 
Not answered 7 5 12 
Total 33 41 74 
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The majority of organisations (21 out of 74; i.e. 28.28 per cent) “often” consult with 
their employees about “Leave and Flexible Working Arrangements”, with nearly 
identical response rates amongst the unionised (11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent) and 
non-unionised sectors (10 out of 33; i.e. 30.30 per cent). Slightly fewer respondents 
(17 out of 74; i.e. 22.97 per cent) denoted “sometimes”, with there being variant 
responses between the unionised (12 out of 41; i.e. 29.27 per cent) and non-unionised 
sectors (five out of 33; i.e. 15.15 per cent). Four unionised and three non-unionised 
organisations indicated that they “extensively” consult with their employees about 
these issues. On the other hand, 16 organisations, with an equal share between the two 
sectors, consult “infrequently” with their employees about such issues. Nearly 
nominal are the responses that are denoted as “not at all”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation about Not at all 3 2 5 
Leave and Flexible 
Working Arrangements 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
8 
5 
8 
12 
16 
17 
Often 10 11 21 
A great deal 3 4 7 
Not answered 4 4 8 
Total 33 41 74 
A vastly higher proportion of unionised organisations (10 out of 41; i.e. 24.39 per 
cent) claimed that they “extensively” consult with their employees about “Work 
Organisation Issues”, than non-unionised organisations (one out of 33). The majority 
of the respondents (21 out of 74; i.e. 28.38 per cent) suggested that provision of 
consultation “often” takes place for such issues with higher ratio in the non-unionised 
sector (11 out of 33; i.e. 33.33 per cent) than the unionised sector (10 out of 41; i.e. 
24.39 per cent). Slightly fewer respondents (18 out of 74; i.e. 24.32 per cent) denoted 
“sometimes” with regard to this matter, with variant figures between the unionised 
(11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent) and non-unionised organisations (seven out of 33; 
i.e. 21.21 per cent). On the other hand, in seven non-unionised and six unionised 
workplaces, there is “infrequent” consultation about “Work Organisation”. 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation Not at all 2 0 2 
about Work 
Organisation 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
7 
7 
6 
11 
13 
18 
Often 11 10 21 
A great deal 1 10 11 
Not answered 5 4 9 
Total 33 41 74 
Likewise with “information-sharing”, there was moderate response rate about 
consultation with employees for “Training Strategy”, since 20 organisations (i.e. 
27.03 per cent) “infrequently” consult with their employees and the figures in the 
unionised sector (14 out of 41; i.e. 34.15 per cent) are higher when compared with the 
corresponding figures in non-unionised workplaces (six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent). 
Slightly fewer respondents (17 out of 74; i.e. 22.97 per cent) denoted “sometimes”, 
with there being nearly similar response rates amongst the unionised (nine out of 41; 
i.e. 21.95 per cent) and non-unionised organisations (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per 
cent). Even fewer respondents (11 out of 74; i.e. 14.87 per cent) denoted “often”, and 
likewise, the response rates are almost identical across the unionised (six out of 41; 
i.e. 14.63 per cent) and non-unionised sectors (five out of 33; i.e. 15.15 per cent). 
Exactly, the same number of unionised (i.e. three out of 41; i.e. 7.31 per cent) and 
non-unionised organisations (i.e. five out of 33; i.e. 15.15 per cent) denoted in their 
answers “not at all” or “a great deal”. 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation Not at all 5 3 8 
about Training 
Strategy 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
6 
8 
14 
9 
20 
17 
Often 5 6 11 
A great deal 5 3 8 
Not answered 4 6 10 
Total 33 41 74 
Similar is the scattering of responses regarding consultation about “Equality and 
Diversity Issues”. Most of organisations (18 out of 74; i.e. 24.32 per cent) 
“infrequently” do consult, with identical response rates between the unionised (10 out 
of 41; i.e. 24.39) and non-unionised sectors (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent). In 
addition, 14 organisations (i.e. 18.92 per cent) denoted “sometimes” in their 
responses, with a higher response rate at this level from the unionised sector (10 out 
of 41; i.e. 24.39 per cent) when compared with the non-unionised sector (four out of 
33; i.e. 12.12 per cent). A rather limited response rate was designated as “often”, since 
only five unionised and three non-unionised organisations provided such a response. 
However, a bit higher response rate (10 out of 74; i.e. 13.51 per cent) denotes an 
“extensive” incidence and use of consultation for “Equality and Diversity Issues”, 
while the number of respondents is equally shared between the two sectors. On the 
other hand, seven non-unionised and four unionised organisations do not consult “at 
all” about these issues. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation Not at all 7 4 11 
Equality/Diversity 
Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
8 
4 
10 
10 
18 
14 
Often 3 5 8 
A great deal 5 5 10 
Not answered 6 7 13 
Total 33 41 74 
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More regularly, consultation is implemented for issues that involve “Pensions”. More 
specifically, the majority of organisations (18 out of 74; i.e. 24.32 per cent) “often” 
consult their employees about these issues, with more responses at this level coming 
from unionised workplaces (12 out of 41; i.e. 29.27 per cent) than from the non-
unionised sector (six out of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent). However, only eight organisations 
“extensively” provide the right of consultation on this matter and five of them are 
non-unionised. In addition, some respondents (14 out of 74; i.e. 18.92 per cent) 
indicated that consultation occurs “sometimes” with higher incidence in the non-
unionised sector (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent) than in the unionised sector (six 
out of 41; i.e. 14.63 per cent). In seven unionised and four non-unionised workplaces 
there is “infrequent” consultation, whilst eight unionised and four non-unionised 
organisations do not consult “at all”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation Not at all 4 8 12 
about 
Pensions 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
4 
8 
7 
6 
11 
14 
Often 6 12 18 
A great deal 5 3 8 
Not answered 6 5 11 
Total 33 41 74 
Extensive consultation is implemented about “Health and Safety Issues”, with higher 
incidence in the unionised sector. More specifically, the majority of organisations (28 
out of 74; i.e. 37.84 per cent) quite extensively (i.e. “a great deal”) consult with their 
employees about such issues and this is significantly more common in unionised 
workplaces (19 out of 41; i.e. 46.34 per cent) than in the non-unionised sector (nine 
out of 33; i.e. 27.27 per cent). In addition, a quite substantial number of organisations 
(25 out of 74; i.e. 33.78 per cent) provide “often” the right of consultation and 
conversely the incidence is higher in the non-unionised sector (14 out of 33; i.e. 42.42 
per cent) rather than the unionised sector (11 out of 41; i.e. 26.83 per cent). On the 
other hand, a limited number of organisations (eight out of 74; i.e. 10.81 per cent) 
denoted “sometimes” and six of these are unionised. Quite nominal are the responses 
that “designated” in their answers “infrequently” and “not at all”. 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation Not at all 3 0 3 
about Health 
and Safety 
Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
Often 
2 
2 
14 
2 
6 
11 
4 
8 
25 
A great deal 9 19 28 
Not answered 3 3 6 
Total 33 41 74 
Similarly with the case of information-sharing, the majority of organisations (23 out 
of 74; i.e. 31.08 per cent) moderately (i.e. “sometimes”) consult with their employees 
about “Technological Changes”, with far more responses at this level coming from the 
unionised sector (15 out of 41; i.e. 36.59 per cent) as compared with non-unionised 
workplaces (eight out of 33; i.e. 24.24 per cent). In addition, 10 organisations “often” 
provide consultation and six of them are unionised. Only five organisations, of which 
three of them are unionised, consult “extensively” with their employees. Nonetheless, 
eight unionised and seven non-unionised organisations responded that this practice 
was “infrequent” and 10 responded (with equal share amongst the two sectors) “not at 
all”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation about Not at all 5 5 10 
Technological 
Changes 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
7 
8 
8 
15 
15 
23 
Often 4 6 10 
A great deal 2 3 5 
Not answered 7 4 11 
Total 33 41 74 
When compared with “Technological Changes”, a nearly similar distribution of 
responses was received in relation to consultation about “Management and 
Supervision Arrangements”. That is, most of the organisations (17 out of 74; i.e. 
22.97 per cent) moderately (i.e. “sometimes”) consult with their employees with there 
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being a much higher incidence in unionised workplaces (13 out of 41; i.e. 31.73 per 
cent) than in non-unionised workplaces (four out of 33; i.e. 12.12 per cent). 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that there is a much higher response rate for more 
regular (i.e. “sometimes”) consultation with the employees in non-unionised 
workplaces (nine out of 33; i.e. 27.27 per cent) compared with the unionised 
workplaces (four out of 41; i.e. 9.76 per cent). Only five organisations, of which three 
are unionised, denoted in their answers that there is “a great deal” of consultation on 
such issues. On the other hand, 15 organisations, which nine of them being unionised, 
“infrequently” consult with their employees and 10 organisations (with equal share of 
respondents between the two sectors) do not consult “at all”. 
Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation about Not at all 5 5 10 
Management/Supervision 
Arrangements 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
6 
4 
9 
13 
15 
17 
Often 9 4 13 
A great deal 2 3 5 
Not answered 7 7 14 
Total 33 41 74 
Likewise with information-sharing, consultation about “Corporate Social 
Responsibility” “infrequently” takes place for most of organisations (21 out of 74; i.e. 
28.38 per cent) with there being a much higher response rate for the unionised sector 
(15 out of 41; i.e. 36.59 per cent) as compared with non-unionised workplaces (six out 
of 33; i.e. 18.18 per cent). A substantial number of respondents (18 out of 74; i.e. 
24.32 per cent) denoted that there is no consultation “at all” with the employees, with 
there being a nearly identical response rate amongst the unionised (10 out of 41; i.e. 
24.39 per cent) and non-unionised workplaces (eight out of 33; 24.24 per cent). On 
the other hand, 12 organisations (with equal share of respondents between the two 
sectors) consult with their employees “sometimes”. Seven organisations, of which 
four are non-unionised, implement this practice more regularly (i.e. “often”). Only in 
three workplaces (which two of them are unionised) is consultation extensively 
applied. 
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Recognition of Trade 
Unions 
No Yes Total 
Consultation about Not at all 8 10 18 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility Issues 
Infrequently 
Sometimes 
6 
6 
15 
6 
21 
12 
Often 4 3 7 
A great deal 1 2 3 
Not answered 8 5 13 
Total 33 41 74 
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Interview Schedule 

I. Interview Questions with Trade Union and Employee 
Representatives  
General Introductory Questions 
•	 What is your job title and responsibilities in your organisation? 
•	 How do you describe the current employment relations in your organisation? 
•	 Have any changes been recently made in the implementation of employee 
voice arrangements due to legal or other policy interventions? If yes, what 
changes have been made? What do you expect in the future from these 
changes? 
•	 To what extent are you aware of the ICE Regulations? 
Employment Involvement Practices 
•	 Which are the main features of employee voice arrangements in your 
organisation and how these arrangements are being designed? 
•	 Which are the main features of the employee involvement practices in your 
organisation? 
•	 Do you have trade union recognition agreement at your workplace, a work 
council and any other form of employee representation? 
General Questions about Employee Involvement/Participation: 
¾ Do you have regular downward or upward communication with the managers 
in your organisation (such as: team meetings between managers and 
employees)? How these procedures take place and over which issues? 
¾ At which stage employee participation takes place? (i.e. Is it proactive or 
reactive? What is the timing of information-sharing and consultation?) 
¾ Which other methods or arrangements are used? (such as: the negotiation 
process). 
¾ Any other arrangements for the conduct of meetings? (such as: agenda setting, 
reporting of the minutes, newsletters etc). 
¾ What is the impact of the ICE Regulations on these procedures? 
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¾	 Is there any signed agreement with the employees concerning the 
involvement and participation arrangements (such as: information 
sharing, communication, consultation or negotiation)? 
¾	 How do you understand/consider the terms: information, communication, 
consultation and negotiation? 
Information-Sharing 
•	 Do you receive information for important working decisions? If yes, which 
type of information do you receive? How the process of information-sharing 
takes place? 
•	 To what extent (or how often) are you being informed about strategic issues, 
such as: company strategy/plans for the future or major structural changes to 
the company? 
•	 To what extent are you being informed about employment issues, such as: 
employment prospects, conditions of employment, training and skill 
development? 
•	 To what extent are you being informed about financial issues, such as: budget 
of the organisation, sales, profits, market share etc? 
•	 To what extent are you being informed about other issues? 
•	 Have any changes been recently made in the way that you are being informed. 
If so, how these changes have been implemented (whether these changes are 
due to the legislation and whether they comply with the requirements of ICE 
Regulations)? 
•	 Why do you believe that the process of information-sharing is important for 
your organisation? Which are your expectations from it? 
Consultation of Employees 
•	 How often are you being consulted before important working decisions are 
made? 
•	 Is there any form of direct or indirect consultation at your workplace? If yes, 
about which issues you are being consulted? How the consultation process 
takes place? How often does it take place? 
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•	 To what extent (or how often) are you being consulted about strategic issues, 
such as: company strategy/plans for the future or major structural changes? 
•	 To what extent are you being consulted about employment issues, such as: 
employment prospects, conditions of employment, training and skill 
development? 
•	 To what extent are you being consulted about financial issues, such as: budget 
of the organisation, sales, profits, market share etc? 
•	 To what extent are you being consulted about other issues? 
•	 To what extent are you being consulted over working decisions that directly 
affect you? 
•	 To what extent do you believe that your views are being heard? 
•	 To what extent do you believe that you have influence over important 
working decisions? 
•	 Have any changes been recently made in the way that you are being 
consulted? If so, how these changes have been implemented (whether these 
changes are due to the legislative provisions and whether they comply with 
the requirements of ICE Regulations)? 
•	 Why do you believe that consultation is important for your organisation? 
Which are your expectations from it? 
Closure 
•	 In your opinion, which are the main benefits from the: (1) employee voice 
arrangements, (2) two-way communication between managers and you, (3) 
information-sharing from managers to you, (4) consultation process? 
•	 In your opinion, which are the critical issues and factors that should be 
considered in designing the: (1) employee voice arrangements, (2) two-way 
communication between managers and you, (3) information-sharing from 
managers to you, (4) consultation process? 
•	 In your opinion, which are the main forces that may constrain the 
implementation of the: (1) employee voice arrangements, (2) two-way 
communication between the managers and you, (3) information-sharing from 
managers to you, (4) consultation process? 
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•	 How do you believe that employee voice arrangements should be better 
designed and implemented in relation to the: (a) employee involvement 
practices, (b) information-sharing to employees, (c) consultation process? 
•	 In your opinion, to what extent do you believe that the ICE Regulations have 
already affected or will possibly affect your workplace? 
•	 In your opinion, whether the ICE Regulations shall have an influence on the 
context of British Industrial Relations? 
•	 Is there anything else that you would like to add or you believe that I should 
have asked you about the use/implementation of Information, Consultation 
and Negotiation arrangements in your organisation? 
II. Interview Questions with Chief Executives and HR Managers or 
Other Managers 
General Introductory Questions 
•	 What is your job title and responsibilities in your organisation? 
•	 How do you describe the current employment relations in your organisation? 
•	 What is the number of employees at your site? 
•	 Have any changes been recently made in the implementation of ‘employee 
voice arrangements’ due to legal or other policy interventions? If yes, what 
changes have been made? What do you expect in the future from these 
changes? 
•	 To what extent are you aware of the ICE Regulations? 
Employment Involvement Practices 
•	 Which are the main features of ‘employee voice arrangements’ (or 
employee involvement techniques) in your organisation and how these 
arrangements are being designed? 
•	 Which are the main features of the employee involvement techniques in 
your organisation? 
•	 Do you have trade union recognition agreement at your workplace, a work 
council or any other form of employee representation? 
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General Questions about Employee Involvement/Participation: 
¾ Do you implement any form of downward or upward communication with the 
employees in your organisation (such as: team meetings between managers 
and employees)? How these procedures take place and over which issues? 
¾ At which stage participation takes place? (Is it proactive or reactive? What is 
the timing of information-sharing and consultation?). 
¾ Which other methods or arrangements are used? (such as: the negotiation 
process). 
¾ Any other arrangements for the conduct of meetings? (such as: agenda setting, 
reporting of the minutes, newsletters etc). 
¾ What is the impact of the ICE Regulations on these procedures? 
¾ Is there any signed agreement with the employees concerning the 
involvement and participation arrangements (such as: information 
sharing, communication, consultation or negotiation)? 
¾ How do you understand/consider the terms: information, communication, 
consultation and negotiation? 
Information-Sharing 
•	 Do you implement any form of direct or indirect of information-sharing? If 
yes, which type of information is provided? How the process of information-
sharing takes place? 
•	 To what extent (or how often) are employees being informed about strategic 
issues, such as: company strategy/plans for the future or major structural 
changes? 
•	 To what extent are employees being informed about employment issues, such 
as: employment prospects, conditions of employment, training and skill 
development? 
•	 To what extent are employees being informed about financial issues, such as: 
budget of the organisation, sales, profits, market share etc? 
•	 Do you currently provide information for other issues? 
•	 Have you recently made any changes in the way that employees are being 
informed? If so, how these changes have been implemented (whether these 
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changes are due to the legislation and whether they comply with the 
requirements of ICE Regulations)? 
•	 Why do you believe that information-sharing is important for your 
organisation? Which are your expectations and objectives from it? 
Consultation of Employees 
•	 How often employees are being consulted before important working decisions 
are made? 
•	 Do you implement any form of direct or indirect consultation? If yes, about 
which issues the consultation takes place? How the consultation is being 
implemented? How often does it take place? 
•	 To what extent (or how often) are employees being consulted about strategic 
issues, such as: company strategy/plans for the future or major structural 
changes? 
•	 To what extent are employees being consulted about employment issues, such 
as: employment prospects, conditions of employment, training and skill 
development? 
•	 To what extent are employees being consulted about financial issues, such as: 
budget of the organisation, sales, profits, market share etc? 
•	 To what extent are employees being consulted about other issues? 
•	 How often workplace representatives are being consulted over important 
working decisions that directly affect the employees? 
•	 To what extent do you believe that consultation has an influence in your 
workplace? 
•	 Have you recently made any changes in the way that employees are being 
consulted? If so, how these changes have been implemented (whether these 
changes are due to the legislation and whether they comply with the 
requirements of ICE Regulations)? 
•	 Why do you believe that consultation is important for your organisation? 
Which are your expectations and objectives from it? 
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Decision-Making Process 
¾ How the employment involvement issues are being resolved and decisions 
are being implemented in relation to the “Information and Consultation 
arrangements”? 
¾ How do you come to your final decision-making? 
¾ Any involvement of ‘outside’ advisor? (such as: ACAS) If any, how did 
they provide advice? Why did you choose to have an ‘outside’ advisor? 
¾ In general, who are involved in the decision-making? How and why? 
Closure 
•	 In your opinion, which are the main benefits from the: (1) employee voice 
arrangements, (2) two-way communication arrangements between you and the 
employees, (3) information-sharing from you to the employees, (4) 
consultation process? 
•	 In your opinion, which are the critical factors and issues that you consider 
important in designing the: (1) employee voice arrangements, (2) two-way 
communication arrangements between you and the employees, (3) 
information-sharing from you to the employees, (4) consultation process? 
•	 In your opinion, which are the main forces that may constrain the 
implementation of the: (1) employee voice arrangements, (2) two-way 
communication between you and the employees, (3) information-sharing from 
you to the employees, (4) consultation process? 
•	 Do you have any future plans in relation to employee involvement practices, 
and more specifically, about the: (a) provision of information-sharing to the 
employees, (b) consultation process? 
•	 How do you believe that employee voice mechanisms should be better 
designed and implemented in relation to the: (a) employee involvement 
practices, (b) information-sharing to the employees, (c) consultation process? 
•	 To what extent, do you believe that ICE Regulations have already affected or 
will possibly affect your workplace? 
•	 In your opinion, whether the ICE Regulations shall have an influence on the 
context of British Industrial Relations? 
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•	 Is there anything else that you would like to add or you believe that I should 
have asked you about the use and implementation of ‘Information and 
Consultation arrangements/agreements’ in your organisation? 
•	 Is there anyone else in your organisation (e.g. other manager, director, 
employee representative or trade union representative) that may provide some 
further help in my research? Do you believe that it would be appropriate for 
me to meet other people, as well, from your organisation? 
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Case-Study One 
I. Use of Various Forms of Direct Employee Involvement and Participation at 
the Felixstowe and Manchester Sites (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 
4=often, 5=a great deal) 
Felixstowe Manchester 
team-working/self-management 4 4 
notice boards 4 5 
team briefings/cascade communication 5 4 
quality circles/project groups/TQ circles 3 3 
suggestion schemes 1 1 
employee ballots 2 2 
employee opinion/satisfaction surveys 2 1 
team meetings 5 3 
meetings with the entire workforce 4 4 
focus groups or workshops 5 4 
staff newsletter/journal 4 3 
individual letters to all employees 3 2 
workplace-site intranet 5 3 
e-mail reporting/updates 5 5 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
II. Use of Various Forms of Indirect Employee Involvement and Participation at 
the Felixstowe and Manchester Sites (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 
4=often, 5=a great deal) 
Felixstowe Manchester 
European Work Councils 3 1 
Joint Consultative Committees/employee representative 
bodies/employee forums 
5 5 
non-routinised written communications or meetings 
between employee representatives and senior managers 
5 3 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
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III. Level and Issues Included for Information-Sharing and Consultation with 
the Employees at the Felixstowe Site (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 
4=often, 5=a great deal) 
Information 
Sharing 
Consultation 
Financial issues (e.g. financial performance/prospects, 
budgets/budgetary cuts etc) 
5 3 
Production issues (e.g. level of production/sales, quality of 
products/services, changes to products/services etc) 
5 4 
Employment issues (e.g. redundancies, reducing labour turnover, 
changes to employment levels/status etc) 
5 5 
Pay issues (e.g. wage/salary reviews, terms and conditions, bonuses, 
job evaluation etc) 
5 5 
Future plans (e.g. company expansion/contraction etc) 4 4 
Leave and flexible working arrangements (including working time 
etc) 
5 5 
Work organisation (e.g. changes to working methods, allocation of 
work between employees etc) 
5 4 
Training strategy 5 5 
Equality/Diversity issues 5 5 
Pensions 5 5 
Health and safety 5 5 
Technological changes 4 4 
Changes to management/supervision arrangements 5 4 
Corporate social responsibility 5 5 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
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IV. Level and Issues Included for Information-Sharing and Consultation with 
the Employees at the Manchester Site (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 
4=often, 5=a great deal) 
Information 
Sharing 
Consultation 
Financial issues (e.g. financial performance/prospects, 
budgets/budgetary cuts etc) 
4 1 
Production issues (e.g. level of production/sales, quality of 
products/services, changes to products/services etc) 
4 3 
Employment issues (e.g. redundancies, reducing labour turnover, 
changes to employment levels/status etc) 
5 5 
Pay issues (e.g. wage/salary reviews, terms and conditions, bonuses, 
job evaluation etc) 
5 5 
Future plans (e.g. company expansion/contraction etc) 4 2 
Leave and flexible working arrangements (including working time 
etc) 
2 2 
Work organisation (e.g. changes to working methods, allocation of 
work between employees etc) 
2 2 
Training strategy 2 2 
Equality/Diversity issues 2 2 
Pensions 3 3 
Health and safety 5 5 
Technological changes 3 2 
Changes to management/supervision arrangements 5 2 
Corporate social responsibility 1 1 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
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V. Roles and Responsibilities for Management and Employee 
Representatives at the Felixstowe Site as Defined by the 
Constitution Agreement of the CCC Meetings 
 Management Representatives 
Roles Understand Company policies and procedures. 

Be impartial. 

Actively participate in the meetings. 

Show commitment and promote the Council. 

Communicate issues/concerns to management team where appropriate. 

Make information available to Employee Representatives. 

Show an appreciation of the issues. 

Provide support to Employee Representatives. 

Represent management's opinion and Company policies. 

Ensure that site issues are raised and discussed at the Council before 

implementation. 

Feedback to management team and middle management. 

Inform Council of business issues and priorities. 

Liaise between the Council and the Company management team. 

Issue filtration through investigation and prioritising concerns/issues. 

Communication of issues to Council and employees including 

feedback. 

Be involved in joint problem solving with the Council. 

Be visible to the constituents. 

Represent to the rest of the Company the collective view and decisions 

made by the Council. 

Meet deadlines detailed in the constitution. 

Solicit views relating to issues from the Council. 

Availability to attend meetings. 

Act on consensus views. 

Provide facilities and provisions for Council meetings. 

Complete actions and give feedback within agreed deadlines.

Give feedback to the CCC on policy issues. 

Maintain confidentiality of CCC discussions where this is appropriate. 

Responsibilities 
A senior manager within a function. 

Good team working skills.

Good problem solving abilities.

Good people skills - conciliator not confrontational.

Good communication skills - with all levels of the organisation.

Good listening skills. 

Ability to meet deadlines. 

Skills 
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 Employee Representatives 
Roles Understand Company policies and procedures. 

Be impartial in their role as an Employee Representative. 

Actively and regularly participate in Council meetings. 

Voice the opinion of the constituency.

Communicate their role and responsibilities to the constituency. 

Give feedback to the constituency. 

Show commitment and promote the Council and its activities.

Undertake training specific to this role. 

Liaise between the Council and the constituents. 

Filter, prioritise and investigate concerns/issues raised by the 

constituency. 

Communication of issues to Council and employees including 

feedback. 

Be involved in joint problem solving with the Council. 

Be visible, making themselves known to the constituency and new 

starters. 

Responsibilities 
Represent to the rest of the Company the collective view and 

decisions made by the Council.

Meet deadlines detailed in the constitution. 

Solicit views relating to issues from the Council meetings. 

Understanding everyone’s concerns. 

To represent constituency interests in a clear and concise manner. 

Communicate with area Supervisor/Managers. 

Gathering of issues before the meeting using an appropriate method. 

Complete actions and give feedback within agreed timescales.

Notify the Chairperson of any impending issues where possible. 

Participate in the induction process for new employees in their 

constituency, using the standardised CCC induction presentation 

available on the HR intranet. 

Deputise for a fellow employee representative in the same constituency, 

if absent. 

Maintain confidentiality of CCC discussions where this is appropriate 

and requested. 

Good team working skills.

Good problem solving abilities.

Good people skills - conciliator not confrontational.

Good communication skills - with all levels of the organisation.

Good listening skills. 

Ability to meet deadlines. 

Skills 
(Source: Constitution Agreement Document, April 2005). 
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Case-Study Two 
I. Use of Various Forms of Direct Employee Involvement and Participation at 
the Bridgwater Depot (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=a 
great deal) 
Depot 
team-working/self-management 4 
notice boards 5 
team briefings/cascade communication 4 
quality circles/project groups/TQ circles 2 
suggestion schemes 2 
employee ballots 5 
employee opinion/satisfaction surveys 4 
team meetings 4 
meetings with the entire workforce 3 
focus groups or workshops 2 
staff newsletter/journal 2 
individual letters to all employees 2 
workplace-site intranet 3 
e-mail reporting/updates 3 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
II. Use of Various Forms of Indirect Employee Involvement and Participation at 
the Bridgwater Depot (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=a 
great deal) 
Depot 
European Work Councils -
Joint Consultative Committees/employee representative 
bodies/employee forums 
4 
non-routinised written communications or meetings between 
employee representatives and senior managers 
4 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
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III. Level and Issues Included for Information-Sharing and Consultation with 
the Employees at the Bridgwater Depot (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 
3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=a great deal) 
Information 
Sharing 
Consultation 
Financial issues (e.g. financial performance/prospects, 
budgets/budgetary cuts etc) 
3 1 
Production issues (e.g. level of production/sales, quality of 
products/services, changes to products/services etc) 
4 4 
Employment issues (e.g. redundancies, reducing labour turnover, 
changes to employment levels/status etc) 
4 4 
Pay issues (e.g. wage/salary reviews, terms and conditions, bonuses, 
job evaluation etc) 
5 5 
Future plans (e.g. company expansion/contraction etc) 4 4 
Leave and flexible working arrangements (including working time 
etc) 
4 3 
Work organisation (e.g. changes to working methods, allocation of 
work between employees etc) 
5 5 
Training strategy 2 2 
Equality/Diversity issues 3 3 
Pensions 3 1 
Health and safety 5 3 
Technological changes 4 3 
Changes to management/supervision arrangements 3 1 
Corporate social responsibility 3 3 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
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Case-Study Three 
I. Use of Various Forms of Direct Employee Involvement and Participation at 
the Yeovil Store (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=a great 
deal) 
Yeovil Store 
team-working/self-management 5 
notice boards 5 
team briefings/cascade communication 5 
quality circles/project groups/TQ circles 1 
suggestion schemes 4 
employee ballots 2 
employee opinion/satisfaction surveys 2 
team meetings 5 
meetings with the entire workforce 5 
focus groups or workshops 1 
staff newsletter/journal 5 
individual letters to all employees 5 
workplace-site intranet 1 
e-mail reporting/updates 1 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
II. Use of Various Forms of Indirect Employee Involvement and Participation at 
the Yeovil Store (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=a great 
deal) 
Depot 
European Work Councils -
Joint Consultative Committees/employee representative 
bodies/employee forums 
5 
non-routinised written communications or meetings between 
employee representatives and senior managers 
1 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
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III. Level and Issues Included for Information-Sharing and Consultation with 
the Employees at the Yeovil Store (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 
4=often, 5=a great deal) 
Information 
Sharing 
Consultation 
Financial issues (e.g. financial performance/prospects, 
budgets/budgetary cuts etc) 
5 5 
Production issues (e.g. level of production/sales, quality of 
products/services, changes to products/services etc) 
4 4 
Employment issues (e.g. redundancies, reducing labour turnover, 
changes to employment levels/status etc) 
2 2 
Pay issues (e.g. wage/salary reviews, terms and conditions, bonuses, 
job evaluation etc) 
4 4 
Future plans (e.g. company expansion/contraction etc) 4 4 
Leave and flexible working arrangements (including working time 
etc) 
4 4 
Work organisation (e.g. changes to working methods, allocation of 
work between employees etc) 
4 4 
Training strategy 3 3 
Equality/Diversity issues 1 1 
Pensions 4 4 
Health and safety 4 4 
Technological changes 2 2 
Changes to management/supervision arrangements 4 4 
Corporate social responsibility 1 1 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
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Case-Study Four 
I. Use of Various Forms of Direct Employee Involvement and Participation at 
the Main Head Office and Warehouse (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 
3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=a great deal) 
team-working/self-management 5 
notice boards 5 
team briefings/cascade communication 2 
quality circles/project groups/TQ circles 4 
suggestion schemes 1 
employee ballots 1 
employee opinion/satisfaction surveys 4 
team meetings 3 
meetings with the entire workforce 1 
focus groups or workshops 2 
staff newsletter/journal 5 
individual letters to all employees 3 
workplace-site intranet 2 
e-mail reporting/updates 5 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
II. Use of Various Forms of Indirect Employee Involvement and Participation at 
the Main Head Office and Warehouse (1=not at all, 2=infrequently, 
3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=a great deal) 
Depot 
European Work Councils -
Joint Consultative Committees/employee representative 
bodies/employee forums 
4 
non-routinised written communications or meetings between 
employee representatives and senior managers 
4 
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
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III. Level and Issues Included for Information-Sharing and Consultation with 
the Employees at the Main Head Office and Warehouse (1=not at all, 
2=infrequently, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=a great deal) 
Information 
Sharing 
Consultation 
Financial issues (e.g. financial performance/prospects, 
budgets/budgetary cuts etc) 
4 -
Production issues (e.g. level of production/sales, quality of 
products/services, changes to products/services etc) 
5 3 
Employment issues (e.g. redundancies, reducing labour turnover, 
changes to employment levels/status etc) 
3 4 
Pay issues (e.g. wage/salary reviews, terms and conditions, bonuses, 
job evaluation etc) 
3 -
Future plans (e.g. company expansion/contraction etc) 4 4 
Leave and flexible working arrangements (including working time 
etc) 
3 -
Work organisation (e.g. changes to working methods, allocation of 
work between employees etc) 
3 -
Training strategy 4 4 
Equality/Diversity issues 3 -
Pensions 3 -
Health and safety 5 5 
Technological changes 2 3 
Changes to management/supervision arrangements 2 3 
Corporate social responsibility 1 -
(The questionnaire was filled in by the HR manager). 
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